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ABSTRACT
Carl Schmitt’s idiosyncratic account of the history of the state and international relations is 
fundamental to an understanding of his role as a theorist of the international. The thesis argues 
that Schmitt’s pessimism about the prospects for the modem state derives from his historical 
method. Combining theologically and geopolitically determinist elements, Schmitt creates 
varying historical narratives which together attribute the limitations of the state form to its own 
genesis. Schmitt creates a multi-layered historical account in which broadly domestic and 
international factors combine to erode the possibility of authentic political separation, and 
‘hasten’ a broad universalism. Theological in origin, Schmitt deploys the opposing typologies 
of ‘restraint’ and ‘hastening’ as both historical descriptions, and as yardsticks by which to 
measure the efficacy of political actors. In the context of contemporary events, Schmitt 
eventually concludes that the history of the state has entered a period of terminal acceleration, 
and can no longer be sustained via the usual political methods.
Having depicted this historical perspective, the thesis goes on to consider the ramifications of 
these conclusions for Schmitt’s continued relevance as a theorist of the international. 
Consideration is given to the two devices Schmitt deploys in an attempt to uncover a new 
language for world politics -  the Grossraum and the Partisan. The thesis argues that neither 
concept lives up to its claim to transcend or reform Schmitt’s pessimistic history of the state. 
They are both derivative concepts that collapse back into Schmitt’s wider nostalgia for the 
European state form. On Schmitt’s own terms, they do not offer a conceptual point of departure 
for a raw new account of inter-genus politics.
Rejecting the notion of ‘Schmittianism’ as a coherent and programmatic position in IR, the 
thesis concludes that Schmitt’s continuing value lies in his provocative historical critique, rather 
than his conceptual innovation.
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My first exposure to Carl Schmitt was in 2001-2002 when I had the good fortune to study the 
History of Political Thought from 1890 to the Present under the supervision of Martin Riihl, 
then of Queen's College, Cambridge. In this setting, my first reading of Schmitt was in the 
context of manifold other thinkers (including Nietzsche, Weber, Sorel, Franz Neumann, 
Adorno and Horkheimer), each of whom was grappling in their varying ways with the 
political problems of late modernity. Schmitt stood out from this field both for his polemical 
force, and for his profound neglect among English speaking scholars. At this time, none of 
Schmitt's post-war works were available in English translation, and except for the occasional 
efforts of Gary Ulmen as editor of Telos, there was virtually no English language scholarship 
on The Nomos o f the Earth. The 'gap in the market' for serious study of Schmitt as an 
international thinker seemed self-evident.
In 2003 I produced a Masters thesis entitled Justus Hostis: Carl Schmitt on Public Enmity. I 
am grateful to Margot Light for her supervision, her sound guidance on how to conduct 
research on "controversial" subjects, and for her heartfelt and much appreciated 
encouragement ever since. Martin Riihl, Jan-Wemer Muller and Joe Devanny were also of 
great assistance at this stage in helping to clarify my ideas on Schmitt's international thought. 
I am also grateful to the anonymous examiners at the LSE whose encouraging remarks Margot 
enthusiastically relayed. Such positive feedback doubtless stiffened my resolve to pursue the 
present project.
For the past three years the LSE has provided a stimulating and supportive environment for 
the pursuit of what has been a somewhat solitary research agenda. Chris Brown has been the 
very model of a PhD supervisor. Chris' support comes not only in the form of constructive 
remarks and sage tactical advice, but most agreeably in the form of food, drink and great fun. 
I am sure he would accept of himself the description "interested in Schmitt, but certainly not 
Schmittian," making him an informed and sympathetic reader of my work. I hope that he has 
now overcome early misgivings that he was somehow complicit in siring an underground 
"Schmitt School” at the heart of the LSE.
Many others at the LSE have also helped to shape this thesis through their generous 
suggestions and criticism. Each year I have been fortunate to attend constructive and thought-
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provoking research panels, and I am especially grateful to Barry Buzan, Spyros Economides 
and Peter Wilson for their perceptive reflections on various parts of the thesis. Margot Light 
and Mick Cox have been constant in their enthusiasm, and an excellent source of advice on 
the pragmatic demands of completing a PhD thesis. I am also grateful to Douglas Bulloch, 
Kenny Chitranukroh, Simon Curtis, Phillipe Fournier, Rune Henriksen, Stefanie Ortmann, 
Serena Sharma, Ewan Stein and Louisa Sunderman for their various remarks and suggestions.
I have also been lucky to enjoy continued advice and feedback from my undergraduate 
teachers, most especially Tim Harper. And all this despite "absconding to the L-S-E." Tom 
Bum, Greg Callus, Alex Evans and John Matthews have frequently asked the sort of probing 
non-specialist questions that force one to re-evaluate some fundamental tenets of the thesis. I 
am grateful to them for the interest they have shown. I am also grateful to Gabriella Slomp 
and Robert Howse for stimulating correspondence that has immeasurably improved my 
understanding of certain ambiguities in Schmitt's work.
In exploring the religious and theological aspects of the thesis, I have been fortunate to 
develop links with the ECPR Standing Group on Religion. I am grateful to Giorgio Shani for 
chairing a panel at the ECPR Conference in Budapest in September 2005 where I had the 
opportunity to present an earlier version of Chapter 3 of this thesis. I also developed certain 
themes from Chapters 3 and 4 at the IPSA Conference in Fukuoka, Japan, in July 2006, in a 
panel chaired by Jeff Haynes. I am grateful to Giorgio and Jeff for including me in these 
events, and for their stimulating discussions of my work. I am also grateful to other 
participants for their criticisms and encouragement, and in particular to Vendulka Kubalkova, 
Mustapha Pasha and Richard Ryscavage.
Many research students perhaps experience the sense of living on borrowed time. In my case, 
this was quite literally so, as I laboured towards a finite start date with my present employer, 
Clifford Chance. During this period they have provided me with substantial material support, 
affording me the freedom to focus on my research without the constant distraction of part time 
work. In recent months, they have also offered me the flexibility necessary to complete this 
project.
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None of this would have been possible without the relentless support and encouragement of 
my family. My parents have remained enthusiastic about my research, and have given me 
more material and emotional support than one could wish for. I am especially grateful for 
them providing me with a peaceful and focussed environment in Tewkesbury in which to 
work, often denying themselves the utility of their country retreat in the process. Without the 
many productive hours I spent there, it is doubtful whether this thesis would ever have come 
to fruition.
Last but in no way least, my thanks go to Sarah. In the course of completing this thesis she 
obtained the dubious honour of becoming "Mrs Hooker." Her constant companionship has 
helped me to avoid the worst pathologies that total immersion in the work of Carl Schmitt 
might threaten. She has borne my frustrations with grace, and her simple confidence in me 
has headed off my pessimism at the pass. I am very fortunate.
NOTE ON SOURCES, TRANSLATION & CITATION
Efforts at translating Schmitt’s work into English have been somewhat patchy and piecemeal. 
Wherever a recent and reliable English translation of a work exists, that translation will have 
been used in this thesis. This includes George Schwab’s translations of The Concept o f the 
Political, Political Theology and The Leviathan in the State Theory o f Thomas Hobbes, as well 
as the MIT Press series of translations including Political Romanticism and The Crisis o f 
Parliamentary Democracy. Gary Ulmen’s 2004 translation of The Nomos of the Earth is of 
great value in opening up Schmitt’s more emphatically international work to an English- 
speaking audience. Ulmen has also recently completed a translation of The Theory o f the 
Partisan.
For the most part, Schmitt showed a preference for writing extended essays of between 3,000 
and 10,000 words. Several of these have been published in English in the journal Telos, 
although there is no comprehensive English-language collection of Schmitt’s essays. Many of 
the most important of these have been collected and published in two German language 
volumes. Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles 1923-1939 
(Hamburg, 1940), brings together 36 of Schmitt’s essays written before the Second World 
War. Its focus, as the title implies, is on works that tend to focus on the post-1919
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international order, international law, and the political conditions of Europe. Staat, 
Grossraum, Nomos: Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916-1969 (Berlin, 1995) brings together a 
further 39 essays written over a longer time period. Edited by Gunther Maschke, it is the 
most wide-ranging and comprehensive collection of Schmitt’s works. It contains sketches of 
many of the ideas that Schmitt would subsequently work up into book length pieces.
Some of these essay pieces are extremely important in their own right, and provide points of 
interconnection between Schmitt’s more substantial works. Still others represent work in 
progress, and as would be expected, are worked up in more detail into monographs. In such 
contexts, I have tried in so far as is possible to emphasise the more major monographs, 
utilising Schmitt’s essay pieces only to clarify ambiguity, or to trace particular lines in the 
development in his thought. Since this is intended as an account of Schmitt’s specific 
understanding of the historical fate of the international system and not as an intellectual 
biography or comprehensive survey of Schmitt’s oeuvre, selectivity has been a necessary part 
of the exercise.
Where no English-language translation is available, or where available translations are 
provisional, unreliable or arcane, all translations are my own. For the most part, Schmitt is 
an extremely direct and stylish author, and the common difficulties of rendering ‘academic 
German’ are blissfully avoided. Nevertheless, where there may be some ambiguity of 
meaning, I have adopted the practice of reproducing the original German either in parenthesis, 
or, with longer passages, as a footnote. Following Ulmen, I have taken the step of rendering 
the phrase ‘Hegung des Krieges’ as ‘the bracketing of war. ’ The verb ‘to bracket’ appears, in 
this context, to have become a common standard in English-language, and to use a different 
phrase would threaten confusion. Nevertheless, as the later discussion of Schmitt’s concept 
illustrates, this is by no means an unproblematic translation.1
Consideration is also given to a comparatively small amount of unpublished material from the 
collection of Schmitt’s papers at the State Archive in Diisseldorf. The Schmitt Nachlafi 
contains almost 500 archive cartons, and includes correspondence to and from Schmitt, 
handwritten notes, sketches and early drafts, as well as Schmitt’s collected library of books
1 See below p.32 fn.27 and p. 109
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and essays, complete with marginalia.2 I am grateful to Herr Prof. Jurgen Becker for 
permission to access the archive in July 2005, and to all the staff who provided assistance in 
finding materials. I have adopted their suggested form in citing material from the archive. 
HSTaD designates the Haupstaatsarchiv Diisseldorf. RW265 is the unique identifier for the 
Schmitt collection. There then follows an individual folder number. Since many folders 
contain several items collected thematically, I have endeavoured to identify the specific 
material under consideration.
2 For details of the contents of the archive see D.van Laak & I.Villinger Nachlafi Carl Schmitt: 




















CHRONOLOGY OF SCHMITT’S LIFE
Bora in Plettenberg in Westfalen
Publishes habilitation thesis Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des 
Einzelnen [The Value of the State and the Significance of the Individual]
Graduates in law from Strassburg University
Marries first wife, Pawla Dorotic (divorced in 1925)
Professorship at the University of Greifswald 
Publishes Der Diktatur [The Dictator]
Publishes Politicsche Theologie [Political Theology]
Marries second wife, Dushka Todorovic
Professor at the Hochschule fur Politik in Berlin
Professor of law at Cologne University
Publishes second edition of Der Begrijf des Politischen [The Concept of 
the Political]
Professor of law at the University of Berlin 
Joins the Nazi party
Organises anti-Semitic conference of jurists calling for the elimination of 
Jewish influences in German law
Publishes Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes [The 
Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes]
Publishes Land und Meer [Land and Sea]
Arrested by Soviet forces in Berlin
Re-arrested by the Americans and interned awaiting possible trial at 
Nuremberg
Released without having been indicted 
Returns to enforced retirement in Plettenberg
Publishes Der Nomos der Erde [The Nomos of the Earth]
Publishes Theorie des Partisanen [Theory of the Partisan]
Dies in Plettenberg aged 96
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INTRODUCTION
It is not uncommon for the end of wars to herald a response to the effect that ‘nothing will 
ever be the same again.’ To be sure, wars leave scars both emotional and physical. They 
leave tales of loss and instincts of vengeance. But in the political theory of Carl Schmitt, war 
is above all a political act. ‘War is the existential negation of the enemy.’3 It leaves concrete 
changes in the configuration of politics. It draws new lines on maps, and creates new lines of 
authority of men over other men. No matter how infrequent or limited, warfare is a necessary 
corollary of Schmitt’s understanding of political life. And as such, the observation that war 
inflicts permanent changes on social life is, for Schmitt, nothing more than an observation that 
the history of the state rolls on.
Yet, amidst the destruction of Berlin in 1945, Schmitt was preoccupied with a quite distinct 
and more fearsome sense that ‘nothing will ever be the same again.’ Arrested by the Russians 
in April of 1945, arrested and re-arrested by the Americans, interred and questioned by the 
Nuremberg prosecutor, Schmitt suddenly became an actor in what was, for him, a more 
startling moment of change. Nuremberg seemed to cement a process that had preoccupied 
Schmitt for the past 25 years. War was no longer simply an affair of states, to be settled in 
the moment of defeat or victory. It was also a matter of right and wrong, an issue that 
implicated individual morality. Long after the real substance of battle had been determined, 
the quest to ascribe guilt continued. And even if Nuremberg could find no evidence to bring 
an action, Schmitt became emblematic of that guilt. Schmitt became a character in the story 
of the end of the Westphalian state.4
1945 marks the rough mid-point of Schmitt’s intellectual career. Doubtless the year is 
significant in the study of Schmitt for reasons we shall explore. But perhaps above all, it is 
significant for its place for staging the personal drama of Carl Schmitt -  for turning Schmitt 
into part of the story that his own work was attempting to analyse. From his internal exile at 
Plettenberg, Schmitt became the unacceptable face of Germany’s intellectual past -  a
3 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (trans. G.Schwab) Chicago: Chicago University Press (1996) 
p.33
4 For the story of Schmitt’s interrogation by the Nuremberg prosecutor Robert Kempner see 
J.W.Bendersky ‘Carl Schmitt at Nuremberg’ in Telos 72 (1987). The same issue reproduces a 
transcript of some of Schmitt’s interrogation. See also J.W.Bendersky ‘Carl Schmitt’s Path to 
Nuremberg: A Sixty Year Reassessment’ and a further transcript of Schmitt’s interrogation in Telos 
139 (2007).
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dangerous, shocking dinosaur who doggedly refused to adapt to the changed circumstances of 
the Federal Republic. Even today, more than twenty years since his death, engagement with 
Schmitt’s theories of the state and the international system provokes deep discomfort. Indeed, 
it is hard to think of another intellectual figure who provokes quite such polarised views. And 
as a consequence, the analysis of Schmitt’s work has increasingly become a process of 
advocacy. Those who are interested in Schmitt become engaged in a process of exhumation, 
whilst Schmitt’s opponents try to keep him buried. The frequent response of those hostile to 
renewed interest in Schmitt is that he was an arcane and reductive Nazi who has little to offer 
current debates. Yet it is a sentiment often accompanied by its apparent antipode -  that the 
invocation of Schmitt is dangerous, seductive and destructive. Since both instincts cannot be 
correct, it is clear that work remains to be done to cut through the drama, and to situate 
Schmitt’s project more impartially.
The story at stake here is Schmitt’s study of the slow decline of the sovereign state, and with 
it the international system based on the formal equality of states. The detailed timing of this 
story is unclear. To be sure, 1945 (or more precisely, Schmitt’s realisation of Germany’s 
imminent defeat some time earlier) is an important moment in shaping Schmitt’s own 
conclusions. Likewise, 1919, and the determination of the aftermath of war through legal 
measures forms a prominent place in Schmitt’s critique. Heinrich Meier suggests that by 
‘1931-32, Schmitt sees himself facing a changed political situation’, and that ‘in 1932, Schmitt 
believes himself already able to look back at the “liberal age” in which “political viewpoints 
were robbed, with special pathos, of all validity and subordinated to the normative 
prescriptions and ‘orders’ of morals, law, and economics.”’5 Perhaps from a German 
perspective, 1933 is the key date. As much in celebration as trepidation, Schmitt himself 
concluded of the day Hitler took power that ‘one can say that on that day “Hegel died”.’6 The 
twin questions that preoccupied Schmitt were why this dissolution had come to pass, and what 
would the future of world politics look like without the ‘Schmittian’ state.
Carl Schmitt was one of the most profound and most prolific theorists of international order of 
the twentieth century. He also enjoyed extraordinary intellectual longevity, allowing him to
5 Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue (trans.J.H.Lomax) Chicago: Chicago 
University Press (1995) p.21-22
6 Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk: Dreigliederung der politischen Einheit Hamburg: HAVA (1934). 
Herbert Marcuse remarks that this is the point at which he cannot bear to read any more of Schmitt 
(see Negations Boston: Beacon (1968) p.275, fh.79).
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forecast and trace the political changes to international order under conditions of late 
modernity. Schmitt’s immense range across legal, political, historical and theological 
canvasses provides an enormous, synthetic, arch-conservative world view. For all of the 
moral, personal and professional failure that attached to Schmitt’s life, he has left a legacy of 
political categories and critical positions that continue to enjoy wide appeal in contemporary 
study of international order. He is also a figure who sought to transcend the terms of debate 
in any one field of intellectual activity, thereby creating challenging and innovative ways of 
viewing global politics. His arrival as a serious object of debate in international political 
theory is overdue.
Schmitt is of manifest value to International Relations scholars, and we should welcome the 
gradual reduction of knee-jerk hostility to the use of Schmittian categories in debate. 
Schmitt’s famously parsimonious definition of the Political as the distinction of the enemy is a 
provocative addition to debates on pouvoir constituant and should be of interest both to those 
who continue to assert the validity of the state as the basic political unit, and those who look 
elsewhere for the contemporary political dynamic. In addition, Schmitt offers a rich and 
rewarding historical analysis of the theme of power and restraint in the concept of the state 
that might prove a useful resource to those who assert the value of the state as the ‘least bad 
option’ for world politics. The Nomos o f the Earth, written towards the end of the Second 
World War, is a vastly ambitious history of world politics that also provides a passionate 
defence of the triumph of the European state system. The great breadth and erudition of what 
is, in a self-evident sense, Schmitt’s magnum opus appears destined to guarantee a place for 
Nomos o f the Earth in the canon of essential IR reading.
However, for all its analytical depth and vast ambition, Schmitt’s international thought 
represents a failure. Probably even by his own admission (and at least as early as 1946)
Schmitt had run out of convincing ways to theorise the new foundations of global political
order.7 It is the intention of this work to illustrate the way in which Schmitt’s understanding 
of the ‘history’ of the state form prevented him, ipso facto, from envisioning change to the 
foundations of international order. As such, it is a rejoinder to those who see hope in 
Schmitt’s post-1945 work for a reordering of global politics along lines that, whilst 
transcending the Westphalian state in one way or another, nevertheless retain the vital public
enmity that makes Schmittian politics tick. By contrast, we contend that Schmitt’s
7 See Schmitt Ex Captivitate Salus Cologne: Greven Verlag (1950)
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eschatological-historical position results in a sterile conundrum in which Schmitt was tom 
between an ultra-reactionary defence of the flawed state form, and a breathless anticipation of 
an apocalyptic world unity.
A part of this project will be to examine the degree to which such talk of apocalypse is 
metaphor. Whether or not this is the case, however, it becomes clear that Schmitt regards the 
global ascendance of liberal universalism as a catastrophe. And in the face of such a pacified 
globe, the only position consistent with Schmitt’s historical interpretation of this crisis is to 
await the inevitable but unknowable implosion of a formless order. The language Schmitt 
uses to consider this scenario is unfamiliar and uncomfortable for those interested in 
international political theory. We are hardly well equipped for discussion of the restraint of 
the coming Antichrist, portended as it is by the political unity of the world, and prefiguring 
the apocalypse! Nevertheless, it is hoped that by examining the intellectual roots of this 
position, the way in which Schmitt related it to the contemporary history of the state, and, in 
turn, the impact of this view on Schmitt’s political decisions, it will be possible to draw 
illuminating parallels with more familiar accounts of the uncertain political underpinning of 
the contemporary international order.
This work will consider the way in which the two devices Schmitt creates to theorise post- 
1945 world order fail to convince, each in their own way. On the one hand, Schmitt 
developed a concept of Grossraumordnung which might, in simple terms, be contemplated as 
a pluriverse of continental empires.8 One might regard the Grossraum concept as broadening 
out of the state concept into a more viable territorial space. At the same time, a Grossraum is 
imagined as something qualitatively different from the state in that its binding cultural content 
is less organic, and the mechanics of political control are more self-evident. On the one hand, 
it changes the territorial basis of politics to contain the pressures of technology and 
communication. On the other hand, it is a decisionist entity laid bare.9
8 The Grossraum concept has been especially popular with ‘Schmittians’ of the Left who regard the 
concept as holding some hope to encouraging a European political space that resists the universalising 
tendencies of global economics and American hegemony. Fuller consideration is given to this 
appropriation in the following chapter.
9 See Chapter 6 below.
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The other key concept in Schmitt’s post-1945 work is that of the Partisan.10 This is a more 
reactive and reflective category that Schmitt seems to see as the last political corrective to 
abject universalism. Indeed, Schmitt’s historical account of the rise of the partisan in Spanish 
and German resistance to Napoleon makes clear that the category is intended, by definition, as 
a somewhat desperate response to imminent global unity. Yet the Partisan, whilst convincing 
as the locus of political reaction, and perhaps recognisable even today in localised, 
particularist movements such as the Zapatistas, cannot provide the basis for a new view of 
international order. As I shall argue later, the very concept and self-awareness of the Partisan 
is itself parasitic on the disorder and sense of immanent collapse that Schmitt commits himself 
to redress.
The partisan is an echo of politics, and lacks the inter-subjectivity necessary for the kind of 
politics described in Concept o f the Political. As Gabriella Slomp has convincingly argued, 
the form of politics that the partisan represents is qualitatively different from inter-state 
politics and, crucially, offers no basis for stability.11 In short, the partisan has the same 
twilight quality that haunts much of Schmitt’s post-1945 work, and provides a challenge to 
those who seek to reconcile Schmitt’s theory of the political to the contemporary world. If the 
partisan is all we have left, we have already abandoned the idea of a meaningful political 
order. Following Schmitt, we would be forced to choose between disorder and the absence of 
politics. For Schmitt this is hardly a choice at all.
Given his belief in the immutability of politics, this failure of imagination is at once shocking 
and disconcerting. After all, Schmitt’s most famous contribution to political thought is his 
definition of the political as a realm that prefigures and survives the concept of the state. If 
even Carl Schmitt failed to imagine a convincing political order without the Westphalian state 
at its core, one is left to wonder how the terms of political debate that Schmitt left to us can be 
reconciled to the contemporary world. Furthermore, if the position is one of despair, how far
10 Schmitt’s Theorie des Partisanen was completed in 1962, stimulated in large part by an attempt to 
find a political analysis or, even, justification, for General Salans in Algeria {Theorie des Partisanen: 
Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen Berlin: Duncker & Humblot). See Chapter 7 below.
11 G.Slomp ‘The Theory of the Partisan: Carl Schmitt’s Neglected Legacy’ in History of Political 
Thought XXVL3 (2005)
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should we share what his most sympathetic biographer, Joseph Bendersky, described as 
Schmitt’s ‘almost chronic fear of disorder?’12
Schmitt’s most famous work, his Concept o f the Political of 1932, is chock full of dire 
predictions of what will ensue if the opportunity is not taken to protect and entrench the 
division of states as ‘the most intense and extreme antagonism.’13 If the march of liberalism 
continues, and ‘state and society [are allowed to] penetrate one another,’ Schmitt can envision 
only a facile world of entertainment.14
‘A politically united people becomes, on the one hand, a culturally interested 
public, and on the other, partially an industrial concern and it employers, 
partially a mass of consumers......
These dissolutions aim with great precision at subjugating law and politics, 
partially into an individualistic domain of private law and morality, partially 
into economic notions. In doing so they deprive state and politics of their 
specific meaning.,15
Schmitt predicts that the march of liberal individualism will result in a situation in which the 
concept of the state becomes impossible. ‘Every encroachment’, he predicts, ‘every threat to 
individual freedom and private property and free competition is called repression and is eo 
ipso something evil.’16 Schmitt’s implacable hostility to the triumph of liberalism within the 
state, and cosmopolitanism among states, provides his work with its constant polemical slant. 
Leo Strauss characterised the mission Schmitt sets for himself as motivated by a desire ‘to 
replace the “astonishingly consistent systematics of liberal thought”, which is manifest within 
the inconsistency of liberal politics, by “another system”, namely a system that does not 
negate the political but brings it into recognition.’17 It is precisely this challenge that 
motivates many of those most interested in Schmitt today.
12 J.W.Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich Princeton: Princeton University Press (1983) 
p.97




17 L.Strauss, ‘Notes on the Concept of the Political’ in H.Meier (ed.) Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: the 
Hidden Dialogue (trans. J.H.Lomax) Chicago: Chicago University Press (1995) p.85
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Liberalism, then, is the immediate and evident target of Schmitt’s thought. Much has been 
made in recent times of the potential theoretical value of Schmitt’s insights in the context of 
post-Cold War politics, when the triumphant ascendancy of liberal internationalism has 
seemed so likely. Yet the optimism and political activism of many contemporary 
‘Schmittians’ seems strangely at odds with the contours of Schmitt’s own hopes and fears. 
Behind Schmitt’s vociferous critique of liberalism, there lies a deeper and far more important 
concern for the nature of the political world, and the seriousness of human life. It is only by 
examining the theoretical and, at times, personal and psychological basis of Schmitt’s 
concerns that a fuller picture can emerge of precisely what motivated and aggravated the old 
man from Plettenburg.
This work will argue that Schmitt’s pessimism about the prospects for international order 
springs from a particular and peculiar concept of history. According to this view, Schmitt’s 
view of time is distinctly determinist, yet coloured also with a normative attachment to the 
ordered universe of the jus publicum Europaeum. Rather than turning to history for the tools 
to theorise this sense of unravelling over time, Schmitt tended instead towards theological 
interpretations of time. Whilst Burckhardt and Meinecke continued to be of interest to 
Schmitt, the focus of his interest tended to be on the political manifestations of their work in 
context, rather on the theory of history per se.is Schmitt’s only consistent and mainstream 
position on the philosophy of history was his profound hostility to teleology, remarking as he 
did on the ‘deep antithesis between the scholastic ahistorical approach and a historical mode 
of thinking, in particular the 19th century humanitarian philosophy of history [which] exhibits 
the self-conscious arrogance of an idealist philosophy of history.’19
In short, Schmitt regards conventional historiography as tending to bifurcate into either feeble 
Hegelianism of the progressive state or else, a history of ‘personae morales’ infused with ‘the 
psychological phenomenon of Renaissance individualism.520 Schmitt’s own historical 
approach, exemplified in the breathtaking history of the idea of the state in Nomos o f the
18 See ‘Zu Friedrich Meinecke’s Idee der Staatsraeson’ in Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit 
Weimar-Genf-Versailles, 1923-1939 Berlin: Duncker & Humblot (1994)
19 From a discussion of Vitoria’s scholastic objectivity in Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the 
International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (trans. G.Ulmen) New York: Telos Press (2004) 
pp. 107- 108
20 Nomos p. 144
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Earth, thus, in a sense, eschews its status as history. It has only a loose concept of time and 
change, and is concerned instead with the possibility of concrete order. It is a history of 
orders punctuated by moments of radical change. Stability, rather than change, is the 
yardstick for Schmitt. Yet the modem history of the state directly affronts this emphasis on 
the stability of concepts. The very possibility of nomic order appears threatened to Schmitt. 
The decline of the state reflects a wholly unprecedented increase in the pace of history. 
Rather than a moment of reformation, Schmitt fears that the current process of dissolution is 
terminal.
Thomas Hobbes is the key figure in the fleshing out of this essentially eschatological vision of 
modem history.21 A difficult and contested figure throughout Schmitt’s work, Hobbes comes 
to represent the intellectual origins of the modem state in the maxim ‘protego et obligo. ’ As 
such, Hobbes is seen as the intellectual bridge from the complexio oppositorium of medieval, 
ecclesiastical politics, and the quasi-religious sovereignty of the modem state. Hobbes is at 
once hero and villain in Schmitt’s account. His remarkable conflation of God and politics in 
the modem state allowed for true unity of the Commonwealth, the existence and persistence 
of concrete orders of men organised as potential fighting units, and the survival of political 
authority that was, in the final analysis, absolute. At the same time, however, in failing 
properly to subordinate the ‘covenant’ of the people to the power of the sovereign, Hobbes 
opened up a conceptual gap that has been widened ever since by the liberal assertion of the 
primacy of individual veritas over the auctoritas of the state.
This, it is argued, gives the most valuable insight into Schmitt’s account of the decline of the 
modem state. The seeds of the erosion of the state were sown in its very creation. In leaving 
open a space for private morality, the Hobbesian state allowed for the creation of a moralising 
individualism that came to oppose the very logic of the state, and challenge the ‘validity’ of 
the authority placed above them. Schmitt’s ‘story’ of the state is a rueful tale of a brilliant 
political concept that has inadvertently ushered in an unstoppable tide of depoliticisation. 
This ‘story’, with its identified origins and dire predicte dire ending, dominates the way in 
which Schmitt thinks about modem politics.
21 Only Donoso Cortes compares to Hobbes in terms of the degree of intellectual debt Schmitt openly 
acknowledged. Our study of Hobbes shall focus on Schmitt’s pamphlet of 1938 The Leviathan in 
Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes (trans. G.Schwab) Westport CT: Greenwood Press (1996).
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Besides this story of the unravelling of the state concept from within, Schmitt presents an 
ancillary narrative of an aggressive external attack on the state concept from the sphere of 
international relations. Not only do the ‘people’ gradually assert their ‘rights’ against the 
state, the very spatial and territorial basis of the system of states as a whole is challenged 
conceptually, accelerating the decline of the Nomos. First England, and then the United 
States, succumb to a radical concept of oceanic space that is logically inconsistent with the 
territorial basis of the European state. This confrontation of Land and Sea, between the 
‘telluric’ European state and the Atlanticist latitudinarianism of the Anglo-Saxons creates a 
second historical dynamic that interacts with the failures of the Hobbesian concept. The 
combined effect is nothing short of disastrous for Schmitt.
In exploring this diagnosis of decline and a search for new principles, it has been necessary at 
times to avoid dealing with Schmitt’s works strictly chronologically. The premise is that 
Schmitt was engaged in two related but distinct intellectual processes. On the one hand, an 
analysis of decline, and on the other, a search for new principles to remedy that decline. It is 
hardly surprising that Schmitt continued to sharpen his critique at the same time as exploring 
positive responses. Indeed, the latter included all manner of both intellectual and, perhaps 
more significantly, political moves throughout Schmitt’s life, including his advocacy of 
Presidential rule under the Weimar constitution, and his eventual decision in favour of 
Nazism. In the context of his search for new principles of world order, therefore, Schmitt 
published his theoretical proposal of a politics of large spaces four years before he published, 
in Land and Sea, a fully formed critique of the conditions that might necessitate a shift to 
large space politics. For the sake of clarity and the thorough exploration of Schmitt’s ideas, 
the approach taken here is to break down Schmitt’s ideas logically into retrospective and 
anticipatory categories. Where appropriate, every effort has been made to clarify 
chronological inconsistencies, and to explain that links between Schmitt’ critical reflection and 
search for new principles (links that often exist within the same work).
Instead of a strictly chronological approach, the work is rather organised broadly into two 
halves. After an initial review of Schmitt's oeuvre and emerging secondary literature on 
Schmitt as an international thinker, Chapters 3,4 & 5 focus on Schmitt's understanding of the 
history of the international system. Chapter 3 essentially concerns sovereignty as an historical 
phenomenon, and the creation of a radically 'internal' political space in the European state. 
By contrast, Chapter 4 addresses what might be termed the 'external' facets of Schmitt's 
account of international history. Here we address Schmitt's ideas on territoriality,
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geopolitical determinism and the spatial conditions of international order. In both chapters, 
the emphasis is on extracting the deeper assumptions and theoretical insights that characterise 
Schmitt's nascent theory of history. Chapter 5 seeks to draw several of these themes together 
in the idea of historical acceleration. It emphasises the important link that Schmitt draws 
between political order and the social experience of time, and the feedback relationship that 
he argues to have existed between the system of international states and the theoretical 
possibility of order.
As such, Chapter 5 links the first, historically orientated half of the thesis with the second, 
forward looking section. Chapter 5 draws together the historical themes that constitute 
Schmitt's sense that we face a present 'crisis.' Chapters 6 & 7 go on to examine his attempts 
to respond to that crisis productively, and to produce an agenda for future order. The 
chapters focus in turn on key conceptual innovations through which Schmitt attempted to 
think beyond the state and towards some new principle of world political order and stability. 
Both chapters seek to illustrate the difficulties Schmitt had trying to reconcile his pessimistic 
theory of history with these bold attempts to define a new basis for world politics. His image 
of the future never escaped his complicated and theoretically entangled fascination with the 
past. Despite the imperatives he set for himself as a harbinger of change, Carl Schmitt the 
historian wins out against Carl Schmitt the politician.
Jacob Taubes described Schmitt as the ‘apocalyptician of counterrevolution.’22 It is a phrase 
that sums up the tension between the depth of Schmitt’s antipathy to the emergent triumph of 
universalism, and his lack of optimism that the force could be halted. It seems that admission 
of defeat was not within Schmitt’s nature. Instinctively drawn to leaps of faith, both of the 
religious and political kind, Schmitt clung on to the hope that his worst fears would somehow 
be averted. He awaited the lightning flash of a new political nomos that would succeed where 
Nazism had failed in arresting the advance of cosmopolitan dreams. For those who share the 
same hopes, Schmitt may very well continue to be a source of comfort and inspiration. On 
his own terms, however, Schmitt the ‘diagnostician’ was ultimately prevented from crossing 
the fence and making a real contribution to thinking about how the modern world ought to be.
72 Cf. J. Taubes The Political Theology of Paul (trans. D.Hollander) Stanford: Stanford University 
Press (2004) p.69
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CHAPTER 2 -  SCHMITT’S ‘INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT’
The “arrival” of Schmitt in the mainstream of IR is hardly surprising. Chris Brown notes that 
‘it is striking that there are so few good studies of “the state and IR.”1 It is precisely this 
nexus that dominates Schmitt’s political thought as a whole. His interest in the historically 
conditioned nature of the state, the theoretical grounds of political interaction, the social 
meaning of warfare and the philosophical basis of political obligation all point towards a basic 
consideration of the theory of the state. It is impossible to give a full overview of Schmitt’s 
political thought as a whole within these pages, and besides, numerous studies of that nature 
already exist. Our purpose instead is to sketch out the meaning of “Schmitt’s international 
thought” and to locate the key con as an international theorist, cepts and historical 
interpretations that characterise Schmitt
In the non-German speaking world, Schmitt’s reputation is largely founded on his work of 
1932, The Concept o f the Political. Although this small, brilliant, polemical work is arguably 
the most important distillation of Schmitt’s political theory, the prominence of this one volume 
tends to distract from the huge volume and range of his work over time. As interest in 
Schmitt has grown, the range of literature available in English has continued to grow, and the 
recent translation of Nomos o f the Earth by Gary Ulmen, and the reissue of George Schwab’s 
translation of Political Theology by MIT Press are to be welcomed.2 In addition, Telos Press 
continues to publish translated essay pieces by Schmitt, thereby making up for the absence of 
English translations of Schmitt’s collected works such as Stoat, Grossraum, Nomos and 
Positionen und Begriffe. Nevertheless, serious gaps remain in the resources available to 
English-speaking scholars, and this chapter will attempt to range broadly across Schmitt’s 
oeuvre as a whole in emphasising the key elements of his vision of international order.3
1 Brown, Understanding International Relations p.63
2 Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth (trans G.Ulmen) New York: Telos Press (2004) ; Schmitt, Political 
Theology (trans. G.Schwab) Cambridge MA: MIT Press (2005)
3 For an excellent short overview of readings of Schmitt, and points of divergence between the German- 
speaking and English-speaking reception communities, see P.C.Caldwell, ‘Controversies over Carl 
Schmitt: A Review of Recent Literature’ in The Journal of Modern History 77 (June 2005) pp.357- 
387.
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Schmitt must be read, of course, as part of a German political tradition centred on Herder’s 
notion of the national community, and Hegel’s ethical concept of the state. Yet Schmitt is 
more apocalypse to than apotheosis of this tradition. Schmitt is interested in the problematic 
aspects of good and stable concepts of state and international law under the conditions of late 
modernity. As such, it is suggested that an attempt to sketch Schmitt’s antecedents, and 
contextualising Schmitt in the context of his intellectual heritage should be abandoned here in 
favour of a straightforward typology of Schmitt’s core concepts. Whilst this typology is, to 
some extent, arbitrary and artificial, such simplification is a necessary prelude to a more 
detailed consideration of Schmitt’s theory of history.
The phrase “Carl Schmitt’s international thought” used in the title of this chapter requires 
explanation. In contrast to certain other twentieth century political philosophers who sought 
to relate theories of the state to issues of international order, it is impossible to point to 
Schmitt’s international work as located in some identifiable source.4 Whilst Nomos o f the 
Earth is undoubtedly the most important single source of Schmitt’s thoughts on world order, it 
is by no means a distillation of a theory of international order. “International” concerns are 
present in Schmitt’s political theory from the outset, and his political theory consistently refers 
itself to the problematic nature of modern global politics. For Schmitt, politics is, by 
definition, a ‘pluriverse’ and hence international (or inter-something).
As such, our overview of Schmitt’s ‘international thought’ must take account of the 
interpenetration of his various fields of investigation. The conjunctive nature of the work 
under examination is both a source of richness, but also a challenge to the process of 
sketching an overview. It is therefore proposed to isolate several manageable ‘segments’ of 
Schmitt’s thought. We will thereby consider the way in which Schmitt’s concepts of the 
political, his account of political theology, his concern for the tension between juridical and 
moral categories, and notions of territoriality interrelate. The greater objective of this work 
as a whole will then be to examine how Schmitt’s experience of time related to this amalgam.
Aside from the breadth of the literature, several secondary problems attach to this process. 
The first relates to the conjunctive nature of Schmitt’s thought. We have no choice but to 
follow the contours of Schmitt’s thought as accurately and honestly as possible. Yet it is
4 One might think here of Rawls’ Law of Peoples as an example of a deliberate 'international' 
counterpart to a prior theory of the domestic.
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beyond dispute that the connections and intellectual parallels that Schmitt draws are often 
highly idiosyncratic. One might say that this idiosyncrasy threatens to pass the initiative to 
Schmitt. There is no choice but to confront Schmitt on his own territory, in the complex 
amalgams he draws. The challenge is to do so without succumbing to Schmittitis (a seemingly 
common affliction among Schmitt scholars), the principal symptom of which is a certain awe 
for the breadth that the work represents.
The second principal problem to be borne in mind is in the varieties of form that might be 
termed ‘international order.’ Schmitt sees world order as problematic, changing and 
historically conditioned. Such united concept as exists is therefore fairly dynamic in Schmitt’s 
thought. The closest we come to a stable international order composed of like units and 
possessing of a thin common normative content is the jus publicum Europaeum depicted at 
length in Nomos o f the Earth. As depicted in Nomos, this is clearly an international society of 
sorts. But the point of Schmitt’s work is that it neither consists of international society in its 
entirety (i.e., the society as a whole has a necessary ultimate exterior), nor is it stable over 
time. Imperial systems, spatial orders based on the premise of trade, Grossraueme, and aerial 
spaces also feature as aspects of a complex global (dis)order.
Both the ‘international’ and the ‘order’ of ‘international order’ are continually problematised. 
“Order” has a particular resonance for Schmitt, who certainly does not associate the concept 
with peace and security. By contrast, stable order is characterised by the security of the 
concept of the political. Good enmity makes good stability, with all of the attendant need for 
strong concepts of public association, particularism and legitimated violence. The ultimate 
hope that Schmitt holds out is the simultaneous achievement of order and the political, such 
that the modem state system had come so close to achieving.
We will conclude this section with an overview of the reception of Schmitt into contemporary 
International Relations theory. The peculiar paths via which this reception has taken place 
centre on Schmitt’s critique of the hypocrisy and dangers of global liberal hegemony. As 
such, Schmitt’s work has constituted a theoretical resource to those on both the Left and the 
Right who seek to challenge the logic of a global economic, political and ethical system that, 
in their view, denies the possibility of local freedom and moral seriousness. As this work as a 
whole will attempt to show, however, the basis of Schmitt’s critique of liberalism has 
idiosyncratic origins that extend beyond the mere affirmation of the political against
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universalism, calling into question the validity of attempts to construct a contemporary 
Schmittian vision of world politics.
The Political
Schmitt is most strongly associated with his work of 1932 The Concept o f the Political and the 
definition of politics as enmity. It is no exaggeration to describe this insight as Schmitt’s 
basic theoretical position from which the remainder of his political theory flows, and as such, 
we must give due consideration to the true meaning of this observation. The following, oft- 
repeated remark from the Concept o f the Political is the essence of Schmitt’s definition of 
politics;
‘The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that 
between friend and enemy.,s
This theoretical starting point invites several observations. Firstly, this represents politics as a 
contingent category that reflects the nature of a relationship, and is not a self-referential 
concept. It defmes politics in a sociological or historical sense, and does not represent an 
attempt to find a basic philosophical account of politics rooted in concepts of the public good. 
The key referents to this concept of politics are community, power (that can contain and 
mobilise a community) and war. Schmitt is actively hostile to normative or theoretical 
definitions of enmity since ‘only the participants can correctly recognise, understand and 
judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict. ’6
Whilst contingent on confrontation, however, Schmitt also regards the political as immutable. 
He draws sociological assumptions about group behaviour that are reminiscent of questions of 
the nature of man in classical political theory. Whilst there are men, there will be 
collectivities of men. Whilst such collectivities exist, war will remain as a basic human 
possibility. War is the very logic of group existence, since existence would be meaningless 
without the possibility of existential affirmation. In the extreme instance, this affirmation will 
involve killing and dying in defence of the conceptual validity of the group. For Schmitt there
5 Schmitt, Concept of the Political p.26
6 Ibid p.27
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is no other possibility, and life will be much easier if we accept and manage these 
uncomfortable effects of collective life.
Marcuse derided Schmitt’s basic political position as ‘justification by mere existence’, but 
doubtless Schmitt would have responded by questioning the relevance of ‘justification’ to his 
analysis of politics.7 Schmitt does not claim to be representing a political ideal, but is rather 
attempting a description of the way the world is. The language of justification in relation to 
the political only makes sense as an existential, and not a moral assertion;
‘There exists no rational purpose, no norm no matter how true, no 
programme no matter how exemplary, no social ideal no matter how 
beautiful, no legitimacy or legality that could justify men killing each other in 
this way.
In short, Schmitt’s is a world in which existence is the sole political category. As Concept o f 
the Political makes clear, other disputes that lead to war are mere window dressing for the 
basic, existential confrontation of one group against another. Once a substantive division is 
sufficient to create a watershed, and to divide men into ‘potentially fighting [collectivities] of 
men,’ one has the political.
The category of enemy is thus an existential one, and cannot be reduced to any pre-existing 
category or norm. Whilst the parameters of enmity will often fall to be realised along, inter 
alia, national, religious, cultural or other such lines, such concepts are autonomous from the 
fact of enmity;
‘The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of 
a union or separation, of an association or dissociation. It can exist, 
theoretically and practically, without having simultaneously to draw on upon 
all those other moral, aesthetic, economic or other distinctions. The political 
enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as 
an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him 
in a business transaction. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and 
it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in an especially intense way,
7 H.Marcuse Negations (Boston, 1968)
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existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case 
conflicts with him are always possible.’8
A political world is a world with divisions that have genuine meaning, and which might 
ultimately result in the requirement to fight or die on the basis of nothing more than the fact of 
belonging on one side or other of the dividing line. That is not to say that ‘the Political’ 
emerges only where there is actual war. The essence of the Political lies in its potentiality -  
in the latent potential of the social world to take sides and to fight;
‘War is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics.
But as an ever present possibility it is the leading presupposition which 
determines in a characteristic way human action and thinking and thereby 
creates a specifically political behaviour.’9
The basic position of enmity as politics is modified by several ancillary observations. Firstly, 
Schmitt stresses the importance of a public dimension to that enmity. Private hatred, or an 
agonal confrontation between two private citizens will not amount to politics.
‘An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivty of 
people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public 
enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of 
men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a 
relationship. ’10
The political enemy is ‘hostis’ and not ‘inirrucus’, and Schmitt draws on Plato’s distinction 
between public and private enmity and the corresponding distinction between true war 
between Hellenes and Barbarians, and mere internal discords between private enemies. 
Schmitt reads Plato as expressing the thought that ‘a people cannot wage war against itself and 
a civil war is only a self-laceration and does not signify that perhaps a new state or even a 




11 Concept p.28 fh.9
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Schmitt arguably enters difficult conceptual territory here, since he appears to be prejudging 
the subject matter of the divisions that, according to the view expressed above, cannot be 
reduced to anything less than the mere fact of adversity. Schmitt has in mind the confrontation 
of collectives of men who thereby separate the physical existence of the individual from the 
existential identity and interests of the group.12 The problem remains, however, of how to 
determine the stability and continuation of the groupings that give the Political its specific 
character. Why should it be, for instance, that the expression of private hatred in civil war 
cannot give rise to ‘a new state or even a new people’?
This problem of political origins is acute in Schmitt, and nowhere more so than in trying to fit 
his thought into contemporary international political theory. Leo Strauss dismissed Schmitt’s 
attempt theoretically to separate the Political from the theory of the state as a mere polemical 
device to serve Schmitt’s immediate critical goals.
‘Following [Schmitt’s own general principles], the sentence “the political 
precedes the state” can manifest the desire to express not an eternal truth but 
only a present truth. ...Thus Schmitt’s basic thesis is entirely dependent upon 
the polemic against liberalism; it is to be understood only qua polemical, only 
“in terms of concrete political existence’.13
The precise problem Schmitt encounters is in how to logically separate concepts of the state 
from concepts of the political, whilst simultaneously retaining his attachment to the state as 
the sole bearer, following de Maistre, of ‘public morality and national character.’14
We will return later to the precise relevance of this public content to Schmitt’s definition of 
the political, in the context especially of external recognition of the sovereign decision and the 
legal aspects of political identity. For the time being it is sufficient to highlight that politics as 
conflict need not be inconsistent with a legal framework. On the contrary, true politics will 
be better sustained by a clear legal recognition of conflict as the basic defining aspect of 
political life, and a re-emphasis of the existential nature of group life. Such conceptual clarity 
will allow for a stable Nomos, that is to say, stable political units that can act as the locus for 
political division.
12 This distinction between the respective interests of the individual and the political unit is explored in 
greater depth in the following chapter in the context of Hobbes’ concept of the state.
13 L.Strauss ‘Notes on The Concept of the Political’ p.83-84
14 Political Romanticism (trans. G.Oakes) Cambridge: MIT Press (1986) p.61
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Consideration of these questions takes us beyond the basic political definition, however. It 
would be a mistake to read Schmitt’s definition as advocacy of a belligerent state system. The 
political could give rise to potentially limitless means of expression. The Concept o f the 
Political opens with the assertion that the ‘concept of the state presupposes the concept of the 
political.’15 Over time, Schmitt moved away from the intimate association of the political with 
the modem state, and always recognised that the state was a historically contingent form of 
political expression. In the 1940s and 1050s, Schmitt dedicated considerable energy to 
contemplating future social configurations that might supersede the state as the dominant basis 
of public enmity. In this sense, the political is a wholly independent category that seeks to 
express the most basic manifestation of man in society.
States and their System
For Schmitt, the Westphalian state is the most successful and stable manifestation of the 
political in world history. That said, in the Concept o f the Political, the state is not a 
necessary political concept, and its existence in history is contingent and ephemeral. ‘The 
concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political’, and hence is subordinate to and 
dependent on the primary friend-enemy distinction.16 Schmitt has an historical understanding 
of the state that correlates fairly well with the standard IR interpretation of the emergence of 
several functioning states at or around the time of Treaty of Westphalia in 1658. He considers 
that ‘the significance of the state consisted in the overcoming of religious civil wars, which 
became possible only in the 16th century, and the state achieved this task only by a 
neutralization.’17
The precise historical achievement of the state was to achieve the unity of auctoritas 
(traditionally claimed by the emperor) and the potestas that had been the preserve of the 
Papacy throughout the Middle Ages. In achieving this unity, the state perfected its own 
sovereignty which, in raw political terms, meant that the state achieved a monopoly of the
15 Concept p. 13
16 Concept p. 19
17 Nomos p.61
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power to decide the on the exceptional situation, and so to name the public enemy. That is to 
say, the precise quality of sovereignty lies in its competence to determine when the normal 
functions of positive law are inadequate to the circumstances at hand. It is the sovereign who 
both creates and solves the exceptional situation through the imposition of its will. The 
essential characteristic of the modem state is that it should form the watershed of the friend- 
enemy distinction, and so maintain an external-internal divide. After the chaos of the Thirty 
Years war, the triumph of the state consisted in its ability to neutralise and overcome civil 
war. In terms of the basis of conflict, it substituted raison d’etat for the interminable struggles 
of religious righteousness.
The two theoretical heroes in the achievement of this neutral concept of sovereignty, Bodin 
and Hobbes, are again the familiar conceptual ‘originators’ of the state in IR theory. 
Schmitt’s following account of the historical-theoretical achievement of sovereignty is worth 
quoting in full;
‘At least since Bodin, a true jurist would confront [a] sceptical and agnostic 
disposition with a decisionist formulation of the question that is immediately 
given with the concept of state sovereignty: who then is in a position to decide 
authoritatively on all the obvious, but impenetrable questions of fact and law 
pertinent to the question of justa causal The asserted juridical right and 
moral legitimacy of one’s own cause and the alleged injustice of the 
opponent’s cause only sharpen and deepen the belligerent’s hostility, surely in 
the most gruesome way. That we have learned from the feuds of the feudal 
age and from the creedal civil wars over theological truth and justice. But 
state sovereigns ended such murderous assertions o f right and questions o f 
guilt. That was the historical and intellectual accomplishment of the
sovereign decision  A simple question was raised with respect to the
interminable legal disputes inherent in every claim to the justa causa: Who 
decides? (the great Quis judicabit?). Only the sovereign could decide the 
question, both within the state and between states.’18
The authority of the sovereign state is therefore Janus faced. Internally, the state abrogates to 
itself the right to determine all matters of public truth and so denies the potential for
18 Nomos p. 156-157 (my emphasis)
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internecine struggles over questions of universal truth and justice.19 Externally, there can be 
no higher authority than the state, since it must be the state itself that determines the public 
enemy. As we have already seen, identification of the enemy cannot be subject to any pre­
existing norm, and can only be determined in the concrete situation. Therefore, a necessary 
condition of the truly political state is that it has unfettered discretion to choose whichever 
enemies, and on whatever basis, as it may wish from time to time. The international 
achievement of the modem state lies, therefore, in its capacity to recognise and challenge the 
just enemy.
In intellectual terms, therefore, Schmitt regards the rise of the state as a reaction to the 
intertwined problems of truth and authority in the Middle Ages. There is an additional spatial 
dimension to the rise of the state that is less intimately connected to Schmitt’s basic theory of 
decision on the exception, and is rather a matter of historical accident (ie. the spatial origins 
of the state do not appear to be logically necessary in order for the state to possess a 
specifically political character). Whereas the Greeks had envisioned a political world based 
on twin poles of polis and cosmopolis, and the Middle Ages had been characterised by 
religious-intellectual lines of political ordering, the organising logic of the state was its 
territoriality.20
Territory became the dominant basis of the continental state, and the state itself developed a 
monolithic and absolute notion of a single territorial status. Thus the exercise of legality 
internally, and the assertion of sovereign right externally, became referable to the territorial 
possession or extent of a particular state. The process of ‘land appropriation’ became the very 
logic of the European state, and with it came the identification of law and authority with the 
territorial space in which it was exercised. As such, ‘the restriction of law to the land and to 
one’s own territory has a long tradition in legal history.’ As a result of this, ‘it is historically 
more correct to focus on the relation between order and orientation, and on the spatial context 
of all laws.’21
19 See Chapter 3 for a fuller discussion on Schmitt’s reading of Hobbes and the nexus between 
autoritas, potestas and veritas in the concept of the modem state.
20 See Nomos p50-55 passim
21 Nomos p.98
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The precise importance of this territoriality is difficult to quantify, and Schmitt is at pains to 
ensure that the territorial strengths of the state do not end up qualifying the basic political 
category.22 Nevertheless, certain advantages of a territorial ordering concept are quite 
evident. Firstly, territory is consistent with the neutrality of the state vis-a-vis questions of 
religious truth, ideology or other matters of universal importance. Secondly, and especially in 
the context of the land battles of modern warfare, territory allows for the unambiguous 
conduct of hostilities in a regularised, public and self-affirming manner. Furthermore, when 
looking externally, the concept of territory provides an innate limiting factor to the political 
ambitions of the state. The ultimately defensive imperative to confront the enemy is strongly 
affirmed by the identification of the state with a particular, ‘telluric’ space.23
‘The ability to recognise a justus hostis [just enemy] is the beginning of all international law,’ 
Schmitt asserts.24 The self-assurance of the state with respect to its internal authority creates, 
in turn, stability in its external visage. The state is allowed the space and moral freedom to 
examine the external world with a cool and independent eye, and can ‘choose’ to act in 
whatever manner it sees fit.25 The consequence is the Westphalian system of co-existing 
sovereign states which together mutually create and recreate the terms of the jus publicum 
Europaeum. This is the thin international law that amounts to the mutual recognition of 
existence that, in Schmitt’s scheme, is essential for the validity of the state.
22 See Chapter 4 for fuller consideration of the effect of this question of territoriality on Schmitt’s 
historical consciousness, and in particular, the contrast he draws between continental and oceanic 
concepts of space in Land und Meer Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta (1954)
23 The loss of the state’s basic territorial orientation is one of the elements of the modem malaise with 
which Schmitt is concerned. In Chapter 6 we consider his Theorie des Partisanen, and the idea that 
modem partisan fighters retain the fundamental link with territory.
24 Nomos p.52
25 In considering the behaviour of the state, Schmitt largely glosses over the question of agency. 
Perhaps the agency of the state is supposed to be defined in reverse by answering the question Quis 
judicabitl Schmitt is, of course, concerned with the legal possibility of decisive and personal decision 
making, as evidenced by his advocacy of direct presidential rule under Article 48 of the Weimar 
Constitution, and his critique of parliamentarism (See The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (trans. 
E.Kennedy) Cambridge: MIT Press (1985)). Schmitt did develop an early theory of sovereign 
dictatorship (see Die Diktatur Berlin: Duncker & Humblot (1921)), but the decision-making capacity 
of the state externally is related only implicitly to the need for a single source of internal political 
authority.
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As such, the legal status of sovereign equality is a fact, not a norm. The exercise of 
sovereignty is the international status of the state. Without sovereignty, there can be no state, 
and so no ‘participation’ as an international actor. With sovereignty, there is no way to avoid 
or prevent participation as an international actor (and, therefore, membership of the 
international system/society /jus publicum Europaeum), since the logic of sovereignty is a 
latent capacity to exercise the powers of justus hostis. A state unable to exercise the power to 
declare an enemy has ceased to be a state. If there is some other authority capable of making 
that declaration on behalf of the purported state, then sovereignty has been displaced into the 
hands of that other party. If no public decision is conceivable, then the politico-legal 
capability of that group for sovereignty has been displaced, and presumably civil war ensues.
The unfettered power of the territorial state thus gives rise to a historically distinct system of 
international law that would be recognisable from realist textbooks on international relations, 
albeit via an alternative reasoning. International law is the de facto collective status of various 
states that have each reached a comparable settlement of the question of balancing potestas 
and autoritas, each having settled on a territorial orientation. The functional similarities of 
these states give rise to a comparatively stable collective condition which can be descriptively 
characterised as the system of public international law.
‘The state had become independent with respect to the question of whether the 
given state authority was legitimate or illegitimate. Just as state wars became 
independent of the question of the justice or injustice of the grounds of war in 
international law, so, too, did the question of justa causa become independent 
in international law. All law came to reside in the existential form of the 
state.’26
The overall effect, albeit only in a conditional and contingent way, was the limitation of the 
worst excesses of violence in interstate war, and the establishment of nominal, social ‘rules of 
the game’ in the conduct of relations between sovereigns. By jealously protecting the right to 
make war, states ended up regularising the conduct of war and, by comparison with the 
messianic violence of the Thirty Years War (and the analogous violence of the French 
Revolutionary Wars), interstate warfare became increasingly humane.27 Indeed, “war in
26 Nomos p.204 (emphasis in the original)
27 Schmitt describes this limitation of warfare as ‘Hegung des Krieges.' Ulmen translated this as the 
‘bracketing of war’ which is the use we will generally adopt throughout. ‘Hegen’, however, is a
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form” is held up as ‘the strongest possible rationalisation and humanisation of war.’ ‘Both
belligerents had the same political character and the same rights; both recognised each other
as states. As a result, it was possible to distinguish an enemy from a criminal.’28
Anarchy is the key characteristic of this modern European state system, and Schmitt 
celebrates the existence of such anarchy as the necessary evidence that the Political remained 
intact. Schmitt’s account of the ordered world of European politics stresses that anarchy and 
order are not mutually exclusive categories. In a formulation that Hedley Bull could surely 
have subscribed to, Schmitt castigates the sloppy conflation of anarchy and disorder;
‘...[such] use of the word “anarchy” is typical of a perspective not yet
advanced enough to distinguish between anarchy and nihilism. For this
reason, it should be stressed that, in comparison to nihilism, anarchy is not 
the worst scenario. Anarchy and law are not mutually exclusive.’29
For most of its history, the anarchy of the state system has been productive of a form of 
quasi-legal order. Schmitt’s great fear is that the 20* century assault on the state system will 
result in precisely the form of violent chaos that ‘liberal’ critics erroneously attribute to the 
state.
The perfectly functioning European state system forms, therefore, something of an historical 
and conceptual ideal for Schmitt. The fact that the realisation of the European state form, its 
multiplication, and the style of co-existence were achieved as a result of historical chance does 
not dent Schmitt’s admiration for such achievements. In a fashion typical of his use of 
historical example, Schmitt paints an idealised notion of the jus publicum Europaeum as a 
system in which the choice between war and neutrality rests with the sovereign, and a proper 
political dynamic exists unthreatened by universal claims. As such, the state system is worthy 
of our attachment, and should be defended against rival claims that will dismantle and obstruct 
this cool functionalism. Although state and politics are not commensurate, the state has done 
a worthy job, in Schmitt’s account, of ensuring the stability and continuation of the Political.
difficult word to translate, and Schmitt’s use of it in this context is idiosyncratic. ‘Hegen’ is 
suggestive of a form of benign and protective management of something by a superior and 
disinterested outsider. Its most natural usage is in the context of forestry, whereby a forester will 
cultivate, nurture, protect, fell and replant a particular, defined piece of woodland.
28 Nomos p. 142
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Nomos
The modem state exists, therefore, within a global order that has developed a certain 
character of its own. The state has generated this order, in Schmitt’s account, precisely 
because the state form so enshrines the ‘fundamental process involved in the relation between 
order and orientation.’30 Schmitt adopts the word Nomos to describe the fundamental 
territorial ordering of the world. i[N]omos is the immediate form in which the political and 
social order of a people becomes spatially visible. ...Nomos is the measure by which the land 
in a particular order is divided and situated; it is also the form o f political, social and religious 
order determined by this process. ’31
Schmitt’s Nomos is a challenging concept precisely because it is taken to encapsulate the fact 
of a particular set of orientations, and the effect of those orientations on the nature of order. 
Nomos describes the essence of any particular order in its entirety, As such, and as Schmitt 
makes clear in his consideration of the word’s etymology, Nomos is a ‘fence-word’ that can 
mean ‘dwelling place, district, pasturage.,32 The ‘Nomos of the Earth’ is therefore intended to 
convey the conditional and temporally fragile order of things in the world which, despite this 
sense of contingency, nevertheless exists as a concrete reality.
The existence of a concrete Nomos, whatever its origins and constitutive parts, is a necessary 
pre-condition for the possibility of order. Modem Europe, with its constitutive parts and its 
common awareness of the concrete fact of a jus publicum Europaeum constituted just such a 
Nomos. Other Nomoi based on different concrete spatial realities are theoretically possible, 
but the advocacy of a Nomos misses the point that such order and orientation is a reflection in 
fact of a concrete order, and not an ideal type that adheres to rules of any kind;
29 Nomos p. 187
30 Nomos p.67
31 Nomos p.70 (my emphasis)
32 Nomos p.75. Schmitt gives a pointed overview of the origins and misuses of the term Nomos, and 
claims to be recovering the Aristotelian meaning from confusion. (Nomos p.67-79)
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‘As long as the Greek word nomos in the often cited passages of Heraclitus 
and Pindar is transformed from a spatially concrete, constitutive act of order 
and orientation -  from an ordo ordinans [order of ordering] into the mere 
enactment of acts in line with the ought and, consistent with the manner of 
thinking of the positivistic legal system, translated with the word law -  all 
disputes about interpretation are hopeless and all philological acumen is 
fruitless.’33
The Nomos exists as a constitutive act that is already apparent by the time that anyone could 
conceive of its outlines. ‘The original act is nomos.'34 Any nomos can be either the fulcrum 
of history, or subject to historical undermining on its own terms. Whereas the continuing 
validity of the state depends on the continuing capacity for sovereignty, change in the nomos 
is determined at a less defined conceptual level. ‘All subsequent developments are either 
results of and expansions of [the original act] or else redistributions {anadasmoi) -  either a 
continuation on the same basis or a disintegration of and departure from the constitutive act of 
the spatial order...’35
One possible rendering of nomos would be ‘law’ in the sense of international law. In The 
Nomos o f the Earth, it is clear that the putative international law of the jus publicum 
Europaeum was a nomos -  the first global nomos. Alessandro Colombo argues that there is a 
distinct similarity between Schmitt’s notion of common social mores in the jus publicum 
Europaeum, and English School ideas on international society. Far from being an extreme 
realist with a belief in power politics, Schmitt saw that ‘the jus publicum europaeum places 
international anarchy in a societal and, more importantly, juridical web’ and which does so 
via institutions that ‘[change] the nature of the players, the extent of the playing field, and the 




36 A. Colombo ‘Challenging the State: Carl Schmitt and “Realist Institutionalism”’ Paper Presented to 
the 5th Pan-European International Relations Conference, The Hague, Sept 2004. p.3
37 See also A..Colombo ‘L’Europa e la Society Intemazionale: Gli Aspetti culturali e istituzionale della 
convivenza intemazionale in Raymond Aron, Martin Wight e Carl Schmitt’ in Quademi di scienza 
politica 2 (1999)
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In the case of the jus publicum Europaeum at least, nomos can be meaningfully compared to 
an idea of international law in the sense of a shared framework of understanding -  a shared 
field in which politics takes place. But the concept of nomos cannot be reduced to law, 
especially in the way that the latter term has come to be understood. Schmitt specifically 
rejects the translation of nomos as law due the array of misunderstandings that would 
inevitably ensue.38 The nomos cannot be viewed as a set of rules or norms that somehow 
‘govern’ or ‘regulate’ the conduct of states. But it does represent a basic level of 
commonality such that the pluriversal basis of politics can be sustained.
Thalin Zarmanian argues that the concept of nomos is better understood when read in the 
context of Schmitt’s domestically-oriented views on the meaning and function of law.39 He 
suggests that Schmitt’s entire project is motivated by ‘the search for an answer to the problem 
of the Rechtsverwirklichung (actualization of the law).40 At the domestic level this search 
focussed on the tension between a universal principle of law, and the application of principle 
to the concrete situation. As Zarmanian puts it, Schmitt was searching for ‘an Archimedean 
point -  the legal order -  in which the tension between the idea of law (die Rechtsidee) and 
empirical reality could converge.’41
In the domestic context, the most obvious instance in which this tension between norm and 
concrete reality comes to light is in the state of emergency. The fact that law as a normative 
set of rules cannot solve the state of emergency is evidence of the fact that the actual content 
of law as order cannot be determined a priori, but is instead a constitutive act rooted in the 
decision by the sovereign. It is the sovereign decision, in the concrete situation, that produces 
a legal order, and it is the ability to create order that lends legitimacy to the sovereign 
decision. In Zarmanian1 s words, ‘legal order is, therefore, according to Schmitt, a particular 
shape given to empirical reality through a sovereign decision.,42
38 ‘In an age such as this, it is inexpedient to Germanize nomos as “law”. Nomos p.71-72
39 T. Zarmanian, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Problem of Legal Order: From Domestic to International’ in 





If the sovereign decision is the latent ‘solution’ to the problem of pluralism in Schmitt’s 
domestic context, the concept of nomos offers a parallel solution to the broader problem of the 
political pluriverse of groups. The international setting cannot be constituted by an abstract 
set of rules, since, in the absence of a single culture and a single political community, there 
will be no means to apply such rules to the concrete situation. What we have instead, is the 
particular arrangement by which the particular political unit is reconciled and embedded in the 
universal context. In Schmitt’s own parlance, any nomos represents the accepted ‘structuring 
combination’ of Ordnung (order) and Ortung (localisation or (in Ulmen’s translation) 
“orientation”).43 For Schmitt, this is an explicitly spatial accommodation between the 
particular territory of the political unit, and the widest spatial horizon in which the validity of 
that political unit is implicated. Following Zarmanian, this use of space is vital for Schmitt’s 
schema in that it ‘accounts for the existence and for the co-implication of empirical reality, 
law, and the political,’ and secures an environment in which the diverse political units can 
survive as bearers of specificity or Lebensmoeglichkeit.44
Thus nomos represents a complex mediation between the particular and the universal, through 
which various political units gain recognition and the ability to project and protect their own 
concept of collective life. In a similar vein to Zarmanian, Sergio Ortino illustrates the nature 
of the parallel between nomos and the sovereign decision in a domestic context 
( ‘entscheidung *)
‘Entscheidung and Nomos share the same substance, because each of them 
represents the true core of an historical legal event characterized by an 
absolute and concrete nature capable of founding a new system of law. 
Entscheidung and Nomos differ from each other because the former refers to 
a specific legal community, who decides to create a new political system upon 
new principles and new legal norms, while the latter refers to the new way in 
which humanity decides in a specific epoch of his evolution to organize itself 
into new forms and with new values and principles. When a new holder of 
the constituent power takes a fundamental decision in favour of a new legal 
order, we are witnessing a political revolution. When humanity accepts the
43 See Ibid. p.55
44 Ibid. p.57
37
new Nomos of an emerging new epoch, we are witnessing a space 
revolution.’45
The collapse of one nomos and the rise in its place of another seems, therefore, to be nothing 
less than the transformation of global reality. Only in modem times, of course, is it logically 
necessary (or even possible) that a nomos would be global. ‘[NJomos is a matter of the 
fundamental process of apportioning space that is essential to every historical epoch.’46 The 
Greek nomos would have consisted of the Meditteranean world. As Schmitt amply illustrates, 
the nomos of the modem European state system is, by definition, Eurocentric. A conceptual 
fence exists around the nomos beyond which there is no social reality, no commonality, no 
order.
The pre-eminent international problem for Schmitt, therefore, is the attempt to ascertain what 
will be the new nomos of the earth. Thinking through this task was a breathtaking personal 
challenge, given that the identification of a new nomos required nothing less than establishing 
the locus of the Political, the determination of the question of orientation, and the unknowable 
question of the form of order that such orientation would produce. ‘Every new age and every 
new epoch in the coexistence of peoples, empires, and countries, of rulers and power 
formations of every sort, is founded on new spatial divisions, new enclosures, and new spatial 
orders of the earth.’47 Assuming that the old international nomos was witnessing terminal 
decline, the challenge Schmitt set for himself and for those who subscribed to his basic 
contention was to observe and theorise the shape of the new Nomos.
The Katechon
The idea of Nomos immediately raises the question of time. In the following three chapters 
we shall consider Schmitt's peculiar understanding of history and the philosophy of history in 
more detail. But it will perhaps be useful to outline in brief the somewhat a somewhat arcane 
theological figure - the Katechon, or "Restrainer" - that is of central importance to Schmitt
45 S. Ortino, ‘Space Revolution and Legal Order’, Paper presented to the 5th Pan-European International 




both in positing historical time, and in a wider sense, in defining his political purpose. For 
Schmitt, the notion of the Katechon appears to become increasingly important as a device for 
linking together ideas on theological truth (as a barrier to progressive rationality or post- 
structural doubt) and his commitment to historical restraint (as a barrier to the apparent 
acceleration of modernity). In one sense, the Katechon becomes a shorthand for a complex 
amalgam of anti-modem and anti-positivist commitments. As such, Schmitt's use of it is 
necessarily evasive and obscurantist, since it represents, in a sense, that which refuses to 
submit to a regulated logic.
What then, is the provenance of the Katechon? It is clear that Schmitt derives the idea of 
Katechon from the 2nd letter of St.Paul to the Thessalonians (that is to say, from the one part 
of the New Testament most strongly associated with ideas of apocalypse and eschata). In II 
Thess. 2:6-7, confronting the question of Satan, St.Paul wrote:
“And you know what is restraining him now so that he may be revealed in his 
time. For the mystery of lawlessness is already at work; only he who now 
restrains it will do so until he is out of the way.1 
It is a passage that has created enormous controversy among theologians, and which lies at the 
centre of political theological attempts to divine a theological basis for the idea of secular law. 
It seems that Schmitt interpreted the passage to mean that lawlessness and the absence of order 
represented the realm of the devil. By contrast, political and legal order represents the 
historical force of the apostolic succession - the maintenance of a revealed truth through the 
efforts of mankind. As Schmitt writes in Nomos o f the Earth, the Katechon is an 'historical 
concept' of great force that preserves 'the tremendous historical monolith' of Christian 
Empire and 'holds back' the eschatological end of history.48
As such, the idea of Katechon is written into Schmitt's DNA as a political theorist. It is 
fundamental to his orientation towards history and to his understanding of the purpose and 
destiny of man-made politics. As the following three chapters will illustrate, it is the idea of 
Katechon and Schmitt's peculiar theological understanding of history that shape his ultimate 
commitment to order as the sole political idea. And it is from this prior commitment that his 
other innovative ideas of order such as state and nomos derive. His apparent belief in and 
fear of the end of historical time lends an urgency and seriousness to Schmitt's self-image that
48 Schmitt, Nomos p.60
39
simply could not arise without this ultimate reference to a theology of truth and authority. 
Towards the end of his career, Schmitt would become increasingly engaged in the study of 
Tertullian as the paradigmatic example of a katechontical jurist. Heinrich Meier argues that 
“Tertullian’s guiding principle 'We are obliged to something not because it is good but 
because God commands it ', accompanies Schmitt through all the turns and vicissitudes of his 
long life. ”49
For the time being, however, it is necessary to point out, as if this were required, that 
Schmitt's extrapolation of the idea of Katechon is by no means necessary, and is certainly not 
a 'mainstream' interpretation of Thessalonians. Indeed, it is by no means clear that Schmitt 
himself subjects the idea of the Katechon to a rigorous, disciplinary analysis from a 
theological perspective. His interest is in the Katechon as a politically pregnant category. It 
is certainly true that Schmitt's apocalyptic and endist vision of the Antichrist and its restraint 
is quite distinctly Catholic (at least, in a pre^"4 Vatican Council sense). For many Protestant 
theologians, the idea of the Antichrist in 2 Thess is to be associated with the institution of the 
Papacy. For Schmitt, by contrast, the Catholic Church represents the pre-eminent restrainer. 
Credible examination of debate on the katechon would require theological expertise outside 
the scope of this work. Our concern is Schmitt's political application and abstraction of a 
theologically rooted idea, and the political purpose he invests in it. Schmitt unusual, dramatic 
and inherently political reading of the Katechon is a central concept to the following study. It 
is also an aspect of Schmitt's thought that has been wrongly, if understandably, played down 
by those seeking to apply Schmitt's ideas to IR.
Style and Polemic
Undoubtedly, much of Schmitt’s renewed appeal in political theory generally lies in the clarity 
of the concepts he delivers (his ‘Begriffsmagie’), and the gently emphatic method of their 
delivery.50 In a predictable analogy, the polemical effect of Schmitt’s work has been 
described as akin to Blitzkrieg. Ernst Jiinger’s famous description of Schmitt’s thought as a 
‘mine that explodes silently’ neatly encapsulates the dual effect of Schmitt’s persuasive style, 
and the strange intellectual romance that attached to his enforced isolation from post-war
49 Meier, Lesson p.92
50 G. Kateb ‘Aestheticism and Morality: Their Cooperation and Hostility’ in Political Theory (28:1) 
(2000)
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intellectual life.51 Given a general consensus on the literary and polemical impact of Schmitt’s 
work, it is all the more remarkable that a comprehensive study of the aesthetic-polemical 
nature of Schmitt’s work is yet to emerge.52 More broadly, those who seek to adopt Schmitt 
in support of contemporary political visions face the tricky task of separating the substance of 
Schmitt’s theory from the aesthetic talent with which he was undoubtedly blessed.
Whilst improving the accessibility of his work to a wider audience, Schmitt’s hypnotic style 
has probably hampered the prospects for temperate and considered reception of his work. His 
combination of intellectual accessibility, underplayed erudition and sheer readability disturbs 
Schmitt’s critics as much as it delights his fan-club. Too often, those who seek to criticise 
Schmitt display an apparent fear of being led into dark labyrinths of thought via a serious 
engagement with his thought, and this fear results in a reverse polemic of condemnation. The 
‘dangerous mind’ is to be prodded from a distance, avoiding the danger of contagion from 
those who engage without first ‘knowing their Schmitt.’ Even William Scheuerman’s 
generally temperate analysis contains the warning that ‘it would be a mistake to let Schmitt off 
the hook too easily even when his analysis seems most impressive.,53
The obverse effect of Schmitt’s slippery style is that he has been able, as Jan-Wemer Muller 
puts it, to mean ‘so much and so many seemingly contradictory things to so many', such that 
arguably ‘no twentieth-century thinker has had a more diverse range of readers.’54 This broad 
appeal and theoretical pliability brings its own dangers, not least the very real possibility that 
the conceptual core provided by Schmitt is transmogrified by his disciples to the point that 
putative ‘Schmittianism’ can have no meaning. This peculiar process of adoption was 
doubtless aggravated by Schmitt’s meddling hand in his supposed years of isolation in 
Plettenberg after 1947.
51 Andrew Norris takes Jiinger’s phrase as the title for his review essay ‘A Mine That Explodes 
Silently: Carl Schmitt in Weimar and After’ in Political Theory (33:6) (Dec. 2005)
52 David Pan’s short study ‘Political Aesthetics: Carl Schmitt on Hamlet’ in Telos 72 (Summer 1987) 
provides a good if esoteric point of departure for consideration of Schmitt as an aesthetic thinker. See 
also G. Kateb ‘Aestheticism’ ; S. Pourciau ‘Bodily Negation: Carl Schmitt on the Meaning of 
Meaning’ in Modem Language Notes (120:5) (Dec. 2005)
53 W.Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law Lanham MD p. 152
54 J-W Muller, Dangerous Mind p.3 & p.2 (emphasis in the original)
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It goes without saying that Schmitt represents a style of academic writing as far removed from 
the arcane and intricate forms of typical ‘academic German’ as it is possible to imagine. Most 
commentators have engaged at some level with the problematic question of how to 
comprehend the ‘method to Schmitt’s stylistic magic.’55
Schmitt in IR
Fully twenty-six papers were presented to the Standing Group on International Relations panel 
on ‘The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt’ at the 2004 conference in the 
Hague.56 It gave the impression of a dam bursting in IR, and a widespread, pent-up interest in 
the possible applications of Schmitt in IR theory flooding out. Participants were drawn from 
fields as diverse as international law, political theory, theology, literary theory, intellectual 
history and international relations. Inevitably such a diverse gathering will entail much debate 
at crossed purposes. But this reception was quite exceptional for the vast range of theoretical 
applications to which Schmitt’s work was put.
With apologies to the necessity of creating further typologies, it is suggested that the 
emergence of Schmitt into international political theory can be traced along various distinct 
lines of thought. What these approaches share, however, is their adoption of Schmitt as a 
theorist of the necessity of a political pluriverse, to be cited against the apparent advance of 
global liberal hegemony. Schmitt was, of course, implacably opposed to those who regarded 
the political and moral unity of the world as the pinnacle of human achievement and the 
gateway to utopian paradise. World unity was dangerous and nihilistic. At best, such unity 
was a futile chimera, the pursuit of which would lead mankind into dangerous and bloody 
escalation of conflict. At worst, the pursuit could be successful, resulting in a facile and 
depoliticised world. Furthermore, and especially in his pre-war writings, Schmitt condemns 
the use of liberal universalism as a cloak that hides the particular political interest of those 
who espouse it. These two strands of Schmitt’s critique of liberal universalism have been 
taken up respectively by the Right and the Left.
55 J-W. Muller, Dangerous Mind p.9
56 Several of the papers presented to the panel are available at an online archive at 
http://www.sgir.org/archive/index.htm.
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i) Schmitt and the Realists
The emphasis in Schmitt’s work on the primacy of the political decision and the immutability 
of war as a human possibility resonates naturally with a ‘realist’ interpretation of international 
relations. For instance, as Scheuerman has amply illustrated, Schmitt had a profound 
influence on forming the ‘harder’ edges of Hans Morgenthau’s political realism, and the 
latter’s concern for the role of the nation state as bearer of authentic human meaning.57 
Schmitt himself has been characterised as a realist of sorts, to be read alongside other theorists 
of political power and raison d’etat.58 In his pre-war writings in particular, Schmitt showed an 
intimate concern for the requirements of pragmatic and power-oriented foreign policy that 
read like classic expressions of realist international relations theory.59 He also produced a 
highly sympathetic study of Meinecke’s theory of Staatsraison.60
This implacable opposition to the creation of a global state, and concern to impose limits to 
the intrusion of international law inside the boundaries of the state has made Schmitt an 
apparently valuable resource to realists, broadly conceived. Gary Ulmen - described by one 
of his closest collaborators as a ‘pro-New Deal American nationalist’61 -  is one of the most 
prominent protagonists in the attempt to deploy Schmitt against the replacement of the 
international order with ‘free-floating concepts [that] do not constitute institutional standards 
but have only the value of ideological slogans.’62 Ulmen takes up Schmitt’s critique of the just 
war tradition, and shares the view that denial of war as a tool of rational politics is both
57 W. Scheuerman ‘Another Hidden Dialogue : Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau’ in The End of Law 
(Lanham, MD, 1999). For consideration of Morgenthau’s links to Schmitt in the wider context of the 
American Right see Alfons Sollner, ‘German Conservatism in America: Morgenthau’s Political 
Realism’ in Telos 72 (1987) pp. 161-172.
58 See for instance, E.Bolsinger The Autonomy of the Political: Carl Schmitt’s and Lenin’s Political 
Realism London: Greenwood Press (2001) ; E.Vad Strategic und Sicherheitspolitik: Perspektiven im 
Werk Carl Schmitt Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag (1996)
59 See Schmitt ‘Rhineland als Objekt intemationelle Politk’ in Positionen und Begriffe
60 Schmitt, ‘Zu Friedrich Meineckes Idee der Staatsraeson’ (Berlin, 1926)
61 P.Gottfried ‘Forgotten but not Gone’ in American Oudook Magazine (Fall 2001)
62 G.Ulmen ‘Introduction to “The Land Appropriation of a New World” in Telos (109 -  Fall 1996)
p.26
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dangerous and hypocritical, and will result in the use of war as a form of religious or 
ideological domination rather than a part of acceptable raison d’etat.63
In addition to his basic hostility to a normatively based global politics, Schmitt also appeals to 
certain contemporary realists for his apparent ability to avoid the stasis that might result from 
an unrealistic continued attachment to notions of Westphalian politics. In his distinction of 
politics from the state form, Schmitt appears to hold out the possibility of restructuring 
political realism time after time, adapting the basic premise of power politics to new structures 
of global power. In characterising the contemporary value of Schmitt’s Nomos o f the Earth, 
Ulmen argues that;
‘[g]lobalization and new, larger political entities require a new political 
realism and a new political theory dealing with a new type of law regulating 
“international” relations. This global order will fail if it does not take into 
account the accomplishments of the only truly global order of the earth 
developed so far: the jus publicum Europaeum. ,64
In other words, Schmitt appears to offer hopes of a new conceptual depth to political realism, 
allowing a constructive engagement in debates on globalisation and the changing political 
competence of the state. The necessity of ‘the political’ as part and parcel of the human 
condition can be defended, whilst the future competence of the state can be debated. In 
particular, Schmitt’s interest in the possibility of a new spatial basis for politics proves an 
attractive line of enquiry to those realists aware of the potential need to move beyond the rigid 
old assumptions of specifically state power as the basic component of world politics.
The use of Schmitt in this vein does not prevent the simultaneous, ongoing defence of the 
state. Paul Gottfried calls on Schmitt in support of his argument against what he regards as 
the dominant, passive liberalism of the contemporary ‘managerial state.’ Gottfried 
understands power to be the primary political category, and castigates the modern Western 
tendency to obfuscate power and render it an exercise of bare management. This managerial 
tendency is made all the worse by a tendency towards the incorporation of a false and 
hypocritical moralism into the function of government. Whilst the domestic effects of this
63 G.Ulmen ‘Just Wars or Just Enemies?’ in Telos (109 -  Fall 1996) p. 112
64 G.Ulmen ‘Introduction’ to C.Schmitt Nomos of the Earth p.34
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obfuscation of power are Weberian in character, Gottfried draws heavily on Schmitt in 
arguing that the managerial state must be abandoned in favour of clear, hard-headed, realist 
political dynamics in foreign policy too.65
This association of Schmitt with calls for a renewed realism in world politics has inevitably 
raised the question of an underground influence on contemporary US policy-making. The 
suggestion that Schmitt is ‘Dick Cheney’s Eminence Grise’ is based in part on the exercise of 
a form of executive power domestically that, it is argued, corresponds to Schmitt’s theory of 
dictatorial power.66 But there is a clear international dimension to the attempt to draw this 
linkage. Levinson, for instance, draws on the idea of ‘lines of amity’ in describing the policy 
of torture in Iraq as essentially ‘Schmittian.’67 And besides all else, those seeking to trace a 
line of heritage from Carl Schmitt to the neo-con hate figures need do little more than stress 
the productive relationship that Leo Strauss had with Schmitt, and then stress the influence of 
the former. For those intent on making the point, and in the absence of evidence that Cheney 
eagerly reads Nomos o f the Earth in the bath, the simply equation Schmitt plus Strauss equals 
Bush is perversely appealing.
For the most part, the characterisation of Bush foreign policy as ‘Schmittian’ is polemical and 
unrealistic, and does further damage to attempts to study Schmitt’s political theory 
dispassionately and effectively. A brief survey of the literature in this area reveals a large 
volume of impressionistic attempts to draw some correlation, and surprisingly little interest in 
the only realistic avenues of influence. In other words, there is much interest in the idea that 
the ‘label Schmittian [seems] a good fit’, and little grafting to discover the nature of any 
influence.68 The notion that the neo-cons were ‘bom under a Schmittian star’ does little to 
enhance our understanding of what a ‘Schmittian’ foreign policy might actually be.69
65 P.Gottfried, After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State Princeton: Princeton 
University Press (1999)
66 B.Boyd ‘Carl Schmitt: Dick Cheney’s Eminence Grise’ in Executive Intelligence Review (6 Jan, 
2006)
67 S.V.Levinson ‘Torture in Iraq’ in Daedalus (133:3) (Summer 2004)
68 M.Specter ‘Perpetual War or Perpetual Peace? Schmitt, Habermas and Theories of American 




This approach of using ‘Schmittian’ as a term of intellectual abuse has also played a part in 
describing Huntingdon’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ thesis as somehow infused with Carl 
Schmitt’s concern for the political world as a pluriverse in which violence remains an ever 
present possibility.70 Whilst Huntingdon’s contention that conflict is an immutable part of the 
societal condition might draw on the Concept o f the Political, there is no necessity that it 
should do so. One hardly needs Schmitt to make the point that perpetual peace might be the 
least likely outcome. And as Ulmen points out, Huntingdon has a fundamentally different 
notion of the mechanics of political agency to Schmitt.71 For Huntingdon, conflict emerges 
from culture, whereas for Schmitt the ultimate political ration must be the act of command 
and inscription. Huntingdon is seeking sociological foundations that are too rigid to 
correspond to Schmitt’s basic understanding of the political.
Furthermore, it might be added that Huntingdon’s emphasis on the inscription of cultural 
hatred and the concomitant notion that the future Nomos he describes will witness radical 
instability is odds with the dispassionate description of enmity that Schmitt puts forward. 
There is no need for Schmitt’s enemies to hate one another, and their enmity is more perfect 
for its lack of hatred. By contrast, hate, infused with heavily layered cultural, religious, 
linguistic and racial difference is the very basis of the divisions that characterise Huntingdon’s 
schema. In many respects, Huntingdon seems to believe that the temperate enmity that 
Schmitt clings to has been subsumed by the very cultural aspects that Schmitt always insisted 
were subordinate to the basic fact of division. For Huntingdon, culture defines the political 
whereas Schmitt’s concept the political is the form-giving principle (in its ideal-type at least).
ii) Schmitt and the Right
As a man unequivocally of the hard Right, Schmitt is quite natural a sympathetic figure for the 
contemporary hard Right. In truth, Schmitt has been omnipresent, giving intellectual succour 
to the German-speaking Right throughout his years of internal exile.. Jan-Wemer Muller’s
70 S.Huntingdon, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' in Foreign Affairs Summer 1993.
71 See G.Ulmen, 'Towards a New World Order: Carl Schmitt's "The Land Appropriation of the New World"' in 
Telos 109 (Fall 1996)
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superb study of Schmitt’s influence in European thought cast light on Schmitt’s shadowy but 
astonishingly effective influence throughout German, French and Spanish intellectual circles.72 
Schmitt’s continuing influence on the Right is no less real as a result of its shadowy secrecy. 
Public figures on the Right always had more to lose from an acknowledged engagement with 
the Kronjurist of the Third Reich than those on the Left, and especially so in Germany where 
the process of intellectual rehabilitation was such an arduous and delicate process for so 
many. It is instructive, for instance, that German legal theorists of the 1950s such as Ernst 
Forsthoff, Rudiger Altmann and Hermann Liibbe were necessarily low-key in their 
appropriation of Schmitt’s constitutional concepts.73
As a result of the reputational sensitivities at stake in Germany, Schmitt’s influence on the 
right was more implicit than explicit. Hanno Kesting and Reinhard Koselleck were both 
informal pupils of Schmitt.74 Meanwhile, Roman Schnur drew on the Nomos o f the Earth in 
his study of the effect of utopianism on international law, and in expressing his hope for a 
renewed national ethic that could contain an element of liberalism within the nation.75 
Although this process of reception and advocacy was largely clandestine, Muller’s study 
suggests that the impact of Schmitt in the development of ideas of world order on the Right 
was ongoing and potent, both in Germany and beyond.
Partly as a result of the bars to the invocation of Schmitt in Germany, open reference to his 
work has been most prominent among the New Right in France, Italy and Spain. In large part 
these theorists have latched on to Schmitt’s innate Eurocentrism, and his suggestion of a new 
ordering of world politics in which the political uniqueness of Europe is emphasised in the 
creation of its own Grossraum. Led by Alain de Benoist, the political-legal primacy of 
Europe depicted in Nomos of the Earth has been overlaid with a theory of European cultural 
superiority in support of a radical right-wing vision of world order. Schmitt thus provides 
several isolated intellectual tools that the Nouvelle Droit have carefully utilised. The 
superiority of Europe in Nomos o f the Earth, is coupled to the possibility of Grossraum 
politics, and these two appropriations are both read in the light of the friend-enemy distinction 
as a call to radical political action. Whilst the way in which these concepts have been re­
72 J-W Muller, Dangerous Mind
731bid. p 76-86
74 Ibid. P. 104-115
75 R.Schnur, ‘Weltffiedensidee und Weltburgerkrieg 1791/92’ in Per Staat (Vol.2) (1963)
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coupled might seem logically dubious, it is worth remembering that the likes of Julien Freund 
and Gianfranco Miglio were pupils and associates of Schmitt, and so perhaps lay the best 
claim to represent a ‘Schmittian’ concept of international order.76
It should come as little surprise that Schmitt can be utilised in support of an essentially fascist 
view of the function of foreign policy. There is, after all, a pretty self-evident precedent for 
this. Whether or not this amounts to the adoption of Schmitt in IR, and whether there can 
even be a fascist theory of international relations, is for others to judge. The point rather is to 
stress that, for all the creative and dynamic uses of Schmitt’s thought in attempting to theorise 
contemporary international relations, it is important to remember that Schmitt is subject to 
pretty unambiguous application in the interests of the contemporary hard Right. Again, 
whether or not this observation should be taken as a ‘warning’ is for others to decide.
iii) Schmitt and the Left
Schmitt’s critique of a Wilsonian world order resonates equally on the Left among those who 
seek to challenge the Washington consensus, the abusive nature of supposedly ‘benign’ US 
hegemony and the erosion of local political difference. This approach is both the highest- 
profile and most surprisingly counter-intuitive use of Schmitt in thinking about contemporary 
world politics. The strange relationship between Schmitt and the New Left began in earnest 
in 1968, when their shared hostility to the ‘banality’ of liberal parliamentarism was thrown 
into sharp relief.
Initially, this effect was especially strong in Italy, where those on the Left who attempted to 
apply Schmitt’s concept of enmity into an absolute hostility to liberalism were derided as the 
Marxisti Schmittiani.11 According to Mario Tronti and his associates, placing enmity at the 
heart of a vision of politics not only negated the very logic of liberalism, it was also a spur to
76 Schmitt’s thought has been appropriated widely within the New Right, including a considerable focus 
on Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory. Recent works of a more explicitly international flavour include 
J.Freund ‘Schmitt’s Political Thought’ in Telos (102) (Winter 1995) ; A.de Benoist ‘Qu’est-ce que la 
souverainete’ in elements No.96 (Nov. 1999) ;
77 J-W Muller, Dangerous Mind p. 178
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increased radicalism. Schmitt could be used to bring together an almost syndicalist notion of 
political unity with the sheer aggression of the enmity distinction. Furthermore, the 
identification of political unity as a concept prior to and distinct from the state was deployed 
as a further theoretical prop in support of revolution action to tear down the stale, outmoded 
and hypocritical edifice of the bourgeois state.
In recent years, some of the Marxisti Schmittiani have radically adjusted the balance away 
from discredited Marxism and towards a more thoroughgoing adoption of Schmitt as a 
talisman of the Left. Much work in this area has centred on the ideas of radical democracy 
and agonal pluralism in opposition to the allegedly apolitical and dominating stasis of the 
liberal state. As with the critique from the Right, this approach draws intimately on Schmitt’s 
sustained assault on supposedly universal values of liberalism as a cloak for political interests 
and as a means of eroding identity.
Such a critique is international in its manifestation since the whole objective is to assert the 
validity and necessity of difference, yet tends to focus more narrowly on the alleged hypocrisy 
of Western universalism.78 The universalism that Schmitt feared on its own terms as the 
negation of politics is recast by the Left as a particular, identifiable phenomenon -  namely the 
triumph of Western liberal capitalism. Assertion of ‘the Political’ thus becomes a defence 
against a form of universalism to be feared and despised, rather than the necessary, de facto, 
assertion of ‘the Political’ on its own terms against an idea of universalism that remains 
abstract. Slavoj Zizek summarises the appeal of Schmitt to those on the Left concerned with 
this defence against liberal hegemony;
‘...the way to counteract the re-emerging ultra-politics is not more tolerance, 
more compassion and multicultural understanding, but the return o f the 
political proper, that it, the reassertion of the dimension of antagonism which, 
far from denying universality, is cosubstantial with it. That is the key 
component of the proper leftist stance as opposed to the rightist assertion of
78 As William Rasch puts it, ‘Not only is conflict within the system outlawed, but also that among the 
systems, for universal morality always results in ‘reconciliation’, whether one wants it or not. Such 
‘outlawry’ never operates neutrally; such ‘reconciliation’ always camouflages a differend and 
masquerades as peace.’ W.Rasch ‘Conflict as a Vocation’ in Theory, Culture & Society 17:6 p.26
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one’s particular identity  true universalists are those ... who engage in a
passionate struggle for the assertion of a Truth that compels them.,79
In other words, Schmitt’s emphasis on the particular nature of politics is useful at this time, 
and in this context, because the universalism on offer to us is unacceptable. Liberal 
universalism cannot represent true freedom and as such must be resisted by the reassertion of 
particular identities, and the exposition of Western claims to benign leadership as fraud and 
hypocrisy. Schmitt thus provides a theoretical underpinning to a form of bunker mentality 
that continues to hope for the ultimate achievement of the ‘Truth that compels them.’ It
hardly need be stressed that this sense for the role of ‘the Political’ is radically at odds with
the hostility that Schmitt felt per se towards universalism. Schmitt’s fear was of universalism 
qua universalism. Just as his analysis of the state is underpinned by a foundational sense of 
the meaning of politics, his critique of liberalism is underpinned by a foundational fear of 
world unity. Schmitt’s concerns are clearly not co-extensive with those Left Schmittians 
whose primary fear is liberalism itself.
This use of Schmitt is motivated by a desire to find an active and political response to the 
current situation. The objective is to theorise a response to the triumph of liberalism that is 
more satisfactory than Adorno’s fatalistic advocacy of ‘near asceticism as a response to a 
modernity in which even culture becomes an industry. ’80 For William Rasch et al, recourse to 
Schmitt is all about ‘establishing the logical possibility o f legitimate political opposition.'*1 
Schmitt provides a point of departure for creating an assertive and linguistically novel arena 
for attacking the current political consensus. He is seen as providing ‘vocabularies that do not 
just emphatically repeat philosophically more sophisticated versions of the liberal ideology of 
painless, effortless, universal equality.’82
79 S.Zizek ‘Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics’ in The Challenge of Carl Schmitt (ed. Mouffe) 
p.35
80 W.Rasch, Sovereignty and Its Discontents: On the Primacy of Conflict and the Structure of the 
Political London: Birckbeck Law Press (2004) p. 1
81 W.Rasch Sovereignty and Its Discontents p. 13
82 W.Rasch, ‘Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle’ in The South Atlantic Quarterly 
104:2 p.261
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Those who seek to apply Schmitt in this direction adopt varying degrees of theoretical 
sophistication, but are collectively driven by their ability to identify with Schmitt’s basic 
contention that modem liberalism and its international manifestations are intellectually and 
morally bankrupt. A strange substitute for a discredited Marxism of old, Schmitt has emerged 
as an ally of convenience in the raging debates against globalisation and the triumph of 
American power. The appeal of Schmitt in this context lies, most basically, in the way that 
he ‘lifted [the] veil’ between law and political fact, and in so doing helped to answer the 
‘question that never ceases to reverberate in the history of Western politics: what does it mean 
to act politically?’83 Schmitt continues to be a spur to leftist radicalism in the extremity of the 
political position he presents.84
Leftist Schmittians have been given a second wind by the work of the Italian professor of 
aesthetics Giorgio Agamben, and his theory of ‘bare life.’ Agamben argues that the 
contemporary world order has eradicated the sense of interior and exterior that characterised 
the jus publicum Europaeum described by Schmitt. This has exposed the ‘bare life’ of 
individuals who assert an exterior unto themselves, and stand in contradistinction to the 
homogenous Empire of liberal civil society. Agamben subscribes to Schmitt’s fear that denial 
of the basic, legal distinctions of the state leads inexorably to a violent and uncontrollable 
hyperpoliticisation, and takes a critical interest in Schmitt’s development of a 
Partisanentheorie as a way of thinking about the political effects of resistance to hegemony.85 
Jan-Wemer Muller argues, not implausibly, that this ‘Schmittian’ pessimism about a world 
without meaningful political divisions can be traced from Schmitt, via Agamben, to the 
influential work of Hardt and Negri. 86 We will return later, in this context, to the viability of 
using Schmitt’s thoughts on the Partisan in this sort of application.
83 G. Agamben State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) p.2
84 Most recently, Schmitt’s critique of liberalism is deployed as an explanation for the current 
phenomenon of global terrorism. As Mouffe argues, ‘There is certainly a correlation between the 
now unchallenged power of the United States and the proliferation of terrorist groups. Of course, in 
no way do I want to pretend that this is the only explanation. Terrorism has always existed, and it is 
due to a multiplicity of factors. But it undeniably tends to flourish in circumstances where there are 
no legitimate political channels for the expression of grievances.' Mouffe, ‘Schmitt’s Vision of a 
Multipolar World Order’ in The South Atlantic Quarterly p.250 (my emphasis)
85 See G.Agamben ‘Homo Sacer’: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (trans. D. Heller-Roazen) (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998). Following the advent of the ‘War on Terror’, Agamben takes up 
the theme of the state of exception and the exercise of executive power in State of the Exception 
(2005)
86 M.Hardt & A.Negri Empire (Harvard, 2000). See J-W Muller Dangerous Mind p.229
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What remains here, however, is a certain perplexity at Schmitt’s sticking power on the 
European Left. It is certainly understandable that Schmitt formed an object of interest and a 
useful shock factor to Mario Tronti and his associates in the 1960s. Understandable too, 
would be the strategic and occasional deployment of Schmittian concepts and phrases in 
support of a broader, and conceptually distinct emancipatory project. Yet in the circles where 
his thought is celebrated, Schmitt looks like a godfather above the intellectual landscape. The 
epithet ‘Schmittian’ is adopted with a certain intellectual and moral pride, perhaps as a badge 
of intellectual bravery. Uncovering the reasons for this inverse dogmatism would require a 
thesis unto itself, and would probably prove a futile exercise in deductive psychology anyway. 
The one factor that emerges again, however, is Schmitt’s seductive and self-contained style. 
Once one climbs on board with Schmitt’s conceptual language, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to disembark and draw alternative, dispassionate linkages. Such, again, are the 
strengths and weaknesses of a compelling Begriffsmagie.
It is impossible to improve upon Muller’s withering assessment of the use of Schmitt by the 
contemporary Left;
‘Schmitt’s apocalyptic vision that almost anything was preferable to liberalism 
had apparently invaded the Marxist imagination -  and often made into a form 
of messianism. ... But as long as the Left continued to lack an alternative 
social reality, it would be all the more likely that it would have to resort to 
rusty and double-edged Schmittian swords in its battle against global 
capitalism.,87
iv) Kosovo
Nowhere was the contemporary use of Schmitt in the theory and polemic of contemporary 
international relations made clearer than in debates over the use of force in Kosovo. Both 
Left and Right made extensive use of Schmitt as a critical tool, and the example serves as 
consolidation and overview for the ostensible parameters of a ‘Schmittian’ foreign policy. For 
‘Schmittians’ Kosovo represented the hypocrisy and danger of liberal foreign policy in 
microcosm. The West claims to speak in the name of an abstract ‘humanity’ whilst all the
87 J-W Muller, Dangerous Mind p231-232
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time pursuing its own political goals. According to the critics, the inconsistency of the two 
objectives becomes clear in failure to obtain a UN mandate, and by comparison with other 
international scenarios.
Why Kosovo and not Rwanda, ask the Left? The Schmittian answer is that the much vaunted 
‘ethical foreign policy’ that seeks to legitimate intervention only comes into play when real, 
old-fashioned, particular interests are at stake. The prospect of Albanian refugees continuing 
to flood into Bari and Brindisi was reason enough for Italy. The prospect of wider 
conflagration, and disruption to German and Austrain business interests in the Balkans was 
reason enough for the rest of the EU. Yet once again, the West dresses up its policy interests 
in the name of humanity. Thus the critique mounted by Danilo Zolo and others directly 
echoes Schmitt’s critique of the claims of the Allied powers to act in the universal interest in 
the 1923 Ruhr crisis, in 1939, or again in the great confrontations of the Cold War.88
Schmitt was also utilised in the critique of the methods of warfare deployed in Kosovo, 
emphasising as they did the indirect and responsibility-free use of force that characterises 
modern Western warfare (or, as Schmitt might have had it, potestas indirecta). Thus the use 
of sanctions regimes, bombing from high altitude and the techniques of psychological warfare 
all fall within the banner of indirect and hypocritical power.
‘Pure economic imperialism will also apply a stronger, but still economic, 
and therefore (according to this terminology) nonpolitical, essentially peaceful 
means of force. A 1921 League of Nations resolution enumerates as 
examples: economic sanctions and severance of the food supply from the 
civilian population....
War is condemned but executions, sanctions, punitive expeditions, 
pacifications, protection of treaties, international police, and measures to 
assure peace remain. The adversary is thus no longer called an enemy but a 
disturber of the peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of 
humanity.’89




For these readers of Schmitt, such criticisms penned in 1932 are equally true of the foreign 
policy goals and methods of NATO.
For the Right Kosovo seemed dangerous precisely because it appeared to shepherd in a new 
paradigm in international law that, once in place, might prove hard to shift. After a decade of 
debate on the collapse of the sovereign state and a rising norm of interventionism, Kosovo 
seemed to mark the final ‘waning of the state’ and the emergence of a ‘new paradigm of 
international law.’90 Western states should not baulk from expressing their political interests 
through foreign policy, and certainly shouldn’t enter into the language of global 
humanitarianism, and so give rise to the prospect of being hung by their own petard. 
Milosovic as an international enemy would be fine. But Milosovic as an individual subject of 
international law, and a war mounted in defence of the interests of Kosovars treated as, 
individually, the responsibility of international humanity seemed disastrous. For the Right, 
therefore, there was more to be feared from the thought that the humanitarian discourse in the 
West was actually true.
v) Schmitt and the Postmodernists
Given the appeal of Schmitt to radicals of seemingly every persuasion, it was only a matter of 
time before Schmitt appeared in post-modern debates on the viability of the state concept. We 
needn’t linger too long here, other than to note that the value of Schmitt to post-modernism 
centres on the impossible question of whether or not his concept of the political is 
foundational or not. Even Jacques Derrida, whose Politics o f Friendship is in part an 
extended engagement with Schmitt’s thought, declined to reach any conclusions on the matter. 
He held out the possibility that Schmitt is essentially a diagnostic thinker, whose basic concern 
for the contingency of foundational concepts on the concrete reality of confrontation could be 
proto-post-structuralist to some degree.91 This question cannot be answered, of course, 
without thorough consideration of the degree to which Schmitt was irreversibly attached to the 
state-form, despite the potential freedom created by his independent concept of the Political.
90 C.Schreuer ‘The waning of the nation state: towards a new paradigm for international law’ in 
European Journal of International Law (1993)
91 See J.Derrida The Politics of Friendship (trans. G.Collins) London: Verso (1997) p. 104
54
One could dwell indefinitely here on points of intersection and divergence between Schmitt 
and post-structural ideas. In certain respects, this work as a whole addresses the question of 
Schmitt's approach to foundations and the temporality of concepts, and so places him in a 
context where such points of intersection might hopefully become evident. It is worth noting 
that this concern for political design, and Schmitt's continued quest to define the deep 
institutions of political life does and will continue to make him an interesting point of 
reference in post-structural thinking on global order. There is doubtless a case for arguing 
that Schmitt himself is a sort of a post-structural thinker, since the focus of his theory is on 
the problematic aspects of this process of definition and maintenance of concepts.
The point, for the time being, is to highlight the fact that Schmitt's work has been, and is 
likely to be invoced in mainstream IR through the work of those whose primary concern is 
with philosophies of knowledge. Schmitt will be of manifest value as both a resource and a 
challenge to those who question the logical possibility of ordering concepts and the political 
presuppositions that drive the agenda of political theorists of all shades. It remains to be seen 
how this process will take shape, and whether the gap in language between Schmitt's ideas of 
truth and the scepticism of those who deal with him will be bridged.
vi) Schmitt and the Liberal Challenge
Schmitt’s rehabilitation as a thinker to be read and taken seriously, if not to be admired, is by 
now sufficiently advanced as to have engaged the attention of those beyond the radical Left 
and Right, and their post-structuralist critics. Whilst many in the ‘mainstream’ would 
doubtless prefer to continue the ‘ostrich’ approach of the past sixty years, and consign Schmitt 
to history, this appears to be an increasingly unviable and unnecessary attitude. Whilst 
perhaps the most tepid approach to using Schmitt in international political theory, there is 
nothing intrinsically flawed in reading Schmitt as a conceptual challenge requiring of a 
response. This, after all, was the dominant attitude with which Schmitt was initially received 
into Anglo-American political theory in the 1980s -  a process that produced much good 
analytical research.
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On the one hand, this approach can focus on the ‘lessons’ that Schmitt can teach us. Schmitt 
can be read as exemplary of the dangers of losing sight of a sense of academic moral 
responsibility and of uncoupling the power of thought from its political uses. Mark Lilia 
makes much this point in his consideration of Schmitt as one of a number of ‘reckless minds’ 
who, in their various ways, aggravated the dangerous potential of their thought with foolhardy 
forays into politics.92 Lilia addresses the question of the responsibility that intellectuals bear 
for the policy application of their ideas, and takes parallel snapshots of Heidegger’s complicity 
in Nazism, and Foucault’s strange applause for the Ayatollahs. In itself, the argument in 
favour of responsible scholarship is sound, but there is something of the schoolmistress to 
start a liberal ‘engagement’ with Schmitt on such terms.
More productive examples of responding to the ‘challenge’ of Schmitt on the international 
level have tended to follow the lead of David Dyzenhaus in accepting and seeking to address 
Schmitt’s challenge to a liberal concept of neutrality. Schmitt can be used in this way as a 
stalking horse within liberalism (including debates on a liberal foreign policy) in order to 
attack excessive formalism and the hiding of politics behind formless legalism. Dyzenhaus 
himself, although ultimately rejecting Schmitt, nevertheless deploys Schmitt’s critique of 
liberal neutrality against the legalist concept of political power advocated by Dworkin and, to 
a lesser extent, Rawls.93 Ironically, given the legendary antipathy between the two men, this 
approach is suggestive of the use of Schmitt as a weapon of attack in support of a more 
Habermasian, deliberative democracy against the formal legalism of Anglo-American 
liberalism.94
92 M.Lilia The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics (New York, 2001)
93 D.Dyzenhaus Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Herman Heller in Weimar 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press (1999)
94 Such a consequence would doubtless be equally distasteful for both Schmitt and Habermas. Whilst 
acknowledging Schmitt’s intellectual capability, Habermas condemns his ‘crude anti-Semitism and 
toadying to the Nazi authorities’, characterising him as fascinated ‘above all [by] the aesthetics of 
violence.’ (J.Habermas, The New Conservatism (trans. S.W.Nicholson) Cambridge MA: MIT Press 
(1989). Ellen Kennedy provoked fury by arguing for a logical connection between Schmitt and 
Habermas. Pointing out connections between Habermas’s Stuctural Transformation and Reinhard 
Koselleck’s Critique and Crisis, Kennedy argues that the latter’s self-professed debt to Schmitt silently 
extends to the Frankfurt School (E.Kennedy ‘Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School’ in Telos 71 
(Spring 1987)
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The most original liberal argument in support of Schmitt is that deployed by Renato Cristi in 
support of his theory of ‘authoritarian liberalism.’95 Cristi argues that the fundamental 
character of the stable modem state, according to Schmitt, is the unquestioned sovereign 
authority of its government both internally and externally. Provided sovereignty as the locus 
of decision is not undermined, the nature of governance itself can be inherently liberal (in the 
sense that it is participatory and guarantees civic freedoms). Indeed, in Nomos o f the Earth 
and The Crisis o f Parliamentary Democracy, Schmitt does hold up the national liberalism of 
nineteenth century liberalism as combining certain ‘freedoms’ with a stable political 
framework. However, Cristi’s exemplary cases of Singapore and various Latin American 
democracies more or less makes the point that the privilege Schmitt grants to the exercise of 
sovereignty is necessarily at odds with the logic of liberalism. Whilst the phrase 
‘authoritarian liberalism’ might adequately describe a historical situation, the concept is 
ultimately oxymoronic if one subscribes to Schmitt’s notion of authority.
The use of Schmitt as a challenge, and as a tool occasionally to critique the political nature of 
Western liberalism has its merits, but as with the leftist use of Schmitt, one wonders how far 
the use of Schmitt in particular is necessary. There is a hollowness to the assertion of some 
need to be watchful for the pitfalls of which Schmitt serves as warning. For those who yearn 
for the arrival of cosmopolitan internationalism (or, for the more optimistic among them, 
celebrate its arrival), Schmitt necessarily represents the past. And this is necessarily so, since 
the achievement of such a condition in reality was the political nadir that Schmitt so feared, 
and worked so tirelessly in seeking to avert.
On the other hand, if there is a timelessness to Schmitt’s insights, then the fundamental insight 
that should be of concern to international political theory is the assertion, to borrow Frost’s 
phrase, that good fences make good neighbours. If ‘the Political’ really is immutable, and 
conflict is an omnipresent possibility in man’s social condition, then Schmitt’s concern for the 
stability of the Nomos becomes paramount. The challenge then would be to recreate the 
successful ‘bracketing’ of war and to emulate the ‘one singular accomplishment of continental 
European jurists and governments in the 17th and 18th centuries, and accomplishment that was 
perpetuated in the 19th century: the rationalization and humanization of war.’96
95 R.Cristi Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy Cardiff: Cardiff 
University Press (1998)
96 Schmitt Nomos of the Earth p. 149
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Whether or not Schmitt’s views on international order presents a challenge depends on the 
degree to which one shares his fear of nihilism. For those who welcomed Fukuyama’s 
prognosis of an end to history, Schmitt’s fundamental concern will be incomprehensible. By 
contrast, for those who would prefer an anarchy in which one knows where one stands to a 
universalism in which one is nowhere and everywhere at one, Schmitt will offer some source 
of inspiration;
‘[In the Middle Ages] there had been tumultuous conditions of a terrible sort, 
also on European soil -  conditions of “anarchy”, but not of “nihilism” in the 
sense of the 19th and 20th centuries. If “nihilism” is not to become an empty 
phrase, one must comprehend the specific negativity whereby it obtains its 
historical place: its topos. Only in this way can the nihilism of the 19th and 
20th centuries be distinguished from the anarchistic conditions of the Christian 
Middle Ages. In the connection between utopia and nihilism, it becomes 
apparent that only a conclusive and fundamental separation of order and 
orientation can be called “nihilism” in an historically specific sense.’97
What follows is an attempt to sketch out Schmitt’s own understanding of the historical 
realisation of this looming disaster, and the way that this historical consciousness affected his 
ability to theorise beyond the state. It is only by considering Schmitt’s specific and 
idiosyncratic understanding of history that we can begin to understand the uniqueness of the 
crisis of the state in Schmitt’s mind, and the hefty consequences he ascribed to this. 
Realisation of Schmitt’s peculiar pessimism may well leave room for others to develop a 
Schmittian concept of world order in his stead. To ignore, however, the theological and 
historiographical aspects of Schmitt’s account of modem international relations would be to 
engage in the kind of selective reading of which Schmitt himself was all too fond.
97 Ibid. p.66
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CHAPTER 3 -  UNRAVELLING SOVEREIGNTY
‘Do not concern yourself: the Leviathan -  its shadow is long -  therefore 
the Leviathan is already concerned for me. It already holds an honoured 
place in the barbed wire Prytaneum waiting for me. There it will sustain 
me with food and drink befitting o f the place. ’
Carl Schmitt1
The isolation of stable concepts of power and authority are the hallmarks of Schmitt’s 
theoretical method. As the previous chapter makes clear, the dominant starting point for all 
of Schmitt’s political thinking is the state, and its specific, defining attribute, sovereignty. All 
of Schmitt’s early work was directly or indirectly concerned with accurately defining the state, 
and making clear the relationship between the state and the Political. In theoretical terms, 
Schmitt rests on a definition of sovereignty as the power to decide on the exception -  the pure 
capacity to impose a coherent ordering decision at the point at which law ends. To act 
politically is to define enemies. To exercise sovereignty is to decide on the exception. These 
are the twin poles of Schmitt’s familiar, ideal theory of politics in the state.
This lean set of definitions that Schmitt worked out in the 1920s and early 1930s undoubtedly 
remain as his most distinctive contribution to subsequent political theory. By isolating out the 
essence of political authority, Schmitt created a powerful descriptive and analytical tool with 
which to criticise political reality. Yet this slimline approach to theory inevitably left several 
questions of an historical nature that Schmitt was forced to address in his later work. In 
situating an ahistoric set of concepts of the state, Schmitt had thus far had comparatively little 
to say about the existence and persistence of these concepts over time. Moreover, despite 
logically separating attributes of the Political (enmity), from the narrower attributes of 
sovereignty (a contextual decision), Schmitt fails to exploit the historical relationship of the 
latter to the former. He famously asserts that ‘the concept of the state presupposes the 
concept of the political’, but does not go on to explore the specific attributes and historical
1 ‘Sorge dich nich: der Leviathan -  lang sei sein Schatten -,also der Leviathan wird schon fur mich 
sorgen. Schon halt er eine ehrenvolle Unterkunft in einen Stacheldraht-Prytaneum fur mich bereit. 
Dort wird er mich auch unterhalten mit Speisen und Getranken, die seiner wttrdig sind. ’ Schmitt, 
Glossarium: Aujzeichnungen der Jahre 1947-1951 Berlin: Duncker & Humblot (1991) p. 180
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experience of statehood.2 Schmitt’s theoretical explorations clearly raise a profound historical 
question -  how, when, and on what basis has the state come to dominate the exercise of the 
Political? And in the shadow there lies an ancillary question -  what if this monopoly 
collapses?
It is evident that Schmitt had always implicitly subscribed to a commonplace understanding of 
the modem state as a conceptually distinct entity, with its origins in the convulsions of 
reformation. As early as 1923, Schmitt depicted the European Middle Ages as an era before 
the state, in which political life was organised as a complexio oppositorum -  a situation in 
which the varying enmity of kings, princes, ecclesiastical rulers, republics and dukes all took 
place within the context of shared commitment to Rome.3 Assuming, as Schmitt does, that the 
Political is a permanent condition of human life, it is evident that the state can only be a 
temporary locus of politics. The political history of the state has a beginning, and, 
presumably, a potential end.
Schmitt’s first stop in the conceptual history of the state is Jean Bodin whom he considers to 
‘stand at the beginning of the modem theory of the state.’4 Indeed, the concept of sovereignty 
that Schmitt develops in Political Theology and deploys in The Concept o f the Political, 
resonates most strongly with Bodin’s methods and typology. Both were concerned to distil a 
precise and ahistorical definition of sovereign power in an attempt to illustrate and secure its 
conceptual priority over other claims. Bodin was concerned to ‘clarify the meaning of 
sovereign power’, and aphoristically settled on a definition of sovereignty as ‘the absolute and 
perpetual power of a commonwealth’, which is to say, ‘the highest power of command.’5 
Schmitt celebrates Bodin’s elevation of command in a single locus -  the total and indivisible 
possession of power -  in his own definition of sovereignty as decision on the exception.6
2 Schmitt, Concept of the Political p. 19
3 See Schmitt, Romischer Katholizmus und Politische Form (2nd ed.) Cologne: Klett-Cotta pp. 11-16
4 Schmitt, Political Theology p.8
5 J.Bodin, On Sovereignty (trans. J.H.Franklin) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1992) p.l
6 Schmitt suggest that ‘by considering sovereignty to be indivisible, he finally settled the question of 
power in the state.’ Political Theology p.8. See also A.Norris , ‘Sovereignty, Exception, and Norm’ 
in Journal of Law and Society 34:1 pp.42-44
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In his early focus on defining and refining the core elements of sovereign authority, Schmitt 
has much in common with Bodin. Faced with a wholly distinct context, Bodin surely 
produces a more sympathetic and less necessarily oppressive settled understanding of 
sovereignty.7 But in terms of method, they both seek to produce a stable set of concepts to 
characterise sovereignty, and to provide roots. They are both committed to sovereignty as a 
principle of order that precedes ideas of justification or permission. And they both posit a 
fundamentally ahistorical notion of sovereignty conceived in terms of its permanence.8 They 
both try to produce an immutable yardstick against which the vagaries of real, non-ideal 
political life might be measured.
In time, Schmitt came to recognise the limitations of this stark separation of a concept of 
sovereignty from the historical manifestations of its practice. Increasingly during the 1930s, 
Schmitt turned towards an examination of the state as an historically conditioned product, 
situating the concept of sovereignty in a non-ideal context.9 Having settled on a workable set 
of political definitions, Schmitt turned his concern to the existence of the state, and the system 
of states, as a conceptual-historical reality. Of necessity, this focus combined elements of raw 
political history with a more abstract examination of the rise and fall of the state as a category 
that monopolised exercise of the Political. The starting point to a reading of Schmitt’s history 
of international order is a closer examination of this reading of the historical survival of the 
state as the basic unit of such an order.
Schmitt’s curious historical method starts from his pre-formed concept. He is engaged by the 
history of the Political, the history of the State, the history of the Jus Publicum Europaeum. 
Indeed, throughout his oeuvre, history qua historiography is an under-theorised component of 
his political thought as a whole. And likewise, the challenge of reading Schmitt as a historian
7 For a discussion of points of divergence between Schmitt and Bodin see G.Harste ‘Jean Bodin on 
Sovereignty, State and Central Administration’ in Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 
2 (2001)
8 For both Bodin and Schmitt, historical contingency may attend to the survival of a particular bearer of 
sovereignty, but sovereignty itself is ‘not limited either in power, or in function, or in length of time’ 
Bodin On Sovereignty p.3
9 One cannot be overly prescriptive in drawing these chronological distinctions. However, I broadly 
agree with Ojakangas’s characterisation of 1933 as a dividing line between Schmitt’s early work on 
the decision and a formal definition of sovereignty, and his subsequent exploration of ‘concrete orders 
and institutions.’ See Ojakangas A Philosophy of Concrete Life: Carl Schmitt and the Political 
Thought of Late Modernity Bern: Peter Lang p. 19
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has been taken up only selectively. Whilst Nomos o f the Earth in particular has been read as 
an historical work, the interest has focussed largely on the way in which Schmitt has 
appropriated historical phenomena such as the Congress of Vienna or the establishment of the 
Monroe doctrine in illuminating his contemporary political theory. Any ‘Schmittian’ ‘theory’ 
of history is somewhat more elusive.
During the Nazi period, Schmitt was condemned and dispossessed on the grounds of his 
alleged Hegelianism, an accusation brought by Ernst Roehm in connection with supposed 
progressivism in Schmitt’s political work.10 Certainly, Schmitt is never wholly detached from 
the German tradition of thinking about the organic and total nature of the state. His critical 
engagement with Hegelian philosophies of history is worthy of detailed examination, and 
forms an important element of his wider critique of neutralisation and positivism.11 However, 
the purpose of this chapter is to argue that a different form of determinism marks Schmitt’s 
theory of international order. Rather than being characterised by progression, the prospects 
of the state are coloured instead by a determined process of unravelling and dissolution that 
can be read into the very content of the state concept itself.
It is Hobbes, rather than Hegel, who emerges as the dominant figure in the formation and 
explanation of this process of unravelling. It is Hobbes who provides a theoretical peg on 
which Schmitt hangs his interpretation of the state as a concrete historical entity. Through his 
reading of Hobbes, Schmitt establishes a historical framework with which to evaluate the fate 
of the state. By conflating the ‘Hobbesian’ ‘theory’ of the state with the emergence of the 
state as a concrete entity, Schmitt sets about searching for causal clues to the current condition 
of the state as a bearer of politics.
A note of caution is necessary here. By Chapters VI and VII of his 1938 study of Hobbes' 
Leviathan it is evident that Schmitt has conflated the Hobbesian theory of the state with the 
modern state in its concrete manifestation. This conflation seems deliberate and self- 
conscious, and leads one to conclude that Schmitt read the actual modem state as the product
10 In December 1936 the SS publication Das schwarze Korps savaged Schmitt as an opportunist Catholic rooted in a 
Hegelian concept of the state. It asserted that his avowed anti-Semitism was a mere artifice designed to gamer 
favour with the regime. See J.Bendersky, 'The Expendable Kronjurist: Carl Schmitt and National Socialism, 
1933-1936' in the Journal of Contemporary History 14:2 (1979) pp.309-328.
11 See Chapter 5 below. For an overview of Schmitt’s reading of Hegel see R.Howse ‘Europe and the 
New World Order’ in Leiden Journal of International Law 19:1 (2006). See also Chapter 5.
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of Hobbes’s concept of the state. Schmitt gives a cursory account, for instance, of how 
‘Hobbes’ important theory of the state did not materialize in England and among the English 
people but on the European continent among the land powers.’12 The Cromwell dictatorship 
came close to inaugurating a Hobbesian state, but in the end it was the French and Germans 
who, it is suggested, who turned concept into dominating reality.13
This notion of materialisation is quite extraordinary. Schmitt appears to be seriously 
suggesting that, via a process of translation through Pufendorf and others, Hobbes’ theory of 
the state was transformed into political reality. Even by Schmitt’s standards of reduction, this 
appears a remarkably loose notion of causation, and Schmitt declines to elaborate on or justify 
his bold attempt to read the state concept in reality as more or less identical to Hobbes’s idea 
of Leviathan. One must be in no doubt but that the methodology of Schmitt’s study of 
Leviathan is entirely self-serving. For our purposes, however, we must tolerate this 
conflation of conceptual origin and political manifestation, since our interest is in the way in 
which Schmitt thought about the history of the state. Schmitt’s curious study of Hobbes is the 
clearest exposition of Schmitt’s own ideas on the historicity of the state.
In this regard, it is no coincidence that Schmitt’s discussion of Hobbes exhibits a growing 
concern for the interrelationship of political authority and questions of political belief. We 
will argue for an understanding of Schmitt’s historiography as characterised by a problematic 
form of "endism". Grandly determinist in its tone, Schmitt is concerned to portray history in 
terms of the fate of the state as a bearer of truth. This fatalism, aligned with a fear of 
universalism that is unmistakable eschatological in character, profoundly impacts Schmitt’s 
understanding of the possibilities inherent in political theory, and his own potential to provide 
theoretical answers to political problems. It is in his work on Hobbes, and the accompanying 
account of the unravelling of the state, that Schmitt is most explicit about this unique historical 
pessimism.
As Morgenthau was to realise with bitterness, Schmitt was extraordinarily reluctant to 
acknowledge intellectual debt, either to his peers or ‘great men’ playing a part in the
12 Schmitt, Leviathan, p.79
13 Schmitt’s account of the English rejection of Hobbes’ state model, and the unique basis of the Anglo- 
Saxon state is considered further in Chapter 4 of this work.
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formulation of his thought.14 In pure intellectual terms, Schmitt presents himself as something 
of an autodidact. There is little acknowledgement of the nationalist context provided by Max 
Weber, and even his important and highly productive confrontation with Leo Strauss was 
carried out in largely coded form.15 And although it is clear enough that Schmitt belongs to a 
recognisable stable of counter-Revolutionary, archconservative thinkers such as de Bonald and 
de Maistre, he rejects the status of “disciple” to any recognisable figure.
Three figures threaten to break through this self-created isolation. In his post-war work 
especially, Schmitt expresses a fairly uncomplicated admiration for two figures of European 
counter-revolution, de Maistre and Donoso Cortes.16 Although his consideration of the latter, 
in particular, is of considerable importance in formulating Schmitt’s ideas about the Catholic 
church as a complex and universalising political agent, their position in relation to the history 
of the state is fairly straightforward. Schmitt admires them both for the zeal of their 
counterrevolution, the determination with which they pursued an intelligent reformulation of 
hierarchies of order, and the belief they shared in the possibility of uniting true religious faith 
with a stable political order. Whilst both are important in Schmitt’s impression of the history 
of the state in the early nineteenth century, neither gives much clue as to Schmitt’s deeper 
sense of the historical fate of the state. For this, we must turn to Hobbes.
Schmitt’s use of Hobbes in constructing a long-view of the history of the state comes with a 
health warning concerning the nature of the parallels to be drawn. Our primary concern here 
is with Hobbes’ place in the elaboration of Schmitt’s peculiar and pessimistic account of 
modern history. As such, we are interested in Hobbes as the textual figure, seen through 
Schmitt’s eyes. A part of this textual reading concerns Schmitt’s own impression that
parallels existed between himself and Hobbes, both in terms of the anarchic political situations
14 After an initially warm relationship, Morgenthau fell our with Schmitt, in part because of Schmitt’s 
failure to acknowledge Morgenthau’s clear influence on his re-draft of Concept of the Political. For a 
detailed examination of the complicated relationship between Schmitt and Morgenthau see Scheuerman 
End of Law chapter 11; C.Frei Hans J.Morgenthau: an Intellectual Biography (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2001) pp. 118-132; M.C.Williams, 'Why Ideas Matter in 
International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism and the Moral Construction of Power 
Politics' in International Organization 58 (2004) p.633-635.
15 Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss
16 With the exception of Hobbes, Donoso Cortes is the only thinker whom Schmitt examined in a book 
length essay in his Donoso Cortes in gesamteuropaeischer Interpretation Cologne: Greven Verlag 
(1950)
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they both encountered, and in their shared belief in the paramount importance of stable 
political concepts. Schmitt’s own reading of this parallel is important in establishing his 
reading of time, and in his general account of the time-limited existence of the state.
However, this thesis is also concerned more broadly with the question of Schmitt’s relevance 
as a political theorist to ongoing questions of international political theory. In this context, it 
is interesting to parenthetically draw our own parallels between Hobbes as a political theorist 
of action, and any attempt that Schmitt may or may not have made to emulate the relative 
success of Hobbes in formulating and promulgating stable political concepts. This is a more 
judgemental analysis, and requires clear separation from consideration of the parallels Schmitt 
himself drew. It is hoped that the separation between these divergent concerns will be 
maintained as far as is possible, although they will meet, of course, in Schmitt’s own 
interpretation of the weaknesses of Hobbes’ political theory of action.
The Leviathan in the State Theory o f Thomas Hobbes : Meaning and Failure o f a Political 
Symbol
Where his own theory of the Political starts with the bald expression of the power to bind, 
Schmitt sees myth as the starting point of Hobbes’s innovation of the state as a new historical 
category. Starting from the idea of the Leviathan, Schmitt constructs a vision of the state in 
which the interplay of myth, belief and obedience are the key historical motors. The question 
of political faith and the link between revelation and political obedience are an increasing 
theme in Schmitt’s work following his study of Hobbes. One need not, in order to recognise 
this truth, accept in whole Heinrich Meier’s thesis that Schmitt is best read as political 
theologian contra political philosophy as a whole.17 Indeed, the concern for order that links 
Schmitt to Hobbes is suggestive of a complex amalgam of philosophy and religion, at exactly 
the point where ‘politics and religion collide.’18 Both perceived themselves as writing against a 
background of unprecedented political disorder and uncertainty, and in both cases the origin of
17 Meier, H. The Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the Distinction Between Political Theology 
and Political Philosophy (trans.M.Brainard) Chicago: Chicago University Press (1998)
18 Ibid. p. 101
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this disorder was diagnosed as the destructive ‘contrast of autoritas and veritas.,19 Whereas 
for Hobbes this dissociation manifested itself in the Thirty Years War and competition between 
sovereign and papal authority, for Schmitt the separation could be seen in the advance of 
formless universalisms (liberal, Bolshevik, even (arguably) fascist) at the expense of the 
sovereign unit.
Schmitt saw parallels between the mid-seventeenth and mid-twentieth centuries, and regarded 
himself as driven by similar political imperatives as Hobbes. As Meier points out, ‘it is 
certain that no other philosopher is present in a similar way in Schmitt’s oeuvre’ as a whole.20 
Hobbes’ political philosophy presented a challenge to Schmitt. On the one hand, it was 
Hobbes (beyond even Bodin and Erastus) who created the theoretical underpinning of the 
modem state structure, and, in turn, the modem international system. It was Hobbes who 
ensured that the sovereign state would become the ‘ultimate concrete deciding instance’, and 
thus created the extra-legal international system to which Schmitt is so attached. 21 Thus 
Hobbes is attributed a crucial historical role in the creation of a new and stable political order. 
Schmitt observes that ‘the distance that separates a technically neutral state from a medieval 
community is enormous,’ and there is little doubt that the modem state represents 
unprecedented success in uniting authority and truth under one roof.22
Schmitt’s conclusion on the value of Hobbes as political philosopher is worth quoting in full;
‘..he restored the old and eternal relationships between protection and obedience, 
command and assumption of emergency action, power and responsibility against 
distinctions and pseudoconcepts of a potestas indirecta that demands obedience 
without being able to protect, that wants to command without assuming 
responsibility for the possibility of political peril, and exercise power by way of 
indirect powers on which it devolves responsibility.’23
19 Schmitt, Theology p.33-34
20 Meier Lesson p. 101
21 Schmitt, Theology p.47
22 Schmitt, Leviathan p.46
23 Ibid. p.83
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However, as the subtitle of the 1938 work reveals (Meaning and Failure o f a Political 
Symbol), Hobbes is no means the hero of the piece. In his study of Hobbes, Schmitt is 
attempting to explain how the successful Hobbesian state has met (in Schmitt’s view) with such 
an ignominious end in the twentieth century. Having achieved the goal of a secure, staatlichen 
condition, why has the modem state eaten itself away from the inside through a series of 
neutralisations and abandonment of its mythical force? Schmitt’s depiction of this historical 
process is, it is submitted, typically eschatological in its scope. He seeks the seeds of political 
destruction in the very origins of the concept of the state. Rather than attributing the decline 
of the Hobbesian state to historical accident or exterior force, Schmitt reads this decline as a 
product of the concept itself.
Schmitt wrote this short but significant work during 1938, at the beginning of his period of 
enforced exclusion from the mainstream intellectual life of the Third Reich. It is unique 
among Schmitt’s works in several respects. Firstly, it outwardly resembles a normal 
academic thesis more closely than any of his other works, with the predictable exception of 
his subsequently published doctoral thesis, and his legal treatises. The work is thick with 
cross-references and acknowledgements to Hobbes scholars, and shows that Schmitt was 
remarkably conversant with English-language scholarship on Hobbes. Schmitt also 
acknowledges the degree to which Toennies and Strauss had shaped his thinking on the 
content of Hobbes work.
The outward appearance of the work as a thoroughly researched treatise on the content of 
Hobbes theory of the state is, however, something of a smokescreen. As Schmitt makes 
clear, his work on Hobbes is primarily ‘directed at ascertaining the influence of the political 
myth [of the Leviathan] as an arbitrary historical force.’24 Hobbes is being read in the work 
as the creator of a political myth that comes to interpenetrate the state as a concrete reality. 
And although Schmitt suggests that the ‘last word on where the political fate of the mythical 
image’ has not yet been written, he nevertheless considered the concrete reality of the state to 
be in crisis. As such his concern is to examine how myth and reality were brought together, 
and the consequences of that association for the future of the concrete reality. Schmitt starts, 
therefore, from the premise that the myth of Leviathan is flawed in its historical 
manifestation. The purpose of Leviathan in the State Theory o f Thomas Hobbes is therefore to 
account for the ‘failure’ of the symbol in its very conception.
24 Schmitt, Leviathan p.26
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The critique of Hobbes contained within this work takes on a typically Schmittian seriousness 
precisely because of the success of the Hobbesian conceptual framework. In tying Hobbes’ 
mythical concept of the state to the concrete history of that concept over time, Schmitt comes 
to conflate the origin of the concept into its consequences. Schmitt undoubtedly considered 
Hobbes’ mythology of the dominance of the state to be the single most important early 
modern attempt to restore some form of unity to politics. Schmitt agreed with Strauss and 
Schelsky that Hobbes wrote Leviathan as a form of political action, in an attempt to counteract 
‘the anarchy brought about by the religious fanaticism and sectarianism that destroyed the 
English Commonwealth during the Puritan Revolution.’25 But the concern for Hobbes is 
dynamic and referable to contemporary conceptual problems. Under such conditions, 
confusion can easily arise as to the particular target Schmitt has in mind at any one time.
The work begins with consideration of Hobbes’ choice of the ‘Leviathan’ as the mythical 
symbol used to characterise the state. Schmitt explores the various meanings attached to 
‘Leviathan’ over time. Whilst endless variations on the myth appear to have existed over 
time, Schmitt focuses on the contrast of Christian and Jewish imagery of the Leviathan. In 
Christian theology, he suggests, the Leviathan is read as a demonic sea-creature that is caught 
and tamed by Christ, using the cross as fish-hook, and so symbolising the triumph of 
Christianity over heathen power. By contrast, Schmitt presents the supposed Jewish-Cabbalist 
myth in typically anti-Semitic terms as a ‘Jewish battle myth’ in which Leviathan and 
Behemoth represent the heathen earthly powers, with Jews standing in a position of innate 
superiority to the violence of their political battle.26
Given such richness of mythical background, Schmitt goes on to criticise Hobbes’ 
appropriation of the Leviathan myth for the thinness of its mythical content. Whereas the rich 
symbolic imagery of the famous copperplate frontispiece to Leviathan seems to offer so much, 
the actual text of the work disappoints in its failure to account for the importance of the 
mythical image itself. On the one hand, Schmitt argues, Hobbes was writing in a period in 
which demonic mythology had lost all seriousness, and the depiction of demonic myths such 
as Leviathan and Behemoth has become tools of irony rather than serious theological content. 
Schmitt illustrates the point by drawing a contrast between the serious demonology in the
25 Ibid pp. 10-11 & 21
26 Ibid. pp. 8-9
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paintings of Hieronymous Bosch and the playful and ironic depiction of demon’s in Bruegel. 
‘Between the demonology of Hieronymous Bosch and the hell of Bruegel the notion of 
worldly realism arose’, and so the force of demonic imagery is reduced.27 Thus on the one 
hand, Hobbes’ use of Leviathan can be read as a merely playful depiction of hugeness and 
power, and could increasingly be read as such by those subject to the power of the state.
The immediate impression of the Leviathan myth, Schmitt argues, is one of irony. At most, 
the Leviathan is depicted as a colourful and somewhat playful metaphor for the concentration 
of power in the state. Yet Schmitt still clings to the belief that Hobbes did, in fact, intend that 
the Leviathan should have real mythical force. ‘Like all great thinkers of his time,’ Schmitt 
suggests, ‘Hobbes had a taste for esoteric cover-ups.’28 The suggestion is that the selective 
reference Hobbes makes to the meaning of the Leviathan myth is revealing in its parsimony. 
Despite insisting that clarification of this meaning would require ‘biographical and individual 
psychological inquiries’ beyond the scope of his study, Schmitt does nevertheless seek to draw 
out the content of Hobbes’ Leviathan myth beyond this mere allegory of power.29 Schmitt 
suggest that Hobbes draws three links between the Leviathan myth and the state as reality, 
namely in the covenant of men, the state as machine, and the Leviathan as an object of awe.30 
Schmitt’s suggestion seems to be that the key to Hobbes mythical representation of the state 
lies in the relationship of these three components.31
Schmitt immediately appears to be grappling with the gap between an original mythical and 
conceptual unity in the idea of the Leviathan, and its evident vulnerability to the ravages of 
irony and individualism. If Hobbes did intend the mythical image of Leviathan to represent 
the harmonious relationship of political association, executive power, and representative 
majesty, the key question is the competence of the myth to achieve its task. Or put another 
way, how do these core elements of concrete politics - elements, it must be stressed, that had 
existed in alternative configurations in the medieval complexio oppositorum -  fare when 
configured with the device of Hobbes’s state? Without the universal faith of Rome, the state 




30 Ibid. Chapter III
31 See below p. 86
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Schmitt illustrates the potential impact of time on the concrete meaning of the elements 
Hobbes brings together. In Chapterer IV of the work, he examines the changing meaning of 
mechanisation over time, and seeks to explain that, in contrast to the inanimate concept of 
machine created by German idealism, Hobbes’ machine was perfectly capable of possessing 
mythical and organic content.32 Thus there is no irony or contradiction in the dual imagery of 
personal and mechanical sovereign in Hobbes’ Leviathan. Both the organic and the 
mechanical aspects of this sovereignty could be objects of awe and myth. In spite of this 
coherent starting point, Schmitt suggests that the adoption of a mechanical image lent itself to 
gradual attack by rationalism. As Schmitt puts it;
‘Because of [the confrontation between rationalism and a mechanistic 
mythology], Hobbes’ concept of the state became an essential factor in the 
four-hundred-year-long process of mechanization, a process that, with the 
aid of technical developments, brought about the general “neutralization” 
and especially the transformation of the state into a technically neutral 
instrument.,33
Schmitt then presents an illustration of this technically neutral, mechanised state that is 
familiar from his earlier work on the process of neutralisation in the modern state. 
Specifically, in its very neutrality, the state comes to associate ‘its values, its truth and 
justice’, in its technical perfection, and so gives rise to the formlessness of juristic 
positivism.34 The laws of the state become independent of subjective content, and the state 
itself ‘derives its esteem and dignity from its organised inclusiveness and the calculability with 
which it functions rationally as a mechanism of command.,35
32 In an earlier essay, Schmitt had focussed on the effect of the mechanical image of the state in creating 
a mechanised image of man. As Schmitt notes, ‘the mechanisation of the concept of the state thus 
completed the mechanisation of the anthropological image of man.... Just as a mechanism is incapable 
of any totality, the here and now of an individual’s existence cannot attain any meaningful totality’ 
(Schmitt, The State as Mechanism in Hobbes and Descartes, pp.99-100)
33 Schmitt, Leviathan p.42
34 Ibid. p.45
35 Ibid. pp. 46-48
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In this mechanised and ordered entity, we arrive at the perfectly functioning modern state that 
Schmitt will later depict as the constituent unit of the jus publicum Europaeum. The 
mechanism of the state refers itself to its internal order. International questions are thus 
affairs of state, and are removed from questions of truth, myth, or faith. Since the rationale 
of the machine is its own technical perfection, the question of justice cannot penetrate 
confrontations between states. ‘In contrast to religious, civil, and factional wars, wars 
between states cannot be measured with the yardsticks of truth and justice.06
Thus it is the mechanism that finally removes questions of justice from the realm of 
international relations.
‘It used to be observed that even though there are just wars, there are no just
armies. That observation can be made of the state as a mechanism.’
But alongside this bald mechanical content, attempts are still made to conceive of the state in 
mythical terms. Schmitt ranges widely to illustrate the continuing force of animal metaphors 
in describing the state. Schmitt also cites with approval Ernst Juenger’s analogy between the 
modem warship and the mechanism of the state. Both possess centralised command, 
immense power, and become the object of awe and wonder. Thus it is ‘in its mixture of huge 
animal and huge machine [that] the image of the leviathan attains the highest level of mythical 
force.’37 A purely positivist, mechanical vision of the state as a functional entity immediately 
loses the original integrity that Hobbes intended. Yet it is Hobbes himself who inadvertently 
presages that process by stressing the mechanical nature of the state.
The mechanical state depicted in Leviathan is clearly recognisable from the ideal-type state 
presented in Schmitt’s Concept o f the Political. The purely political form presented there is 
characterised by its unchallenged capacity to make political decisions, its competence in 
binding citizens to the validity of those decisions, and the absence of any normative basis 
(whether moral, religious, economic or ideology) which serves to determine those decisions. 
In the short term, therefore, the mechanical neutrality of Leviathan achieves an ideal 
staatlichen condition. It is Schmitt’s intention to illustrate the unsustainability of this order in 




It is in Chapters V and VI of his work that we come to our principle object of interest -  
Schmitt’s account of the pre-ordained unravelling of the Leviathan concept. Schmitt takes up 
the earlier theme of the place of the individual in Hobbes’ state, but this time casts the 
individual as the bearer of capacity for faith. Hobbes’ fatal error, according to Schmitt, was 
in his conceptual separation of privately held belief and public confession of faith. Schmitt 
points to Hobbes’ concern for the subject of miracles as evidence that Hobbes was acutely 
aware of the political importance of private belief.38 For Hobbes (whom Schmitt describes as 
‘agnostic’ in relation to actual belief in miracles), the key political question is that the state 
should have power to enforce public confession of faith. It is for the sovereign to choose 
between truth and falsehood. But Hobbes will not extend this compulsion to private reason 
which he considers to be beyond the reach of politics.39
It is this distinction between public and private that Schmitt regards as the ‘rupture of the 
otherwise so complete, so overpowering unity.’40 The acknowledgement that public truth 
need not actually be believed, and thus the creation of a hollow ‘truth’ of the state, is, for 
Schmitt, the fatal error in Hobbes’ state concept. Schmitt is emphatic in his criticism of this 
step;
‘At precisely the moment when the distinction between inner and outer is 
recognised, the superiority of the inner over the outer and thereby that of the 
private over the public is resolved.’41
‘[Hobbes underscores] the importance of absorbing this right of private 
freedom of thought and belief into the political system. This contained the 
seed of death that destroyed the mighty leviathan from within and brought 
about the end of the mortal god.’42
38 As Schmitt points out, the miracle continued to be a very direct and evident source of political 
authority in Stuart England. Schmitt points out that Charles II carried out around 23,000 healings 
between May 1660 and September 1664. Leviathan p.54





Whilst the distinction is extremely limited within Hobbes theory of the state itself, Schmitt 
suggests that the fatal error lay in drawing the distinction in the first place. The Hobbesian 
concept of the state is doomed by the creation of a private sphere that is not incorporated to 
the concept of the state. This ‘barely visible crack’ is then exploited on all sides by those who 
seek to advance a private and particular interpretation of truth. In a process he attributes to 
figures as diverse as Spinoza, Pufendorf, Thomasius, Frederick the Great, Kant, Moses 
Mendelssohn and Freemasonry, the relationship between public and private is inverted, and 
the essential power of the state to determine truth is lost. Private freedom becomes the form 
giving principle, and the ‘public’ as a whole becomes contingent on how well it coheres with 
private notions of truth and right.43
Leaving aside problems of tone, Schmitt’s central contention is unmistakable. The very 
concept of the state fails to achieve the degree of totality required to sustain itself in its 
monopoly of the Political. Schmitt concedes that the state has an exceptional and unparalleled 
capacity to contain the totality of political life within its own conceptual boundaries. It creates 
a stark division of outside and inside. As the locus of decision and the arbiter of the friend- 
enemy distinction, the modern state has largely made itself the bearer of politics. However, 
Schmitt is determined that in basing the authority of the state on thin autoritas, and not 
properly contesting true veritas, the state has mortgaged itself to the individual. Hobbes as 
‘individualist’ has created a political form that seeks justification in its own technical 
perfection, bases the exercise of power on authority without truth, and has only ‘the simulacra 
of divinity on its side.’44 The historicized Hobbes falls into an overview of history that 
profoundly shapes Schmitt’s political theory as a whole.45
Hobbes in Schmitt’s Political Eschatology
‘Carl Schmitt thinks apocalyptically, but from the top down, from the domain 
of the powers, whereas I think from the bottom up. But we both share the 
experience of time and history as a delay. And this was, originally, the 
Christian experience of time.’
JACOB TAUBES46
43 Ibid. Chapter V passim
44 Schmitt, Leviathan p.61
45 Heinrich Meier gives an excellent account of this historicization of Hobbes in Lesson pp. 122-132
46 Taubes, J. The Political Theology of Paul p.32
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Schmitt argues that Hobbes’ concept of the state included a grievous error that ‘contained the 
seed of death that destroyed the mighty leviathan from within and brought about the end of the 
mortal god.’47 We have already considered the role of confession of faith played in ensuring 
the authority of the state. In Chapter XXXVII of Leviathan, Hobbes argues for the importance 
of sovereign authority over the truth of revelation. Man must be compelled to make a 
confession of faith in accordance with the public truth. However, as Hobbes acknowledges in 
Chapter XXVI, ‘it is easier to bind a man to obey law as miracle than it is to bind a man to 
believe it.,48 As such, Hobbes opened up a conceptual space between public confession and 
private faith. Man is free to believe whatever he likes, provided his confession of faith 
accords with public doctrine.
It is this ‘lip-service confession’ that Schmitt holds responsible for the erosion of the concept 
of the state. The ‘barely visible crack’ in Hobbes structure provided an inroad for liberalism 
to undermine the authority of the sovereign.49 In a process he attributes firstly to Spinoza, the 
concept of the state is inverted.50 Whereas Hobbes had envisaged a total authority in which 
freedom of thought remained a private indulgence, for Spinoza ‘freedom of thought is the form 
giving principle.’51 Over time, therefore, the distinction between public and private became 
concrete, and liberalism acted to assert the primacy of private emancipation over public 
authority. Inadvertently, therefore, Hobbes had created a system in which autoritas and 
veritas were bound to unravel again.
Thus Schmitt’s study of Hobbes combines despair for the prospects of the state in the twentieth 
century with a teleological-eschatological account of how this crisis has come about. Schmitt’s 
entire historical consciousness is geared around this concern for the prospects of the state, to 
be read in the context of its origins. The story of modern politics becomes a story of 
dissolution. Admittedly, there are several aspects to this story, and Schmitt explores several
47 Ibid. p.57
48 Hobbes, Leviathan p. 190
49 Schmitt, Leviathan pp.56-63
50 It should be noted that Leviathan is one of Schmitt’s most aggressively anti-Semitic works, and 
nowhere is this more apparent than his attack on Jews such as Spinoza, Moses Mendelsohn and Stahl- 
Jolson as responsible for this erosion of the state. Fuller consideration of Schmitt’s anti-Semitism 
follows below.
51 Schmitt, Leviathan p.58
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sub-plots throughout his oeuvre. At times Schmitt is primarily concerned with the internal 
dissolution of the authority of the state, as, for instance, in The Crisis o f Parliamentary 
Democracy. At other times, the concern is with the effects of this neutralisation on public 
international law, as in Nomos o f the Earth. And in still other works, Schmitt peers into the 
abyss, and considers the parameters of the apolitical world -  the possibility that the failings of 
the state might spell the end of the Political. What all these concerns have in common, 
however, is that they are fleshed out in the ultimate context of this history of dissolution of the 
state as the modern bearer of politics.
If the language of this study is uncomfortable within mainstream IR, the focus of concern is 
nevertheless familiar. How has man’s disenchantment with the state, and the erosion of the 
latter’s capacity for political action affected the underlying world order? Can there be a new 
basis for political organisation and a new fabric for world order that combines the mechanism 
of the state with broader form of association, allowing both for protection of the citizen and a 
less abusive source of veritasl It is all well and good that Schmitt had previously distinguished 
the Political from the state. Here, he is acknowledging that the dominance of the state in the 
modern period creates its own historical logic, and has a feedback relationship with the 
Political. Hobbes’s state does not simply represent a particular solution to the problem of the 
Political. It dominates all discourse. It superimposes its own historical trends on the fate of 
the Political. The history of the state therefore transcends its own boundaries, and affects the 
very capacity to exist politically.
In this sense, Schmitt’s history of the concept of the state is constructed against the background 
fear of the apolitical -  against the fear that man might cease to exist politically. If Hobbes’s 
state progressively dissolves its own political instincts, then surely we are required to look 
elsewhere for political renewal. It is here that Schmitt’s language of Christological history 
comes to the fore. The avoidance of an apolitical existence is an historical task that emerges in 
every generation. More or less actively, the pluraverse of friends and enemies must be 
maintained. The task of the state, and the task of statesmen, is to act as historical restrainers. 
To hold back the advance of universalism, to delay the realisation of world unity. The state, 
to be sure, might be an effective structure for exercising this task. But if its possessed its own 
conceptual-historical dynamic towards unity and towards mechanical perfection, then at what 
point does it threaten to accelerate the process of universal pacification?
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Drawing on St. Paul’s 2nd letter to the Thessalonians, Schmitt occasionally depicts this 
projected pacified world as the reign of the Antichrist -  that is, as a false paradise imposed on 
earth. An unpolitical world would, on this account, spell the end of history, and the final 
stage before apocalypse. On one level, the notion of the pluriverse of states as ‘restrainer’ of 
the coming Antichrist could be read as an elaborate metaphor for the dangers of world unity.52 
To a certain extent, Schmitt is not demanding that we share a literal interpretation of 
apocalyptic theology. He invites us to share his fear that a world without politics would be a 
world without serious meaning, and, as such, a life not worth living. According to this 
perspective, it might fairly be stated that Schmitt’s demonic language, if taken seriously, 
simply opens the position up to ridicule.
Yet the language of the Antichrist is, for Schmitt, more than an unfortunately anachronistic 
choice of language. Rather, it represents a key element in his criticism of the failings of the 
modern state. The dangers of the unified world are not simply those of abuse of the protective 
function of the state. More basically, world unity would be characterised by a form of peace 
and security that Schmitt, in common with Leo Strauss, regards as a negation of politics by 
means of technology. As Meier points out, ‘for Schmitt’s own expectations ... the Antichrist’s 
slogan pea et securitas, which originates in 1 Thessalonians, is determinative.53 Moreover, the 
fact that the state has incorporated the fabric of Christian truth unto itself, the failure of the 
state contains the danger that faith itself will disappear.54 Instead of living according to a 
unique, revealed political truth, man would face a nihilistic life in a world where there may be 
‘competitions and intrigues of every kind,’ but where all seriousness would be lost.55 It would 
constitute a perpetual ‘Sunday of life.’56
This Antichrist is therefore presented as the potential destination of the state, or, more 
accurately, the coming negation of the state. In its individualism, in its abdication of truth,
52 Any cursory glance through realist IR texts will yield comparable warnings about the despotic 
dangers of world unity.
53 Meier, Lesson p. 164
54 Judith Shklar attributes the same eschatological pessimism to Schmitt’s two other heroes, de Maistre 
and Donoso Cortes; ‘the identification of Christianity with a dying social order meant that faith itself 
was about to disappear from the world, and in this calamity they saw the very end of the world, the 
approach of the prophesised coming of the Anti-Christ.’ {After Utopia: Princeton: Princeton 
University Press (1969) p. 106)
55 Concept of the Poltiical p.35
56 See J-W Muller Dangerous Mind p.94
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and in missing the opportunity to create a political totality, the concept of the state is actually 
accelerating the process of universalism that Schmitt so fears. This historical dynamic lies at 
the heart of every attempt Schmitt makes to theorise contemporary politics, and it is impossible 
to understand the true nature of these unfamiliar concepts without examining in more detail the 
linkage that Schmitt draws between politics, history and theology. As Heinrich Meier has 
convincingly argued, nothing in Schmitt’s work ‘escapes the fundamental jurisdiction of 
political theology.’57
Meier relies in large part on a little known essay written by Schmitt in 1950, entitled Drei 
Moeglichkeiten eines christlichen Geschichtsbildes [Three Possibilities of a Christian View of 
History] in which Schmitt sets out his views on the historical reaction of Christianity to the 
posited coming of the Antichrist.58 Schmitt here suggest that the prospect of apocalypse 
allows for three authentically Christian historical understandings. The first is eschatological, 
which accepts or embraces the coming dissolution in the hope of witnessing the second 
coming of Christ. Schmitt has no hesitation in agreeing with Karl Lowith that Enlightenment 
positivism and its progressive philosophy of history ‘was only a secularized Judaism and 
Christianity and derived its eschata from them..’59 Indeed, once Schmitt’s theological 
concerns come to the surface, it is difficult not to read his concern for the modem loss of 
moral seriousness through depoliticisation in tandem with Lowith’s thesis of the loss of moral 
seriousness in secularisation.60
Such a standpoint is unacceptable to Schmitt, and so he demands a choice between the two 
alternative standpoints that seek to postpone or avoid apocalypse. These both centre on the 
idea that worldly political power acts to ‘restrain’ the coming unity of the world, and so 
accords with Schmitt’s basic belief in the importance of the political universe. Where they 
diverge is in their view of the degree of activism required to maintain the Political. The 
doctrine of the Christian Epimetheus holds that a defensive stance is insufficient, and that fear 
of apocalypse should be a spur to political action. In discussing the work of Konrad Weiss,
57 Heinrich Meier, Lesson p.72
58 ‘Drei Moeglichkeiten eines christlichen Geschichtsbildes’ in Universitas 5, no.8 (August 1950) ; cf. 
Meier, Lesson p.20, n.56
59 Schmitt, ‘Drei Moeglichkeiten’ p.928
^ t  seems that Schmitt even had a hand in the translation of Lowith’s Meaning in History into German, 
having successfully recommended his pupil Hanno Resting for the job. (see J-W Muller Dangerous 
Mind p. 109)
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Schmitt reflects on the argument that ‘the simply restraining forces are insufficient.’. For the 
Christian Epimetheus, ‘historical conditions are always more to be gained than preserved.’61
By contrast, Schmitt appears to prefer a view of human history that has a more passive 
confidence in the capacity of politics to ‘restrain’ world unity. This passive, confident, 
‘katechonticaV view of history focuses on the occasional and unpredictable emergence of 
world powers that prevent the much feared world unity. It is this confidence that a katechon 
will emerge at moments of great danger that comes to be characterised by a curious amalgam 
of anxiety and optimism. We cannot follow Hobbes’s example and design the katechon, but 
we should be confident that such a katechon will emerge from an unknown source. Schmitt 
‘believes in the uninterrupted succession of historical bearers’ of the katechon, and it is this 
belief that explains why, on his account, ‘we have yet to reach the end of history.’62
In Schmitt’s despairing account of the failings of the state, the only remedy to a meaningless, 
non-political world (the realm of the Antichrist) is the recognition of, and unequivocal 
obedience to, the restrainer (Katechon). Throughout the modem period, the nation state has 
more or less adequately fulfilled this role. However, as Meier points out, Schmitt’s account of 
the political Katechon leaves little room for political design. The entire logic of Schmitt’s 
theory of the state means that there can be no criteria for deciding to whom this obedience 
should be granted, since such a decision must be based on faith (through revelation) rather than 
reason.63 The imminent arrival of a non-political world creates an imperative to discover a 
new pluriversal order, but order by design is, on Schmitt’s account, an oxymoron.
This observation returns us to Schmitt’s ambivalent attitude towards Hobbes’ state system. 
Certainly, the pluriverse of states looks very much like a successful encapsulation of Schmitt’s 
core political principles as expressed in The Concept o f the Political. The state system creates 
a form or order that nonetheless possesses the inherent potential for war. In so far as this is 
the case, the state offers protection in return for obedience, and guards against global unity by 
means of its existential status. Hence the modem state system.
61 Schmitt, ‘Drei Moeglichkeiten’ p.931
62 Meier, Lesson pp. 160-161
63 Cf Meier Lesson p.43
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The mounting problem of the state is that it has increasingly confused form and content. At 
times and in places, the state might provide a suitable form for the exercise of restraint. 
Although Schmitt does not claim to be able to identify the Katechon for every era, he does 
suggest a few historical candidates, including modem statesmen. For instance, he suggest that 
the last Hapsburg Emperor Franz Joseph could be considered a restrainer, and even two 
Presidents of Central European states, Masaryk of Czechoslovakia and Pilsudski of Poland.64 
One cannot say, however, that the state = Katechon. One cannot rely on the state to represent 
political division. The dominance of the state form (especially once the form had escaped 
Europe, and become a pret a porter form of political organisation) has obscured this fact, and 
generated a sloppy ignorance of the real contours of political history.
One could say that Hobbes has been too successful. He has contained the Political within an 
ordered structure. Yet the structure itself is so powerful as to obscure real politics. This is a 
theme we shall return to later, but it is worth pointing our that Schmitt’s definition of the 
Political always involves a point of rupture with the existing order. Mika Ojakangas points out 
that Schmitt’s own theory of real politics always focuses on ‘events that introduce rupture in 
the self-enclosed rationalistic systems immanent to themselves.’65 Hence the sovereign 
decision in Political Theology, the determination of the enemy in The Concept o f the Political, 
or the foundational act of land appropriation in Nomos o f the Earth. The idea of real politics 
within a contained system (the state system) seems at first glance a non-sequiter -  or at least, 
as something akin to touch rugby. It always threatens to become a sanitised version of the acts 
of discontinuity and rupture that are the hallmark of real politics.66
Just as the confession of faith in Hobbes’ state is a ‘lip-service confession’, so too can the state 
constitute a false Katechon. As Meier forcefully argues, the core of Schmitt’s critique of the 
Hobbesian state is that it is ‘the work of man’ and not of ‘divine provenance.’67 Whilst 
Hobbes had achieved enormous success in shaping the foundations of politics, his failings (the 
‘barely visible crack’) illustrate the dangers of substituting man-made political structures for 
the revealed Katechon. Hobbes may have produced a workable solution that sufficed for four 
hundred years. However, Schmitt appears to believe that in so doing Hobbes encouraged the
64 See Meier Lesson p. 161
65 Ojakangas, Concrete Life p.35
66 See Chapter 5 below.
67 Ibid. p. 105
79
ascendance of a mechanical rationality that has actually hastened the coming of the 
Antichrist.68
Faced with a modem crisis comparable to that in the seventeenth century, yet aggravated by 
the solutions sought at that time, Schmitt clearly observes a modem imperative to discover new 
political forms that will prevent the dangers of world unity. Stymied as he is, however, by the 
critique of human political design, Schmitt seems helpless to envisage a new political order 
that could replace the compromised state form. Despite his clear inclinations towards political 
involvement, Schmitt is reduced to simply commentating on decline, and stressing the need to 
realise the revealed Katechon where and when it reveals itself.
This essentially diagnostic position is reflected in the general poverty of Schmitt’s imagination 
about new political forms. Rather than seeking to shape new political forms, Schmitt instead 
looks out for evidence that new political forms may emerge. His approach is suggestive and 
detached, rather than dynamic and innovative. As Meier points out, his peculiarly Christian 
notion of revelation, with its anti-Judaic overtones, was perhaps one element in his cautious 
belief that Nazism may be the revealed answer to the modem political crisis.69 Elsewhere, 
Schmitt considers the possibility that political phenomena such as the growth of large territorial 
spaces70or the violence of partisan warfare71 may become successors to the state. In each case, 
however, Schmitt’s approach is passive. There is no attempt to shape a new political order, 
but instead a hopeless watchfulness for the ‘revelation’ of the order to come.
This, it might be argued, is the essence of an eschatological political perspective that is saved 
from nihilism only by the hope that a new political order will emerge from the ether. 
Sovereignty represents an inexorable path towards lost clarity, mechanical stasis, and the 
collapse of politics. Whatever its original achievements, the form has been allowed to 
overcome its political content. Schmitt’s critique of the vulnerability of the state system’s 
capacity to ensure world order is arguably as uniquely challenging and invigorating as his 
critique of liberalism. In both cases, however, his sense of historical inevitability, and his
68 Zbid.p.104
^  Ibid. p. 153
70 Schmitt, ‘Volkerrechtliche Grofiraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot fur raumfremde Machte’ in 
Stoat, Grossraum, Nomos: Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916 bis 1969 (ed. G.Maschke).
71 Schmitt, Theorie des Partisanen
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scepticism of the capacity of human ideas to make a telling difference to man’s political 
condition limits his theory to a critical perspective.
Eschatology and Anti-Semitism
Schmitt’s work on Hobbes also forms the most obvious point of departure for consideration of 
Schmitt’s alleged anti-Semitism. Not only is Leviathan Schmitt’s most evidently anti-Semitic 
work, it can also be read in tandem with contemporaneous entries in the vast diaries, 
published posthumously as Glossarium. The question of the nature, extent and political 
manifestations of Schmitt’s anti-Semitism has been perhaps the most hotly, and the most 
poorly debated aspect of Schmitt interpretation. Above all other areas of interpretation, 
evaluation of this question has produced mutually reinforcing polarisation.
On the one side it is argued that Schmitt was at most a private, temperate anti-Semite in the 
general 19th century German tradition, whose overt anti-Semitism of the 1930s was clearly 
opportunism run wild. The clearest exponent of this view was George Schwab in The 
Challenge o f the Exception, where he argues that Schmitt’s wartime publications are 
inherently unreliable in light of the competitive and protective pressures of academic life 
under the Nazi regime. Works such as Ueber die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen 
Denkens (1934) and Leviathan (1938) offered up gratuitous anti-Semitism in a culpable but 
simplistic attempt to ride the rhetoric of the age. It represents, according to this view, the 
defensive attempts of the Kronjurist of the Reich to defend his position.
Certainly Schmitt was not stranger to opportunism of this sort. It seems plausible, for 
instance, that Schmitt would substitute one target of an argument for another according to the 
impact it would have on its audience. In the second and third German editions of Concept o f 
the Political, for instance, Schmitt replaces a critical statement on Marx, Lenin and Lukacs, 
and replaces it with an overtly anti-Semitic remark about F.J. Stahl. Karl Lowith points to 
this change as clear evidence that Schmitt Nazi-era anti-Semitism amounted to little more than 
gratuitously ‘toeing the [Nazi] party line.’72
72 K. Lowith ‘Der okkasionelle Dezisionismus von Carl Schmitt’ in Saemtliche Schriften vol. 8 
[Stuttgart, 1984] p. 119
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Indeed, it is argued that it may have been mere self-preservation, and not the more base 
motive of self-advancement that motivated Schmitt. Gottfried is especially generous in his 
interpretation of Schmitt’s behaviour in the mid-1930s;
‘He was trying to cover up for his own record as an outspoken anti-Nazi; and 
-  like his beloved Hobbes who supported, each in its own time, Cromwell’s 
Commonwealth and the Stuart Monarchy -  he was coming to terms with an 
established power, however distasteful he might have found it.,73
Under such pressure, it is argued, Schmitt’s submission to Nazi rhetoric is an unreliable guide 
to his own views. The project is to disentangle the important works of this era from their 
context. This, Gottfried suggests, is a task made easier by the clear ‘impression of 
insincerity’ that such remarks give.74
Such an argument has been somewhat undermined by the posthumous publication of the 
Glossarium. Schmitt’s diaries of 1947-1951 were published in Berlin in 1991 and show 
Schmitt to have been consistently and intensely preoccupied with an aggressive critique of 
Judaism. The entries provide a sometimes startling and distasteful insight into a vehement and 
politically oriented hostility to Judaism, sufficiently strong to distort Schmitt’s cool political 
calculus. The apparently unavoidable conclusion is that Schmitt held real, private, vehement 
and (even within the context of commonplace contemporary German prejudice) abnormally 
foreceful anti-Jewish views. The Glossarium thus erodes the argument that the prejudice 
expressed in Leviathan towards the political project of Jewish emancipation, or the influence 
of ‘liberal’ Jewish theorists of the state from Spinoza to Mendelsohn, were merely gratuitous 
additions, spicing up the work for a Nazi audience.
The publication of the Glossarium in no way settles, however, the question of the political 
relevance of Schmitt’s opinions on Judaism, and the way in which it relates to his theory of 
politics overall. The argument of Schwab, Gottfried et al remains in modified form. 
Schmitt’s anti-Semitism is criticised as distasteful and reprehensible. It even, to some extent, 
explains why Schmitt was susceptible to the allure of Nazism. If anti-Jewish sentiment 
dovetailed with Schmitt’s contempt for liberalism, then both instincts come together in a
73 P. Gottfried Carl Schmitt London: The Claridge Press (1990) p.36
74 Ibid. p.37
82
weakness that ‘allowed his notion of enemy to generate his idea of friend.’75 The argument 
continues to maintain that whatever anti-Semitism Schmitt might have felt was irrelevant to his 
political thought, and should not be an object of scholarly concern.
Even if one were to accept this view, there would nevertheless be much to say about 
‘Schmitt’s uninhibitness’ in ‘[catching] the infection of national uprising and [going] crazy for 
one or two years.’76 As Andreas Koenen as amply shown, Schmitt’s collaboration with 
Nazism was far deeper and more committed than that of other German intellectuals such as 
Junger and Heidegger. Not only did Schmitt intensify the anti-Semitic tone of his 
publications, he also applied his considerable experience as an advocate in providing (or 
attempting to provide) legal justification for the discriminatory policies of the Nazi 
government. Those who continue to hold that Schmitt’s antipathy towards Judaism was 
politically irrelevant are left to simply castigate Schmitt as a rotten opportunist.
Taking Schmitt’s concern for the political importance of the Katechon seriously might offer 
one avenue of explanation. Firstly, Schmitt’s concern for the Katechon display a familiarity 
with many of the mythological aspects of medieval anti-Judaicism, alongside the mythology of 
the Leviathan. We simply cannot know, given Schmitt half-ironic playfulness with concepts, 
the degree to which he took such concepts seriously. What is more certain, when one 
examines the pattern of his work as a whole, is that a deep concern for such potentially anti- 
Semitic imagery emerged under the shadow of Nazism, but was never really abandoned in the 
post-war years. The concept of the Katechon also holds out the prospect of the kind of 
messianic delivery from danger that the Nazi party may have appeared to offer. The 
Katechon is revelatory, absolute and infinite -  all familiar Nazi themes.
All of this is not to say that Schmitt’s status as a specifically Christian or Catholic thinker 
condemns him to the status of anti-Semite. The point rather is that Schmitt showed a 
remarkable and apparently natural propensity to apply the conceptual tools of Christian
75 T.B. Strong, ‘Foreword’ to The Concept of the Political p.xxiv
76 J. Taubes The Political Theology of Paul p. 101. Taubes considers Schmitt’s lack of inhibition as 
perhaps the most compelling feature of his character, and ascribes Schmitt’s use of Nazi rhetoric to an 
almost child-like propensity to get caught up in the mood of the moment.
‘[Schmitt] adopted not a text, but a tradition, that is, the folk traditions of church anti-Semitism, onto 
which he, in 1933-36, in his uninhibited fashion, went on to graft the racist theozoology.’ Paul p.51.
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apocalyptic thought in the service of Nazi propaganda. One need only look, for instance, at 
Schmitt’s 1943 article in Der Reich entitled ‘Beschleuniger wider Welt’ for a deliberate and 
polemical association of the concepts of Katechon and Fuhrerprinzip. What hope would the 
Jews have in Schmitt’s account if one is truly supposed to believe that the Fuhrer represents 
the defence of God’s will on earth, and that absolute obedience to his will is the sole duty of 
the German people?
More prosaically, Schmitt made the same customary identifications of Jews with international 
socialism and extreme liberalism that were commonplace in early twentieth century Europe. 
In his study of Leviathan, Spinoza is condemned for his exploitative liberalism. He is 
condemned because, in Schmitt’s account, he used the language of individual human freedom 
as a weapon against the integrity and solidity of the Hobbesian state. For Schmitt, the 
campaign for Jewish emancipation is a selfish and destructive campaign that phrases the 
particular and selfish wishes of its adherents in a universalised language of rights and human 
freedom. Judaism irks Schmitt from a political perspective because it resolutely stands 
outside the authority structure of modem European statehood, and refuses to engage in the 
ironic double loyalty that the Hobbesian state requires. It is therefore a hostility bom as much 
of political as truly religious sentiment, and reflects the degree of intersection between politics 
and theology in Schmitt’s work.
It seems clear that consideration of Schmitt’s views on Judaism require some degree of 
conceptual separation between prejudice based on race, and prejudice based on religious, 
theological, political and cultural prejudice. Those seeking to rehabilitate Schmitt are quite 
right to point out that the racially tinged language of Schmitt’s Nazi era publications do not 
seem characteristic either of his other works, or of his private reflections. Race does not 
appear to have interested Schmitt as a political category. For instance, Schmitt’s international 
legal writings of the 1930s make no mention of ethnic divisions within Europe, and contain no 
racial perspective on the ‘superiority’ of Germans.77 Schmitt had huge admiration for Serbia 
(both of his wives were Serb), and must presumably have felt uncomfortable with the racial 
categorisation of Slavs as sub-human.78 As with his attitude to Slavs, it would be hard to 
substantiate a claim that Schmitt was a fervent anti-Semite in a racial or eugenic sense.
77 See Chapter 6 below.
78 Schmitt’s sympathetic attitude towards Slavs during the war in the East is captured in a national myth 
he recalls being told by his Serbian friend Ivo Andric; ‘Marko Kraljevic, the hero of a Serbian saga,
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It is perhaps more accurate, therefore, to refer to Schmitt as anti-Judaic rather than anti- 
Semitic. Both his published and private writings betray an implacable hostility to Jews qua 
Jews -  that is to say, it is their cultural and religious status that generates Schmitt’s antipathy. 
He clearly regards Jews as standing in a dangerously ambiguous position in respect of 
modern, Christian European states. He regards them as existentially not belonging to the 
structures of authority, public truth and unconditional obedience that he regards as 
fundamental to the success of the body politic. For Schmitt, Jews have always stood outside 
the unified whole of the state. They are not within the body of men composing the Leviathan, 
but instead constitute an external and (most importantly) radically individual and individualist 
standpoint. For Schmitt, Judaism = liberal universalism.
If this interpretation of Schmitt’s antipathy to Judaism is correct, then one can no longer 
sustain the argument that these views are politically irrelevant. Rather, they are part and 
parcel of Schmitt’s overriding critique of liberalism and his dominant fear of universalism. 
He readily blames Jews, individually and collectively, for accelerating the dissolution of the 
state and for promoting a formless and apocalyptic extreme individualism. Therefore he 
selects Jewish figures as emblematic of the pursuit of philosophical individualism (as with 
Spinoza) and of legal positivism (as with Kelsen). Schmitt is especially animated by the latter 
association, bolstering his view of legal positivism as a refuge for a form of scandalous, anti­
political rootlessness;
‘The Jews as an elite in comparison with the Christians: as more or less faithful 
administrators once the Christian elite sinks into legalism. Then, armed with the 
logic, tactics and practice of a formless legalism (leergewordenen Legalitat), the 
Jews understand reality far better than Christian peoples who cannot stop 
believing in the capacity of power and charisma to counteract the law.’79
Clearly these are politically pregnant views, and it would be crass to try to argue whether they 
are more or less reprehensible than racially tinged prejudice. Certainly, Schmitt never
fought the entire day long against a powerful Turk, finally defeating him in a bitter struggle. When 
he had killed the defeated enemy, a snake that had been sleeping in the dead man’s heart awoke and 
spoke to Marko: ‘You were lucky that I was sleeping during your fight’. At this, the hero cried out: 
‘Woe is me, I have defeated a man who was stronger than me!’ Ex captivitate salus p.32-33
79 Schmitt, Glossarium 24.5.1948
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apologised for his views, made no attempt to explain them away as febrile opportunism and, 
as the publication of the Glossarium shows, continued to hold firm to his hostility even when 
faced by the horrific consequences of Nazi racial policy. Criticism on moral grounds is, one 
feels, no longer necessary. The relevant point for us is that there is a strong relationship 
between Schmitt’s anti-liberalism and his anti-Judaicism. The intersection lies in his interest 
in Hobbes and the question of political faith and authority. For our purposes, Schmitt’s 
attitudes to Judaism are interesting in so far as they amplify and underscore his understanding 
of the state and its history, and because they form a part of his critique of the modem malaise. 
We cannot know how decisive this perspective was in predisposing Schmitt towards his 
dalliance with Nazism.
The Tripartite Structure o f the State
Schmitt basically identified with Hobbes’ sense of the intangible unity of politics. Both 
struggled to find a conceptual apparatus to understand the majesty of politics -  the unique 
force of the political union to compel and inspire its citizens. The sum of the political union is 
clearly more than the sum of its constituent parts, and a parsimonious depiction of the logic of 
the polls is necessarily unsatisfactory. In their own ways, both Schmitt and Hobbes drew a 
line around their political theory, beyond which was the real but impenetrable Dasein of 
politics.
In Leviathan in Staatstheorie Schmitt stresses the mysterious tripartite nature of Leviathan. It 
is the political covenant. It is the competent machinery of action and compulsion. And it is 
the mysterious object of awe and obedience. The coexistence of these three facets of the state 
may be, for all we know, historical accident. Schmitt himself, as we have explored, makes 
the extraordinary claim that Hobbes’s theory was somehow made flesh in the European state 
form. Whichever line we follow, the claim is that the interaction between these three poles of 
meaning is self-reinforcing and logically consistent. In an arrangement that is immediately 
reminiscent of Clausewitz’s theory of war, Schmitt argues for the integral complexity of the 
state concept.80 The exact nature of the sovereign is the result of the continuing interaction 
and competition of the three elements.
80 Along with Hobbes, Clausewitz is one of the few figures to whom Schmitt acknowledges an 
intellectual debt. He reads Clausewtiz as arguing that war is not an instrument of politics but, instead,
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Just as Clausewitz’s war is composed of design, aggression and chance, Schmitt’s (Hobbesian) 
state is composed of representative, authoritative and mystical elements. In Schmitt’s 
account, such a conception is distinctly modern, as it was only the post-Reformation state that 
could conclusively abrogate mystical and authoritative functions to itself. This perhaps 
explains Schmitt’s determination to hang this concept so firmly on Hobbes’s shoulders. 
Having glimpsed the abyss of hyper-politics without order, it fell naturally to Hobbes to 
theorise the emergence of a new Commonwealth that could restore the old unities. In a clear 
analogy to Schmitt’s concept of his own role, Hobbes was the clear mind who presaged a new 
order. Thus the state supersedes the church as the conclusive political entity (although, as we 
have seen, Schmitt cannot credit the modem state with the same political integrity as the 
complexio oppositorium of the medieval Catholic church).
It is precisely this internal dynamism of Hobbes’ state concept that gives rise to the need to 
craft and re-craft the balance. Political theory is a fundamentally different exercise for 
Schmitt depending on whether or not he is assuming the basic harmony of these three 
elements of the state. Schmitt’s Concept o f the Political represents a basic analysis of the 
political logic of sovereigns that maintain an adequate balance of these functions -  
representative, authoritative and mystical. Such an exercise is easy in comparison to 
theorising the unravelling and potential reassembly of the tripartite structure in modem 
politics. Schmitt’s study of Hobbes, and the accompanying turn towards Christological
‘the ultima ratio of the ffiend-enemy distinction’, according to which ‘politics remains [the] brain’ of 
war. Concept of the Political p.34 n.14.) Schmitt is also impressed by the Clausewitz’s recognition of 
the Prussian partisan fighters against Napoleon as bearers of true political spirit. Through Clausewitz, 
the partisans were ‘philosophically accredited’ in a conservative fashion, before the world 
revolutionary version of the partisan theory under Lenin. (Theorie des Partisanen p.51) In many 
respects, Schmitt reads Clausewitz with a good deal of sympathy and accuracy, and was especially 
attracted by the sense of inherent restraint he conveyed. This is a point entirely missed by Beatrice 
Heuser in her study of the reception of Clausewitz when she describes Schmitt as criticising 
Clausewitz for ‘focussing so much on inter-state war, which he called a ‘conventional game’ 
compared with true war, war inspired by intense hatred.’ Her conclusion that ‘for Carl Schmitt [in 
contrast to Clausewitz], the desire to annihilate the opponent was intrinsic to his definition of true 
war’ is both fallacious, and overlooks the great value Schmitt derived from a Clausewitzian sense of 
military regularity and conventional enmity between states. See B.Heuser Reading Clausewitz 
London: Pimlico (2002) p.48. Raymond Aron offers a far more sympathetic appraisal of Schmitt’s 
reading of Clausewitz, although he disputes the theoretic lessons Schmitt draws. See R.Aron 
Clausewitz pp.363-370. See also Chapter 7 below on Clausewitz in Schmitt’s theory of the partisan.
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history, seems to represent a recognition that one must engage in exactly this kind of 
historicity, if one is to recognise and restore true political authority.
Once authority or mysticism are lost, the state’s inherent logic is changed. It becomes merely 
representative in the way, presumably, that liberal theory would anticipate and welcome. 
Again, Hobbes proves to be the vehicle by which Schmitt embeds this argument in historical 
context. The great flaw, or “crack”, in Hobbes theory was in the way in which he phrased 
the conventional basis of the state. In describing the contract as the foundation of the 
Commonwealth, Hobbes allowed for interpretation of his state theory as privileging 
representation above the other two poles of the state. As Clausewitz could have told us, once 
one element of the three-pole structure is privileged, the entire edifice becomes dysfunctional.
Schmitt attributes the exploitation of this “barely visible crack” to Spinoza and other Jewish 
philosophers. In so doing, they purportedly reversed the basic structure of the state by making 
authority contingent on consent -  a paradox. By separating out the two elements and placing 
them in a hierarchy, this nascent liberal theory removed the basic possibility of political 
authority and, with it, the logic of the state. If authority is contingent of consent, we would 
all require the same insight as Schmitt or Dostoevsky to will our own vulnerability and 
answerability to the state. We would have to consent to our own powerlessness -  an idea of 
consent that is logically unsustainable. It is only when mediated through the feedback of the 
triangular structure that true authority can appear as something that belongs to the citizen. 
The maxim, after all, is protego et obligo, and not protego ergo obligo. The great flaw of 
these humanist theorists was to make man vulnerable again, by reasoning authority too 
rationally and axiomatically.
Schmitt thus has an integral vision of the relationship between protection and obedience. In 
one of his earliest works, Schmitt gives a lengthy account of the “incompatibility of law 
[Recht] and power.”81 Whilst Schmitt’s early concern was with stressing the distinction 
between the function of law and the concept of authority (in a foreshadow of his famous 
distinction of legality and legitimacy), his stressing of law and authority as logically 
inconsistent concepts reinforces the argument for an integral view of their relationship. 
Representation and authority, right and power, the law and the state, can only speak to each
81 Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen Tubingen: Paul Siebeck (1914) pp.22-44 
passim
other through the medium of the mystical sovereign. Otherwise, they do not have anything 
directly to say to one another. “Law is not will, but a norm, [it is] not a command, but a 
rule.”82 As such, the privileging of the covenant over authority cannot amount to the 
replacement of authority, since the covenant, simply put, is not, nor ever could be, 
authoritative. It needs its obverse part.
Political Design and Political Revelation
Schmitt’s challenge, then, both to himself and to us, is to bring the historical contingency of 
the state form into clarity. It is to clarify the point that sovereignty is a particular social 
institution that is not reducible to the exercise of politics itself, but rather represents one 
possible vehicle for the Political. And indeed, given that the Political cannot, by definition, 
have any prior normative character, the state can only ever be an accidental and derivative 
political form. Unlike the Political then (which, so long as it exists, is immutable), the state is 
a vulnerable entity. It is possible to envisage its end. And this end, Schmitt argues, is a 
product of the very concept itself. The question remains -  what comes next, and how will we 
be able to identify true politics without the comfortable contours of the state to which our lazy 
minds have become accustomed?
Christological themes in Schmitt’s work are relevant to us in two related respects. Firstly, 
they colour his historical account of the state and the international system, and shape his 
historical understanding. Secondly, they open up a limited mode for thinking about the future 
order. Schmitt invites us, it seems, to await some Damascine moment in which the true locus 
of contemporary politics will be found. Yet this aspect of Schmitt’s account of political 
authority and its prospects for future renewal remains strangely absent from most debate about 
the suggested ‘relevance’ of Schmitt to debates on international politics. In the English- 
speaking world, debate on a theological reading of Schmitt has been almost totally absent. By 
contrast, among German scholars, the reading of Schmitt as a profoundly anti-modern, 
theological thinker gained widespread currency, and became a source of great consternation to 
those who championed Schmitt as a potential answer to eternal political dilemmas. Little
821bid. p.42
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debate has taken place across this divide. The former group tend to characterise Schmitt’s 
more theological work as part of his idiosyncratic private life -  something that they are happy 
to consign as irrelevant, along with his political choices. The latter group have tended 
towards tight academic containment, and tend to eschew any attempt to ‘apply’ Schmitt’s 
thought in engaging with broader questions of future order and organisation. As Muller puts 
it, ‘ [t]hought on Schmitt was safely contained within the universities. Yet Schmittian thought 
was not. ’83
The absence of a comparable debate outside of Germany will doubtless be of little concern to 
self-proclaimed Schmittians.84 The fear is that taking Schmitt’s theological concerns seriously 
will result in the characterisation of Schmitt as obscure, illogical and hence, of limited interest 
to contemporary debates. The prospects of serious debate are further hampered by the 
challenge of addressing the contours of the fore-running debate in Germany. Legendary 
anyway for generating hostility and obscurity in equal measure through its debates, the 
German academic establishment surpassed its own high standards in the bitterness of debate 
on this question. The desire to let sleeping dogs lie is perfectly understandable.
Furthermore, the ‘Schmittian’ response to the question of Schmitt’s basic theological concern 
might be dismissed as something ephemeral. We have already seen enough of Schmitt’s 
broad appeal to disparate groups to suggest that Schmittians would have resilience enough to 
overcome such a debate. Indeed, for Right Schmittians such concerns would appear to 
confirm Schmitt’s basic concern for the righteousness of the international order, the historical 
uniqueness of Europe, and the policy applications that de Benoist et al envision. As Muller 
dryly notes, at least those who are sceptical of the wider relevance of the Katechon can 
productively debate the possible role to be ascribed to it. By contrast, ‘every fervent 
reassertion of the ‘theology thesis’ seemed to be caught in a performative contradiction: if
83 J-W Muller Dangerous Mind p.206
84 In his 312 page ‘intellectual portrait’ of Schmitt, Gopal Balakrishnan dedicates just one page to 
consideration of the secularization thesis, and 2 pages to the concept of Katechon. He concludes 
somewhat unsatisfactorily that the concept formed part of an oscillation that Schmitt experienced 
between the conservative impulses of the Katechon and an contrasting radical tendency in ‘a restless 
movement without synthesis’. (G. Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt 
(London: Verso, 2000) pp.221-225)
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Schmitt was only an obscurantist theologian, why was it so important to have yet another 
treatise on him?’85
The problem, of course, is that Schmitt was in no way an ‘obscurantist theologian.’ The 
Katechon is of very direct relevance to Schmitt’s hugely influential interpretation of the 
European state and to his concept of political authority. Consideration of the role of Katechon 
involves far more than mere historical-psychological speculation regarding Schmitt irrelevant 
private motives. The intensity of Schmitt’s schematic attachment to the European order as an 
object of faith must affect our reading of Schmitt as an international theorist. In particular, if 
Schmitt was truly motivated by eschatological concerns that outstripped a subordinate 
opposition to liberal cosmopolitanism on its own terms, a reading of Schmitt as providing a 
clarion call to continue the assault on the liberal order must confront the question of whether 
or not to adopt Schmitt’s more fundamental opposition to unity per se.
Hobbes as International Theorist
‘..we are not every one, to make our own private reason, or conscience, but the 
public reason, that is, the reason of God’s supreme lieutenant, judge; and 
indeed we have made him judge already, if we have given him sovereign 
power, to do all that is necessary for our peace and defence.’
HOBBES86
Evidently, Schmitt’s treatment of Hobbes has rather less to do with Hobbes, and far more to 
do with Schmitt’s own theoretical and political concerns. The reading of Hobbes is an 
element in several ancillary concerns including the ‘secret dialogue’ with Leo Strauss, as a 
way of illustrating the shortcomings of political philosophy, and in Schmitt’s need to provide a 
theoretical peg for Schmitt’s depiction of European history.87 Schmitt posits Hobbes as an 
idealised theoretical starting point for the modem state, and the modem system of states, and
85 Ibid. p.205
86 Hobbes Leviathan p296
87 Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss
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conflates theory and empirical reality through the somewhat bizarre notion of the 
‘conretisation’ of Hobbes’ ideas. As Scheuerman accurately observes;
‘A common argumentative strategy in Schmitt’s political and legal theory is to 
describe historical reality by focussing on the theoretical arguments of a 
paradigmatic theorist or theoretical tradition, before proceeding to contrast sad 
present-day realities with a fictional golden age based more on some set of 
stylised ideas than social reality itself.’88
By any standards, Schmitt’s reading of Hobbes is historically inaccurate. Yet as a work of 
political attribution, and in the way it elides Hobbes’ reputation as a theorist of power with the 
Westphalian system, there are interesting and illuminating parallels between Schmitt’s 
Hobbes, and the ‘canonical’ Hobbes of IR theory.
Schmitt himself might be termed a proto-constructivist in the way in which he saw the coming 
together of intangible conceptual components (fear, authority, violence, ‘the public’, faith) in 
the formation of dominating concepts of sovereignty, war and legality. He read Hobbes with 
the same eye, and recognised the same conceptual amalgamations in Hobbes’ ‘theory of 
international relations.’ In this respect, it might be argued that Schmitt prefigured the new 
reading of Hobbes in international relations, emphasising the extremely complex way in which 
the state mediates between the universal, the particular, and the individual.
The figure of Thomas Hobbes has always loomed large in IR. Sadly, for the most part he has 
been a misused figure. For Morgenthau, Hobbes was a prop in support of his basic 
contention that there can be no objective morality in the international system since such a 
concept cannot have meaning outside of the state.89 More commonly, Hobbes has been the 
straw man extreme realist and ‘peer of Machiavelli’ used by numerous scholars to illustrate 
the dubious and dangerous roots of thoroughgoing realism.90 This abuse has been 
compounded by the relative lack of interest shown by traditional Hobbes scholars in IR
88 Scheuerman, W.E. ‘International Law as Historical Myth’ in Constellations Vol. 11, No.4 (2004) 
p.539. As Scheuerman points out, Schmitt is ‘uninterested in the nuances of Hobbes’s account of the 
difference between morals and law or, alternately, sin and crime,’ and instead focuses wholly on those 
aspects of Hobbes’ thought that give misleading evidence of Hobbes as a ‘decisionist’ thinker.
89 Morgenthau, H. Politics Among Nations p.53n
90 Wight, M. International Theory: The Three Traditions London: Leicester University Press (1991) 
p. 17
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debates. A feedback relationship seems to have emerged, whereby ‘serious’ Hobbes scholars 
look at the generalisations and misinterpretations in IR theory with almost total disdain.
In this context the work of Hobbes scholars such as Noel Malcolm and international political 
theorists such as Michael Williams is to be welcomed. Malcolm’s critique of traditional 
understandings of Hobbes in IR is particularly compelling. In contrast to the view of Hobbes 
as amoral, Malcolm draws the distinction between a jural standard of morality (qua “justice”) 
that pertains within the state, and natural morality that subsists as an objective standard, and 
was referable in the state context to an obligation to protect the life of the citizen. Armed 
with this distinction, Malcolm performs a textual analysis to show that Hobbes considered 
these moral rules to be instrumental in nature.
Certain examples in support of the revisionist view of Hobbes are worth repeating. For 
instance, in De Cive Hobbes points out that, in contrast to the example of Athens and Rome, 
aggressive, imperialist war in the name of profit runs contrary to the logic of the state “[f]or 
the militia, in order to profit, is like a die, wherewith many lose their estates, but few improve 
them.”91 Since, for the citizen, the sole rationale for obedience to the state is that it better 
protects the citizen’s life than the fragile state of nature, it makes no sense for the state 
gratuitously to endanger their lives. “ Accordingly, peace and trade, as circumstances 
conducive to the physical protection of the citizen, are part and parcel of the logic of the state.
Certainly, Hobbes accepts that offensive war may result from necessity or insecurity. The 
picture of Hobbes’ international system is further confused by the fact that it makes little sense 
to use the language of justification when discussing the aggression of the state. It is not so 
much that imperialist aggression is not justified. Rather, as Malcolm illustrates, gratuitous 
aggression or cruelty undermines the logic of the state as it is not referable to the moral duty 
of self-preservation and can, in fact, only jeopardise the security of the citizen.93 As Schmitt
91 Hobbes, T Man and Citizen pl74 para22
92 This aspect of Hobbes’ account of the state resonates strongly with Schmitt, for whom ‘protego ergo 
obligo is the cogito ergo sum of the state.’ Schmitt, Concept of the Political p. 52
93 Malcolm Aspects of Hobbes Oxford: Calrendon Press (2002) p445. Curiously, the revisionist view 
of the integral tension between the state’s capacity for war and its tendency towards limitation is, in 
some respects an echo of Schmitt’s account of the modem, Hobbesian state as expressed most clearly 
in The Nomos of the Earth (although it seems unlikely that Malcolm’s account is influenced by 
Schmitt). Schmitt’s basic account of international order centres on the contention that strongly
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himself notes, ‘if protection ceases, the state too ceases, and every obligation to obey 
ceases.’94 Thus the traditional image of the inherently bellicose state fails to take into account 
the origins of the state in protecting its citizens from violence.
Williams perhaps goes further than Malcolm in his admiration of Hobbes's achievement. For 
Williams, Hobbes's 'political sensibilities are far too subtle to rest with the idea that fear - the 
most basic and potentially destabilising of the passions - provides a simple or straightforward 
resolution to the difficulties of constructing and maintaining a political order.'95 Instead, on 
Williams' reading, the twin fears of the state of nature and the power of the Leviathan are 
transformed by Hobbes in a more humane, more individualistic and more 'liberal' direction 
through the device of the state:
'Rather than valorising fear as the basis of a rigid absolutism, or denying it in the 
name of a politics of transparency, [Hobbes] seeks to manage a politics of fear in 
order to construct a political order which can minimise its necessity and to create 
a recognisably liberal political society in which fear plays a minor but positive 
role in a politics of self- and sovereign-limitation.'96
Our point of departure, therefore, is the modem state with an inherent logic of peaceful 
protection, but the inevitable capacity for violence. The unpredictability of this international 
order is heightened by the fact that aggression may, at times, be the best moral choice for 
statesmen with reference to protection of their citizens. This accords with the traditional 
association of Hobbes with the state’s disposition towards pre-emptive violence. As the 
historical record in De Cive illustrates, imperialist aggression may be the correct moral choice
constituted states with no higher authority serve the best interests of human security. It is the absence 
of an international legal order, and so the state attribute of ius hostis (the quasi-legal ‘right’ to go to 
war, without objective justification) that results in amoral harmony under the constant potential for 
violence. The dangerous modem alternative is a discriminatory, legalist concept of war in which one 
party is characterised as an aggressor and hence a total enemy without the existential right of 
statehood (as explored in Die Wengung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegrifj).
94 Schmitt, Leviathan p.72 Some commentators interperet this aspect of Schmitt’s 1938 work as a 
veiled protest against the Nazi state. Since death at the hands of the state had become arbitrary, the 
state had become a vehicle of obligation, with no recompense in terms of protection. For an 
elaboration of this argument see George Schwab’s introduction to Schmitt’s Leviathan




where circumstances so demand. It is for the statesmen to use the tools of modern rationality 
(including espionage and scientific calculation) to determine that moral choice.97 This, it is 
submitted, is a preferable summary of Hobbes' state as international actor than the more 
bellicose caricature.
Indeed, it is precisely these references of the logic of the state to the protection of the 
individual that Schmitt seeks to criticise. The very elements that Malcolm and Williams hold 
up as evidence that Hobbes was not as bad as once thought are the same elements that Schmitt 
condemns as fatal to the coherence of the state concept. In Schmitt’s account, the 
meaningfulness of political authority is lost at precisely the point at which state and society 
penetrate one another. In making the exercise of power directly (rather than abstractly) 
referable to the protection of individual life, the whole edifice of the state becomes contingent. 
In moral terms, therefore, it is Schmitt rather than Hobbes who resembles the straw man 
extreme realist.
Less familiar in IR is the argument that Hobbes be read in a religious context. On the one 
hand the relationship between protection and obedience can be read as a contractarian issue. 
A certain body of individuals are bound to the sovereign as a result of the imagined or actual 
political pact via which they have traded the insecurity of nature for regulated existence in the 
state. Of course, this covenant is an explicit and highly prominent aspect of Hobbes’ 
Leviathan. Nowhere is it symbolised more powerfully than in the famous frontispiece to the 
1651 edition of Leviathan, where the mythical beast is composed of the bodies of men.
Beyond the juristic covenant, the Leviathan is also, in Schmitt’s account, a Cartesian- 
mechanical sovereign, capable of ‘acting’ internationally in a meaningful way and, moreover, 
a mythical unifying symbol of biblical origin.98 In the successful state, the tripartite nature of 
the Leviathan (covenant, machine and object of faith/fear) remains seamless and assumed. As 
such, the question of the relationship between protection and obedience remains unproblematic 
and, in a sense, pretanatural. Belief in the state makes sense to the eighteenth century man as 
belief in a Catholic God did to thirteenth century man. As such, the modern state possesses 
a power as an object of belief that goes beyond its function as bearer of the covenant. ‘[T]he
97 Hobbes expands on the issue of scientific calculation and the moral choice of statesmen in A dialogue 
between a philosopher and a student of the common laws of England
98 Schmitt, Leviathan p.31
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sovereign-representative person, does not come about as a result of but because of this 
consensus.’99
In this context the role of political faith is more than simply another way of expressing the 
mechanics of obedience. Hobbes’ maxim autoritas, non veritas facit legem points towards a 
form of political faith. It is the state’s possession of political truth that pulls together the three 
strands of the Leviathan metaphor. One often overlooked instance of such reasoning in 
‘Leviathan’ is to be found in Hobbes’ discussion of miracle in the modern state. Hobbes 
asserts the private right of individuals to decide for themselves whether or not to believe. 
However, ‘when it comes to confession of that faith, the private reason must submit to the 
public.’100 The public order thus rests on the capacity of the sovereign to determine ‘truth’ in 
the public sphere.
The stable modern state thus possesses a complex inherent logic that attains stability through 
its mythical representative function. The state demands a certain confession of faith, 
amounting to a confession of political faith. The citizen obliges either because his political 
faith is genuine, or else because the protective-coercive capacity of the state exceeds any 
alternative form of confession. In such an arrangement, the relationship between protection 
and obedience remains latent. Individual instances may arise in which some failure of the 
state’s protective function raises the issue of the individual’s right to resist. One might 
imagine, for instance, a miscarriage of civil justice, in which a wronged citizen faces judicial 
death. As an isolated instance in an otherwise functioning state, such an example seems a 
minor lacuna in Hobbes’ system. As A.P.Martinich puts it, ‘Hobbes would abhor this 
consequence, but, given his principles, it is not clear how he can avoid it.’101 Certainly, the 
individual context does not give rise to a general right of resistance to the state -  a notion that 
Schmitt rejects as ‘factually and legally nonsensical and absurd.’102
However, when viewed in historical perspective, and in the context of the question of political 
faith, the relationship between protection and obedience takes on a different mantle. When
"/bidp.33
100 Hobbes, Leviathan p.296
101 Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (2003) p.48
102 Ibid. p.46
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the issue of political faith is examined as an historically conditioned product, the unravelling 
of the relationship of protego et obligo becomes a more realistic prospect. If the mythical 
premise of Leviathan is taken as something more than mere allegory, it becomes necessary to 
question how changes in modem consciousness of the state as an object of belief affect the 
contractarian basis of Hobbes’ state. This concern for the erosion of political belief and the 
unravelling of the modem state is one aspect of Schmitt’s intellectual project. Thus the 
hollowing out of the modem state, and the unravelling of the three-tiered Hobbesian sovereign 
became, for Schmitt, both a political and a religious crisis. Whereas the crisis of order in the 
twentieth century world exercised political theorists of all persuasions, for Schmitt, there is an 
eschatological aspect to this crisis that fundamentally affected his capacity to imagine a new 
world order. Nowhere is this eschatological angst more apparent than in his study of Hobbes.
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CHAPTER 4 - HISTORIES OF SPACE
If one peculiarity of the state is its particular claims to truth and authority, the other is its 
unique configuration of space. In the previous chapter we explored Schmitt’s ideas on the 
history of political authority, and the slow process by which the particular order enshrined by 
the ‘Westphalian’ state was unravelled from within by the privileging of the individual. In so 
doing, we have relied heavily on aspects of Schmitt’s work that stress religious and 
eschatological themes, as well as his more conventional engagement with political theories of 
the state. We turn now to the second historical dynamic that Schmitt creates in his work -  the 
history of spatial consciousness. According to Schmitt, changes to the nature of spatial 
consciousness over time both made the state form possible in the first place, and then came to 
pose a mounting challenge to the continuing coherence of the state concept in late modernity. 
A clear parallel therefore exists between the internal process of unravelling outlined 
previously, and a second historical dynamic that effectively challenges the state form from the 
outside by undermining one of its key characteristics -  territoriality.
Although handy as shorthand, the characterisation of these histories as ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ threatens all kind of confusion and obfuscation. A note of caution is required. 
Both processes implicate the historical existence of the state as an effective political unit, and 
involve consideration of a complex web of normative phenomena. The ‘domestic’ themes of 
the previous chapter largely concern the constitutive social phenomena that make the state 
possible, and in turn impact the prospects for the state. In the first instance, then, it concerns 
this (whichever) state and its (internal) social arrangements. The ‘external’ phenomena under 
examination in this chapter concern the specifically spatial ordering of states. Since such 
space is all about boundaries with the outside, it naturally draws our attention to the relational 
position of the state.1 It implicates other states, and the wider experiences of land.
Whereas the ‘domestic’ historical dynamic is characterised by the slow widening of the 
‘barely visible crack’ in Hobbes’ state, and the triumph of the individual over sovereign 
power, the international historical dynamic is fundamentally shaped by the historical dynamic
1 Although ultimately, on Schmitt’s terms, the establishment of the political community via a sovereign 
act is already, of course, all about other communities -  the enemy. In the end, therefore, both 
historical processes take the exterior as their logical starting point.
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of ‘Land’ and ‘Sea.’ This elemental dialectic is, for Schmitt, an entirely modern 
phenomenon, rooted in the opening up of the oceans, and cemented by the ‘real decision in 
favour of the element of the sea’ made by certain states (most importantly England, but also 
the Netherlands, perhaps Portugal, abortively by France, and later by the United States).2 
Much of this chapter will explore the vast content that Schmitt inserts into this elemental 
dynamic, incorporating a whole myriad of mythical, religious, technological, legal and 
geographical elements. He argues that ‘each time in history that a power has made a new 
advance into the sphere of human consciousness (through the unleashing of new energies, new 
lands and seas), they also change the spaces of human existence.’3 The astonishing outcome, 
as drawn out in Land und Meer and The Nomos o f the Earth, is an idea of ‘world history [as] 
the history of the conflict of sea-powers against land-powers, and of land-powers against sea 
powers.’4 That is, a kind of elemental determinism.
Given the great interconnections throughout Schmitt’s work, and his tendency to draw 
compound concepts across works on varying themes, the clarity of this separation of internal 
and external challenges to the state is quite remarkable.5 Schmitt recognises, of course, that 
such a clean separation between two logically connected historical processes cannot be wholly 
sustained, and acknowledges the feedback relationship between the two. In particular, 
Schmitt is acutely aware of the various nuances that come together to create ‘spatial 
consciousness’, and the fact that such nuances stand in a relationship with other, internal 
factors (including questions of political authority).6
Nevertheless, Schmitt developed wholly distinct historical architecture to explore the ‘internal’ 
constitutive and ‘external’ spatial processes. Despite the evident crossover points between 
internal and external, the two historical dynamics are basically concerned with different
2 Schmitt, Land und Meer, p.21
3 Ibid. p.56
‘‘Ibid. p. 16
5 As Zarmanian correctly notes, ‘[Schmitt’s] key concepts were disseminated in numerous short texts, 
none of which is complete in itself and which often make an implicit reference to concepts discussed 
elsewhere.’ T. Zarmanian, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Problem of Legal Order’ in Leiden Journal of 
International Law 19 (2006) p.43
6 Schmitt asserts linkages between individual perspectives, collective life, and understandings of space. 
He argues, for instance, that the growth of Calvinism and its doctrine of predestination created the 
opportunity for whole new forms of spatial understanding in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
See pp. 119-122 below.
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questions, as we see if we place them in the context of the political dynamic expressed in the 
Concept o f the Political. On the one hand, the unravelling of the state from within threatens 
the very possibility of the ‘group’, and as such, presents a threat to the political per se. This 
is the very essence of its dangerousness. The widening Hobbesian crack not only erodes the 
state as a coherent organisational concept, but further undermines the very concept of the 
group decision, of authority, of collectivity and of war. This is the basis of the eschatological 
crisis, because the end point of the historical dynamic Schmitt posits does not appear to be the 
realisation of some new organising principle but, rather, the erosion of the very possibility of 
organising principles.
The confrontation of land and sea, by contrast, can be isolated out into a question of Nomos. 
As the discussion in Chapter 2 makes clear, confusion and change in the Nomos o f the Earth 
is a highly dangerous and unpredictable phenomenon, and should not be welcomed or taken 
lightly. In contrast to the unravelling process, however, the changing of the Nomos at least 
holds out the possibility of a new order without the removal of politics per se. As such, 
Schmitt can retain a degree of excitement - zeal, even - in contemplating the new possibilities 
of territorial space with the advent, for instance, of aeronautical technologies. The history of 
Atlanticism, although dangerous in its globalising and homogenising tendencies, is less 
necessarily teleological than that of the unravelling of the state. Schmitt is thus much closer 
to mainstream IR in his analysis of Atlanticism than in the unfamiliar territory of Hobbesian 
determinism.
Of course, there is a third and much more impenetrable historical dynamic at work -  the 
interaction of the Hobbesian dynamic with the Land-Sea dynamic. This is the most dangerous 
facet of all for Schmitt. He admires the great force of Atlanticist gloablism and its capacity to 
establish a new Nomos that can transcend the European space. Indeed, he looks to the 
example of the American continent as the prime historical example in support of his suggested 
Grossraum concept. However, the greatest danger lies in the innate association of Atlanticism 
with the liberal privileging of human independence to the detriment of political action. It is 
for this reason, in light of the great potential of the United States to shape the coming Nomos, 
that Schmitt attached such importance to the examination of these phenomena as conceptually 
distinct. The third dynamic, that of their interaction, is nothing less than world history itself -  
Schmitt’s great synthesis of syntheses that was to provide answers to his concerns about the 
future viability of the Political.
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Nomos & Land
In Chapter 2 we introduced the concept of Nomos in Schmitt’s work as an idea related to the 
fundamental order and orientation of human life in a spatial context.7 As Schmitt writes, 
‘Nomos is the measure by which the land in a particular order is divided and situated; it is also 
the form of political, social and religious order determined by this process. Here, measure, 
order, and form constitute a spatially concrete unity.’8 The specific nomos characterises and, 
in some sense, organises the continuance of politics in a largely self-contained area or 
‘world.’
One way of thinking about a Nomos, therefore, is to think of it as the coherence of multiple, 
simultaneous understandings of political space. Politics is possible within a coherent Nomos 
because, in the shared understanding of space, it is possible to recognise a relationship of 
alterity between ‘us’ and ‘them’ -  between ‘our space’ and ‘their space.’ Politics is possible 
within the nomos since the various political units understand the existence of a zone in which 
interaction can take place. One might suggest that since the enmity that Schmitt regards as 
vital to the existence of politics must contain a degree of mutuality, the individual states 
require a common grammar with which to express their hostility. This grammar is provided 
by the nomos.
As such, the idea of nomos immediately brings forward a notion of epochal history, with each 
epoch characterised by its fundamental and distinct orientation of man to the land -  the 
specific relationship of Ortung to Ordnung. Indeed, the fundamental coherence of a single 
period of history only makes sense in terms of the coherence and endurance of its nomos. In 
this sense, the terms epoch, era, age, nomos and ‘world’ are interchangeable in so far as they 
relate to the temporal endurance of a certain set of shared understandings about human spatial 
interaction. Thus ancient Greece was characterised by a single nomos that ordered the affairs 
of Greeks and gave a sense of the universal that overarched the interactions of the territorial 
units that interacted politically in the Greek ‘world.’ Likewise, the ‘Roman world’, and the 
medieval age in European are each characterised by their own peculiar nomos.
7 See above pp.34-38 See Nomos of the Earth pp.42-83
8 Schmitt, Nomos p.70
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In our previous discussion of nomos, we explored the act of land appropriation as the 
foundational act of any comprehensive territorial order. Schmitt stresses that ‘[e]very 
autonomous and ontological judgement derives from the land.’9 It is the original act of 
dividing, fencing, distributing and organising the land that makes the creation of order 
possible. This implication of the land creates the Ortung that may then stand in its specific 
and peculiar relationship to Ordnung in a way that cannot be achieved without the 
foundational division. It is this that creates character, both inwardly, and in the orientation of 
the ‘fenced’ land towards the outside. Schmitt clearly understands the original, physical 
meaning of character -  ‘[t]he sea has no character, in the original sense of the word, which 
comes from the Greek charassein, meaning to engrave, to scratch, to imprint.’10 Each epoch 
-  each nomos -  has its origins in a distinctive form of land appropriation.
Epochal change is therefore the product of a change in the collective conception of space that 
underlies a certain spatial order. A new form of land organisation is the motor of change 
from one epoch to another -  the putative spatial revolution that Sergio Ortino compares to the 
equivalent domestic revolution when one locus of domestic authority is superseded by 
another.11 Schmitt is therefore wedded to a geographically informed view of history at a 
macro-level, in which the particular possibility of order is derived from the particular form of 
spatial arrangement. The particular contours of a land appropriation, from the ground up, 
precedes and creates all other elements in an historical order. The act of appropriation 
‘constitutes the original spatial order, the source of all further concrete order and all further 
law. It is the reproductive root in the normative order of history.’12
Pre-Modem Orders
World history has therefore witnessed numerous nomoi existing both simultaneously and 
consecutively, but never overlapping. A nomos is not universal in a scientific sense. There 
need not be a provable extension to the outer bounds of known human existence. But it must
9 Ibid. p.45
10 Ibid. p.43
11 See above p.37-38
12 Schmitt, Nomos p.48
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cast the shadow o f universality over those people and those political units that operate within 
its universe. In the pre-modem world, therefore, the shadow of other worlds at the fringes of 
various nomoi did not fundamentally disturb the sense that a particular nomos represented a 
comprehensive and complete spatial order. The nomos of the ancient Greek world, for 
instance, was never conceptually or existentially challenged by the known reality of a Persian 
universe predicated on an incompatible sense of the spatial world.
In the pre-modem era, ‘interconnections [between power complexes] lacked a global 
character.’13 Where confrontations occurred between such power complexes, the absence of a 
common spatial consciousness was starkly reflected by the lack of any highly self-conscious 
and public form of specifically political interaction in the sense of that depicted in Concept o f 
the Political. When Greeks confronted Persians, or Romans confronted Germanic tribes, the 
confrontation fell outside of the coherent boundaries of a single spatial universe. The Persians 
did not present Greeks with the ‘ever-present possibility of conflict’, but rather with an 
exceptional, extraordinary and existential discontinuity with the Greek world.14 As such, 
where the orbits of ancient nomoi clashed, the result was extreme, existential violence, and 
the urge towards annihilation that is explicitly precluded by the controlled version of enmity 
that exists within a nomos.
All pre-modem nomoi therefore lacked the global character that would enable the political 
recognition of enmity in all instances.
‘All the great political power complexes that emerged in the high cultural areas of 
antiquity and the Middle Ages, in both the Orient and the Occident, were either 
purely continental cultures, river (potamic) cultures, or at most inland sea (thalassic) 
cultures. Consequently, the nomos of their spatial order was not determined either by 
the antithesis of land and sea as two orders, as in traditional European law, or (still
less) by an overcoming of this antithesis The common law that arose from such a
pre-global division of the earth could not be a comprehensive and coherent system, 
because it could not be an encompassing spatial order.’15
This absence of a common spatial order made it virtually impossible for empires (each with 
its own ‘orbis *) to recognise the Justus hostis of other empires. As a result, wars between
13 Ibid. p.51
14 Schmitt, Concept p.32
15 Schmitt, Nomos p.53-54. See also Land und Meer pp.23-28
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such ‘worlds’ would invariably be ‘waged as wars of annihilation.’16 The only agent of 
restraint in such circumstances was the simple empirical fact that the low level of pre-modem 
communication and technology kept such interactions to a bare minimum. To a large extent, 
each nomos sustained the illusion that it was a world unto itself.
Given his attachment to the original Greek etymology of nomos, Schmitt pays surprisingly 
little attention to the ancient world as a concrete instance of pre-modem, non-global nomoi. 
He does go some way to creating a broad typology of pre-modem spatial cultures, and in so 
doing emphasises the highly particular form of spatial awareness that underlay these mini- 
universalisms. In Land und Meer Schmitt relies on Ernst Kapp to offer a three-stage view of 
the types of relationship of the nomos to the land.17 In the first instance there are the ancient 
river cultures around the Nile, Tigris and Euphrates, including the Egyptians, the Babylonians 
and the Assyrians. In such potamic cultures, the obvious orientating spatial relationship is 
between the land and the river. Greece, by contrast, represents a thalassic nomos centred on 
the Mediterranean, and with elements in common with ancient Rome, and the Mediterranean 
Middle Ages.
Although thalassic cultures were evidently characterised by their relationship to the inland 
sea, Schmitt is at pains to point out that these were still essentially territorial orders that were 
oriented to a certain notion of land appropriation. In the pre-modem world, ‘the great 
primeval acts of law remained terrestrial orientations; appropriating land, founding cities, and 
establishing colonies.’18 Therefore, whilst thalassic cultures stood in a relationship to the sea, 
this relationship was ‘characterised’ by the idea of coast as a boundary, and as one element in 
the act of land appropriation. The primary element continued to be the land. The point is 
made most clearly in Schmitt’s discussion of Venice as a medieval thalassic culture, in which 
all of the ceremonial and symbolic acts of Venetian life point towards a culture of coasts and 
camps, rather than a maritime existence. Venice represents a ‘KustenreicK that treated its 
mastery of the sea as part of the formative process of its fundamental concept of the land.19
16 Ibid. p.55
17 Schmitt, Land und Meer p.23
18 Schmitt. Nomos p.44
19 Schmitt, Land und Meer p.24-25
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Schmitt is far more interested in the historical example of medieval Christian Europe as the 
last pre-modem nomos. To a certain extent the focus on medieval Europe in Parts I and II of 
Nomos o f the Earth is motivated by the search for seeds of the spatial revolution that led to the 
first global nomos in world history -  the system of European states. Schmitt therefore focuses 
to a great extent on the way in which scholastic theories of ‘international law’ developed in 
late medieval Europe (and especially the reaction of Vitoria to the discovery of the new world) 
are properly understood in the context of the medieval political order from which they 
originated.20 The objective is polemical to a certain extent, and it soon becomes clear that 
Schmitt wishes to attack those contemporary legal positivist who fail to recognise that 
Vitoria’s language of justice ‘must be judged in terms of the jus gentium of the respublica 
Christiana of the Christian Middle Ages -  not in terms of present-day international or 
interstate law..’ Schmitt stresses the spatial and conceptual uniqueness of the European 
Christian order so as to mbbish contemporary attempts to decontextualise medieval doctrines 
of the just war, and reapply them to radically different modem conditions.21
Nevertheless, even if Schmitt’s objectives are polemical, he is drawn towards a fuller 
explication of the medieval order than he offers for Greek or Roman spatial orders. The 
fundamental characteristic of European Christendom is that it displays an essential unity 
between order and orientation -  that is, between the local and the universal, between ortung 
and ordnung. As early as 1923 Schmitt was developing a theory of the possible political 
relationship between the universal church and the particular state (or political unit). In 
Romischer Katholizmus und politische Form (‘Roman Catholicism and Political Form’) 
Schmitt had depicted the Catholic church as a potential common point of meditation among 
European powers that could dispel the worst effects of their antipathy.22 The great strength of 
the Catholic church, in this account, was its ability to survive as a complexio oppositorum (a 
set of complex oppositions) and so to provide a political form to the diverse political
20 Schmitt explicitly predicates his discussion of the medieval international order on the need to rescue 
medieval concepts from the artificial history of their reception. ‘In scholarly discussions of 
international law today, especially concerning the question of just war, the international law of the 
Christian-European Middle Ages is invoked and utilized in a peculiar and contradictory manner. 
...[This is true of] numerous arguments and constructions in which, for example, League of Nations 
theorists in Geneva and American jurists and politicians have endeavoured to utilize medieval 
theories, above all those concerning just war, for their own ends.’ Schmitt, Nomos p.56
21 For a discussion of Schmitt’s wider appeal to medieval historical examples as a tactic in his critique 
of just war see G. Slomp ‘Carl Schmitt’s Five Arguments Against Just War’ in Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 19:3 (2006) pp.437-440
22 Schmitt, Romischer Katholizismus und Politische Form (1923)
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pluriverse of European civilisation. Put baldy, the ‘universal’ church could offer an order that 
is compatible with the inward orientation of the political units.
Although Schmitt’s concern in Romisher Katholizmus lay mainly in arguing for the possible 
mediating potential of the church in contemporary Europe (an idea he quickly abandoned), the 
vision of a Christian order expressed is clearly that of a recreation of the complexio 
oppositorum of medieval Europe. The medieval church stood as the superior source of 
religious authority, external to but enveloping the anarchical relations between ‘secular’ 
powers. ‘No difference [Gegensatz] emerged that it could not encomapass.’23 Rome formed 
the cardinal orienting point for all of European civilisation, such that all language of 
legitimacy and justification was expressed in terms of the ultimate orientation towards the 
universal church. ‘The history of the Middle Ages is thus a history of the struggle for, not 
against Rome.’24
Schmitt stresses the conceptual distinction between the order contained in the idea of 
European Christendom, and the political dynamic expressed in the power relations of the 
princes and emperors. ‘Thus, the antitheses of emperor and pope were not absolute, but 
rather diversi ordines [diverse orders], in which the order of the respublicana Christiana 
resided.’25 Any idea of a fundamental rivalry between the papacy and the Christian princes 
derives, in Schmitt’s account, from a failure to recognise the fact that these institutions 
constituted logically distinct and mutually reinforcing elements of the same overall order. The 
‘unity of imperium and sacredotiunC relied at all times on ‘the distinction between potestas 
[power] and auctoritas [authority] as two distinct lines of order of the same encompassing 
unity.’26 This unity of order and orientation meant that all roads of authority led to Rome.
At the local level (in the various ‘ortungen’ of medieval Europe) political power was 
possessed and deployed according to the will of sovereign princes, in accordance with the 
logic of their political power. Whilst perhaps less firmly defined territorially than the 
sovereign state that was to follow in the modem era, the power of political units was 
nevertheless inscribed on the land. The foundational acts of the European spatial order were
23 Schmitt, Romischer Katholizismus p. 11




those that fundamentally challenged the territorial logic of the preceding spatial order. In 
Schmitt’s account, the foundational land appropriations of the medieval European order were 
those acts of conquest and adverse possession by migratory peoples such as the Vandals in 
Spain and the Lombards in Italy. The vital character of these land appropriations is that ‘they 
exceeded the limits of the existing order of the [Roman] empire’, and thereby placed the 
spatial logic of the Roman order into question.27
Politics was territorial, and the possibility of reciprocal politics (i.e. warfare) rested on the 
fact that medieval Europe possessed a common historical point of departure -  a certain act of 
land appropriation that gave rise to the possibility of the nomos. Europe in the Middle Ages 
was therefore anarchic in the sense that it was a political pluriverse, and the potential of 
princes to engage in war against one another was never put into question. Nevertheless, such 
conflict as did take place between Christian princes (over the usual political matters of rights, 
power and defence) took place within the overall context of the respublica Christiana, and as 
such, they were ‘bracketed wars’ that ‘were distinguished from wars against non-Christian 
princes and peoples’ (i.e. wars that took place outside the boundaries of the nomos).2*
The component parts of the respublica Christiana therefore exist within the context of the 
universal shadow of the church. The unity of order and orientation resulted in a restraint of 
history in the subtle coexistence of order and diversity. As such, in the midst of this complex 
order of opposites, one might say that the Katechon was here at work, restraining the 
possibility of meaninglessness and total disorder. The anarchy of the Christian Middle Ages 
acted as a barrier against historical stasis, whilst at the same time avoiding a headlong 
historical rush to some empty telos. As Taubes might have put it, the Christian Middle Ages 
embraced history as delay.29 As such, this medieval order was neither static to the point that 
the possibility of its own collapse was impossible (a situation that would have been ahistorical
27 See Ibid. p.57. Schmitt distinguishes between those acts of conquest by the Vandals and Lombards 
that challenged the order of the Roman Empire, and early acts of land appropriation by Germanic 
tribes such as the Odoacer, the Ostrogoths and the Burgundians that occurred in accordance with the 
Roman spatial order, and so reinforced the existing nomos. See below p. 110-111 for discussion on 
the difference between land appropriation that supports an existing spatial order, and those land 
appropriations (such as those discussed here) that place the logic of an existing order in doubt.
28 Ibid. p.58
29 See above p.73
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and hence nihilistic), and yet it nevertheless achieved a very high degree of stability.30 As 
Schmitt puts it, the European Middle Ages experienced a tension between great historical 
continuity and a specifically Christian sense that ‘the Christian empire was not eternal.’31
Spatial Revolution
Before one can witness a historical dynamic within a spatially normative order, Schmitt 
demands that there must be a foundational act that brings that order into existence in the first 
place. Just as the sovereign decision lies with the determination of law in the exceptional 
situation, a spatial order comes about by an act of puncture. The modem system of European 
states did not, on Schmitt’s account, come about through some gradual and piecemeal process 
of reform. Rather, it involved a radical shift in spatial consciousness, destroying the old 
spatial order and erecting a new vision of spatial orientation in its place. The decaying 
medieval ideas of space, Schmitt contends, were swept away in a revolution of collective 
consciousness.
Schmitt’s account of the political conditions of medieval Europe coheres in many respects 
with an understanding of pre-Westphalian order that is common in contemporary IR theory. 
It is meaningless to talk of the medieval princes, emperors and city republics as if they were 
‘states’ in the modem meaning of the word. The universal power of the Roman church, as 
yet unchallenged by Reformation particularism, presented an overwhelming context and 
orientation for the conduct of political life. European Christendom represented a complex and 
coherent ‘order’ in which the particular ortung of the political unit is counterbalanced by the 
universal ordnung of the papacy. Schmitt could surely have subscribed, for instance, to Chris 
Brown’s account of the medieval political order;
‘Within medieval Christendom there were borders between the various political 
authorities, but these borders existed in a context where the overriding identity was, 
in principle, universal and religious. Individuals were discouraged from thinking of 
their secondary identities as natural, or as conveying more than limited and
30 See the following chapter for detailed discussion on this idea of static, dynamic and accelerating 
history.
31 Schmitt, Nomos p.59
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conditional moral obligations. Rulers ruled where they could, often through violence, 
but the influence of the church -  which was material as well as spiritual, since 
religious foundations owned much of the wealth of the continent -  was, for the most 
part, exercised to limit the scope of the resulting conflict, and sometimes 
successfully.’32
The contrast drawn here between the coherently orientated politics of medieval Europe and 
the starker, modem landscape of sovereignty and non-intervention coheres with the traditional 
use of the Westphalian myth in the history of IR. Schmitt touches on the common themes that 
are deployed to explain the collapse of the medieval order and the rise of the state system in 
terms of the radical changes of the ‘long sixteenth century.’ In particular, the Reformation 
punctured the capacity of Rome to bracket war, and to act as an external point of orientation 
and restraint among European powers. The scale of violence exhibited in the ‘creedal civil 
wars’ made it clear that the bracketing of wars by means of the concept of just cause could 
only cause instability, violence and an acceleration of history under conditions where the 
authority of the church was divided. Following the blood-letting of the Thirty Years War, 
European powers finally started to achieve a new order based on the personification of the 
political unit, the new public character of sovereigns, and a new, intensely spatial order. 
Such changes finally dismantled the old unities of the respublicana Christiana, replacing it 
with a much less coherently ordered (but nevertheless rooted) nomos.33 The state was created 
as ‘the agency of a new, interstate, Eurocentric spatial order of the earth.’34
The sectarian violence that emerged from the Reformation in Europe could clearly not be 
bracketed and contained by the existing European order. As Schmitt puts it, a confrontation, 
war or territorial challenge is ‘bracketed’ to the extent that it ‘do[es] not jeopardise the 
comprehensive spatial order as a whole.’ If one considers Schmitt’s use of the term 
‘bracketing’ [Hegung], one is struck instantly by its basic applicability to the medieval order. 
An agricultural or forestry word, Hegung refers to the safe containment and management of 
livestock or trees within a contained, safe and ordered space.35 The challenge posed by rival 
spatial understandings inherent in certain strands of the Reformation clearly emanated from
32 C. Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice p.20-21
33 See Schmitt, Nomos pp. 140-151
34 This is the title to Chapter 1, Part III of Nomos
35 On the translation of ‘Hegung’ see above p.32 fn.27
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outside this contained Roman space, and challenged the coherence of its spatial concept. The 
impact of this challenge was therefore revolutionary in a spatial sense.
The difference between a spatial change that takes place within an existing order, and a spatial 
change that jeopardises that order, may not be easily discerned in certain instances. Wars, of 
course, do not challenge the coherence of a nomos per se. The whole point about the 
medieval order that Schmitt depicts is that it was a comprehensive order that contained 
genuine conflict within it. The multiple confrontations of the Pelopenesian Wars did not 
destroy the comprehensive spatial logic of the Greek world. Anarchy does not pose a 
challenge to the survival of a spatial order (but is often rather a sign of its health and 
coherence).
Indeed, Schmitt regards the ability to reconstitute one’s sense of being in space as a core 
human characteristic. ‘[Man] has the power to overcome his historical being and 
consciousness. He knows not only birth but also the possibility of rebirth.’36 Accordingly, 
man possesses the choice to exist and live within spatial horizons that are in some sense of his 
own construction. For the most part such choices and distinctions do not constitute 
revolutionary alterations to the generalised spatial consciousness, but are instead latent 
evidence of man’s capacity to cope with differing spatial categories. At a localised level, this 
capacity for variant spatial experience simply described the profound differences between 
different kinds of people and their existence in space;
‘A city dweller thinks of the world differently than a farmer; a whaler has a 
different Lebensraum that an opera singer, and a pilot experiences the world and 
life not only in a different light, but also in different matter, depths and 
horizons.’37
But beyond such personalised distinctions, it is the generalised capacity for changing existence 
in space that forms the essence of Schmitt’s notion of spatial revolution. There are clearly 
certain instances in which the overall collective understanding of space -  the understanding of 
space that has political consequences -  is radically altered.
36 Land und Meer p. 14
37 Land und Meer p.55
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In Chapters 10-12 of Land und Meer, Schmitt uses theoretical and historical reasoning to 
answer the question, ‘what is a spatial revolution?’38 He suggests that people in the long 
sixteenth century ‘had a particular understanding that their ‘space’ was subject to great 
historical changes,’ and considers whether this consciousness amounts to a spatial 
revolution.39
‘Each time in history that a power has made a new advance into the sphere of human 
consciousness [in den Geschichtskreis des menschlichen Gesamtbewufisteins eintrete\ 
(through the unleashing of new energies, new lands and seas), they also change the 
spaces of human existence......
The change can be so deep and so unexpected that it not only changes distances and 
scale, not only changes the external horizon of man, but also changes the very 
structure of spatial consciousness itself. Then one can talk of a spatial revolution. ,4°
Schmitt provides only two detailed instances of such spatial revolutions. The first -  the shift 
from a comprehensive medieval order to the Westphalia system of sovereign states -  appears, 
at first glance, to be less about the concept of space, and rather more about ideological or 
authoritative principles of politics. After all, the immediate territorial basis of the emergent 
states was, in very many cases, virtually identical to the immediate spatial claims of preceding 
princes and kings. France or England, for instance, continued to be recognisable notions on 
either side of the watershed. If anything, one might suggest that the revolutionary aspect was 
a question of degree rather than extent. Westphalia was revolutionary because it represented 
the political charge of territory as a foundational political fact, rather than as a contingent and 
subordinate fact of a wider and looser order. It represents a decision in favour of territory -  
in favour of the element of land -  as the primary ordering principle of politics. In this 
respect, the experience of the Thirty Years War might be said to have created a higher degree 
of self-consciousness about the possible political effect of territoriality. It helped to situate 
territory as an historical concept, rather than as an assumed fact of political existence as it had 
been in every previous nomos.
38 Schmitt, Land und Meer p.55
39 Idem.
40 Schmitt, Land und Meer p56-57
111
If the shift to a modem Europe of states marked the conceptual realisation of land, the second 
instance of spatial revolution of concern to Schmitt marks the conceptual discovery of its 
antipode -  the sea. This present, ongoing alteration of spatial consciousness is doubtless the 
most radical spatial revolution. In its very nature, maritime life rejects all fixity, all 
permanence, all rootedness. It conceives of order only in terms of the ultimate coherence of 
its own references. A concept without limits, the sea engulfs everything. It only knows only 
temporal difference, and at the micro level -  in the momentary position of a ship, or the 
breaking of a wave. And it can only conceive of order in terms of the coherence of its 
entirety. In the development of sea-power, global commerce, extra-European expansion and 
the emergence of the United States, Schmitt senses precisely this decision against the political 
premises of land, and in favour of a maritime form of existence. To a great extent, Land und 
Meer and Nomos o f the Earth are engaged in an attempt to analyse the conceptual-historical 
effect of this ongoing discontinuity between terrestrial and maritime modes of situating 
political existence.
The Element o f Land
Before we go on to consider Schmitt’s depiction of the modem historical dynamic between 
firm land and free sea, it is worth pausing a moment to consider the status of the primary 
element, land. Land is clearly the natural human habitat. In the beginning, therefore, man 
knew only the land. Simply put, ‘since man is not a fish and not a bird’, he is a ‘creature of 
the land.’41 The firm land is man’s ordained domain, and every pre-modem spatial order was 
predicated solely on the land as the form-giving element. Any relationship to the sea or to the 
air was merely by means of a boundary to the land, as evidenced in Schmitt’s discussion of 
the Venetian Kustcultur.
Schmitt’s turn towards the elements as the key to historical understanding is a 
characteristically esoteric move. In Land und Meer Schmitt stresses his understanding of 
elements in terms of the ancient division between land, sea, air and fire, as drawn from 
Thales.42 Schmitt clearly arrives at the device of an elemental history via his prior emphasis
41 Schmitt, Land und Meer p.7-8
42 Ibid. p. 12-15
112
on the centrality of land to the ordering of any existence. In Schmitt’s thought, as in his 
theory of human organisation, land is both the point of origin and the form-giving element. 
Schmitt’s concept of elemental history grows out of the status of land as man’s natural 
element, and is so geared to a discussion of the disturbance of this terra-firma by the historical 
activation of other elements.
As our previous discussion of the nomos concept illustrates, firm land is vital to the realisation 
of a spatial order since it is only land that has character -  that can be inscribed, appropriated, 
owned and divided. In The Nomos o f the Earth, land is depicted as the tripartite source of all 
law and order;
i) First in the inner measure of man’s toil in the earth,
ii) Second, in the fact that soil cleared for work manifests clear lines (that is to say, 
divisions),
iii) Third, it is in the fences and walls that grow up around these divisions that ‘the 
orders and orientations of human social life become apparent.,43
Thus the land is not only man’s ‘natural’ habitat, but also offers the physical and ontological 
fixity required to create meaningful order.
Schmitt argues that man’s orientation to the land is the source of the original distinction 
between public and private, and that it mutually implicates ideas of private ownership and 
public protection. In this he is by no means unique among political theorists in looking to the 
land as the original basis of legal divisions. He applauds Kant for having recognised that 
‘supreme proprietorship of the soil [is the] main precondition for the possibility of ownership 
and all further law, public as well as private.’44 But Schmitt rejects Kant’s formalism, and the 
reduction of the fact of land ownership as a categorical theory. Schmitt stresses instead the 
concrete fact of land appropriation as an historical event that in itself proceeds the possibility 
of all other distinctions between public and private, or between authority and ownership. The 
very force of a land appropriation comes not from any normative status as a new order, but 
rather from its historical character as a point of rupture, and the foreshadow of a new order.45
43 Schmitt, Nomos p.42-43
44 I. Kant, The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the 
Science of Right p. 182. See Schmitt Nomos p.46
45 Schmitt, Nomos pp.45-48
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The land appropriation is the defining act of a new historical era -  ‘[at] the start of every great 
epoch there is a great act of land appropriation.,46
As such, Schmitt’s ideas on land as the concrete source of order implicitly repudiate Lockean 
ideas on property as the product of human energies. Famously, for Locke, property is to be 
viewed as that which man removes from nature by his labour, and since ‘this Labour [is] the 
unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no man but he can have a right to that what is once 
joyned to...’47 For Schmitt, the foundational act of proprietorship is not labour, but force. 
Appropriation is a violent act that establishes the future possibility of ownership. To talk of 
man’s labour, his use of the soil, the content of his social life -  all of this, for Schmitt, is to 
avoid the arbitrary historical fact of appropriation that must necessarily precede the social 
order. Property, for Schmitt, is a contingent social fact that hinges on an arbitrary original 
event of appropriation.48
The act of land appropriation is primary in Schmitt’s thinking about the foundation of law for 
three main reasons;
i) Land appropriation is the foundational act, and it is theoretically impossible to think 
about the creation of law in any other order. All other aspects of social order 
necessarily derive from the original, concrete act of appropriation, and any attempt to 
avoid this harsh, real, unjust fact is delusional. In his essay 
Appropriation/Distribution/Production Schmitt sought to attack the narrowness of 
political economic debates in contemporary liberalism and Marxism by stressing the 
primacy of the act of appropriation. Schmitt argued that it is impossible to discuss acts 
of distribution and production without first having ascertained the act of original 
appropriation.49
ii) The act of land appropriation is the only means by which the ruler of a political unit can 
achieve a secure separation of a zone of peace from a zone of conflict. The boundary
46 Schmitt, Land und Meer p.71
47 J.Locke ‘The Second Treatise on Government’ para. 27 p.288
48 This insistence of the logical priority of appropriation is also the basis of Schmitt’s rejection of 
Alexandre Kojeve’s conclusion that a stable future order could be based on production alone. See 
Ojakangas Concrete Life p. 161
49 Schmitt, ‘Appropriation/Distribution/Production: Towards a Proper Formulation of the Basic 
Questions of any Social and Economic Order’ in Telos 95 (Spring 1993)
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creation involved in a land appropriation involves the exclusion of enemies to the zone 
on the exterior, and the neutralisation of the interior as a single order. Thus the land 
appropriation is the foundational separation between domestic and international law.
iii) In creating an internal zone of peace, the act of land appropriation cements the amity of 
the particular political community. The particular political community is predicated on 
a certain understanding of land ownership, and is therefore existentially committed to 
the maintenance of that spatial arrangement. As such, individual interests in land 
ownership dovetail with the spatial logic of the political community itself. The very 
self-interest of citizens compels them to act together in the maintenance of the spatial 
status quo.50
This latter point clearly coheres with the logic of protego et obligo which we explored in the 
previous chapter. One measure of the degree to which a sovereign succeeds in his protective 
role lies in the degree to which he maintains the internal spatial order and the security of 
formative instances of land rights. In Der Diktatur Schmitt displays an interest in the classical 
definition of despotism, and the relation of this concept to the disruption of common 
understandings of property rights. Schmitt’s argument that there is a basic connection 
between the territorial status of the political unit and the maintenance of a certain concept of 
territory within the political unit could doubtless be illustrated by numerous historical 
examples.51
There is a natural stability to the concept of territory then, that derives from the permanence 
of the land. Changes to the concrete element are either de minimus (as in the case of landslips 
or changing vegetation), or else are imperceptibly slow (as with erosion or glaciation). In the 
context of the firm land, therefore, a spatial revolution will entail either an alteration of scale, 
or a change in the intensity of association with the land. In other words, as with the changes 
wrought by Westphalia, it will involve changes in perception rather than being driven by
50 See also Zarmanian ‘Carl Schmitt’ p.56
51 See Der Diktatur. Consider, for instance, the delicate territorial balance of the Hapsburg empire in 
the early seventeenth century. The disappropriation of the Duchy of Mecklenburg, and the 
replacement of the Duke with a Bohemian commoner was clearly an unsustainable disturbance of the 
common understanding of the relationship between the overall territorial structure of the empire, and 
the particular property and ownership concerns of local agents. See A. Osiander The States System of 
Europe, 1640-1990 Oxford: Oxford University Press (1994) chapter 2.
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changes in the substance of the land. The emergence of the sea as a politically charged 
element changed this.
The Element o f Sea
In all antiquity, Schmitt suggests, man has only an elemental relationship with the land. All 
order is territorial, all ownership derives from the land, and all orientation is in accordance 
with the division of land. The most significant historical departure of the modem era (the one 
that distinguishes it from every previous political order) is the emergence of the sea as a real 
and total element in human existence. Of importance here is the difference between 
relationships to the sea as a boundary in thalassic societies, and the modem decision in favour 
of the sea that was total, elemental and irreversible. In Schmitt’s account, certain modem 
states made an elemental decision in favour of the sea that radically changed the very basis of 
their orientation. As such, a radical dichotomy between sea-power and land-powers emerged 
as a basic motor of modem history. In the Westphalian era, Schmitt argues for an 
understanding of world history as the dialectical relationship of land and sea.
Schmitt acknowledges that the sea has always exerted a curious pull on mankind. He remarks 
on the prominence of the sea in myths of creation in which the sea ‘features as the ancestor of 
mankind. ’52 From ancient Greece and the legends of peoples of the south Pacific, right up to 
Darwin’s theory of evolution, man has always (Schmitt argues) had some form of Romantic 
attachment to the sea as a source of origins and mysticism. ‘It is curious that when men stand 
on a coastline, they naturally stare out from the land over the sea, and do not look back over 
the land from the sea.,53
We have already seen that pre-modem societies such as medieval Venice often lived according 
to a coastal disposition. Schmitt is also interested in pre-modem attempts to appropriate areas 
of sea as an adjunct to land appropriations. Such attempts to extend terrestrial authority over 
areas of the sea relied on a far higher degree ‘of human means of power and human
52 Schmitt, Land und Meer p. 10
53 Ibid. p.9
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consciousness of space’ than is necessary for the original and primary land appropriation.54 
Moreover, in the pre-modem era, such appropriations were fundamentally limited by the 
corollary of the land-appropriation out of which they grew. Thus the great Mediterranean 
societies of Assyria, Greece, Rome and Carthage, and arguably also the Hanse in the Baltic, 
are instances of prototypical sea-appropriations which nevertheless relied fundamentally on the 
terrestrial limits of the inland seas to which they related. The defining characteristic of such 
appropriations continued to be a basic terrestrial consciousness.
Despite their limited nature, these early attempts to inscribe law and order onto the sea 
already point to some of the fundamental differences between the possibilities of fixity 
inherent in the land element, and the fluidity of the sea. For each of the thalassic cultures 
mentioned above, the sea remained an area of contestation at the outer limits of the grounded 
nomos within the particular empire or society. It was never possible to achieve the same 
status of law (or normative order) on the sea as could be achieved on land. The sea was a 
realm of piracy that could never be made subject to the same intensity of political orientation 
as could firm land. The absence of boundaries made it impossible to separate a zone of peace 
from a zone of war, and so there appeared a seamless continuum between trade, political 
power and piracy. ‘On the sea, fields cannot be planted and firm lines cannot be engraved.’55 
The sea was a zone of constant and immutable conceptual challenge to any order.56 Those 
powers that ventured into the sea are best seen as land powers with ships.57
This huge indeterminacy of the sea in contrast to the fixed land meant that, for the most part, 
the sea continued to be an object of fear in the pre-modern world. ‘Many peoples kept to the 
mountains, far from the coasts, and never lost the old, pious fear of the sea.’58 In Schmitt’s 
account, the sea was present as an elemental force in human life only as a supra-boundary 
concept. The sea represented an unknown, inhuman and uncontrollable exterior that stood as 
antithesis to the very fabric of ordered human existence. For the most part it was shunned 
and avoided, and history continued to be constituted by the slow moving tensions within the 
terrestrial unity of order and orientation.
54 Schmitt, Nomos p.44
55 Ibid p.42
56 Ibid pp.42-46
57 Schmitt, Land und Meer p.26
58 Schmitt, Nomos p.43
117
The Elemental Decision in Favour o f the Sea
For most of human history, therefore, land has been the hegemonic element of human 
existence. It is only during the long sixteenth century, and the transformation of Europe from 
a unified respublica Christiana to a system of sovereign states, that the sea comes to play a 
world historical role. In our discussion of spatial revolution, we have already seen that one 
factor in the destruction of the old order and the foundational act of a new order lay in the 
consequences of Reformation. The key spatial characteristic of this new order was in the 
unprecedented decision of certain states to reorder their spatial self-consciousness along 
maritime rather than terrestrial lines.
Most of the content of Land und Meer concerns itself with the factors that encouraged and 
enabled certain peoples to take this elemental leap into total maritime existence. That is, the 
structural changes that allowed people to break the elemental bonds with the land that had 
characterised all previous human existence. Schmitt points to a myriad of changes in 
technology, innovation, religion, forms of trade, notions of commodity and the growth of 
capital that coalesced with changes in the perception of space and adventure. Certain societies 
fundamentally resisted this draw to a maritime existence, and concentrated on fleshing out the 
primary territorial consequences of the new staatlichen political order.59 And in this 
combination of embrace and resistance, a new bipolar historical dynamic started to emerge.
Schmitt’s great prototypical symbol of the elemental decision in favour of the sea is the image 
of whalers [Waljager] -60 Enabled by the great advances in English and, more particularly, 
Dutch ship-building in the period from 1450, the practice of whaling gradually opened up the 
horizon of the open ocean, and stimulated a form of interaction with the sea that cut loose of 
its territorial boundaries. Whilst the ordered world of the Doge focussed only on the inland 
sea, the ramshackle Dutch gradually turned their eyes to the meaning of maritime existence. 
A productive dynamic thus emerged between ship technology and the practice of whaling that 
drew Englishmen and Dutchmen ever more into the orbit of the sea. Whaling was a conduit
59 Recall Schmitt’s remark that Hobbes’ idea of the territorial state only became actualised in 
continental Europe, whilst the English attachment to the freedom of the sea negated the idea of the 
centralised territorial space to which Hobbes’ state theory naturally led. See above p.61-62
60 See Schmitt, Land und Meer chapter 5
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to adventure and discovery. ‘The whale tempted them out onto the oceans, and emancipated 
them from the coasts. Through the whale man discovered the ocean currents and found the 
northern passage. The whale led us.’61
Here as elsewhere, the whale is an important symbol for Schmitt in its original biblical role. 
In Leviathan Schmitt discussed the Cabbalistic myth of the great battles between the sea- 
creature Leviathan, and the great land beast, the Behemoth. Schmitt revisits this theological 
mysticism in Land und Meer, and the prominence of the whale as the symbol of the new 
maritime existence is no accident in this respect. Schmitt explicitly endorses the value of 
reading the world-historical dynamic through the lens of this mythical confrontation, and 
shows admiration for the prescience of Isaac Abravanel’s fifteenth-century linkage of the 
Leviathan-Behemoth myth to the political situation of Portugal, Castille and Venice.62 In both 
a practical and symbolic sense, therefore, the whale serves Schmitt as both cause and symbol 
of the shift towards a maritime existence.
In terms of the more tangible historical forces encouraging a shift towards the maritime 
existence (such as technology and new forms of capitalism) Schmitt characteristically conflates 
causation and outcome, all under the banner of elemental change. Therefore the discovery of 
the Americas, the development of navigation equipment, the invention of ships capable of 
sailing to windward, the foundation of chartered trading companies, the encouragement of 
privateering and the opposition of Catholicism and Protestantism ‘[all belong] to the elemental 
change from land to sea which constitutes our subject here.’63 Whilst this scatter-gun picture 
of the structural changes of the sixteenth century may fail to satisfy from a causal perspective, 
Schmitt is nevertheless effective in presenting an image of this as a concrete, momentous, 
historical point of rupture. His point appears to be that something is happening that is opening 
a historical cleavage between the conception of space as fixed land and the conception of 
space as free sea.
In a twist on the familiar Weberian thesis of the Protestant origins of capitalism, Schmitt looks 
to religion as one of the sources of variant spatial horizons.64 Alongside Europe’s growing
61 Schmitt, Land und Meer p.34
62 Schmitt, Land und Meer p. 17
63 Schmitt, Land und Meer p.46
64 See especially, Land und Meer chapter 15
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capacity to engage with oceanic space, the new theology of pre-destination encouraged, in 
Schmitt’s account, a new detachment from the concrete orientations of the dry land. It is no 
accident, Schmitt argues, that Calvinism was the faith of the most adventurous and 
territorially detached of Europe’s peoples in the sixteenth century -  the Huguenots, Dutch 
freedom fighters and sea beggars, and the English Puritans. Schmitt sees the doctrine of 
predestination as the highest expression of self-confidence by an elite, and as a natural conduit 
to both ‘devil-may-care’ adventurism, and a lofty self-elevation from the concrete orders of 
the terrestrial world. Calvinism saw its opportunity in the opening possibility of maritime 
existence, and in turn reinforced the depth of the revolution in favour of the sea. To a great 
extent, therefore, the adoption of the sea was the product of a ‘world historical brotherhood 
that was cemented between political Calvinism and Europe’s emergent maritime energy.’65
This decision of certain European peoples in favour of maritime existence is the revolutionary 
event in the creation of a new nomos. Schmitt argues that the comparison of medieval Venice 
with early modern England or the Netherlands firmly establishes the revolutionary substance 
of the latter’s relationship with the sea;
‘However, when we pose the question of whether [Venice] is an example of pure 
maritime existence, and represents a real decision in favour of the sea, we are struck 
by how narrow the Adriatic, and, indeed, the Mediterranean as a whole were, when 
compared with the unforeseeable expanses that the world’s oceans would come to 
offer.’66
‘[The whalers] were the first born members of a new elemental existence -  the first 
new, genuine, ‘children of the sea.” 67
What then, is the substance of this ‘decision’ supposedly made by England and the 
Netherlands? In some respects, as Schmitt points out, the English were late starters in 
realising the full planetary potential of oceanic space. Schmitt argues that their starting point 
was the founding of the Muscovy Company in 1553 (fully sixty years after Columbus sailed) 
and claims that the English first ventured south of the equator as late as 1570. Moreover,
65 ‘...die weltgeschichtliche Bruderschaft, die den politischen Calvinismus mit den aufbrechenden 
maritimen Energien Europas verbindet. ’ Land und Meer p.84-85
66 ’ Schmitt Land und Meer p.21-22
67 Ibid. p.35
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English advances at this time were largely based on technological advances achieved in the 
Netherlands, which remained the leading innovator in ship design.68 The English ‘decision’ 
certainly did not lie, therefore, in some status as a trailblazer, or in some unique technical 
capacity to embrace maritime life.
England’s status as an island was clearly one factor in its predisposition to the maritime 
decision, and yet, as Schmitt points out, there were many island peoples who specifically did 
not decide in favour of a maritime existence in the early modem period. Nevertheless, he 
does regard England’s self-conscious identity as an island nation as causally important. It 
gave the English a head start in grasping the ocean as an independent, absorbing element. For 
continental people, the sea forms one of several boundaries in which land is the primary 
element. Schmitt argues that island people tend to look on land as coast with a ‘hinterland.’ 
The sea is the sole meaningful boundary. One might say that it is the land that is the oddity - 
a point of interruption. Whereas continental peoples are predisposed to think about the sea in 
terms of shipping ‘lanes’ between territorial points, the English (Schmitt argues) had some 
conception of themselves as implicated by the sea, and as inhabiting a ship or the back of a 
whale -  i.e. inhabiting a space defined by the sea.69
Yet all such structural predispositions towards a maritime existence do not of themselves 
explain the substance of the decision that Schmitt is talking about. This is not a decision in 
the political sense, in that it does not represent a process of political distinction and 
enforcement. ‘Decision’ in this context refers rather to a form of sociological shift in 
perception, via which the English and Dutch came to define their spatial consciousness on 
radically different lines to the rest of Europe. The ‘decision’ in question is the full embrace of 
the possibilities of maritime life, the adoption of a new concept of spatial freedom, the 
extension of global adventure, and the transformation and expansion of society in reflection of 
these newly found freedoms.
In Schmitt’s schema, the unique factor in the English and Dutch relationship to the sea was in 
their readiness to regard the sea as empty, lawless and free. Whilst other European powers 
attempted to comprehend the dawning oceanic age from within the context of the European 
spatial order, these northern Europeans embraced the possibilities of the sea as a separate
68 Schmitt, Land und Meer p.51
69 See Schmitt, Land und Meer pp.90-95
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element. This elemental distinction is best illustrated, in Schmitt’s account, by the officially 
sanctioned growth of privateering in Tudor England. The free marine corsair capitalism -  or 
piracy by another name -  encapsulated the distinction between the free sea, and the ordered 
territory of land in which law and order applied.70 Whilst the English and Dutch embraced 
the bill possibilities of this maritime existence, other states held firm to strict territoriality.
The notion of an ‘elemental decision’ in favour of the sea allows Schmitt to skirt around the 
problem that numerous European powers, both Catholic and Protestant, were fully engaged in 
the opening up of oceanic space and the ‘New World.’ The early prominence of Spain and 
Portugal in this area is self-evident, but Schmitt continues to regard these early-modern states 
as wedded to the land as their foundational element (and especially so Spain). France likewise 
strikes Schmitt as an interesting example of the failure to make a decisive change in favour of 
maritime existence -  a decision Schmitt again attributes to religious determinism;
‘France failed to follow through on its promising attempts at the sea, such as were
primarily associated with the Protestant Huguenots  the decision against the
Huguenots and in favour of Catholicism was also, in the final analysis, a decision 
against the sea and in favour of the land.’71
The substance of a decision in favour of the sea clearly consists of more than the mere fact of 
oceanic reach and maritime capability -  for Schmitt it represents an existential departure.
This conclusion on the fate of French maritime existence also points to the conclusion that the 
leap into a maritime form of existence is culturally mediated. As with changes in territorial 
consciousness, the initial decision for or against the sea only makes sense as an expression of 
certain pre-existing aspects of culture. The turn towards a maritime existence is not 
historically inevitable, but rather represents a form of boldness and adventurism -  a radicalism 
that could be resisted and restrained by conservative sovereigns in Europe who acted to 
bolster their territorial status, and clamped down on domestic forces that pushed for an
70 Schmitt illustrates this conceptual difference with the historical example of the Killigrew family of 
Cornish pirates. The legality or otherwise of their behaviour is entirely determined by whether or not 
it occurs within the element of land or sea. The two represent separate realms, each capable of total 
human occupation. Schmitt, Land und Meer pp.46-50
71 ‘Frankreich hat den grofien Anlaufzum Meer, der rrui dem hugenottischen Protestantismus verbunden
war, nicht durchgehalten  [dem Ubertritt] gegen die Hugenotten und fur den Katholizmus
entscheiden hatte, war damit, im letzen Endergebnis, auch die Entscheidung gegen das Meer und fur 
das Land gefallen. ’ Land und Meer p.52-53
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opening up of these new indeterminate spaces. The great Catholic powers of early modem 
Europe sought, therefore, to extend absolute political control over the growing maritime 
sphere, and to make seafaring a limited adjunct of their terrestrial power base.
Spain and Portugal attempted to benefit from the new opportunities of seafaring, whilst at the 
same time protecting the land oriented order of Europe from any disturbance from the great 
new oceanic space. In the first instance, the response to the realisation of great oceanic space 
was an attempt to extend the form of sea-appropriations that had characterised thalassic 
attempts to organise maritime space. This was pursued in an attempt to organise a form of 
sea-appropriation from within the existing order that merely extended their respective 
territorial conceptions of themselves. As such, they negotiated ray a -  great lines projected 
across the sea that would divide the rule of Spain from the rule of Portugal (most famous, of 
course, is that enshrined in the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494).72
The other geopolitical response of firmly ‘territorial’ states against the emergence of the sea 
was via the use of so-called amity lines.73 These lines reflected an awareness among 
territorial states that they could not evade the reality of huge oceanic space by merely ignoring 
its existence. At the same time, however, the new space clearly presented a challenge to the 
territorial orientation of the metropole. Amity lines, whereby states agreed to the 
geographical limits of the European order, represented an attempt to externalise oceanic 
space, and thereby to neutralise its potential effect on the foundations of European order. 
‘Beyond the line’ there lay another world, in which Europeans would explore, conquer and 
fight as aliens unconnected to the order and orientation of metropolitan Europe. Such a 
concept was insufficient, however, to neutralise the dialectic effect of the sea on the land, 
since of itself it recognised the relationship of two distinct spaces in an historical relationship 
with one another.74
Germany, meanwhile, remained virtually isolated from the fact of oceanic expansion and the 
dynamics of New World colonisation. The states of Germany continued to represent the 
highest point of terrestrial orientation. Schmitt remarks with interest that Lutheranism -  the
72 See Schmitt, Nomos pp.86-92
73 Amity lines are an important aspect of Schmitt’s view of the dynamic between land and sea, and will 
be discussed in more detail later.
74 See Schmitt, Nomos p.92-99
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dominant Protestant doctrine in Germanic Europe -  was territorially conservative in contrast 
to Calvinism. German Lutheranism was doctrinally content with a territorial framework for 
history and the persistence of small states.75 Where continental Calvinism did persist, it either 
sought an oceanic outlet (as with the Princes of Brandenburg who were among the few 
German princes with an instinct for sea power) or, in the case of Swiss and Hungarian 
Calvinism, was rendered historically meaningless as a result of the failure to express its 
expansive energy.76
The Sea & ‘Emptiness’
In point of fact, the opening up of oceanic space during the ‘first planetary spatial revolution’ 
was as much about new land as it was about the dominance and mastery of the sea by whale 
hunters and pirates. The ‘land-appropriation of the new world’ by European powers was 
therefore the final component of the new global nomos, and constituted the new foundational 
act on which a territorial order of the globe could be founded. ‘[T]he basic event in the 
history of European international law [is] the land appropriation of the new world.,7? But as 
Schmitt is quick to point out, this process of appropriation is by no means as well-oriented as 
previous, uncontested territorial appropriations. The territory of the new world fell into a 
conceptual no-man’s land, best categorised as somewhere on the boundary of free sea and 
fixed land.
All European powers could agree on the conceptual distinction of European and non-European 
land. The land of European states acquired a special territorial status rooted in mutual 
recognition. Colonial land was regarded as free space that was not subject to the same 
normative framework as the European space. As such, the new global nomos was rooted in 
the distinction of three spheres -  European land, non-European land, and the sea -  each with 
varying tendencies towards the definition of enemy, property and authority.78 This conceptual 
distinction suited all European powers (both ‘territorial’ and ‘maritime’) as it allowed the
75 See Schmitt, Land und Meer p. 84
76 Ibid. p.83
77 Schmitt, Nomos p.83
78 See Schmitt, Nomos p. 183-184
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distinction of a stable European space in which the basic territorial logic of the home states 
was not challenged. The logic via which each reached the notion of free spaces varied, 
however. As we have seen, ‘territorial’ powers were already well-used to the idea of amity 
lines that served the practical purpose of neutralising the new horizon of conflict.79 For the 
maritime powers, however, the free continental space of the new world came to be seen as 
made of the same substance as the free sea.
In both cases, the most significant characterisation of the new world was that it represented an 
area ‘free’ for discovery and occupation. In Nomos Schmitt considered the 16th and 17th 
debate on whether the New World should be regarded as res nullius or res omnium. The 
lands of the Americas and the Far East were, of course, ‘land.’ But in truth, their 
territoriality was not now implicated in the creation of order. They were not appropriated as 
territory so much as concepts. The lands of the New World were situated as an abstract idea 
-  that which lay beyond the line, in a zone of indeterminacy. They were not part of the 
order, but conceived of instead as a theoretical category subordinate to the European order. 
In a sense, the territory of the New World was treated with irony, as a plaything.
For the first time, the entire earth was comprehensible as a single unit. And this realisation 
immediately generated a shift away from the concrete and towards the abstract. Man started 
to contemplate the relationship of the earth to the sun. The Enlightenment philosophers 
revelled in the pregnancy of ‘emptiness’ -  the horror vacui of the New World -  as a 
philosophical idea. The enormity of the global space invited an intimacy between the 
individual subject and the seductive universalism of the new age. Renaissance painters -  
‘barometers of the changing spatial concepts’ -  started to depict the human subject ‘in a space 
that gave a perspective of emptiness.’80 Whereas Gothic architecture had ‘angled’ people in a 
heavy context, emergent geometric styles sought to replicate the idea of free space.81 In short, 
the realisation of an incomprehensible global space invited personal transcendence. It took 
man outside the concrete context of his existence in a place, a community, and a political 
order.
79 Schmitt identifies the first such amity line as having been included as a secret clause in the Treaty of 
Cateau-Cambresis (1559). See Nomos p.92
80 Land und Meer p.68
81 Land und Meer p.69
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What better way to characterise this aesthetically clean escape from the concrete realities than 
through Thomas More’s idea of Utopia. That is to say, U-topos -  the negation of topos, the 
negation of place. ‘Such a word would have been unthinkable in the mouth of anyone in 
antiquity.’82 Without the medieval avenues of belief and the promise of Roman salvation, man 
started to create his own Neverlands from the confines of his own mind. In the Hobbesian 
state, the individual was to be allowed the space to dream his own dreams of paradise. And 
in the embrace of an oceanic existence, the individual could find substance for those dreams -  
desert islands, tropical shores, u-topias. Although he declines to bring the two historical 
stories together, it is abundantly clear how Schmitt understood their relationship, and that they 
were pulling together towards formlessness. ‘Each horror vacui brought much joy for the 
philosophers of the Enlightenment. But maybe this was just an understandable shuddering in 
the face of the nothigness and emptiness of death, before a nihilistic idea and, above all, 
nihilism itself.,83
All was not lost at this stage, of course. Within Europe, conscious efforts were made to 
sustain a highly normative, terrestrial order of states. Here, land continued to dominate. 
Politics continued to be a terrestrial affair. But Europe could not, and did not wish to, 
incorporate the new wide open spaces as part of the territorial order. In contrast to the unity 
of order and orientation in medieval Europe, the nomos of the jus publicum Europaeum was 
instead founded on the fundamental opposition of and tension between land and sea. Whereas 
the coherence of universal and particular in the medieval world had ‘slowed down’ history, 
Schmitt presents the confrontation of land and sea as an almost textbook Hegelian dialectic. 
Here we have two forces that threaten to negate each other. It constituted an explanatory 
framework into which Schmitt was able to pour all the various points of divergence between 
the conservatism of terrestrial Europe and the spatial radicalism of the Anglo-Saxon world. 
Accordingly, much of Schmitt’s international history of the period following 1500 is reducible 
to the idea of world history in the confrontation of land and sea.
On the one hand there are the terrestrial accommodations of continental Europe. On the other 
we have the detached English -  ‘of Europe, but not in Europe.’84 Added to this was the
n Afo»ttwp.l78
83 Land und Meer p.67
84 Schmitt, Nomos p. 173. Any observer of recent debates about British Euroscepticism would be 
amused by Schmitt’s use of this formulation.
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uncertain position of non-European lands in relation to this division. Colonial land 
appropriations muddied the waters, since ‘they were neither international interstate nor 
international private law matters, but even so they were not purely intrastate matters.’85 
Within the context of the world historical dialectic of land and sea, non-European territory 
was to constitute a unique source of conceptual contest. The sea represented the pregnant 
possibility of disorder -  u-topos, formlessness, nihilism -  and there was no apparent way to 
contain this possibility within an order of territory.
Geopolitics & History
Against the backdrop of Schmitt constitutional and political theory of the 1920s and early 
1930s, this turn to geopolitics seems curious. Schmitt had displayed comparatively little 
interest in the geopolitical movement in German politics during that period, despite the 
relative prominence of such ideas in popular discourse during the 1920s and, increasingly, in 
the early 1930s.86 Moreover, through figures such as Manfred Langhans-Ratzeburg and Otto 
Kollreuter and their ideas of ‘geojurisprudence’, geopolitical ideas had entered the academy as 
a significant branch of anti-positivist legal theory.87 With his focus on the content of 
sovereignty and the intricacies of constitutional law, however, Schmitt seems to have made 
certain assumptions about territoriality that he only now called into question.
The distinction between Schmitt’s preoccupation with juridical analysis and the trends in 
geopolitical thought are perhaps most evident in the varying intellectual responses to the legal 
and political status of the Rhineland under the Versailles settlement. Schmitt’s concern had
85 Schmitt, Nomos p. 199
86 For a comprehensive overview of the German geopolitical movement in the Weimar period see 
D.T.Murphy The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany 1918-1933
87 Langhans-Ratzeburg’s major study Begriff und Aufgaben der Geographischen Rechtswissenschaft 
(Geojurisprudenz) [The Concept and Application of a Geographic Science of Law (Geojurisprudence)] 
was published in 1928, advocating the importance of geographical understanding to the reality of 
international law. Apparently in line with Schmitt’s ideas on the distinction between real and artifical 
sovereignty, one of Langhans-Ratzeburg’s innovations was the creation of maps of real, de facto 
power in contrast to the artificial borders of de jure state power. Kollreuter popularised the idea of a 
'community of destiny' (an idea that he partly derived from his study of Japan in Das politische 
Geschicht Japans Berlin: Heymann (1940)), and also engaged in public debate with Schmitt through 
the Deutsche Juristenzeitung in April 1933.
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always been primarily with the sovereign-constitutional ramifications of this international 
indeterminacy.88 The key prompt for his concern was the Rhineland as a problem of 
sovereign authority, rather than some geographically principled question of a specifically 
‘German’ right to that territory. By contrast, the geopolitical disciples of Rudolf Kjellen and 
Friedrich Ratzel addressed the problem in the language of ‘natural’ borders and a providential 
German space stretching from the Rhine to the Vistula. In a sense their concern was more 
specific and concrete, and less intellectually abstract than Schmitt’s. Walther Vogel, for 
instance, argued that the internationalisation of the Rhine would be unsustainable because 
France was an alien power in the Rhineland. German control of the Rhine was geopolitically 
determined, and any attempt to prevent it by means of international law was historically 
unsustainable.89 Elsewhere, Adolf Grabowsky was concerned with the distinction between 
‘mere treaty borders’ such as those imposed by Versailles, and ‘natural’ borders based on 
territory and ethnicity.90
Schmitt was a latecomer, therefore, to geopolitical and geo-historical modes of thinking from 
within the context of theorising on the problems of contemporary German geopolitics. 
Characteristically, Schmitt skirted around the large body of literature already in existence 
about the problem of geographic determinism and the role of geography in sustaining and 
shaping political formations. Land und Meer makes absolutely no reference to Kjellen, 
Ratzel, Haushofer or Langhans-Ratzeburg, despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that his 
‘application of Raum concepts to international law and state relations had been prefigured in 
the 1920s [and earlier] by [such] geopolitical thinkers.’91 Despite its obvious debt to an 
ongoing tradition of geopolitical thought -  a debt cagily acknowledged by reference to Halford 
Mackinder and Alfred Thayer Mahan -  Schmitt is clearly seeking to present a different 
perspective from the ongoing and increasingly programmatic debates in German geopolitics 
and geojurisprudence. Two key distinctions are apparent.
Firstly, German geopolitics in the 1920s and 1930s was pre-eminently concerned with the 
‘problem’ of Germany’s position, and the search from a programmatic policy response to
88 See Schmitt’s 1928 essay ‘Rheinland als Objekt internationaler Politik’ in Positionen und Begriffe
89 See Vogel’s essay ‘Rhein and Donau als Staatenbilder’ in Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik I (1924)
90 See J.Klein, ‘Adolf Grabowsky, ein vergessener Politikwissenschafler’ in B.Hafeneger & W.Schafer 
(eds.) Aufbruch zwischen Mangel und Verweigerung Marburg: Marburg Rathaus Verlag (2000)
91 Murphy, Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany 1918-1933 London: Kent State 
University Press (1997) p.29
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solve its geopolitical vulnerability. As David Murphy carefully illustrates, German 
geopolitics was constantly caught between a pessimistic appraisal of Germany’s geopolitical 
disadvantages, and the optimistic proposal of ideas on spatial expansion and Lebensraum 
designed to remedy this position.92 Despite drawing thinkers from differing backgrounds of 
law, academic geography, demography and journalism, publications such as the Zeitschrift fur  
Geopolitik were constantly engaged in the search for purposive theories that could help to 
address the immediate situation in Germany. Alongside its pretensions to scientific status, 
German geopolitcs was self-consciously political in the sense of proposing and pursuing tight 
policy ideas, and bolstering a broader set of foreign policy ideas (particularly on the political 
right).
Despite its own political motivations, Schmitt’s Land und Meer simply does not engage in the 
specific question of Germany’s geopolitical position, and the prospects for a future 
realignment of its spatial conditions.93 Overtly, at least, Schmitt is not writing a specifically 
German meditation on the problems of geodeterminism and the political ramifications of 
spatial consciousness. Indeed, his clear objective is to situate Germany as one among several 
traditional, territorial, European states-in-form that are together conceptually challenged by 
the turn towards a maritime mode of spatial thinking. Mainstream German geopolitics sought 
to stress the uniqueness of Germany contra France and Italy on the one hand, and Russia on 
the other. Infused with Romantic themes, Karl Haushofer et al tended towards an assertion of 
Germany’s territorial uniqueness as a bridge between East and West -  that is, as a specifically 
non-western state.94 In stark contrast, Schmitt’s depiction of a geopolitical dynamic between 
land and sea clearly rehabilitates Germany as a traditional European state pitted against a rival 
Anglo-American understanding of space.
There is much that could be said about Schmitt’s determination to write and think in terms of 
the historic European experience of statehood rather than reverting to a particular concern for 
the specific geopolitical problems of Germany. It is a tendency that persists broadly within 
Schmitt’s work, and that distinguishes him significantly from most other conservative German
92 It was Karl Haushofer who coined the phrase Lebensraum and introduced it to Hitler as early as 1924 
through their mutual friend Rudolf Hess. See Murphy Heroic Earth p. 106-110
93 In this respect, Schmitt’s later work on Grossraum is far more in keeping with the German 
geopolitical tradition. See Chapter 6 below.
94 See M.W.Lewis & K.E.Wigen The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography p.59
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political and geopolitical theorists of the inter-war years.95 His Catholicism, his deep 
grounding in French history and language, his engagement with Donoso Cortes and de 
Maistre, and his marriage to a Serbian wife all perhaps play a part in drawing Schmitt away 
from an overtly nationalist theoretical language. But beyond this, it also re-emphasises 
Schmitt’s concept of a certain, special, plural, political-territorial arrangement in the process 
of erosion. It represents his idealised commitment to a particularly European territorial state 
that is struggling to survive the pressure of Atlanticism.
For most geopolitical theorists, the problem of maritime space and naval power was one of 
simple tactics and orientation. Much debate in German geopolitics centred around the 
question of whether or not Germany might be able to assert itself as a maritime power, and 
latterly challenge the imperial and oceanic power of Great Britain and the United States. 
Under the influence of Mahan, theorists such as Haushofer and Josef Marz grappled with the 
realisation that maritime power was now a pre-requisite of world power, and tried to address 
the challenge this posed to Germany in policy terms.96 ‘The key geographic fact confronting 
Germany,’ Marz concluded, ‘is that it has no free access to the world’s oceans and that its 
links to overseas colonies can always be blocked by the power that controls the English 
Channel and the North Sea.,97 The lesson derived from Mahan that Germany would have to 
either achieve authentic maritime power, or else radically restructure its terrestrial power to 
such a height as to obviate the imperative to maritime existence -  that is to say, it would have 
to achieve a maritime form of power on the continent.
For Schmitt, the lesson from Mahan is less axiomatic, less positive, and in many respects 
more subtle. The maritime mode of power that Mahan identifies represents a form of spatial 
orientation that is so totally at odds with the terrestrial foundations of the state as to represent
95 The most obvious distinction is with Max Weber for whom, as Wilhelm Mommsen has amply 
illustrated, the purpose of political theory was always first and foremost the creation of specific 
answers to the concrete and particular problems of German politics. See W.J. Mommsen Max Weber 
and German Politics, 1890-1920 (trans. M.S.Steinberg) Chicago: Chicago University Press (1990).
96 Mahan’s seminal work The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 enjoyed a high profile in 
Germany even before its translation in 1896, and became a key resource in debates about the 
development of German naval power during the Weimar period. See Herwig, ‘The Influence of A.T. 
Mahan upon German Sea Power’ in J.B.Hattendorf (ed.) The Influence of History Upon Mahan: The 
Proceedings of a Conference Marking the Centenary of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea 
Power Upon History Newport R.I.: Diane Publishing (1991)
97 J. Marz, Landmachte und Seemdchte p.35
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a wholly distinct mode of being. Schmitt would doubtless have recognised the possibility that 
a ‘maritime’ mode of orientation might be possible within a continental context -  that is to 
say, that the formlessness, unrootedness, ideologically universal form of (anti) spatial politics 
represented by Mahan’s Atlanticism might supplant traditional terrestrial political 
arrangements - that politics might become despatial. But for Schmitt, this was hardly a policy 
challenge to be embraced and acted upon. Instead, it represented a meta-historical challenge 
to the coherence of a terrestrial way of living politically. The challenge posed by the sea to 
the land is less to do with the mechanics of power, and has far more to do with the limits of 
historical consciousness.
This realisation leads us to the second key distinction between Schmitt and those geopolitical 
theorists engaged in the hunt for a geographic response to Germany’s political circumstances -  
their differing comprehension of the interaction of history and geography. Arthur Vogel 
presents a good example of ideas on geopolitically determined history. Similarly to Schmitt in 
Land und Meer, his avowed project in Das Neue Europa was to uncover the elemental 
foundations of the contemporary European state system, and the present predicament of 
Germany. In so doing, he stressed the ‘deeper, slower currents of national life and the barely 
changing geographical circumstances’ that shaped history with ‘unrelenting force.’ 98 The 
substance of such geopolitical determinism lay a profound (if, frankly, imprecise) interaction 
of drainage systems, natural mountain and desert boundaries, with the admixture of racial and 
cultural factors. Oswald Spengler too, of course, proposed a complicated account of the 
interaction of culture and geography in the determination of conflict and history.
At first glance, Schmitt’s historical dynamic of land and sea might seem to have much in 
common with such geopolitically determinist accounts. But Schmitt’s objectives are more 
refined and more subtle than a simple attempt to account for conflict along geopolitical lines.99 
Land and sea represent radically inconsistent modes of existence in relation to space rather 
than simply functionally distinct determinants of conflict. The problem of sea-power is not 
simply one of tactical assertion, but rather transforms the essence of political existence 
irreversibly. The abandonment of a terrestrial mode of political orientation changes 
everything, and the consequences are unestimably dangerous. And yet, as with the liberal
98 Vogel, Das Neue Europa und seine historisch-geographischen Grundlagen Bonn: Schroeder (1925) 
p.v
99 Of course, any such acknowledgement of geographically determined lines of conflict would tend to 
contradict Schmitt’s basic function on conflict as a purely political expression of sovereign will
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exploitation of Hobbes’s ‘barely visible crack’, Schmitt is appearing to suggest that the power 
of a maritime, universal mode of political (dis)orientation is irresistibly powerful. Arguably, 
the starry-eyed appeal of Mahan to German geopolitical theorists of the inter-war period 
makes exactly this point.
Intriguingly, Schmitt and Vogel were both coming to the same conclusion -  that, in Murphy’s 
words, ‘that the nation-state as such, which [Vogel] said had arisen as a specific response to 
the conditions of European geography and the small continent’s multiplicity of languages and 
ethnic-cultural groups, had exhausted its utility.’ But such a conclusion was less pregnant 
with danger for Vogel than for Schmitt. For Vogel, as for many ambitious geopoliticians in 
Germany, the challenge to achieve a spatial revolution was a challenge to be embraced, and 
an opportunity to break the shackles of Germany’s geopolitical disadvantages. For Schmitt, 
however, such a move represented the challenge of a radically unstable, rootless, and 
dangerously universal maritime mode of existence that appeared to offer few prospects for 
order and containment. The dismantling of a Europe of states to be replaced by the 
confrontation of some spatially freewheeling counterpoise to Anglo-American maritime power 
was, frankly, a ghastly prospect. And yet that dismantling was, in Schmitt’s analysis, an 
unavoidable fact of the present.
There are clear parallels between this understanding of geographic history, and Schmitt’s 
account of the history of the sovereign state under conceptual challenge from liberalism. He 
depicts an ideal-conceptual notion of a static, ordered and comprehensive idea of the state. In 
the first instance, this is an idea derived from the theory of Thomas Hobbes and rooted in an 
anthropomorphic ideal of a decisionist sovereign. In the present case, it is a state that 
possesses a specifically terrestrial understanding of the basis and limits of its spatial existence. 
In both instances, the static ideal is challenged by a progressively destabilising force that, in 
itself, offers no apparent hope for the creation of a new order. The sovereignty of the state is 
eroded by the political assertion of the individual subject. The terrestrial basis of the state is 
undermined by the emergence of a radically decontextualised assertion of bare maritime 
power. For Schmitt, these interrelated processes are, simply put, tragic.
Schmitt’s critique of the dialectic or dialogism of Land and Sea is therefore part of his wider 
critique of the intellectual and historical processes of modernity. For him, the loss of a 
terrestrial base is of particular significance because of the sheer importance he places on it in
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the act of appropriation and the formulation of order. Territory is as close as we come to a 
foundation in Schmitt’s thought, and the idea of trying to situate real politics without it seems 
absurd and fanciful. The spirit of the ocean might be detestable for all sorts of real and 
immediate reasons. But in its essence, this critique is exactly the same as Schmitt’s critique of 
liberal individualism. It is a critique of the way that the intellectual currents of modernity 
have created a situation in which, to borrow a phrase from a quite different stable of thought, 
‘all that is solid melts into air.’ Or, in Schmitt’s immediate context, into water. It is a part, 
then, of a more fundamental critique of the experience of time and the erosion of any sense of 
permanence in modernity. The task now then, is to uncover this perspective on history a little 
more directly.
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CHAPTER 5 -  ACCELERATION & RESTRAINT
‘ I  have a methodology that is peculiar to me: the phenomena that occur to me, so to speak, 
from things [Stoff] that I  think about, and not from pre-existing criteria. One can call that 
phenomenological, but I  myself prefer to avoid such general methodological questions. They
tend to go on for ever. ’*
These intertwined stories of the dissolution of the state and the order of states are of 
inestimable importance in understanding Schmitt’s personal intellectual and emotive response 
to the political world around him. They skewed his reading of contemporary phenomena, 
heightened his sense of the importance of the current age, and provoked in him a curiously 
energetic pessimism in contemplating the future. Unlike other epochal changes, Schmitt sees 
the twentieth century as dominated by the pre-ordained collapse of the existing order, but 
without the evident advent of a new age. Any attempt to read Schmitt as a theorist of the 
present must, it would seem, weigh the effects of this intense spirit of fin  de siecle.
Moreover, it would appear that any productive attempt to ‘think with’ Schmitt about 
normative order and the future of the political must share this fear of the end. The whole 
insistence on the logical priority and necessity of enmity feeds off such apprehension. 
Naturally, there may be many foundations for such a fear, and the basis of Schmitt’s own 
concerns are hotly contested. It seems most likely, as argued in chapter 3, that the language 
of Antichrist is more than mere metaphor, and represents a genuinely (if idiosyncratic) 
Christological historical framework. But to a very great extent, the historical frame that 
Schmitt produces would be equally relevant if the fear of dissolution were motivated by a 
commitment to purely human phenomena.2 Schmitt’s analysis of history is all about how to 
mediate between the formlessness of total violence, and the formlessness that would ensue 
were there no violence whatsoever.
It is worth stressing too, that Schmitt is clearly animated by the fear that both such dissolute 
states are entirely possible. In other words, he is a world away from the normative
1 Schmitt, ‘Gesprach iiber den Partisanen’ in Staat, Grofiraum, Nomos p.621
2 In various places Schmitt addresses such motives as the maintenance of cultural difference and the 
maintenance of a seriousness to life.
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indifference of those who regard the system of sovereign states as here to stay. It would be 
foolish to seize on Schmitt’s apparent assumption of the Political as immutable, as evidence 
that he fits best as some bedfellow of IR realists. Firstly, for Schmitt the state is nothing 
more than a temporary historical accident that will surely be swept away like every previous 
nomic order. But Schmitt’s precise political concern is with the interrelationship of nomic 
orders and social institutions (the state, international law, cultures of rights) with the prior 
question of the Political. Within orders, the concerns of realists certainly resonate with 
Schmitt. But ideas such as statecraft and the national interest take on a very different hue 
when they are related to this ultimate ratio of avoiding final dissolution.
As we have seen, Schmitt’s depiction of the story of the modem state system follows a highly 
peculiar path. He uses fully formed theoretical accounts of both the state (as derived from 
Hobbes) and of international law (as derived from an idealised account of the achievement of 
Westphalia) as a hook on which to hang his historical narrative. Schmitt’s history of 
modernity is more a theoretical history, and less a history of concrete events. Evidence that 
fails to fit Schmitt’s account of the development of the modem state is largely ignored. In 
short, we are asked to accept these theoretical formulations as adequate synonyms for the 
concrete reality of these phenomena in their ‘original’ form. The story of the state and of 
international law is therefore one of deviation from original purity -  a story of the loss of the 
vitality of that original moment of puncture.
The transmogrification of Hobbes’s theory of the state into the concrete reality of the state, 
and the reading of international practice as synonymous with the professed standards of 
European international law are the two key points of connection. But there are many other 
ways in which Schmitt excessively ties his own theoretical understanding together to historical 
reality in explaining progression away from these starting points. It is a point well made by 
Scheuerman:
‘...any attempt to deduce complex, real-life institutional trends from alleged 
contradictions of a particular intellectual system should meet with a healthy dose 
of skepticism. Far too often, Schmitt assumes that history accords with political 
and legal theory: the internal conceptual limits of liberal theory explain 
liberalism’s real-life political ills.’3
3 W. Scheuerman Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time London: John Hopkins Press 
(2004) p. 119-120
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Although Scheuerman’s precise concern is with the way that Schmitt reads the historical 
effect of liberalism, the point can be made more generally in relation to Schmitt’s historical 
reasoning. He assumes that the intellectual foundations of the modern state have the decisive 
effect in how the state fares historically. Moreover, he extends this intellectual-foundational 
story to the international setting, and assumes that theoretically consistent pathologies are 
unfolding in world politics. Historical contingency appears to be something Schmitt can only 
account for at a revolutionary moment -  i.e. in the foundation or destruction of a Nomos.
This manner of looking at the past immediately raises the question of pace. What precise 
events and processes increase the rate at which we move away from the original unities? 
Conversely, what is that slows the processes of unravelling? By framing political actors so 
heavily in a pre-determined logical setting, Schmitt is forced to measure their actions against 
the wider narrative of decline and dissolution to which he is now committed. In so far as we 
may talk about personified sovereigns, their world-historical status is referable to the extent to 
which they slow the logical disentanglement of sovereignty itself. Schmitt’s method of 
historical reasoning elevates acceleration and restraint as important ways for evaluating real 
events against the wider historical framework. Change within the existing system can 
ultimately be read in terms of whether it hastens or restrains the logical disentanglement of the 
system as a whole.
This chapter aims to evaluate Schmitt’s wider understanding of the relationship between 
(temporary) orders of the political, and the experience of time. How can these structuring 
principles of the Political be reconciled to the survival of enmity as the basic human 
condition? How does acceleration in nomic orders affect Schmitt’s underlying understanding 
of politics as immutable conflict? What is it that makes modern social acceleration of time so 
much more dangerous, in Schmitt’s estimation, than previous shifts in social order? What is 
so special about the experience of time in late modernity when viewed from a Schmittian 
perspective? History, it is argued, is about far more for Schmitt than merely the concrete 
experience of agonal politics. The changing experience of time has done enormous damage to 
the sorts of foundations in which Schmitt roots his understanding of the Political -  territory, 
monopoly over truth, representative myths. Schmitt’s fear, in other words, is that the 
collapse of the Eurocentric system of states might not be the starting point for a new order;
‘The most terrible transformation of the world lies in [the possibility ofj a
bewildering expansion of power in which things become certain, audible
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(hoerbar) and clear (vemehmbar) that [nevertheless] surpass the capacity of our 
physical senses; audible and therefore authoritative (besitzbar). A new concept of 
property or, even more than this: the rule of functionality (die Beherrschung von 
Funktionen)-, cuius regio, eius economia, now: cuius economia, eius regio. That 
is the new Nomos of the Earth; no more Nomos.’4
Historical Order & ‘Slow Time'
At first glance, Schmitt’s step from ideal theory into history appears to present a paradox or 
an internal contradiction. The immutable essence of the Political is all about divisions and 
confrontations that are defined by the fact that they escape any normative order. Yet the 
survival of political dynamic over time is all about replicable structures of order. The concept 
of Nomos appears blind to the raw reality of the exceptional situation. As Alberto Morreiras 
puts it,
‘Schmitt’s position in The Nomos o f the Earth seems to contradict his earlier 
position on the political successfully: the notion of a nomos of the earth, of an 
order of the political, accomplishes, perhaps against Schmitt’s own will, a 
deconstruction of his notion of the political.’5
For Morreiras, this juxtaposition of the theoretical essence of the Political and its historical 
containment in a Nomos leaves a glaring question that Schmitt refused to answer;
‘Do we prefer to uphold the notion of a nomic order, or do we prefer to abide by 
a savage, anomic notion of the political? Is there a choice?’6
It is, of course, a false question. Presumably, we would all (Schmitt included) choose to live 
in a stable normative order in which the possibility of ‘real physical killing’ is at its most 
contained. Schmitt does not contend that we should or do actively choose to live politically. 
His critics, to be sure, are quick to paint in him a celebration of violence, instability and 
perpetual aggression. But in fact, the Political is hardly a matter of choice. It is an ever
4 Schmitt, Glossarium (16th July 1948) p. 179
5 Morreiras ‘A God Without Sovereignty’ p.82
6 Morreiras ‘A God Without Sovereignty’ p.82
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present possibility, the escape from which would amount to the end of history, the end of all 
truth, the end of belief, and the end of all seriousness. It is only here that Schmitt becomes a 
partisan in defence of the continuing possibility of Schmittian politics. What for some would 
amount to paradise on earth is, for Schmitt, the most ghastly prospect.
Schmitt does not offer a choice between anomic politics and the notion of a nomic order. The 
institutions of concrete political life contain political diversity in two ways. Firstly, Schmitt 
maintains, every system for the organisation and containment of politics has been predicated 
on a hard-headed understanding that war and division is a normal and unavoidable part of life. 
The complexio oppositorum of Medieval Europe, and the jus publicum Europaeum that 
succeeded it, merely remedied the worst dangers of the Political, and refracted political 
dynamic through a focussed lens. Schmitt not only maintains that anarchy and law are not 
mutually exclusive; his entire depiction of anomic politics mediated through institutions relies, 
it seems, on the basic contention that real law always derives from anarchical foundations.
But secondly, whatever the social and political institutions that coalesce to create a Nomos, it 
is only ever a temporary arrangement. It therefore maintains political diversity temporally, in 
the fact of its own fragility. Every ordering of the political is a contingent act, and every 
concrete structure of order has no basis other than an inertia drawn from its foundational 
moment. Yet without principles of order o f some kind, how can the Political obtain traction in 
the concrete historical world? The real meaning of Schmitt’s famous contention that ‘the 
concept of the state presupposes the concept of the Political’ comes to the fore once again.7 
How do we square the circle between these apparently timeless orders, and the truly timeless 
resistance of the Political to any attempt to permanently impose order? How can the 
structures of order seem so strong, when mortality is their most basic attribute?
Put another way, Morreiras is correct to focus on the apparently irreconcilable tension 
between Schmitt’s genuine commitment to the maintenance of the state system, and his belief 
in the immutability of violent politics. But he is wrong to expect or wish for a logical 
resolution of this tension. The tension is vital to the whole theory of politics as Schmitt 
presents it. Resolution of the tension would, of course, spell the end of history. Structures of 
the political cannot be so solid as to exclude the possibility of their own demise. Yet at the
7 Schmitt, Concept of the Political p. 19
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same time, these structures must be experienced as permanent, or else politics will become 
wholly formless. Without the persistence of ideas such as state, international law, Christian 
princes, Roman Empire etc, the distinction between public and private cannot survive.
What we have in Schmitt, then, is a rather extreme juxtaposition of etemalist and presentist 
perspectives. There is no necessary contradiction in Schmitt’s mind between the 
inescapability of violent politics, and the success of broadly normative orders that drive 
towards a containment of that violence. All of his deep theoretical analysis of the meaning of 
the Political is aimed at distilling permanent rules to describe something essential about the 
human condition. On the other hand, Schmitt seeks to describe the various concrete 
phenomena through which man has created and experienced these timeless phenomena. 
Indeed, Schmitt’s description of the universal Roman church as one such institution is apt, 
since at times Schmitt’s attempts to describe this relationship resembles the theological 
account of the gap between transcendental Christian truth and the Church as a human 
institution.8 The concrete institutions of human life provide a barrier against the universal, 
and create a forum in which political existence does not have to engage directly with universal 
questions.
Principles of order therefore obtain an important but ultimately ambiguous place in Schmitt’s 
theory. They must be ambiguous from a theoretical point of view, because they are not the 
products of reason, but products of historical events. But they are also ambiguous 
historically, because they possess the shadow of permanence, whilst remaining temporary. A 
principle of order only has the capacity to achieve order in so far as it is experienced as the 
way of ordering divisions. If the contours of an order are constantly and effectively 
challenged, then the order obviously fails to contain political dynamics, and is not, therefore, 
an order. It is essential therefore, that from generation to generation, the institutions of order 
and authority are viewed as the natural order of things -  as a given. Yet, if these institutions 
were, in fact, indestructible, this would preclude the possibility of another, future point of
8 In his diaries Schmitt remarks that ‘The most important word [in the work] of Thomas Hobbes 
remains: Jesus is the Christ. The power of this sentence is that if he [Christ] appears on the edge of 
the intellectual construction, that means that he is also something external to the system of belief. 
This deportation (Abschiebung) is a characteristic of Christ that seems to be an analogous forerunner 
to Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor. Hobbes discussed and intellectually grounded the things that the 
Grand Inquisitor does: Christ’s effect in the social and political spheres is rendered harmless; the 
anarchistic Christianity in which he remains in the background as an indispensable source of 
legitimacy.’ Glossarium (23rd May 1949) p.243
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rupture. As such, it would lead to historical stasis, and diminishing political returns within a 
reductive and overly stable order. Schmitt’s orders seem to require an imperceptible but real 
form of dynamism.
Schmitt’s study of the state and the system of international law confirms this impression of 
permanence. His European state is clearly the product of a convulsive historical accident. Of 
itself, the state could be described as a highly sophisticated way of securing the political 
community, providing a formidable machine for the maintenance of political authority, and a 
clear platform for the expression of enmity externally. His study of Hobbes enhances 
Schmitt’s reading of the state in The Concept o f the Political and Political Theology, 
emphasising its contingent nature as a response to concrete challenges. In the following 
centuries, the state dominates the exercise of politics to such an extent that organised human 
existence without the state becomes virtually unimaginable. Civil wars become a struggle for  
the attributes of sovereignty, and therefore uphold the nomic order. Indeed, it is precisely this 
impression of permanence that makes Schmitt’s separation of the political from the state seem 
so radical. So great was the state’s air of inevitability, most political theory had assumed it to 
be the originator of politics per se. At first inadvertently, Schmitt’s study of the separation of 
concept of the state and the political necessarily involved a deeper study of the experience of 
time in the latter.
Motion is a central tension in Schmitt’s study of the state. History must be dynamic. But 
there is an imperative to restrain that movement within a known normative order. It is of 
great importance to Schmitt whether history is fast or slow. As we have seen, he is far more 
comfortable thinking about the past in terms of moments of rupture. The ideal, for Schmitt, is 
a knife edge interruption of the existing order -  the revolutionary moment. It is a sense of 
social change that is somehow analogous to the earthquake. The tension between the existing 
order and the demands of the time grows unnoticed, until suddenly there is a sudden and 
drastic reformulation of the principles of order. This conception has the advantage for 
Schmitt that the establishment of order can be conceived as a moment of command and a 
product of political determination rather than as a flimsy product of impersonal social 
processes. Characteristically for Schmitt, it allows a view of the institutions of political life 
from the top down -  from ‘the realm of the powers.’9
9 J.Taubes, Political Theology of Paul p.51
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Theoretically, the moment of rupture cannot be captured. The whole point is that it is a 
concrete, accidental point of departure. It does not have antecedents. And the potential for 
such revolutionary moments is vital for Schmitt’s hopes for political renewal. But time within 
orders can be theorised historically according to its pace. Indeed, as Schmitt presents them, 
the primary historical purpose of political ordering principles appears to be to contain and 
restrain the dynamics of enmity within a containable framework. Among states, contention 
and warfare becomes a more limited affair, and does not escalate towards absolute heights. 
Concerns remain partial, limited and specific. The existence of the order itself keeps absolute 
and universal questions at bay. For as long as enmity is contained in a system of mutuality, 
theological questions are kept at bay.
The immediate effect of orders of the political is therefore to allow a dynamic around 
questions of truth and authority that are real, but nevertheless possess a safe degree of irony. 
The system itself suggests a certain dynamic, and removes urges towards any final resolution. 
The system allows for productive and dynamic tension, without instigating a headlong rush 
towards logical (or theo-logical) resolution. This is true, of course, of the complex dynamics 
of medieval Europe. And as we have noted previously, the imperative on slow time and the 
neutralisation of debates over absolute truth is a key part of Schmitt’s recourse to Hobbes. 
What Schmitt seems to require, in other words, are complicated tensions in which concrete 
political concerns collide with truth claims in a dynamic but ultimately irreconcilable melee.
The only possibility of reconciliation -  of a final resolution of the slow historical contretemps 
-  is an interruption from the outside. An act of revelation, the foundation of a new order, or 
the coming of apocalypse. Slow time is therefore predicated on a latent understanding that the 
current order is not total. That it does not and cannot contain every historical possibility. As 
Ojakangas and Meier have both convincingly illustrated, it is this insistence on the removal of 
final historical possibilities from the imminent experience of order that leads Schmitt to his 
ultimate rejection of modem / progressive philosophies of history. Rationalist histories seek 
to resolve tensions on the basis of an assumption that historical outcomes can be determined 
rationally from within the existing order. For Schmitt, such an assumption incorrectly 
excludes the possibility that either unforeseen revolutionary events, or divine acts of 
revelation, will interrupt.10
10 See Ojakangas Concrete Life pp.205-211 and Meier Lesson p. 15. Ojakangas disputes Meier’s 
assertion that, for Schmitt, this latent externality must ultimately be contained in a Christian idea of
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Modem Epochs
Schmitt’s emphasis on time as delay is tied intimately to the figure of the Katechon. As we 
have explored previously, Schmitt uses this Pauline term rather broadly to describe the 
historical effect of certain kinds of political actors. Consciously or otherwise, there are forces 
or individuals in each age that have the effect of restraining the emergence of the Antichrist. 
Following the account given in 2 Thess, Schmitt equates the realm of the Antichrist on earth 
to a hubristic period of peace in which all meaningful difference is eliminated. This is a 
period of total commensurability, in which it will no longer be possible to make meaningful 
distinctions on the basis of morality, aesthetics, religion, economics or any other set of 
criteria. Whether or not we wish to read this as a genuinely theological or merely allegorical 
position, it is the historical end point against which Schmitt gears his political thought as a 
whole.
Even before developing the specific historical critiques expressed in Land und Meer and The 
Leviathan in the State Theory o f Thomas Hobbes, Schmitt developed a detailed and politically 
pregnant criticism of the modern experience of time as movement towards a neutral centre. 
There is something distinctive about the way that history is experienced through the prism of 
modernity that attempts to eliminate the complexities and tensions that Schmitt regards as so 
important to the era of Christological time. The manifestations of this acceleration are 
extremely familiar from Schmitt’s work, and broadly equate to all of the programmatic 
aspects of liberalism. The pursuit of peace, the reinstitution of laws of jus ad bellum, the 
marginalisation of religion, the creation of a positivist system of law and a generalised 
apolitical sentiment are all dangerous evidence that world politics is structurally oriented 
towards the pursuit of neutrality and the acceleration of social time.
Schmitt first gave detailed consideration to neutralisation as a historically problematic process 
as early as 1929 in a short essay The Age o f Neutralisations and Depoliticisations.11 As
revelation. For Ojakangas, Schmitt rejects Hegel because he rejects the historical force of events that 
lie outside our realm of knowledge. For Meier, Schmitt rejects Hegel because his philosophy of 
history denies the transcendence of God. Both agree, however, on the importance of Schmitt’s 
reservation of an unknowable zone of historical indeterminacy.
11 Schmitt, ‘The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations’ (trans. M.Konzett & J.P.McCormick) in 
Telos 96 (1993)
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presentist as ever, Schmitt grapples with the historical process that has generated what he 
regards as the present malaise of European politics. ‘Our present situation’, Schmitt argues, 
‘can be understood only as the consequence of the last centuries of European development; it 
completes and transcends specific European ideas and demonstrates in one enormous climax 
the core of modern European history.’12 Schmitt sets out to trace ‘the stages in which the 
European mind has altered over the last four centuries’, suggesting that concrete human 
affairs are mediated by a particular central sphere of intellectual interpretation.13 On a century 
by century basis, Schmitt argues that the previous four hundred years had been shaped in turn 
by theological, metaphysical, humanitarian-moral, and finally economic modes of mental 
existence. In the twentieth century, Schmitt argues, technology is supplanting economics as 
the ‘central sphere’ of ‘intellectual life’.1415
The power of these central intellectual spheres lies in their ability to provide an abstract point 
of convergence. Prefiguring the themes he developed in his study of Hobbes, Schmitt argues 
that the 17th century turn from theology to metaphysics was motivated by the desire to find a 
zone of neutrality in which the violent disputes of theology would be avoided.16 Hobbes’s 
creation of a neutral category of total political authority was one manifestation of the 
metaphysical attempt to create neutral intellectual categories. ‘Following the hopeless 
theological disputes and struggles of the 16* century, Europeans sought a neutral sphere in 
which there would be no conflict and they could reach common agreement through debates 
and exchange of opinion.’17 The motive of avoiding theology ‘because it was controversial’ is 
the central point. There was a common enterprise ‘to find minimum agreement and common 
premises allowing for the possibility of security, clarity, prudence and peace.’ Metaphysics 
was the first attempt to posit a ‘concept of truth’ around which all interests could coalesce.18
12 Schmitt, ‘Neutralizations’ p. 131
13 Loc. cit.
14 Ibid. pp. 131 - 134
15 Schmitt had first developed his critique of the contemporary mythicisation of technology in 1916 in a 
commentary on Theodor Daubler’s poem Das Nordlicht in which he drew a link between liberalism, 
the myth of technology, and the idea of the Antichrist.
16 ‘The transition from the theology of the 16th century to the metaphysics of the 17th century (which is 
not only metaphysically but also scientifically the greatest age of Europe -  the heroic age of occidental 
rationalism) is as clear and distinct as any unique historical occurrence.’ Ibid. p. 132
17 Ibid. p. 137
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Despite themselves, all attempts to create a neutral sphere have failed. In Schmitt’s eyes, it is 
a misconceived effort, since it mistakenly posits the idea that a genuine, incontestable 
common truth can be established through the means of the central sphere. Whereas 
metaphysics began as an effort to establish a sphere of neutrality, the means of metaphysics 
soon became the basis of contesting claims, and the essence of new and more dramatic 
conflict. It is a process echoed by Schmitt’s assertion in The Concept o f the Political that any 
substantive dispute (whether religious, moral, aesthetic, economic etc) may become political if 
it provokes sufficiently deep divisions among groups of men. And as each mechanism for the 
pursuit of neutrality breaks down under the weight of its own hubris, it is replaced by another 
sphere that claims to possess the path to a common and neutral truth. Thus metaphysics was 
replaced by ‘vulgarisation’ of 18th century moral philosophy, which was in turn replaced by 
Marxian economics.19
The Age o f Neutralisations and Depoliticisations is an important early statement of Schmitt’s 
critique of the blind modern pursuit of principles of neutrality. In large part, it is a critique of 
(what Schmitt holds to be) the erroneous idea that truth and knowledge claims can be settled 
in an apolitical direction. It possesses the same sort of ambivalence as Schmitt’s political 
writing of the same period. On the one hand Schmitt despairs of the frequent modem beliefs 
that all truth is somehow immanent, and that all tension may be resolved intellectually.20 Such 
belief in the universal truth of derivative claims provokes the sort of extremity, violence and 
disorder that, for Schmitt, always accompanies a loss of clear headed acceptance of the 
political condition. The ‘secret law’ of the age of neutralisations is that ‘the most terrible war 
is pursued in the name of peace, the most terrible oppression only in the name of freedom, the 
most terrible inhumanity only in the name of humanity.’21 Yet, on the other hand, the fact 
that every sphere in the pursuit of this neutral centre rapidly breaks down is evidence of the 
futility of the positing of a neutral antipolitics. The pursuit of a neutral core may be 
damaging, but it is ultimately delusional. As with most of Schmitt’s work prior to 1933, the 
fear is not that neutralisation will succeed, but with the damage that will result from attempts 
to achieve it.
18 hoc. cit.
19 Schmitt, ‘Neutralizations’ p. 133
20 On Schmitt’s reading of the modem shift from transcendent to immanent conceptions of metaphysics 
see Ojakangas Concrete Life pp.32-39.
21 Schmitt, ‘Neutralizations’ p. 142
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Indeed, in 1929 Schmitt is still at pains to point out that he is not arguing for some 
progression through various stages towards the achievement of neutrality. Schmitt *speak[s] 
not of human culture as a whole, nor of the rhythm of world history’ and maintains that ‘the 
three successive stages of the changing central spheres are conceived neither as a continuous 
line of “progress” upwards not the opposite.’22 Indeed, The Age o f Neutralisations is rather 
optimistic about the potential for European renewal just as soon as Schmitt’s analysis results 
in a general awareness of ‘the pluralism of spiritual life’ and recognition that ‘the central 
sphere cannot be neutral ground.’23 The idea that technology is achieving a neutral sphere 
results, he argues, from a confusion of the spirit of technicity with the fact of technology 
itself.24 Technicity simply represents the same spirit of neutrality that has accompanied every 
other sphere. ‘The spirit of technicity... is still spirit.... It is perhaps something gruesome, 
but not itself technical and mechanical.’25 And as such, technicity will fail in its drive towards 
a neutral centre.26 In the final analysis, then, attempts to erect a mythology of technology as a 
neutral sphere are bound to fail.
The Age o f Technology
If the spirit of technicity is just another false hope of neutrality, Schmitt nevertheless identifies
certain apocalyptic dangers in the age of technology, each of which has very concrete political
22 Ibid. p. 132
23 Ibid. p. 142
24 See Ibid. pp. 140-141. Schmitt’s argument here clearly prefigures his criticism in Leviathan in the 
State Theory of Thomas Hobbes of the confusion between the concrete fact of the state as a machine, 
and the confusion that results from a generalised and progressive notion of mechanisation as a 
rationally objective, neutralising phenomenon. See pp. 70-72 above.
25 Schmitt, ‘Neutralizations’ p. 141
26 For more on Schmitt’s ideas on the age of technicity see below pp. 147-150. In drawing the gap 
between technology as a concrete fact of the modem age, and a Russo-centric ‘spirit of technicity’, 
Schmitt is clearly claiming back technology as a means at the disposal of political actors. This is not 
the same, however, as a valorisation or aestheticisation of technology for its own sake - a view 
misleadingly ascribed to Schmitt by several of his detractors. See for instance J.Herf Reactionary 
Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge, 1984) 
pp. 118-120; and R.Wolin, ‘Carl Schmitt: The Conservative Revolutionary Habitus and the Aesthetics 
of Horror’ in Political Theory 20:3 (1992)
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manifestations. From a very partial intellectual perspective, Schmitt is concerned that the 
spirit of technicity threatens the conceptual and intellectual primacy of Europe. Technicity is 
a product of the outside, turned against its European heritage. ‘The Russians have taken the 
European 19th century at its word, understood its core ideas and drawn the ultimate 
conclusions from its cultural premises.’27 In other words, although technicity is a false god 
like all the others, it is the first non, or anti-European epoch. As Duncan Kelly has argued 
generally of Schmitt in his writings prior to 1933;
‘..the threats [Schmitt] perceived from the Soviet Union were twofold: first, he 
feared the general Russian spirit of anti-authoritarianism, exemplified in both 
Dostoyevsky and Bakunin, and second, the Soviet Union’s wholehearted embrace 
of technicity as ideology, represented to Schmitt its irrationality. ,28
This early critique of Russia therefore prefigures much of Schmitt’s more developed 
contemplation about the historical fate of the state. It emphasises the inadvertent significance 
of the present moment as the point at which nomic dissolution and intellectual neutralisation 
has reached its apotheosis. It heaps praise on the ‘heroic age of occidental rationalism’ and 
the achievements of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza and Grotius, whilst simultaneously tracing 
the unforeseen historical effect of their attempt to neutralise truth claims. And perhaps above 
all, it displays an instinctive but theoretically undeveloped Eurocentrism. Schmitt mourns the 
end of a European intellectual and nomic order. He calls on Europeans to shake off ‘the spell 
of cultural decline’, and to renounce ‘the security of the status quo’ in a new political 
revolution.’29 Yet the basis of this hope vested in Europe appears emotional rather than 
programmatic, since Schmitt recognises that there can be no return to the golden age of the 
16th century, nor beyond to the order of the medieval Roman church. On the historical route 
out of the present, Schmitt concludes;
‘...every genuine rebirth seeking to return to some original principle, every 
genuine ritomar al principio, every return to pure, uncorrupted nature appears as 
cultural or social nothingness to the comfort and ease of the status quo. It grows
27 Schmitt, ‘Neutralizations’ p. 131
28 Kelly, D. The State of the Political p.212 Schmitt reads Dostoyevsky’s fable of the Grand Inquisitor 
from The Brothers Karamazov as a typically Russian expression of anti-authoritariansim. ‘For 
[Dostoyevsky’s] basically anarchistic (and thereby, also, atheistic) instincts, every political power was 
something wicked and inhuman’ (Romischer Katholizismus p.54).
29 Schmitt, ‘Neutralizations’ pp. 140-141
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silently and in darkness, and a historian or sociologist would recognise only 
nothingness in its initial phases.’30
Schmitt refuses to conclude that the intellectual games of technology actually results in 
historical acceleration, despite it giving that appearance. Indeed, there is so much in the 
political manifestations of the modem age that tends towards the loss of quasi-foundations and 
the acceleration of time. Liberalism promotes an intensified and ironic individualism that 
refuses to engage with the concrete political order. Socialism embraces a deterministic idea of 
economics as the shared goal of humanity. As ideologies of life, both political models present 
a false ideal of historical convergence. The myth of mechanisation has ‘turned the belief in 
miracles and an afterlife -  a religion without intermediary stages -  into a religion of technical 
miracles, human achievements and the domination of nature.’31 All progress and all truth 
appears to be within the grasp of living men. Whereas the logical corollary of a belief in 
miracles and the divine was an impulse to obedience and the majesty of authority, technicity 
creates his own standards to legitimacy according to quantifiable outputs. The essence of the 
modem age, into which the European state has been sucked, is the remorseless elevation of 
rationality;
‘As someone once said (rather crudely), in Kant’s system God appears as a 
“parasite of ethics.” Every word in his Critique o f Pure Reason -  critique, pure 
and reason -  is polemically directed against dogma, metaphysics and ontology.’32
But unlike the ages of metaphysics, moral philosophy, or even (to a lesser extent) economics, 
the primacy of technology threatens an inversion of questions of means and ends. Ironically 
for someone who would remain silent on the horrors of the Holocaust, Schmitt was acutely 
aware of the dangers that might result from conflation of moral fervour and technical means.33
30 Ibid. p. 141
31 J.McCormick, ‘Introduction to Schmitt’s “The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations”’ in 
Telos 96 (1993) p. 126
32 Schmitt, ‘Neutralizations’ p. 133
33 Although many would regard it perverse to cite Schmitt as a prescient critic of processes that resulted 
in Holocaust, there are clear parallels between his analysis of the ‘myth of technology’ and 
sociological analyses of the Holocaust that look to a combination of rationality, myth and technology 
as a causal factor (see especially Zygmunt Baumann, Modernity and the Holocaust Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (1991)). With their shared debt to Karl Lowith, it is striking the degree to 
which Schmitt’s critique of technicity resonates with Jacques Ellul’s sociological-anarchist analysis of 
modernity in The Technological Society (1964) thirty five years later. Schmitt is clearly seized with
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‘If humanitarian-moral progress is still expected by many today from the 
perfection of technology, it is because technology is magically linked to morality 
on the somewhat naive assumption that the splendid array of contemporary 
technology will be used only as intended, i.e. sociologically, and that they 
themselves will control these frightful weapons and wield this monstrous 
power.,34
The only politically certain thing about technology is that ‘every strong politics will make use 
of it.,35 Quite aside from its status as a source of myth, technology is historically significant 
for the way in which it alters the exercise of power. It opens up new possibilities in several 
directions, but the two that concerned Schmitt the most were changes in the capacity for 
violence, and changes to the meaning of space.
It might seem a rather prosaic fascination compared to a sociologically inspired critique of 
myth, but there is a case for saying that Schmitt’s concern for the violent potential of modem 
weaponry trumped all his more abstract concerns. The fact that modem warfare increasingly 
involves the efficient slaughter of thousands, or potentially millions, is a very obvious 
challenge to a theorist whose avowed model of international law stems from a period of 
cavalry cabinet wars. Schmitt was well aware that the simple rejoinder to his nostalgia for the 
jus publicum Europaeum was to point out that 18th century statesmen did not have access to 
missiles, machine guns, or chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Of necessity, he 
considered the stability of the quasi-normative order of European interstate law as deriving 
from the (contingent) spatial order, rather than from a (deliberate) respect for the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda.36 In part, Europe sustained a slow, contained, limited system of states 
and form of warfare because its leaders lacked the means to do anything else. Or, put another 
way, the fact that modem weaponry offers a whole new horizon of victory places the 
conscious restraint of statesmen into question with wholly unprecedented urgency.
the problematic that results from Ellul’s observation that ‘that which desacralizes a given reality, itself 
in turn becomes the new sacred reality.’ (See D.J.Fasching, The Thought of Jacques Ellul (New York: 
Edward Mellen Press (1981) p.35 and J.Ellul The Technological Society London: Jonathan Cape 
(1965).)
34 Schmitt, ‘Neutralizations’ p. 139
35 Ibid. p. 141
36 See, for instance, Schmitt, Nomos p. 148
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It is not only the means of destruction, but also the territorial horizon that shifts as a result of 
technological advance. The changes in spatial consciousness that Schmitt depicts in Land und 
Meer are intertwined with technological enablement. New ship design opens the oceans, 
aircraft open the skies, and telecommunications establish abstract new spatial connections. In 
contrast to previous attempts to find a neutral core through moral reasoning, technology does 
not come up against state boundaries, but rather lends itself to their transcendence. In this 
sense, it is technology as a concrete phenomenon rather than as myth that lends itself to 
historical acceleration. Technology destabilises the present nomic order not because it 
provides an avenue to the consensual elimination of divisions, but because it makes these 
divisions seem arcane and unworkable. In true Schmittian style, it is the concrete 
phenomenon that marks the most dramatic change.
The fact that late modernity provides such drastic means of annihilation does not, of itself, 
alter the basis of political calculus. Weapons alone are merely the expression of political 
calculus, and cannot be considered inherently dangerous. Writing in the 1960s, when the full 
potential of weapons of mass destruction had come to fruition, Schmitt was still able to write, 
somewhat optimistically:
‘..it is not in fact the means of destruction that annihilate, but men who kill other 
men by these means. The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes grasped the heart 
of this process in the seventeenth century already and formulated it in full 
precision, though at that time weapons were still relatively harmless.,37
Instead, the advent of modem weaponry makes it more important than ever that the real 
essence of the political is fully recognised in its unromantic clarity. For Schmitt, if we 
continue the modem trend of pursuing some moral-rational fervour for homogeneity with the 
admixture of advanced weapons technology, it will not be long before the ‘work of 
annihilation [Vemichtungswerk]’ will begin.38
Schmitt is always tom between his critique of the abstractions wrought by the modem state 
form, and the undeniable success of the state form in solidifying agonal politics. It is almost 
as if the state has restrained time despite itself. And Schmitt cannot be anything other than 
ambivalent about the achievements of Westphalia. For all that the historical convergences of 
modernity are of concern, Schmitt never loses sight of the fact that the state marked a
37 Schmitt, Theorie des Partisanen pp.94-95
38 Ibid. p.95
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concrete historical barrier to a moment of total dissolution. Of all historical moments, Europe 
in the 16th and early 17th century marks the sum of all Schmitt’s fears of apocalyptic violence. 
And whatever the substance of Schmitt’s critique of the abstraction of the Rechtstaat and 
positivist international law, he remains in something of a performative contradiction. If the 
urge towards neutrality is a chimera, exactly what is it about the drive that we are supposed to 
fear? Is Schmitt simply arguing for an intellectual recognition of the reality of politics, rather 
than actually writing out of a fear of the end?
Schmitt cannot, for obvious reasons, accept the possibility that a spirit of technicity is 
succeeding in its neutralisation, but he nevertheless asserts the pregnancy of the present age. 
This is the moment in which Schmitt calls for a radical reassertion of the basic elements of 
political life, and an escape from the dangerous acceleration of rationality. Several 
commentators have argued that it is in this period, from 1929 to 1932, that Schmitt makes a 
decisive commitment in favour of fascist dictatorship as a vehicle for renewal.39 And indeed, 
there are evident logical connections between Schmitt’s critique of modernity, and the hopes 
that Schmitt occasionally professed to see in Latin forms of fascism. Schmitt’s entire 
historical orientation always called for some sort of radical and clear-headed break with the 
stifling philosophies of progress, humanity and neutralisation.
Schmitt’s essay on Neutralisations and Depoliticisations is an important, concise statement of 
the sort of historical mindset that would be further developed in The Leviathan in the State 
Theory o f Thomas Hobbes. The task of the present age is to reassert the eternal and 
immutable political truths from their obfuscation. But as far as one can tell, this critique 
alone does not lead Schmitt to an abandonment of the state form. As the study of Hobbes 
shows, Schmitt reads the conflation of the state as a political structure with a neutralising 
historical dynamic as a potentially avoidable intellectual accident. Schmitt clings for an 
inordinately long time to a dissociation of the (recoverable) state form from the urge to 
historical acceleration. Indeed, the idea of post-state politics does not really seem to occur to 
him at this stage. Instead, Schmitt sought to distinguish the current conception of the state 
from previous ideas of feudal or absolutist states, thereby arguing for the possibility of a
39 See eg. J.McCormick, ‘Dilemmas of Dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and Constitutional Emergency 
Powers’ in Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 10:1 (1997) pp. 185-187; W.Scheuerman 
Social Acceleration p. 121-122.
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renewal of the state form.40 Up to at least 1933, he still regards the framework of states as the 
principal barrier to acceleration -  the principle locus, if not bearer, of restraint. In 1932, 
Schmitt had still seen the prime political task as the recovery of the essence of the state form -  
‘only a strong state can remove itself from non-state affairs.’41 By the time he published his 
study of Leviathan and Land und Meer six years later, he regarded the stakes of political order 
as considerably higher.
World War & Acceleration
In its backwards way, then, technology does have the accelerative effect that modernity 
always aspires to. It changes the territorial foundations of politics, it increases the means by 
which absolute warfare can be fought, and it raises the seriousness of political calculus to a 
new level. By 1938, Schmitt had squared the circle between his critique of the core 
antipolitical tendencies of modernity, and the potential complicity of the state in this process 
of acceleration. The shadow of impending war presented a dangerous but emphatically 
decisive moment in determining the shape of political time to come. To a very large extent, 
Schmitt’s eventual choice in favour of Nazism can be read as a decision in favour of a radical 
leap into the unknown as the only corrective against the forces of historical acceleration. A 
simple restoration of the Hobbesian foundations of the state was no longer credible. And as 
such, Schmitt finally accepted the collapse of the concrete link between the state and the 
political.
In this respect, Schmitt was to read the Second World War as a battle to establish a new 
multipolar framework of world politics that could reset the clock, and allow for the re- 
emergence of agents of restraint. The parallel with the cataclysmic events of the 17th century 
is manifest in Schmitt’s turn to Hobbes, and his tentative acceptance of parallels between his 
own search for new principles of order, and Hobbes’ creation of a theory of the state. For the 
most part, Schmitt maintained a distance between his conventional analysis of current events, 
and his more abstract contemplation of the themes of theological time. Schmitt is frustratingly
40 See Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy (trans. J.Seitzer) Durham NC: Duke University Press (2004) 
pp.3-14; ‘Die Wendung zum totalen Staat’ in Positionen und Begriffe pp. 146-158
41 Schmitt, ‘Strong State and Strong Economy’ (trans. R.Cristi) in R.Cristi Carl Schmitt and 
Authoritarian Liberalism p.213
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vague on how he understands delay and acceleration in their concrete manifestations. For this 
reason, a short essay the he wrote for Das Reich newspaper on 19th April 1942 stands out in 
its significance.4243 In one short article, Schmitt both applies the logic of restraint and 
acceleration to the situation of world war, and emphasises the dangers he sees in the 
international setting.
Writing in 1942, Schmitt is quite clear that the Second World War is a Raumordnungskrieg -  
a war over spatial order.44 In fact, he contends, not unreasonably, that there are actually two 
quite distinct wars subsisting side by side. On the one hand, there is a limited and rather 
conventional land war that started in Spain in 1936, and which had been won fairly decisively 
by Germany up to 1942. On the other hand, there is a more serious and more historically 
significant oceanic sea war that started with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 
December 1941. Schmitt observes that, contrary to the spell of Anglo-American 
omnipotence, ‘the entry of the USA into the war was clearly not decisive, and so we must 
consider what the world historical and world political meaning of this is.’45 Utilising the now 
familiar notion of a dynamic between land and sea, Schmitt holds out the hope that world war 
will solve this damaging relationship, and result in a new found clarity of political 
organisation, and restraint of political time. War has given the lie to the idea that America 
represents an irresistible trinity of oceanic spacelessness, liberal ‘freedom’, and terminal 
acceleration. Schmitt argues that the experience of war has emphasised the contradictions in 
America’s position, and will force it to choose between a territorial and continental (and 
thereby inherently multipolar and ‘political’) orientation, or continue with its existing attempt 
to inherent the mantle of British oceanic universalism.46
42 ‘Beschleuniger wider Willen; oder, Problematik der westlichen Hemisphare’ in Das Reich, 19th
April, 1942. Collected at HStAD RW265 21149 and reproduced in Stoat, Grossraum, Nomos pp.431-
440 (citations here are from Stoat, Grossraum, Nomos). The title translates as ‘Hastener Against its
Will; or, the Problem with the Western Hemisphere.’
43 Das Reich was a weekly Nazi party newspaper launched in 1940 as a very personal project by Joseph 
Goebbels, who frequently wrote leading articles. Intended as a ‘quality publication’ it is thought to 
have achieved a circulation of around one and a half million by early 1944. See I.Kershaw, The 
Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the Third Reich p.244 fh.45
44 Schmitt, ‘Beschleuniger’ p.433
45 Ibid. p.431
46 Schmitt’s describes the United States as being ‘dizzy’ from the contradictions of its world political 
orientation. Picking up on an observation that has been repeated over several generations, Schmitt 
sees the United States as picking uncertainly between a series of binaries, most notably 
tradition/situation, isolation/intervention, neutrality/world war. (‘Beschleunigung’ p.433-435).
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Having already formulated the notion of large space politics that we shall consider in the 
following chapter, Schmitt clearly hopes for an outcome to war in which America will choose 
to define ‘the western hemisphere’ as a concrete territorial space, rather than as an idea with 
universal application. But what is most significant in this essay, is the link that Schmitt draws 
between territory, political responsibility, and concern for acceleration. America is depicted 
as facing an urgent and real political choice between two ideas of its historical role. It is only 
by embracing one or the other that the United States can play its necessary role as a historical 
restrainer. If it pursues universalism with the same spirit as the British, America will produce 
new conflicts and new divisions, albeit of an unstable and violent nature. If it chooses 
decisively in favour of a limited continental identity, America will produce sharp new lines of 
division that will replace international politics with intercontinental politics. But instead, 
Schmitt sees America as overwhelmed by ‘the same incompetence of decision 
[Entscheidmgsfdhigkeit\ of a discursive politics that, for decades, has staggered between two 
extremes, and which squirms indecisively in the face of the present world-political emergency 
[jetzt auch vor dem grofien weltpolitischen Emstfall zu lavieren sucht\ .,47
Counter-intuitively, then, the essence of restraint is to act. And to a certain extent, delay will 
be achieved regardless of whether that action deludes itself with a universal end game. The 
pursuit of unity will generate divisions and violence, and will do so in new and unpredictable 
patterns. Preferable, to be sure, are the sorts of new division in which the legitimacy of 
difference is inherent to a system, and in which orders of the political emerge to restrain the 
worst extremes of violence. But the specific problem of the current age, in Schmitt’s 
analysis, is the progressive desire to avoid animated and committed positions at all. 
‘Historians and historical philosophers’, Schmitt argues, ‘ought to examine and describe the 
differing figures and types of world historical hasteners [Aufhalter] and delayers 
[Verzogerer].’ Applying these figures to the contemporary world, Schmitt sees Roosevelt’s 
‘absence of decision’ as having thrown America into the ‘maelstrom of history.’ As a result,
Similar observations of the orientation of America to the world are too numerous to mention, but 
Henry Kissinger stands out; ‘Tom between nostalgia for a pristine past, and yearning for a perfect 
future, American thought has oscillated between isolation and commitment.’ (Diplomacy, p. 18)
47 Schmitt, ‘Beschleunigung’ p.435
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the United States is ‘neither a great [historical] shaper/animator [Beweger] , nor a great 
restrainer, but can only end up, against its will, as a hastener. ’48
Schmitt’s immediate target, quite obviously, is to launch a propagandist critique of the United 
States to an intellectual Nazi audience at a time of war. And in this, ‘Beschleuniger’ picks up 
on a Nazi ambivalence about the Anglo-Saxon world that has subsequently become a 
commonplace. Writing in 1942, a political accommodation between a Nazi-dominated Europe 
and its antipode in the Americas was apparently an acceptable position to be expressed in the 
Nazi press. Obviously, Schmitt could not have expressed the same hopes for Russia as a 
bearer of the political historical spirit. As evidence of Schmitt’s genuine hopes for resolution 
of the ‘crisis’ then, this is not a reliable source. But it does prefigure a particular, 
katechontical attempt to discern the emerging patterns of world politics from the concrete 
events in front of him. An indeed, this strange convergence of concrete fact, conceptual 
formulation and historical fear perhaps means that Schmitt’s own preferences are not the 
correct starting point. The right outcome, for Schmitt, is any outcome -  anything that keeps 
the wheels of world history turning.
This, then, emerges as the sole yardstick for measuring the effectiveness of political 
leadership. The critique of Roosevelt emphasises the point that for Schmitt, evaluation of 
concrete politics lies not in virtue, in the maintenance of order, in the administration of law or 
any other tangible set of criteria. It lies in the fact of decision that acts as the bearer of 
historical restraint -  the act of postponement. And since, in Schmitt’s construct of history, 
God clearly moves in mysterious ways, the locus of the decision, and the distinction between 
authentic and false decisions, cannot be discerned rationally. On this diagnosis, the only 
options appear to be acceptance of our fate as being subject to the political, and reconciliation 
to the fact that political authority will always be arbitrary by definition -  its only source is the 
fact of its genesis.
What is the responsibility of political actors on this account? What will it mean to act as a 
delayer rather than a hastener? As with all of Schmitt’s work, the only sure conclusion is that 
‘only the actual participants can correctly recognise, understand, and judge the concrete 
situation.,49 Sometimes delay will entail preserving the nomic order, sustaining a context, and
48 Ibid. p.436
49 Schmitt, Concept of the Political p.21
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living within a historical centre. At other times, among which Schmitt includes the present, 
delay can only be served by rupture and plotting a new path. But the wider context in this 
critique appears to be that modernity ring fences any attempts to achieve the latter. It reduces 
and rationalises rupture within its own intellectual frame. It has removed every mystique. It 
has closed the space available for an ironic mediation between the particular and the universal. 
The ambiguity of Schmitt’s notion of restraint -  the fact that it can be pursued through 
particular and universal mindsets, through attack and defence, through globalism and localism 
-  points to a conclusion that Schmitt’s commitment to order and his belief in the Katechon are 
not reconcilable rationally. As Zizek has argued, Schmitt gets caught between the principle of 
order and the actuality of order in its concrete content. Schmitt is committed to the latter, but 
as a theorist his entire career hangs on the formulation of the concrete through conceptual 
tools.50
From within the horizon of a moralised modem politics, Schmitt seems to ask for a surfeit of 
irony on the one hand, and an unimaginable degree of mental regimentation on the other. In 
the age of nuclear weapons, it seems essential that political leaders -  those actors or forces 
who insert themselves into the void, and take the political decision -  should experience their 
political drives with an ironic twist. To be sure, they will be nationalists or socialists or 
whatever, but their moral commitments must never be sufficiently serious to make wars of 
annihilation a reality. Late modernity drastically reduces the room for miscalculation. On the 
other hand, as Schmitt’s critique of Hobbes makes clear, the people should subscribe wholly 
to the authority of the political decision, without question and circumspection. To allow 
another private sphere would, it would seem, invite a repeat of the moralising irony that has 
hollowed out politics from the inside. If the invitation to recognise the essence of the political 
is to be more than merely a critique -  an explanatory and retrospective framework -  then it 
seems that Schmitt must untangle this Gordian knot of his own making.
50 See Zizek The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology London: Verso (1999) 
p. 114. Zizek argues that a ‘paradox thus lies in the fact that the only way to oppose legal normative 




As with so much of Schmitt’s commentary on the present age, this statement on the world- 
historical failings of the United States invites much derision. The observation of American 
military limitations is clearly premature, and the assertion of American indecisiveness appears 
undermined by the very subject matter of the piece -  the USA’s entry into the war. 
Nevertheless, Schmitt’s critique does give a clearer picture of how we are supposed to 
understand the crisis of the present. And above all, this is a crisis of modernity. Schmitt is 
treading the line between his commitment to a politics that is somehow ‘better’ in its concrete 
manifestations, and the impossibility of formulating rules, norms or concepts to determine 
either what ‘better’ might mean, or how it might be achieved. It is a vulnerable position, and 
Schmitt’s search for a new basis of order ultimately led to an erroneous faith in Nazism as a 
concrete answer to an unknowable problem. Ultimately, the only exit from the horizon of 
modernity will be a point of rupture with no antecedent, no historical continuity and no logos. 
It is a position that seems inevitably to invite miscalculation from those, such as Schmitt, who 
hope for it.51
Schmitt may have struggled to reconcile his modern mind to the critique of modernity, but by 
situating modernity as a historical event -  a story of epochs with a clear point of departure -  
he opens the door to a new age with new mindsets. Schmitt’s pupil, confident and acolyte, 
Reinhard Koselleck, presents a better summation of this reading of modernity than Schmitt 
was ever to distil.52 I believe it expresses something of Schmitt’s perspective on the present 
age;
51 As Scheuerman points out, in Schmitt’s account of law under Nazism, ‘[n]o evidence is produced to 
support the implausible assumption in Schmitt’s argument that Hitler necessarily possesses the 
awesome cognitive capacities required by the enormous tasks of contemporary economic and social 
regulation: Schmitt simply appears to assume this. The fact that National Socialism is no longer “past 
oriented” suffices to render Hitler a “better legislator” than any ever known to liberal democracy.’ 
Scheuerman, Social Acceleration p. 122
52 On Koselleck’s relationship with Schmitt see J.W.Muller Dangerous Mind pp. 104-113. Muller 
suggests that Koselleck’s Critique and Crisis ‘[comes] closest to being a direct elaboration of Schmitt’s 
1938 Leviathan.' (p. 106). Many of Schmitt’s insights we developed more productively after the war by 
a group including Koselleck, Hanno Resting and Werner Sombart than by Schmitt himself. As 
Habermas observed, it was through figures such as Koselleck ‘that we know what Carl Schmitt thinks 
nowadays.’ (J.Habermas, ‘Verrufener Fortschritt -  verkanntes Jahrhundert’ in Merkur 14 (1960)
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‘The crisis caused by the morality’s proceeding against history will be a 
permanent crisis as long as history is alienated in terms of its philosophy.
That crisis and the philosophy of history are mutually dependent and entwined -  
that ultimately one must indeed go so far as to call them identical -  this must, 
when our enquiry has reached its goal, have become visible at several points in 
the eighteenth century. Its Utopianism arose from an interrelation to politics that 
was caused by history, but which was then solidified by a philosophy of history.
The critical crossfire not only grounded up topical politics; politics itself, as a 
constant task of human existence, dissolved in the same process into Utopian 
constructs of the future. The political edifice of the Absolutist State and the 
unfolding of Utopianism reveal one complex occurrence around which the 
political crisis of our time begins.’53
As a critical perspective on the obfuscations and self-delusions of modernity, the Schmitt- 
Koselleck story of the state, society and international order is nothing if not profound and 
stimulating. Many who have shared the same hostility to an all-encompassing modernity have 
chosen the intellectual sphere in which to launch a response or to attempt a corrective. 
Koselleck himself -  ‘a significantly subtler thinker than.. Schmitt’54 -  chose to develop and 
refine the analysis of social acceleration and the experience of time in a critical direction.55 
Toulmin concludes his own critique of modernity with a call to reformulate a ‘humanised 
modernity’ which distinguishes between the rational and the reasonable, which deploys a 
practical philosophy, and which ‘recover[s] the idea of rationality that was current before 
Descartes.’56 It is also a critical perspective on modernity that lends itself to the intellectual 
formulation of radical anti-modernisms -  a critique that could prompt the sort of anti- 
foundationalism that would surely mark the end of the political as Schmitt understood.
53 R.Koselleck Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modem Society Oxford: 
Berg (1988) p. 12. There are striking points of convergence between Koselleck’s (and, by extension, 
Schmitt’s) account of modem historicity, and Stephen Toulmin’s critique in Cosmopolis: The Hidden 
Agenda of Modernity Chicago: Chicago University Press (1990). Toulmin represents an alternative 
vision of how to apply this diagnosis to future politics.
54 J.W.Muller, Dangerous Mind p. 106
55 His work Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (trans. K.Tribe) New York: Columbia 
University Press (2004) concludes simply with a call to realign the experience of past and present.
56 Toulmin, Cosmopolis p.200-201 & chapter 5 passim
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But for Schmitt, the temptation to provide a response from within the horizon of the concrete 
was too great. Having diagnosed the crisis of late modernity with such force, and with the 
use of such elegant political and historical concepts, Schmitt faced the problem of the future -  
how to conceive of, shape, interpret and identify the contours of the coming age. And it is a 
task that Schmitt set about with zeal from the moment that the collapse of the hollow edifice 
of the state seemed evident to him. For Schmitt, the preferable outcome is a new territorial 
order in which, as with the jus publicum Europaeum, units inherently accept difference, and 
live according to the maxim cuis region, eius religio. The alternative would be a radically 
unstable fight for ideals, politics disentwined from territory, escalating violence and the 
absence of order. Schmitt was to dedicate the remainder of his career to the search for 
principles through which order might be recovered.
The following two chapters will consider Schmitt’s two principle attempts to provide a 
conceptual response to the challenge he diagnosed, and which we have explored in the 
previous three chapters. Ultimately the difficulties inherent in his own position would reduce 
the impact of these attempts to little more than an extension of his critique. Schmitt 
Begriffsmagie would never attain the same sparkle in shaping the future as it did depicting the 
past. But in the course of considering his attempt to provide a conceptual commitment to the 
future, we should also bear in mind Schmitt’s one, irrefutable, concrete decision on the matter 
-  his decision to believe in Nazism as katechon. It is a decision that shows the risks involved 
with Schmitt’s politics of rupture, and which suggests that it might have been Schmitt, and not 
Roosevelt, who acted as a hastener against his will.
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CHAPTER 6 - GROfiRAUM
‘...according to Schmitt, the only politics is international politics.’1
If one is to identify one pre-eminent theme in Schmitt’s entire efforts as a political theorist it 
would undoubtedly be to uncover the specifically political failings of liberalism (both 
internally and externally), and to trace the consequences of those failings. Schmitt 
consistently piques interest as the ‘foremost critic’ of liberalism. He is frequently taken as a 
‘challenge’ in the renewal and repair of democratic forms of governance, and in the 
remedying of liberalisms most evident failings. Such a characterisation is by no means unfair. 
Schmitt was constantly pre-occupied with the dangers, as he saw them, of liberal abstraction, 
legal formalism, potestas indirecta and the multiple ‘Ent-Entungen’ of modern ‘politics.’ In 
this account, Schmitt occupies a double negative position that mirrors the liberal ‘de-deings’ 
he attacks -  he is anti-anti-politics.2
So-far this work has argued for a deeper understanding of the historical-theoretical aspects of 
that critique. Both in his detailed account of the origins of the liberal ‘problem’ and in his 
ideas of the irrepressible tide of liberal historicism, Schmitt displayed a complex pessimism 
about the prospects of the modem state, and hence, the prospect of politics in form (or, at 
least, in the form that we have known). The infusion of liberalism into the state is written as 
part tragedy, part farce, and sways between dismayed fatalism and bitter criticism of those 
who have blindly accelerated the process. By the time Schmitt acknowledges that the process 
of dissolution is complete, what remains is the gaping problem of how to restore, re-create or 
create a new political order capable of restraining terminal formlessness. The remainder of 
this work examines Schmitt’s response to this self-diagnosed challenge.
Given the range of analytical tools at his disposal, and his urgent prescription of the need for 
novel political categories, it is initially surprising that Schmitt’s response to this challenge is
1 S. Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism p. 41
2 Ent-Entungen is a phrase coined by Schmitt as a collective term for all of the processes of dissolution 
encouraged by liberalism (e.g. depoliticisation, detheologisation, dehistoricalisation etc). As Marcus 
Brainard points out, the most accurate rendering of Ent-Entungen would be de-deings (although he 
chooses the less absurd ‘un-doings’). See Meier Lesson TNI, p. 175
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so apparently limited. If Schmitt intended his critique of both the legal-positivist state and 
normative international law to prove devastating, it seems inevitable that he should have been 
moved to consider positive alternative strategies. However, although during the 1930s ‘these 
negative criticisms give way to the, as it were, positive vision of an international order that 
Schmitt offers,’ the content of that positive vision is somewhat sparse.3 Against the 
Begriffsmagie on display in Schmitt’s reflective and analytical works, the hollowness of his 
efforts at political innovation are all the more remarkable. This section seeks to outline these 
limitations, and to explore possible relationships between Schmitt’s understanding of the past, 
and his imagination of the future.
In this chapter we shall consider the concept of Grofiraumordnung (an order predicated on 
large spaces) as the most detailed and most heavily conceptualised of Schmitt’s attempts to 
theorise beyond the state towards a renewed political future. This is a novel category with its 
origins in international law, and it reached its most comprehensive expression in Schmitt’s 
1938 treatise Volkerrechtliche Grofiraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot fur raumfremde 
Machtef Following exegesis of the concept and its relationship to Schmitt’s other work, we 
will go on to examine the complicated and tentative distinctions that Schmitt draws between a 
novel Grofiraum and the Westphalian state. International lawyers in the 1930s were 
themselves concerned with the question of how exactly Schmitt’s concept was distinct from 
simply a territorially expanded state, and this line of critique remains relevant to the present 
concerns. Given the failure Schmitt identifies in the relationship of Staatliche political 
authority and the individual (the ‘barely visible crack’) it is clear that any novel concept would 
have to be conceptually highly distinct from the discredited state. It is unclear that Schmitt 
achieves the necessary degree of novelty in the Grofiraum concept.
Finally, this chapter will conclude with a brief examination of the reception of Schmitt’s idea 
of Grofiraumordung in subsequent and divergent political theory. In many respects, the idea 
of a politics of large spaces has maintained a self-evident appeal right through to the turn of 
the century. The very modem challenges that Schmitt once felt necessitated a new, wider 
spatial horizon for politics have themselves accelerated (especially modem communications
3 A. Carty, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberal International Legal Order Between 1933 and 1945’ in 
Leiden Journal of International Law 14(2001) p.34
4 This somewhat clunky title is perhaps best rendered as ‘International law of large spaces with a 
prohibition on intervention by external powers.’ The fourth edition of the treatise (1942) is reproduced 
in the edited collection Stoat, Grofiraum, Nomos.
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and weapons of mass destruction,). Moreover, Schmitt’s problematic reflections on the need 
for a common ‘political idea’ (politische Idee) that permeates a greater political community 
has appeared to resonate with those such as Huntingdon who feel that culture will some to 
define the lines of enmity between larger spaced political units.5 In the context of the 
foregoing discussion, this section will conclude by arguing that any attempt to redeploy the 
Grofiraum concept in a modern setting must take into consideration the complicated political 
problems to which it was initially addressed. That some may find potential value in an idea of 
reconfigured and enlarged quasi-states should not blind us to the comparative failure of the 
Grofiraum idea to address the consequences of Schmittian historical acceleration.
Schmitt’s Path into International Lav/
Schmitt’s idea of Grofiraum began life as a series of theses in international law. Although this 
may seem unremarkable given his profession, it is significant to note that Schmitt’s initial 
response to the apotheosis of international disorder in the 1930s came in the form of academic 
legal studies rather than the emphatic theoretical style of his earlier political works. In so far 
as the idea of Grofiraum was an attempt to solve the problems those earlier works and the 
contemporaneous study of Hobbes identified, Schmitt resorted to the solid foundations of legal 
theory to structure his solution.
Prior to the late 1930s, Schmitt’s academic career witnessed only limited critical work in 
international law. These occasional forays focussed on the flaws of the Versailles-Weimar 
legal system, the hypocrisy of the victorious powers in the First World War, and the need to 
restore the anti-normative foundations of the old jus publicum Europaeum. As such, it was a 
legal counterpoint to Schmitt’s political condemnation of the post-1919 international order. In 
‘Das Rheinland als Objekt intemationaler Politik, ’and ‘Volkerrechtliche Probleme des
5 See Volkerrechtliche Grofiraumordnung p.295-296.
6 ‘International Law’ is a highly problematic rendering of the far more flexible and multivalent German 
word Volkerrecht which defies direct translation. One possible rendering would be ‘law of peoples’, 
but this proves misleading since the latter term has gained a specific meaning in Anglo-American 
international jurisprudence and political philosophy. It is perhaps most obviously defined in the 
negative -  i.e. as that law that exists outside of the domestic legislative and juridical competence of a 
state (although such a definition is itself self-evidently problematic).
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Rheingebiets’ (both 1928) Schmitt’s concern had been to criticise the legal and political 
indeterminacy created by the tenuous status of the Rhineland, and the unsustainable attempt to 
make it subject to international law.7 Although these studies cohere with Schmitt’s parallel 
career as a political theorist, his academic reputation was firmly based in his work in 
constitutional law.
In 1933 Schmitt held a full professorship in law at the University of Bonn, and already stood 
out as a prominent constitutional lawyer. Indeed, constitutional law had predominated 
Schmitt’s scholarly career to that point. In 1928 Schmitt had published his Verfassungslehre 
to considerable acclaim, and had pursued his technical critique of the constitutional failings of 
the Weimar constitution alongside his more polemical critique of the tandem failings of 
liberalism.8 His career as a constitutional theorist reached the height of its notoriety with 
Schmitt’s advocacy of the use of emergency powers under Article 48 of the Weimer 
constitution, and his subsequent legal justification of the Nazi ascent to and consolidation of 
power.9
Schmitt’s initial response to the ascent of Nazism was thus as a constitutional lawyer. 
Whatever his emotional inclinations may have been, Nazism did represent a certain realisation 
of the constitutional principles espoused in the Verfassungslehre, and the ancient ideal of 
Roman constitutional law that Schmitt had earlier outlined in Der Diktatur. In other words, 
Nazism appeared to hold out the promise of closing the formalist-liberal gap between political 
authority and the law. A certain excitement at this prospect is evident in Schmitt’s reflections 
on the new constitutional circumstances of Nazi Germany in 1933 and 1934.10 Schmitt 
celebrated the ongoing attack on legal positivism, and looked forward to a new era of legal 
indeterminacy in Germany in which the exercise of direct and responsible power would 
replace the formless abuses of liberal potestas indirecta.11
7 Both essays are reproduced in Positionen und Begriffe.
8 Jan Wemer-Muller describes the Verfassungslehre as ‘a brilliant conservative effort in deconstructing 
and containing mass democracy.’ Dangerous Mind p.31
9 See Chapter 2 above.
10 See especially Staat-Bewegung-Volk: Dreigliederung derpolitischen Einheit (1933) and Uber die drei 
Arten des rechtswissenschaftliche Denkens Hamburg: HAVA (1934)
11 For more on Schmitt’s reaction to National Socialism as a constitutional lawyer see Ellen Kennedy, 
Constitutional Failure: Carl Schmitt in Weimar, Chapter 1.
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At the same time, Schmitt immediately recognised the linkage between these new 
constitutional opportunities, and ancillary opportunities to challenge the international legal 
status quo. National Socialism had fed, of course, on a generalised sense of discontent with 
the Versailles settlement, and it presented itself as an internationally revisionist regime. In 
Nationalsozialismus und Volkerrecht (1934), Schmitt revisited his critique of the post-1919 
international legal order, but this time his critique was infused with the evident hope that the 
new political order in Germany would translate to a new international legal order.12 Schmitt 
appeared to believe that the creation of a new concrete political order in Germany would 
finally destroy the legal abstractions of the League of Nations. At this point, however, 
Schmitt’s thoughts still lay with some act of recreation of some pre-1914 Grundrechle as the 
likely replacement. In 1933 and 1934, Schmitt continued to focus most of his energy on 
working out the constitutional implications of National Socialist Germany.
Following these energetic opening chapters, however, the prospects of Schmitt developing a 
sustained position as a constitutional theorist of Nazi Germany quickly diminished. The very 
notion of Nazi constitutional law contained a hint of oxymoron, and it quickly became evident 
that substantial academic intrusion into questions of the structure of the state and its authority 
were neither desired nor welcomed. From 1934 onwards, opportunities to make a meaningful 
contribution as a constitutional lawyer were increasingly foreclosed. In common with all the 
other leading legal academics in Germany, Schmitt inevitably faced a dilemma -  quiescence 
or silence.13
Events interceded to make Schmitt’s position as a constitutional theorist increasingly less 
tenable. Following the Rohm putsch, Schmitt effectively endorsed Hitler’s untrammelled 
authority as Ftihrer in his (now infamous) article Der Ftihrer schtitz das Recht (The Fiihrer 
Protects the Law). Schmitt’s constitutional contributions became increasingly dominated by 
the self-protective imperatives of the period and such constitutional theory as he continued to 
produce developed an integrally anti-Semitic tone.14 This apparent slide into sycophancy
12 ‘Nationalsozialismus und Volkerrecht (1934); see also A.Carty ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique’ pp.31-34
13 Detlev Vagts gives a superb account of the response of German academic lawyers to the ascent of 
Nazism in ‘International Law in the Third Reich’ in The American Journal of International Law 84:3 
(1990)
14 Schmitt’s anti-Semitism and his relationship to Nazi policies is considered in more detailed in Chapter 
3 pp.75-78.
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reached its low point with Schmitt’s organisation of a conference in 1936 aimed at uncovering 
and eliminating those Jewish influences that supposedly contaminated German jurisprudence.15
Despite such attempts to build racialist credentials with the regime, Schmitt’s position as a 
constitutional lawyer was nevertheless compromised by his status as a latecomer to Nazism. 
As Bendersky illustrates, suspicion remained within the Nazi hierarchy that this volte face was 
bald opportunism, and not to be trusted.16 Partly due to these limitations to the practice of 
constitutional law, and the frustrations of academic life in Nazi Germany, Schmitt turned his 
attention to broader questions in international law. Certainly this shift was the most realistic 
way for Schmitt to maintain a productive role within the academic hierarchy. Indeed, as 
documents uncovered by Maschke prove, at least one SD agent felt that this shift was little 
more than opportunistic manoeuvring;
‘Once he could see his total exclusion from shaping internal National Socialist 
law, he is now searching for a new field in order to avoid his comprehensive 
marginalisation. ’17
Practical considerations aside, however, it does seem that Schmitt was moved by a genuine 
desire to examine how the radically new Nazi regime might transform the structures of 
international law. With the internal constitutional arrangements now thrown into a ‘properly 
political’ vortex of decision and authority, it perhaps seemed safest and most productive for 
Schmitt to turn his attention to the proper realm of politics -  the international sphere. The 
development of a theory of large spaces as a successor to the jus publicum Europaeum 
constitutes Schmitt’s fully formed attempt to conceive of how the ascent of Nazism might 
radically alter the basis of world politics, and reproduce a solidly rooted, anti-internationalist 
arena for conflict.
This cannot be read, of course, as specifically a response to the realisation of a changing 
nomos. Schmitt only realised a fully formed concept of nomoi after the idea of Grossraum in 
international law had been and gone. However, even without this terminology, it is clear that 
the basic ingredients of this historical realisation fell into place during the 1930s. The essays
15 For more on this conference see Balakrishnan p.205-207
16 J.Bendersky, Carl Schmitt p.248-249
17 See G.Maschke Der Tod Carl Schmitts Vienna: Karolinger (1987) p.352
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in Positionen und Begriffe, published as an edited collection in 1940, clearly addressed 
themselves to the unsustainability of liberal internationalism. In his constitutional theory, 
Schmitt was concerned with reversing the long-term consequences of liberal formalism, and 
recovering direct political authority. Ellen Kennedy is correct in her conclusion that, ‘Schmitt 
thought of the Third Reich as a new state, and his work in the first year of Hitler’s regime 
locates it as a revolutionary break with its predecessor.’18 At some point between 1933, and 
the publication of Volkerrechtliche Grofiraumordnung in 1938, Schmitt appears to have 
reached a deeper conclusion that the Third Reich heralded a more fundamental break than a 
mere ‘new state’, and instead held out the opportunity of radically reshaping the foundations 
of international order.
During 1937 Schmitt was preoccupied to a great extent with his deeper study of Hobbes, and 
reflection on the historical trajectory of the state. The completion of his study of Leviathan in 
1938 illustrates Schmitt’s understanding of the historical trajectory of the modem state. His 
thinking at this stage is intensely historical, addressing himself to a far broader canvas than 
ever before. Whereas his initial response to National Socialism had been precise and 
technical, he had by now developed the grandiose, epochal mode of expression that would 
characterise much of his international work. All of Schmitt’s work of this period is possessed 
of a fin-de-siecle tone that transcends the immediate circumstances of Germany in 1937-1938. 
We can probably say with some certainty, therefore, that it was in this eighteen-month period 
that Schmitt finally concluded the state of Hobbes and Bodin to be beyond resuscitation. If 
renewal and restoration were no longer credible solutions, the key political imperative became 
innovation and the discovery of novel categories. The theory of large spaces was therefore 
Schmitt’s initial attempt to adopt a predictive stance, and to grasp for future principles of 
global order.
18 Kennedy Constitutional Failure p.20
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Volkerrechtliche Grofiraumordnung19
By his own admission, Schmitt had struggled to escape a critical mindset, and to address 
himself to the positive search for new ordering principles. Rather than attempting to innovate 
from first principles, Schmitt suggests that he was instead trying to identify the quasi-organic 
birth pangs of a new order. Such an anticipatory approach is both consistent with the 
conservatism we have witnessed in the previous chapters, but more prosaically, was probably 
a sensible strategy for a theorist under pressure in a Germany where the contours of future 
foreign policy had not yet become clear. According to Detlev Vagts, ‘confusion was 
occasioned by the sheer difficulty of knowing what sort of international law National 
Socialism really implied or needed.’20 It took time for Schmitt to summon the confidence to 
comment on the possible parameters of a new international law under Nazism;
“When, in autumn 1937, I completed my study The Turn Towards a 
Discriminatory Concept o f War as a research piece for the Academy of German 
Law, the political conditions [for this new international law] were not yet
clear  The natural response to that piece would be to pose the question, what
would I propose to take to the place of the old order of states...Today, I can give 
the answer”21
His answer is that ‘the new ordering principle of the new international law is our concept of 
the Reich.'22 Schmitt clearly has in mind here the particular and immediate circumstances in 
Germany that, according to this view, have made possible an alternative vision of 
international order.
‘The thought of a German Reich as the architect and builder of a new 
international law would previously have been a utopian dream, and the content of
19 All references in the chapter are to the 4th edition of Volkerrechtliche Grofiraumordnung, published in 
1941 and included in the collected volume Staat, Grofiraum, Nomos. All page numbers refer to the 
1995 edition of Staat, Grofiraum, Nomos. The core legal-theoretical argument remained constant 
between the 1st and 4th editions. However, the latter is somewhat more extensive in its 
argumentation. It also takes a broader and more generalised perspective, focussing less specifically 
on Central and Eastern Europe, and laying a heavier emphasis on the idea of Grofiraum as a new and 
transformative category for international law as a whole.




the international law it creates would have remained an empty dream. But today 
a powerful German Reich has arisen.’23
Ignoring, in so far as one can, the evidently unsettling self-identification Schmitt makes here 
with bellicose German foreign policy, the broader point remains that Schmitt is identifying the 
rise of the Third Reich with his long-diagnosed need for a particularist, territorial, anti-liberal 
counterpoise to the dangerous ascent of liberal universalism.
The basic outlines of the Grofiraum concept can be summed up in one paragraph. A 
predominant power (the Reich) exists within a larger territorial space (the Grofiraum), in 
which it essentially acts as hegemon. This larger space is both a geopolitical category, but 
should also be characterised by sufficient cultural homogeneity to allow the ‘political idea’ of 
the leading Reich to radiate and to unify. The Reich itself is charged both with ideological 
definition, and with asserting the power to decide on the external orientation of the Grofiraum 
as a whole;
‘A Reich in this sense is the leading and forceful power whose political idea 
radiates (ausstrahlt) throughout the entire Grofiraum, and which fundamentally 
prevents the intervention of foreign powers in the Grofiraum.'24
Although Schmitt intends the idea of Grofiraum as a novel and transformative category in 
international law, he regards the Monroe Doctrine as a ‘precedent for an international legal 
principle of large spaces.’25 As Schmitt reads it, the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 was the first 
instance of a quasi-legal great space with a prohibition on intervention by foreign powers.26 
The United States, as the pre-eminent power (or Reich), asserted the right to prevent 




26 In the late 1930s the Monroe Doctrine became a popular analogy used by German leaders in defence 
of their proposed foreign policy. Ribbentrop cited the Doctrine in March 1939 as a precedent for the 
partition of Poland, and Hitler himself deployed the analogy in a speech to the Reichstag in April 1939. 
Schmitt was apparently warned not to claim authorship of the idea so as to avoid offending the Fiihrer’s 
dignity. (See Balakrishnan, The Enemy p.236 ; Bendersky, Carl Schmitt, p.258-259). The accuracy of 
Schmitt’s understanding of the actual basis of the Monroe Doctrine need not detain us here, but suffice 
to say that most American legal historians would probably challenge his interpretation (see Vagts, 
‘International Law’ p.689).
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pan-American political homogeneity that nevertheless fell short of direct annexation or 
imperialism. The American continent constituted a defined territorial-political space that was 
nevertheless distinct from its predominant power. And beyond its obvious territorial integrity, 
Schmitt argues that there existed some form of cultural homogeneity in the Americas that 
made the dominance and leadership of the United States acceptable and effective.27
As Schmitt interpreted it, the Monroe Doctrine contained two novelties of the highest 
relevance to the new international circumstances. Firstly, the United States reserved for itself 
the power to interpret the basis of the doctrine under concrete circumstances. Schmitt had 
previously posited this kind of international legal indeterminacy as a contrast to the dominant 
positivism. In 1932 Schmitt had written in praise of US legal decisionism in the context of its 
1903 treaty with Cuba -  a treaty that gave the US power to ensure non-intervention in Cuba.28 
In contrast to the kind of treaty-formalism in the ascendancy after 1919, Schmitt saw such 
arrangements as allowing for the true exercise of direct political power. Schmitt firmly 
approved of Hughes’ definition of the US’s relationship to the Monroe Doctrine;
‘When asked in 1923 to characterise the essential content of the Monroe Doctrine, 
Secretary of State Hughes responded with a classic example of pure decisionism 
(Dezisionismus): the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine could only be ‘defined, 
interpreted and sanctioned’ by the United States alone.’29
There was no pretence of rule-based behaviour in the Monroe Doctrine. The US would make 
the decision to act in the concrete instance.
The second distinct feature of the Monroe Doctrine lay in its understanding of space. In 
contrast to the European state-form, Schmitt regarded it as the first concept of international 
law that directly acknowledged the existence of a planetary space.30 As such, it was capable 
of placing the actual territory of the American Grofiraum within the context of planetary space 
it inhabited. Schmitt’s earlier writings on international law displayed profound irritation with 
the growing tendency to create indeterminate territorial categories (protectorates, international 
territories, economic zones etc) whose prime definition lay in some universal idea rather than
27 See Grofiraumordnung pp.277-285




a geographic reality. By contrast, the Monroe Doctrine implicated a precise and particular 
territorial space.
This, Schmitt argues, is a distinct contrast to the incapacity of European powers to reconcile 
their ideas of territory to their new realisation of the vastness of the planet. In particular, he 
regards the British Empire as representing the precise opposite of Grofiraum. The British 
response to the global space, Schmitt argues, had been to de-teritorialise and universalise, 
detaching the abstract idea of power from any concrete orientation. To illustrate this contrast, 
Schmitt points to the British creation of an indeterminate territorial status for the Suez Canal, 
and the classification of the canal in reference to British ‘interests’ rather than its physical 
status.31 As such, the Monroe Doctrine (as originally conceived)32 represents a modestly 
successful attempt to reconcile order and orientation, within the context of the new planetary 
spatial environment.
Despite its prominence, the Monroe Doctrine is intended merely as a starting point for a more 
theoretical working out of legal principle. The intention is not simply to lift the Monroe 
Doctrine as a model, and to impose it elsewhere. Schmitt argues that his intention in referring 
to this precedent is to ‘clarify an international legal principle of large spaces, and to make this 
applicable to all Lebensraume and other historical situations.’33 Schmitt’s objectives are both 
theoretical and practical -  ‘to clear the way for a fruitful and auspicious change in both theory 
and practice.’34 Inevitably this meant that his principle concern lay with the effective marriage 
of his theoretical Grofiraum with the concrete circumstances of Germany on the eve of its 
expansionist phase.
In the immediate context, Schmitt envisioned a European Grofiraum in which Germany would 
stand as the pre-eminent power -  the Reich. In the aftermath of the Anschlufi and Germany’s
31 Grofiraumordnung p.287
32 Schmitt goes on to describe how the United States had subsequently mortgaged the territorial basis of 
the Monroe Doctrine, and fallen into the same universalist trap as the British. Unsurprisingly, 
Schmitt particularly targets President Wilson for his attempt ‘to transform a concrete, territorially 
defined notion of order into a universal “world” idea, and thereby to turn the core international legal 





annexation of the Sudetenland, the push towards German domination of Central Europe must 
have seemed assured. Through both its material power, and the force of its ‘political idea’ 
(politische Idee), the Reich would act to ensure that no external power could intervene within 
the determined Grofiraum. In other words, ‘the guiding principle of the present international 
law [is] the fundamental exclusion of powers from outside the territorial area.’35 This 
prohibition on intervention by external powers in the Grofiraum, coupled to the predominance 
of the leading power within the Grofiraum, appears designed to rationalise and clarify the real 
substance of international relations. In the European context, international relations would be 
subdivided into two categories. Firstly, the relations between the powers within the 
Grofiraum would consist essentially of technical arrangements for coexistence and the 
maintenance of German primacy.36 Secondly, as the Reich, Germany itself would retain all 
power to define the external relations of the Grossraum, and to ensure the non-intervention of 
external powers.
In some respects, this promotion of a European territorial answer to Germany’s predicament 
was familiar from Weimar debates on the restoration and rehabilitation of German power in 
the face of American and Russian intrusion. Walther Vogel, for instance, had concluded in 
1925 that Germany would only restore its international credibility by transcending the limits 
of the traditional nation state, and standing instead at the forefront of some kind of federal 
Europe.37 The idea of Germany at the centre of a legally reconstituted European space was by 
no means a novelty when Schmitt was developing his Grossraum theory. However, Schmitt 
did give a novel and unusual juridical account of how the legal architecture of this new trans­
national unit might operate.
Schmitt actually talks of four kinds of relationship mediated by his new system of international 
law. First, relations between different Grofiraume. Second, relations between Reichs. 
Third, relations between the various volkish groups within a Grofiraum. And finally, relations 
between volkish groups across the boundaries of a Grofiraum.38 However, these categories
35 Grofiraumordnung p.295
36 In the event, of course, Germany adopted a complicated nomenclature and systems of control within 
occupied Europe. Among those territories attacked early on, certain among them were annexed, a 
General-Gouvemement was established in Poland and Bohemia and Moravia became protectorates. 
Most later conquests were treated as bare occupations. See D.Vagts, ‘International Law’ p.697
37 W.Vogel, Das Neue Europa pp.416-422
38 Grofiraumordnung p.305
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clearly break down into an internal / external divide. If one defining characteristic of the 
Reich is its capacity to define the ‘foreign policy’ of the Grofiraum as a whole, then one can 
presume that the external orientation of that Grofiraum will cohere with the external 
orientation of the Reich. Relations among groups inside the space is clearly an important 
issue, but now seems removed from the subject matter of specifically international or external 
politics. Finally, as noted by Peter Stirk, given that the various nations within the Grofiraum 
were ‘subject to the prohibition of intervention by powers alien to the Grofiraum’, it is 
doubtful how significant their relations to volkish groups in other Grofiraume could possibly 
be.’39 Certainly Schmitt makes no effort to suggest what the content of such relations might 
be.
If the Grofiraum concept replicates an internal / external divide with such clarity, how is this 
distinct from simply an enlarged and technically more efficient state? Schmitt is at pains to 
argue that ‘the Reich is not simply an enlarged state, in the same way that a Grofiraum is not 
simply an expanded Kleinraum. ,4° After all, his self-declared objective is to look beyond the 
failed concepts of inter-state law, and to uncover radically new principles for a new age. In 
arguing for the novelty of his categories, he turns broadly to two areas of argumentation that 
we shall consider in turn. Firstly, Schmitt looks to the human community that inhabits the 
Grofiraum, and which forms a reception community for the political idea. Secondly, Schmitt 
argues that the Grofiraum concept radically reconstitutes our understanding of political space, 
providing an escape route from the corrupted spatial ideas of inter-state international law. 
The transformative capacity of the Grofiraum concept lies in the coherence of these two 
arguments.
The 'PoliticalIdea'
Whereas the only glue holding together Schmitt’s Westphalian state was the act of decision 
and a naked typology of power, he is here moved to make reference to the necessity of a




‘political idea’ that somehow originates in the Reich and imparts energy and unity into the 
Grossraum. At first glance this appears to mark a departure from his pure decisionist 
definition of politics per se. However, this cultural or intellectual role ascribed to the Reich is 
placed alongside its more familiar power-political role in guaranteeing non-intervention by 
external powers. Schmitt does not create a hierarchy between these two roles of the Reich, 
and offers little clarification on the mechanics of its ‘radiation’ through the Grossraum. In 
some respects, we are returned to David Pan’s dilemma (outlined in Chapter 3) of the gap 
between the act of decision, and the existence of an environment in which that decision takes 
root -  a reception community. Schmitt recognises that the coherence and stability of the 
Grossraum concept relies on a certain concrete, pre-existent homogeneity -  a volkish 
environment in which some special, unique, particular and anti-universal mode of being can 
make sense -  but he offers no theoretical insight into the content of that homogeneity.41
Both in theory and in practice, the content of this ‘political idea’ remains elusive. Perhaps 
Schmitt is caught in a gap between a desire to provide immediate legal and intellectual 
categories for Nazi Germany, and a desire to produce a generalised and replicable theory of 
the new international order. For Diemut Majer, who regarded Schmitt as a highly culpable 
shaper of Nazi foreign policy, the ‘political idea’ that Schmitt hopes to see radiated through 
Central and Eastern Europe is simply Nazi racial and volkish doctrine.42 Such a view is 
supported by the explicit exclusion of the Jews from any place within this volkish international 
system43, and by the language Schmitt uses to describe the specific ‘political idea’ of the new 
German Reich ',
‘...respect for peoples as unique in form and origin, a way of life defined by 
blood and soil, radiation into central and eastern Europe, and the removal of 
interference by external (raumfremd) and foreign (unvdlkish) powers. The actions 
of the Ftihrer have provided our concept of the Reich with political reality, 
historical truth and a great future in international law. ’ 44
41 The only effort Schmitt makes to clarify this vagueness is to definitively exclude Jews from any 
possibility of a place as participants in the present European Grossraum. See Grofiraumordnung 
p.294-295





According to Majer’s interpretation, the ‘political idea’ amounts to nothing more than Nazi 
ideology, and its ‘radiation’ is nothing more than imposition by force.
Certainly it was necessary for Schmitt’s idea of the ‘political idea’ to resonate with concrete 
political circumstances. Stirk suggests, somewhat more prosaically than Majer, that the 
notion of ‘political idea’ was an elusive and largely unsuccessful attempt to distinguish Nazi 
expansionism from naked annexation;
‘[Schmitt’s] difficulty lay in the need to reconcile German hegemony with 
something short of direct annexation and radical Germanization. [He] needed a
cohesive force to endow the Grossraum with some unity and identity It is this
need which the political idea, as formulated in ‘The Monroe Doctrine as the 
Precedent of the Grossraum principle in International Law’ sought to fill.’45
According to Stirk, therefore, the notion of the political idea was Schmitt’s somewhat feeble 
attempt to ground German dominance in something deeper and legally more substantial than 
mere aggression. Stirk suggests that Schmitt was grappling with the question of ‘how to 
generate sufficient political homogeneity to be able to dispense with the cruder forms of 
occupation and repression.’46 As such, the vagueness of the concept derives from the 
difficulty of the problem it was intended to solve.
Certainly Stirk is right to argue that Schmitt is engaged in an exercise of political distinction, 
and an attempt to provide a justification for German expansion that avoids bare imperialism. 
But Schmitt does so in a way that speaks to the wider distinction between particularism and 
universalism. Schmitt intends Reich and Grossraum to represent qualitatively new concepts 
of international order;
‘Reich, Imperium and Empire are not the same.... Whereas ‘Imperium’ often 
promotes a sense of a universal world order and humanity... our German Reich 
[is] in its essence a non-universal legal order.’47
Whilst Stirk and Majer are both quite right to stress the need to take into account Schmitt’s 
objectives in legitimating and theorising Nazi expansion, it does not necessarily follow that the 
concept of the ‘political idea’ was only intended to make sense in that context.
45 Stirk, ‘Grofiraumordnung’ p.372
46 Stirk, ‘Grofiraumordnung’ p.373
47 Grofiraumordnung p.296
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Although Schmitt believed that new principles of international law were unfolding first and 
foremost in Germany, he had nevertheless expressed a belief that his Grossraum theory should 
be ‘applicable to all Lebensraume and other historical situations.’48 If Schmitt simply wished 
to assert the political predominance of Nazi ideology, and the hope that it would provide the 
socio-political glue to hold together a new European space, why did he choose to express 
himself in such legally generalised language? If the Americas under the Monroe Doctrine had 
been a quasi-Grossraum, and the emergence of other Grossraaume was both likely and 
necessary, then surely the notion of the ‘political idea’ had to exist as a distinct conceptual 
category. It had to be possible for there to be a unique and particular idea that would provide 
homogeneity to the Americas, to south Asia, or wherever else a large space might emerge.
What appears to be at stake here is not the content of the particular ‘political idea’ at hand, but 
the very possibility of a ‘political idea’ as the highest reference point for a political 
community. The concept of a ‘political idea’ is definitively anti-universal. Schmitt’s 
definition of the German political idea is synonymous with his general, particularist critique of 
the post-1919 order. The uniqueness of peoples, the orientating effect of blood and soil, the 
concept of volk as Schmitt deploys it -  all of these are simply extensions of the general 
critique. They represent modes of being and concrete ordering principles that are essential to 
the maintenance of ‘the Political.’ In this sense, the ‘political idea’ represents the possibility 
of the concrete - the possibility of an idea that, in its content, is impossible of replication and 
universalisation. The German political idea is made of its own content, could not have 
emerged elsewhere, could not be generalised, and will never adhere to a positivist and 
universal doctrine. In other words, it marks a pluralist stance against a universal world.
Perhaps it is this that explains Schmitt’s vagueness on the content of the ‘political idea.’ One 
can no more predict the content of a specific political idea than one could predict theological 
revelation. Schmitt’s fervent hope is that Germany’s new political circumstances will ensure a 
continuing, unique political vision. The dangers of conceptual overreach are only too well 
evidenced, in Schmitt’s view, by the slide of the Monroe Doctrine into universalism. The 
political idea must remain defensive and aggressive, rooted in the particular combination of 
order and orientation of its concrete circumstances.
48 Grofiraumordnung p.278
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Far from being a novel and sinister political category, the ‘political idea’ appears to be the 
flip-side of Schmitt’s dominant critique of liberalism and universalism. If the ‘political idea’ 
amounts to little more than the fact of particularism, it is difficult to see what the concept 
really adds to Schmitt’s existing critique. Schmitt’s stated purpose is to discover new 
principles to stop ‘the non-state (unstaatlichen) and non-national (unvdlkishen) of a universal 
world law (Weltrecht) .’49 But the concept of the ‘political idea’ seems woefully inadequate to 
the task. Indeed, if read in this way, it even appears as a rather simplistic adjunct to Schmitt’s 
critical argument - we need to resist universalism; we shall do so by means of powerful 
political units that are committed to non-universalism. This is hardly the conceptual leap- 
forward that Schmitt claims to be able to give.
Furthermore, it is unclear why the notion of the ‘political idea’ and its ‘radiation’ in a large 
space is qualitatively distinct from the state-form that Schmitt regards as obsolete. It is clear 
that states, as Schmitt understood them, were possessed of a political idea in the sense of a 
specific orientation, an understanding of their own peculiarity, and their successful 
functioning in a pluriverse. This imperative to posses a political idea is therefore little more 
than an amplification of Schmitt’s existing theory of the state -  the philosophical bolstering of 
the core component of sovereignty, and a definitive barrier to the assertion of liberal 
universalism. Certainly the ‘political idea’ is never expressed in such terms as an essential 
component of a coherent state in Schmitt’s earlier work. The language is new. But if the 
content of ‘political idea’ turns out to be little more than the potential for uniqueness, what has 
Schmitt really added? This is simply an underdeveloped and incomplete answer to the 
question of what cultural / intellectual content is given, in practical terms, to the political 
community that is bound by the political decision.
A New Definition o f Space
If the ‘political idea’ fails sufficiently to distinguish a Grossraum from a traditional state, then 
the key political criterion of the Grossraum must lie instead in its specific understanding of 
space. Clearly the Grossraum is intended as a spatial category. Schmitt is critical of the
49 Grofiraumordnung p.305
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increasing failure of the state to represent a concrete spatial reality. During the colonial 
period, Schmitt argues, states created a whole myriad of intermediate and indeterminate 
spatial categories such as ‘spheres of influence’ (Interressenspharen) that were expressly 
designed to break the link between political power and territorial orientation.50 He contrast 
the American Grossraum with the British Empire, criticising the latter for its refusal to 
acknowledge its own territorial specificity, and its constant attempts to generalise and 
universalise its political precepts in a non-territorial direction.51 Schmitt saves special 
contempt for Disraeli’s flippant notion that New Delhi would be a more appropriate British 
capital city that London.52 This appears to represent par excellence that process of 
deterritorialisation that has so dogged the international system, and that has contributed so 
drastically to the modem crisis of the state.
Alongside the wilful tendency of governments to obfuscate concepts of territory, Schmitt also 
acknowledges the impact of modem technology in altering the realistic horizons of spatial 
organisation. New technologies of communication make the sovereignty of small spaces seem 
increasingly tenuous, and suggest that a new coherent spatial organisation would have to 
embrace a larger sense of territory -  literally a Grossraum.53 Both in its stress on the 
territorial basis of political orientation (as a raum), and in its acknowledgement of the need to 
recreate a new order with a more realistic sense of political territory (as a Grossraum), 
Schmitt established the question of territoriality as the central category of the Grossraum 
concept. At first glance, Schmitt is seeking to define a new, politically charged understanding 
of space that can serve as the basis of a new order,’
‘Space, per se, is clearly not a concrete order. But equally clearly, every 
concrete order and community has a specific content in terms of place (Ort) and 
space (Raum). In this sense, one can say that every legal establishment 
(Rechtseinrichting) -  every institution -  has a concept of space internal to itself, 
and thereby brings with it its own internal substance and its own internal 
boundaries.’54
50 See especially Grofiraumordnung pp.271-275
51 Grofiraumordnung pp.286-291




On the one hand, the idea of space that underlies the Grossraum concept is relatively 
straightforward and prosaic. Tied to the immediate instance in Germany and Europe, and 
with the Monroe Doctrine as the key precedent, we appear to be talking about essentially 
continental spaces. The prime spatial category would appear to be the Grossraum as a whole, 
since it is this new, wider concept of space that is presented as novel and necessary ‘in 
overcoming the monopoly of the empty state-area concept (Staatsgebietbegrijfs).’55 This being 
the case, one must assume that the Reich itself is a second-tier spatial characterisation. 
Firstly, Schmitt presents the Reich as important in an intellectual-historical rather than a 
spatial sense. The Reich gives moral content and material power to the (qualitatively distinct) 
larger territorial space. As such, it is not presented as a spatial category in its essence.56 
Secondly, if ‘Germany’ and the ‘United States’ are the principle precedents for a new spatial 
politics, it is hard to see how Schmitt could infuse his argument with an urgent new 
categorisation of territory. Schmitt is at pains to argue that the Grossraum is something 
qualitatively distinct from an enlarged state, yet Germany and the United States as ‘Reiche’ 
would appear to possess exactly that quality.
Beyond the fact of largeness, what is new in this theory of political space? Schmitt is clear 
that we are experiencing a revolution of spatial consciousness analogous to that which 
purportedly occurred in the sixteenth century;
‘The true modernity of our age lies in the fact that the spatial-revolutionary 
alteration of the medieval world perspective (that started in the 16th century and 
came to full scientific fruition in the 17th century) offers us an opportunity better 
to understand the alteration of spatial perspective (Raumbildes) and spatial 
imagination (Raumvorstellung) occurring today.’57
This current change in spatial sense is presented as the most significant change in human 
consciousness in 400 years, fundamentally impacting all aspects of human life. What remains 
unclear is whether Schmitt is theorising a new spatial category that coheres with this changing 
understanding of space, or is merely commentating on the inevitability of new spatial
55 Grofiraumordnung p.320
56 Schmitt nevertheless appears to think of the Reich and the separate component ‘peoples’ within a 
Grossraum in territorial as well as cultural-ethnic-social terms. One presumes that the Reich would 
continue to be a territorially defined space that could be depicted on a map. The key distinction is that 
boundaries between these units are now conceived as internal boundaries, and hence subordinate to the 
primary spatial category of Grossraum. Schmitt offers little clarification of the importance of 
territorial distinctions within the Grossraum.
57 Grofiraumordnung p.314
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categories and the need to uncover them. By the standards Schmitt sets for himself - to 
outline a ‘new ordering principle of the new international law’ -  and from the concrete 
content of the theory Schmitt presents, one would assume that he has achieved the former.58 
In fact, it is by no means clear that Schmitt achieves the clarity necessary to claim a radically 
new political understanding of space.
The Grossraum, it is argued, is not simply ‘an expanded Kleinraum,’59 As such, the defining 
point of departure cannot be size. The largeness of the new political space is descriptive 
rather than definitional in any foundational sense. ‘Large’ and ‘small’ would anyway make 
sense only in a relative and specific sense as the spatial contrasts between the European and 
American instances serves to illustrate. It seems strange that Schmitt retreats so decisively 
from scale as at least one defining point of his new concept of space, and all the stranger that 
he should choose the attribute of Grossraum in light of this rejection.60 ‘Gross' is, of course, 
a somewhat multivalent word that cannot be rendered simply as ‘large.’ It also connotes 
greatness, and is akin to the original geographic use of the word ‘Great’ in the sense of ‘Great 
Britain.’ As Schmitt puts it, ‘as with many other contexts (such as “great” power, “great” 
king, “great” revolution), the word (Gross) implies a qualitative level.’61 When attached to 
‘raum’, however, the spatial attributes of the word are clearly emphasised.
Again, Schmitt is perhaps caught between a desire to present a specific justification of 
German expansion in the European space and a more profound reflection on the political 
category of space in a post-Westphalian environment. Whatever the reasons, Schmitt steers 
clear of a tight definition of these new spatial foundations he claims to have uncovered. 
Having given a fairly clear impression of the precise spatial characteristics of the unfolding 
European Grossraum, Schmitt suddenly denies that these characteristics are characteristic of 
the Grossraum concept per se. As with the specific content of the ‘political Idea’, the specific 
content of this ‘new’ and ‘revolutionary’ spatiality remains tantalisingly elusive. Rather than 
following through on his discussion of the precise territorial failings of the state under
58 For Schmitt’s bold claims for the importance of the Grossraum concept in offering a radical 
alternative to the state system see Grofiraumordnung p.306
59 Grofiraumordnung p.309
60 The word ‘Grossraum’ is in common usage in Germany to refer to the greater geographic hinterland 
or region attached to a city such as ‘Grossraum Hamburg’ or ‘Grossraum Frankfurt. ’
61 Grofiraumordnung p.315
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conditions of modernity, Schmitt turns instead to a somewhat sophistic meditation on the 
meaning of space.
Schmitt claims that his idea of Grossraum has a transformative capacity;
‘Grossraum is therefore not a relatively larger space in relation to a relatively 
smaller space -  not an expanded Kleinraum. Clearly the pathetic mathematical- 
physical -natural scientific neutrality of the existing idea of space must be 
overcome.... The inclusion of the word “Gross” should and can alter the 
conceptual playing field <{'Begrijfsfeld’). That is of decisive significance both for 
the law and for the development of state and international legal knowledge, 
because all verbal (and as such, all juristic) ideas influence the conceptual field, 
interacting and growing with their conceptual neighbours.’62
Rather than representing the achievement of a new and reproductive concept of space, Schmitt 
turns his attention to the role of the Grossraum as ‘a bridge from the old to the new concepts 
of space.’63 As with the ‘political idea’ we explored above, Schmitt’s most profound claims 
about his ‘new’ understanding of space is in its capacity to sharpen a critique of the existing 
order;
‘The change to the conceptual terrain achieved by the opposition of the word 
Grossraum to the word Raum would lie above all in causing the latter to lose its 
previous mathematical-natural-scientific-neutral connotations.’64
Schmitt wants to sharpen his critique of the previous, discredited spatial order for lacking the 
depth and intensity of specifically territorial content necessary to avoid the slide into 
formlessness. The state was a territorial unit, but Schmitt criticises the ‘Raumtheorie’ of this 
space as having rendered ‘an empty two-dimensional space.’65 He stresses the need to avoid a 
situation in which the spatial foundation of a particular political order is conceived as nothing 
more ‘than a specified area for a people organised by law,’ as, he argues, has occurred with 
the spatial foundations of the state system.66 Schmitt repeats his familiar critique of the






depoliticisation and universalisation, but this time emphasises the links between these 
processes and the erosion of spatial consciousness. The trends are depicted as symbiotic, and 
Schmitt returns to his theme of the links between liberalism, scientific rationality, and 
incompatibility of Judaism with a spatial understanding rooted in the earth.67 This is a 
specifically spatial addition to Schmitt’s wider critique of modem positivism.
This novel Grossraum category is therefore intended to criticise the ‘flat’ conceptions of space 
that have dominated hitherto, and which tend towards a loss of the fundamental link of order 
and orientation. But Schmitt fails to convey an adequate sense of what a ‘deep’ conception of 
space might consist of. Is a concept of Grossraum intended as a process or as a destination? 
Exactly how would an international order based on a system of Grossraume avoid positivist 
and ‘flat’ conceptions of space that purportedly plagued the state system? What is the link 
between the imperative for breadth that Schmitt explicitly accepts (i.e. the need for larger 
spaces to adequately contain political authority under modem conditions), and the more 
abstract notion of spatial depth and integrity that Schmitt is attempting to develop?
Schmitt’s answer to these obvious criticisms comes in the form of a disconcerting and 
provocative formulation -  he envisages a new concept of space in terms of a space for activity 
or achievement (Leistungsraum).68
‘The spatial is generated only in and on (subjective) physical reality (den 
Gegenstande), and spatiotemporal (Raumzeitlich) orders are no longer mere 
clerical entries (Eintragungnen) in a previously empty space, but instead 
correspond far more closely to a real situation, an actual event. Only now has the 
idea of an empty dimension (Tiefendimension) and a basic formal spatial category 
finally been overcome. Space has become a space for accomplishment 
(Leistungsraum).,69
Quite what one is to make of this categorisation is unclear, and is perhaps deliberately left 
unclear. Certainly one can identify with Schmitt’s association of space with the particular, 
and the need to implicate space as part of the barrier against universalism and formlessness. 
One can likewise recognise the linkage of space to particular human activity, so that space is 
tied to the concrete reality of people rather than the triumph of abstract ideals.
67 See Grofiraumordnung pp.316-318
68 Grofiraumordnung p.319
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Once again however, it is unclear what the ‘novel’ category of Grossraum adds to the basic 
critique of positivism. What is new about this concept that wouldn’t likewise be achieved by 
a radical reassertion of the territoriality and particularism of the state? Schmitt goes to great 
pains to say that a Grossraum is not simply a larger Kleinraum. He claims that the difference 
lies in the capacity of the former to re-emphasise the particularity of space. But couldn’t this 
be achieved equally via a fundamental recovery of the state (i.e. the recovery of the state with 
its essential territorial consciousness)? If what is at stake is the discovery of new concepts to 
address the problems of the current age, why does Schmitt end up lowering his ambitions to 
merely presenting a transformational category? With its sense of territoriality as with the 
category of ‘political idea’, the Grossraum concept appears to break down in the space 
between critique and innovation, and ends up achieving little in either direction.
Why should the conjunction of Gross and raum have the transformative conceptual effect that 
Schmitt claims in contrast to other approaches? Consider Schmitt’s concluding claim for the 
relevance and importance of the Grossraum concept;
‘The idea of Grossraum is therefore of service in overcoming the monopoly of the 
empty state-area concept (Staatsgebietsbegrijfs) and prepare us to experience the 
international system of the Reich as the decisive concept of our legal thought. 
Through this a renewal of legal ideas becomes possible, recapturing the old and 
eternal unity of order and orientation, [which in turn] makes possible the return of 
meaning to the word ‘peace’, and restores the character of unique being (den 
Charakter eines artbestimmenden Wesenmerkmals) to the word “home”.’70
The final line above represents, in truth, the sole significant message conveyed by the concept 
of Grossraum. Schmitt is concerned that the modern organisation of states have lost the 
capacity to sustain and protect the character of unique being. Positivism is accelerating 
history towards an unrooted, unpolitical, ungrounded universalism from which there can be no 
return. But how can one really go about ‘theorising’ a return to the particular? The 
achievement of that specific, concrete grounding of politics in a unique idea, the unique 




of theory but rather the stuff of concrete achievement -  it is a dasein that cannot be prescribed 
by political theory. As with the fact of political existence in the state, one assumes that, by 
definition, the fact of the political existence of the Grossraum can never be normatively 
justified (or at least, can only receive such justification from within, on its own terms). One 
is reminded of the famous passage from Concept o f the Political,
‘There exists no rational purpose, no norm no matter how true, no program no 
matter how exemplary, no social ideal no matter how beautiful, no legitimacy nor 
legality which could justify men in killing each other for this reason. If such 
physical destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to 
one’s own way of life, then it cannot be justified.’71
The Grossraum concept represents an attempt simply to affirm the possibility of content to ‘a 
way of life’ and to stress its spatial characteristics.
If Schmitt realised the impossibility of grounding a new concept of concrete, particular order 
in theory, does this mean that his claim to have uncovered the principles of a new geopolitical 
legal order were essentially fraudulent? Certainly, beyond a cursory appraisal of the concrete 
situation in Nazi Europe, Schmitt does not, in fact, offer any such principles or vision of a 
future order. The idea of Grossraum is almost totally without substance beyond its status as a 
critique of the status quo. Whilst certainly of interest in its assertion of the need for a new 
basis for political uniqueness, the conclusions it reaches are inadequate. Why is a continental 
form of politics better as an assertion of a thorough and anti-universal appreciation of 
territory? Why can’t the state form be revived as genuinely particular? What distinguished 
the ‘political idea’ of a Grossraum from the bare sense of existential collectivity that defined 
the political community in Concept o f the Political} Schmitt wholly fails to address these 
foundational questions, and offers no thorough justification of his position.
Behind the ‘Blut und Boden’ language of the Grossraum concept, it does represent Schmitt’s 
cold analytical attempt to think seriously about how Nazism might fulfil his pet concern -  the 
creation of a plural, territorial order to replace the collapsed order of nation states. From the 
outset Schmitt’s prime point of reference in this work is his long-standing critique of current 
international law - from the initial definition of international law as a jus gentium -  a law of 
peoples -  and the familiar critique of the way that this law has witnessed the elevation of the
71 Concept of the Political p.49
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individual subject on the one hand, and a slide into treaty-positivism (Vertragspositivismus) on 
the other.72 Schmitt rehearses his criticisms of the destructive and abusive role of the League 
of Nations in using positivist international law, adding an additional critique of the idea of 
collective and regional security.73 The specific challenge for Germany at that precise 
historical moment was therefore to stand as a barrier against these abstractions and 
indeterminate categories.
The suspicion must be that the tension between Schmitt’s two objectives in presenting and 
promoting the Grossraum concept was too great. On the one hand, publishing between 1938 
and 1941, Schmitt wished to write explicitly about the novel geopolitical conditions in 
German-dominated Europe. He sought to defend and contextualise Nazi aggression, to 
rationalise the ascendant politics in terms of his existing political theory (perhaps as much for 
the sake of his own peace of mind as for any higher motive) and to think positively about a 
new global order. And yet there was a clear dissonance between Schmitt’s conservative hopes 
of particularism, a territorially defined way of life, and anti-universalism on the one hand, and 
the realities of Nazi foreign policy. The result is a vague, under-theorised and tentative 
elaboration of a new order that never really moves beyond a critical mindset. It certainly fails 
to live up to Schmitt’s bold claim to have uncovered radically new spatial and political 
foundations of a new geopolitical order -  purportedly the most radical spatial transformation 
in 400 years.
The ‘Grossraum’After 1945
The vision of Europe presented in Vdlkerrechtliche Grofiraumordnung was clearly 
unsustainable following Germany’s defeat. Schmitt must surely have realised even earlier 
than this that his hope for a restrained and pluriversal geopolitical order of large spaces did 
not cohere with the reality of Nazi foreign policy. Schmitt’s increasing isolation in the circle 
of Nazi international legal theorists reflected in part his failure to capture the essence of the 
age, and adequately to analyse the real basis of Nazi ambition.74 With the power of hindsight,
72 Grofiraumordnung pp.270-275
73 Grofiraumordnung p.275
74 See D.Vagts, ‘International Law’
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it may appear that Schmitt’s ambitions were delusional. Certainly, as his conversations with 
Nicolaus Sombart illustrate, he was seriously disillusioned with Germany’s own slide into 
expansion and the krypto-universalism of its racial ideology;
‘’Hitler’s historical task: overcoming the Versailles diktat through land war. But 
now we conduct a war of racial annihilation in the East and a worldwide sea war 
in the West.’75
Far from recapturing particularity, territoriality and a specific German way of life, Schmitt 
saw Germany as having been sucked into the kind of global conflict of ideas he so feared. 
With the invasion of Russia and, especially, the entry of the United States as a combatant in 
the European theatre, the prospects for Grossraum politics appeared doomed.
In one sense, perhaps, the immediate foreclosure of prospects for a German-European 
Grossraum resolved the dilemma between theory and practice we identified above. No longer 
preoccupied by the specific political prospects of Nazi Germany, Schmitt was freed to develop 
his ongoing critique of treaty-positivism and the universal assault on the state without the need 
to tie his critique to hopes for the future. From 1943 onwards, Schmitt could develop his idea 
of Nomos in a purely theoretical direction, and indefinitely postpone the question of what 
comes next -  a question he had already posed for himself in 1938 with the publication of Der 
Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsberiff. Certainly Nomos represents a far weightier and 
far more authentic obituary for the European state than the critique in Schmitt’s shorter and 
more agitated works of 1936-1940. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that the essence of his 
pessimism for the prospects of the state, and the imperative to realise new principles of order, 
were already in place in the mid to late 1930s.76 Schmitt’s initial response had been to search 
for answers. After 1945, perhaps chastened and directionless, Schmitt appears to have largely 
given up the hunt for new categories.
Certainly, Schmitt was forced to reappraise his ideas of Grossraum. After all, with the 
simultaneous triumph of the United States and Soviet Russia, the field appeared to have been
75 N.Sombart, Jugend in Berlin Munich: Carl Hanser (1984) p.266
761 would therefore disagree with Jean-Francois Kervegan when he argues that ‘there is a remarkable 
contrast between texts written before or after the Second World War (or National Socialism) -  so 
much so that they can be gathered into two completely independent groups.’( J-F Kervegan ‘Carl 
Schmitt and ‘World Unity” in Mouffe Challenge p.55). Such a strict separation pays too much 
attention to the tonality of Schmitt’s writing, and fails to appreciate the lines of progression and the 
sustained interest in certain core political phenomena.
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cleared for a test of rival universalisms rather than the recreation of the particular, the unique 
and the partial. With the defeat of Germany and Japan, the exhaustion of Europe and the pre­
eminence of the external powers, the prospects for Grossraum politics appeared dim. 
Certainly there was no immediate evidence of an emergent new power to counteract the 
bipolar political system. In contrast to his troubled optimism of the 1930s, Schmitt fell back 
into a reflective and ambivalent viewpoint about the coming order.
Despite the intercession of events, Schmitt nevertheless held on to the theoretical idea of 
Grossraum politics as a potential future answer to the problem of sustaining genuine plural 
politics at a global level. In the concluding chapter of Nomos o f the Earth, Schmitt held out 
the prospect of three potential conclusions to the unsustainable and unsatisfactory 
confrontation of the superpowers. Firstly, one of the superpowers could ‘win’ - a ‘last 
round’ or ‘final step’ in the march towards world unity, with unknowable and, it is supposed, 
terrible consequences. Secondly, there could be some amplification of current divisions, 
expanding into new technological and spatial dimensions. Whilst maintaining political 
plurality, such a solution would presumably maintain the dangers and instability of the current 
situation. And finally -  Schmitt’s clear preference -  ‘a combination of several independent 
Grossraume or blocs could constitute a balance, and thereby could precipitate a new order of 
the earth.’77
The prospect of a new order based on radically distinct ‘large spaces’ continues to be dangled 
as the best possible exit from the current malaise. However remote, fanciful and difficult to 
envisage, Schmitt refuses to abandon an idea that was initially conceived as a rationalisation 
and theoretical rooting of the precise international circumstances of the 1930s. It remains as 
an understated, unknown and undertheorised possibility, and as the only true ‘new Nomos.’
‘It would be as well if the global perspectives of these three possibilities were to 
become generally known. Most of those considering this frightful problem would 
rush blindly towards a single sovereign of the world. That idea certainly has a 
primitive simplicity, but it must not be permitted to displace the other 
possibilities. The second possibility, continuation of the former hegemonic 
balance structure, has the greatest chance of accepted custom and tradition on its 
side. The third possibility, an equilibrium of several independent Grossraume, is
77 Nomos p.355
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rational, if the Grossraume are differentiated meaningfully and are homogenous 
internally.’78
This final sentence encapsulates in brief the essence of Schmitt’s Grossraum concept. Large 
units, few in number, that possess a uniqueness -  a discernible, particular content unto 
themselves. After all the chaos and closure of world war, Schmitt nevertheless clings to the 
hope that large spaces might offer a way out of the political impasse.
Writing in 1952, Schmitt continued to express the belief that both communist and liberal 
aspirations for world unity would be foiled by the emergence of new, more complex 
pluriverse with new large spaces intruding on the East-West dualism.79 This, Schmitt 
suggests, remains a more likely outcome to the unsatisfactory status quo than the achievement 
of world unity. He continues to contrast his plural vision of particular, unique large spaces to 
the aspirational universalism and, specifically, erroneous beliefs in a progressive philosophy 
of history.
‘[H]istroy remains stronger than any philosophy of history, and therefore I do not 
take the current dualism of the world to be a preparatory step on the path to world 
unity, but take it instead to be a step on the path to a new plurality (Vielheit).,8°
Schmitt returns to his theme of this coming new plurality in 1962, expressing confidence that 
‘it appears that we will live through the present (difficult) times, and that the dualist-bipolar 
world system will be overcome by a pluralist-multipolar structure.’81 Indeed, Schmitt now 
argues that the period following German defeat represents a decisive turning away from the 
dangers of world unity. In 1943, Schmitt suggests, the Allied powers possessed a strong 
vision of world unity and perpetual peace. They were committed to such universal-pacific 
ideals as the United Nations, and appeared to believe that Hitler represented a last barrier to 
the achievement of their historical project. In truth, Schmitt argues, this ‘first phase’ was 
‘nothing more than an prelude. As early as 1947, just two years after the end of the Second 
World War, the Cold War entered its second phase.’82 The world took a step back from unity
78 Nomos p.355
79 Schmitt, Die Einheit der Welt
80 Einheit p.505
81 Schmitt, Die Ordnung der Welt nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg p.602
82 Die Ordnung der Welt p.601
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and peace, and entered a phase of bipolar confrontation that could still serve as preparation for 
a new era of multipolar, regional system of large spaces.
Even now, Schmitt is annoyingly elusive about the contours and content of this future system 
of Grossraume. But it is equally clear that the substance of his wartime study remains the 
basis of his thinking;
‘The spatial pluralism that is emerging today is, in reality, a plurality of 
Grossraume. But ‘Grossraum’ means something that must be strongly 
distinguished from an old sense of space that has simply been broadened. When 
we think of space, we first and foremost imagine a two dimensional space. The 
state (in the sense of international law) is primarily a bordered territory within 
which the national legal regime, the national government and national courts hold 
sway. Also, our traditional ideas on war and battle bind us to a flat (flachthaften) 
mode of thought. We think of war as a series of battles that take place and are 
decided on a battlefield. This is a baroque idea -  that war resembles theatre. 
Against this perception, we must remember that....only one tenth of real 
revolutionary war is visible. The greater part of this conflict does not take place 
in comparable spaces and open battlefields, but in the multidimensional space of 
the Cold War.83
This marks a re-emphasis of the original technical-spatial concerns that appeared to necessitate 
an expansion of the territorial basis of politics. Continental spaces appear to possess the 
necessary scale to contain multidimensional space, and to allow for real political control over 
all the various spatial levels at which modern politics will operate. Schmitt hints once again at 
his concern for airpower and modem weaponry, and the difficulty of grounding the political 
control of these facets of power in a spatial reality. Once again, Schmitt presents the politics 
of large spaces, vaguely conceived, as the outcome.
Subsequent readers of Schmitt have often called on this image of continental, anti-universal 
politics as a programmatic basis for opposing the duopoly of the superpowers or, 
subsequently, the monopoly of the United States. In Die Ordnung der Welt, Schmitt suggests 
that the global anti-colonial movement might give rise to new, powerful political
83 Ibid. p.603
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agglomerations in Africa and Asia that might resemble the sort of Grossraum that might 
recreate plural politics.84 And, of course, Europe remains as the prototypical and most 
fervently hoped-for Grossraum. The very vagueness of Schmitt’s ideal of continental politics 
has allowed an astonishingly broad range of theorists to superimpose their own continental- 
political aspirations onto the architecture of Grossraum politics.85 In so far as such 
approaches simply aspire to the possibility of particularity and difference on a continental 
basis, they do cohere with the essence of Schmitt’s theory. Although largely 
unacknowledged, it is at least possible that some subsequent advocates of European political 
and legal unity have been influenced to some degree by Schmitt’s construct.86
As we have seen, the idea of Grossraum amounts to little more than the de facto existence of 
spaces that are ‘differentiated meaningfully and are homogenous internally.’87
Grossraum as Latent Possibility
Despite all the evidence to the contrary, Schmitt does not finally abandon his belief that 
Grossraum politics might represent the future of agonism. But beyond an ill-defined sense of 
the changing spatial possibilities of politics, and the sharp critique of the failings and collapse 
of the nation state, what is unique, distinctive and new about Schmitt’s idea of Grossraum? 
Schmitt hopes that large space politics will develop, ad considers it the most likely solution to 
the present malaise. He offers mild suggestions about how and where such politics might
84 See Die Ordnung der Welt p.596-597 Kervegan argues that ‘with remarkable acuteness, Schmitt 
observes that from the mid 1950s onwards the political emergence of the ‘Third World’ was called on 
to alter the equilibrium of the blocs significantly, even to the extent that one or other of these blocs 
attempts to lean on it.’ (‘Carl Schmitt and ‘World Unity” p.70)
85 The great irony, of course, is that many of those who have engaged with Schmitt’s idea of 
Grossraum in fact harbour the hope that a politically unified Europe might act as the bearer of a 
emancipatory ideals. (See especially C. Mouffe ‘Schmitt’s Vision of a Multipolar World Order’ in 
The South Atlantic Quarterly 104:2) Kojeve was one of the earliest such ‘universalists’ to engage 
critically with Schmitt’s ideas on Grossraum, and indeed proposed his own schema of large space 
politics as a transitional stage towards world unity. See Kojeve ‘L’Empire Latin’ in La regie du jeu 
1:1 (1990).
86 For arguments to this effect see J.Laughland The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the 
European Idea and C.Joerges & N.S.Ghaleigh (eds) Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow 
of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and Its Legal Traditions
87 Nomos p. 355
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emerge, with regional blocks based in the ‘Third World’ and in Europe. And in the idea of 
the Reich within the wider Grossraum, we have some sense of how the transition might be 
achieved between the governmental remnants of the Westphalian system and the assertion of a 
new regional politics.88 We know that such spaces must enjoy homogeneity and some moral- 
cultural content unto themselves. But why should this be the only realistic option on offer in 
the concluding remarks to Nomos o f the Earthl
As the earlier discussion indicated, the Grossraum is essentially a critical and transformative 
category. It is conceived as a radical indictment of the failure of the state system to maintain, 
on the one hand, its sense of territoriality, and on the other, its capacity to enshrine and 
protect a particular and unique conception of a way of life. In the immediate instance, it 
represented an attempt to think legally and internationally about the rise of Nazism in Europe. 
It clearly orientated itself towards the emergent contours of Nazi foreign policy. It celebrates 
the anti-universal particularism of the German Reich, and looks forward to a new and 
complicated form of German domination in Central and Eastern Europe. It claims to see the 
lie in continued ideas of formal equality between states, and with the concrete situation in 
Germany as its starting point, predicts a new form of order that is more relevant to changed 
circumstances. As such, it is a curiously tepid response to reality, and certainly fell a long­
way short of the sorts of Lebensraum theses that came to resonate more clearly with actual 
German foreign policy. It seems clear that Schmitt’s lens of international legal organisation 
was radically at odds with the real tenets of German foreign policy.
Beyond the concrete situation that Schmitt so misjudged, the concept does seek to represent a 
replicable and generalised vision of how global politics might be redeemed. After 1945, 
Schmitt keeps the idea on a form of perpetual life-support, maintaining it as a moribund but 
potent possibility for the future. Without evidence of its emergence, without a foundational 
argument for its desirability and with a rather sophist reflection on the changed meaning of 
space, Schmitt relies on hope and unaccountable suggestion to maintain the idea of 
Grossraum. It clearly lacks programmatic value, or the potential to provide real architecture 
for the design and creation of new political forms. Just as Schmitt claims to have observed 
the emergence of a new order somewhere in late 1937, the Grossraum idea is maintained as
88 That core states would expand and dominate, translating the remnants of their governmental/political 
power into a capacity to bind and protect the larger political space as a whole.
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an invitation to wait and observe the Damascine emergence of a new political form along pre­
ordained, continental lines.
In the final analysis, a Grossraum is definitively the opposite of that which it is intended to 
critique. It is non-universal (but as the examples of the Monroe Doctrine and Nazi expansion 
illustrate, in practice it may not continue to adhere to its anti-universal foundations). It 
represents a concrete particularity (although, as Schmitt remarks, a Grossraum requires 
difference and homogeneity in order to exist, which suggests that the Grossraum itself is 
derivative rather than generative of such difference). It represents a spatial reality against 
non-spatial politics (although Schmitt is unable to pin-down the relationship between the two- 
dimensional space of continents with the radically new spatial imperatives which have 
apparently rendered the two-dimensional spaces of states inufficient).
In 1938 Schmitt’s claim to have discovered in the Grossraum the answer to the future order of 
the planet fails to convince. Grossraume continue to look suspiciously like large states, and 
Schmitt fails to make his case about the uniqueness of their spatial sense. There is little 
attempt to refine and clarify the political essence of the Grossraum beyond a mere extension 
of the public auctoritas depicted in The Concept o f the Political. We are given scant 
information on the methods of authority and domination that might exist between the Reich 
and other political units. Beyond the fact that the Grossraum clearly represents a 
concentration of power -  a bolstering of the de facto power to decide -  Schmitt does not really 
consider why this more complex and more penetrable political arrangement should be a better 
guard against the individualist claims of liberalism that he considered so corrosive. In its 
wartime formulation, the Grossraum appears an under-theorised and somewhat ill-fitting 
translation of the political attributes of the classical European state onto an apparently 
emerging reality. After 1945, it is clearly unsustainable in its original form.
Whether or not Targe spaces’ were to remain the key to a future order of the political (and 
Schmitt apparently never lost hope that this could be the case), the limits of the Grossraum 
theory suggested a need to reconsider the locus of politics more radically. Having tried and 
failed to pour the old political wine of state sovereignty into the (not dissimilar) bottle of 
Grossraum power, Schmitt was eventually to realise the need to clarify further the very 
essence of politics. With little left to lose in the apparently dismal malaise of post-war 
political stalemate, Schmitt slowly developed a more authentic interest in the historical reality
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of politics outside of the state structure. Faced with the absence of the state, he slowly 
realised that the typology of the political that he sought to apply in the Grossraum relied on 
certain unnecessary assumptions derived from the historical reality of the state. To extend our 
metaphor, there was potential to distil the concept of the political still further to provide a 
clearer, purer and stronger classification that truly separated the concept of the political from 
the concept of the state. In a final and dangerous attempt to find a new theoretical path away 
from world unity, deterritorialisation and eschata, Schmitt turned to the history of the partisan 
as a way of achieving this redefinition.
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CHAPTER 7 -  PARTISAN
After 1945, Schmitt was, to borrow A.C. Goodson’s apt phrase, an ‘historically disappointed 
man.’1 His political, moral and intellectual gamble in favour of Nazism had collapsed around 
him. The dream of a European Grossraum under German stewardship had been rendered 
absurd. Far from ‘restraining’ the onward march of individualism and nihilism, Nazism had 
given way to a political setting that seemed to confirm Schmitt’s worst fears. Domestically, it 
is an understatement to suggest that ‘the ‘restorationist’ Bonn Constitution must now have 
seemed to [Schmitt] decisively inferior to the Weimar Constitution.’2 The Federal Republic’s 
new constitutional arrangements and their legal management from Karlsruhe marked the total 
ascendancy of legal positivism and liberal indeterminacy. Internationally, the only corrective 
to ‘Atlanticism’ was the even more moralistic and annihilatory spectre of revolutionary 
Communism. A divided Germany appeared to represent in microcosm the very consequences 
that Schmitt had sought to prevent -  the collapse of the European state, the privileging of 
morality above politics, and the elevation of the enemy from a mere existential other to a 
mortal foe.
In this extreme setting, much of Schmitt’s response was embittered, maudlin and reactionary. 
Schmitt was interred awaiting possible indictment at Nuremberg, spending nearly two years in 
American custody. His letters and essays written in prison (many collected and published in 
1950 under the title Ex Captivitate Salus) are unapologetic for his association with the Nazis, 
and express regret for their defeat.3 Schmitt remained convinced that his diagnosis of the 
malaise of Weimar in particular, and the state of world politics in general, necessitated some 
radical attempt at restoration. His regret was for the contingent failures that undermined the 
project rather than the criminality or moral failings of the enterprise. Regret for Hitler’s own 
self-defeating instincts, for the ongoing failings of the Prussian elite to make a decision in 
favour of reaction, for the Staufenberg plot.4 Regret, in short, for the collapse of his own
1 A.C.Goodson, ‘About Schmitt: Partisans and Theory’ in The New Centennial Review 4:3 (2004) p. 1
2 G.Balakrishnan The Enemy p.258
3 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus
4 The attempt to assassinate Hitler appears to have had a peculiarly intense effect on Schmitt, not least 
due to the central involvement of his close friend Johannes Popitz with whom he had been staying 
shortly before the plot. Schmitt had no knowledge of the plot, and the experience put into conflict 
Schmitt’s sympathies as a friend and his political-intellectual decision in favour of Nazism. He later
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world-historical ambitions for Nazism. By abstracting out into the world historical context, 
Schmitt justifies his decision in favour of Nazism as both a legitimate attempt at renewal, and 
a historical necessity.
In the later 1940s, Schmitt flits between an intensely personal reflection on the meaning of 
these events for himself, and a coldly juridical reflection on the treatment of Germany at the 
hands of the Allies. On the one hand, given his well established aversion to Romantic 
introspection, the publication of Ex Captivitate Salus is a surprisingly personal and exposed 
account of Schmitt as a broken man. Yet at the same time, Schmitt still busied himself with 
providing a critique of the post war political setting using the same critical categories he had 
developed previously. Nuremberg, in this account, offered up the same kind of moralising 
and persecuting ‘justice’ as Versailles, only with fewer prospects for political renewal.5 He 
never realistically acknowledges the unique horror of Nazi crimes.6
Throughout the 1950s, Schmitt was a background figure. Removed from public life, Schmitt 
started his strange second career as an underground mentor to intellectual adventurers of both 
Left and Right, and as a source of productive controversy in the legal and political debates of 
the Federal Republic. As Muller’s superb study amply illustrates, Schmitt became an active 
and influential participant in debates on contemporary Germany from behind the veil of his
describes his ‘beloved Popitz’ as possessing ‘something of the humanist holiness of Thomas More’ 
(Glossarium p.51 & p.55-56)
5 Schmitt prepared a preemptory defence for his friend, the business man Friedrich Flick, who was 
tried at Nuremberg on a charge of assisting a war of aggression. Schmitt here acknowledges that 
certain crimes of Nazism were outside of the juridical freedoms of international law, but nevertheless 
argues that Nuremberg was essentially all about the crime of aggression, and as such, a violation of 
the basic principles of state sovereignty and justus hostis. See Das intemationalrechtliche Verbrechen 
des Angriffskrieges und der Grundsatz “Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege”’ Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot (1994). For an examination of Schmitt’s wider legal and personal response to his 
implication at Nuremberg see Schmitt Antworten in Numberg (ed. H.Quaritsch) Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot (2000)
6 Schmitt’s retrospective position on Nazism and his complicity in it is beyond the scope of this work. 
Schmitt’s response is perhaps the more troubling in that he acknowledged the crimes of Nazism without 
apparently according them any particular moral opprobrium. Schmitt wrote to Ernst Junger in 1948 
that Hitler had been ‘a criminal, but neither the last nor the greatest (since the world historical spirit 
chooses other means for the greatest crimes)’ Letter of 20 July 1948 in H.Kiesel (ed.) Ernst Junger -  
Carl Schmitt Briefe, 1930-1983 p.228. For a good overview of the immediate postwar years, and 
Schmitt’s ambivalent reflections on Nazism see ‘Masks and Mirrors’ in J.W.Muller, A Dangerous Mind 
pp.51-62.
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own internal exile.7 In large part, Schmitt’s work during the 1950s was more nostalgic, more 
reactionary and more conventionally conservative than previously. Joseph de Maistre and 
Donoso Cortes became key figures of interest. And Schmitt’s reflections were also more 
personal and (even) more self-aggrandising. Increasingly, Schmitt himself became an object 
of study -  a sort of anthropomorphic representation of the fate of an authentic conservative 
intellectual in the twentieth century. This merging of personal and political reflection is well 
captured in Ex Captivitate Salus;
‘By recognising [the Other] as my enemy I recognise that he can put me into 
question. And who can really put me into question? Only I myself. Or my
brother  Adam and Eve had two sons, Cain and Abel. Thus begins the
history of mankind.... That is the dialectical tension which keeps world history 
moving and world history has not yet come to an end. ’8
Despite his pessimism and contempt for the political status quo, Schmitt nevertheless avoided 
the conclusion that either the Political or a new order had become impossible.
In spite of his dire wartime predictions, the pessimism of Nomos o f the Earth, and the lack of 
any evidence of emergent new orders, Schmitt could not accept the conclusion that world 
history had come to an end. Too many of the old questions that had motivated the search for 
a new nomos of the earth remained. Can something akin to political authority exist without 
the modern state? Is a new ordering principle possible? Are there emergent new ways to 
achieve the unity of order and orientation? Whatever the inadequacies of its foundations, the 
longer the Cold War persisted, the greater the hope that it represented a changing of the 
seasons rather than a final step. As we saw in the previous chapter, Schmitt made periodic 
attempts to adapt and apply his ideas on Grossraum to a post-war setting. But too much had 
changed for Schmitt to answer such questions with the simple abstractions of his theory of 
state that lay at the heart of the Grossraum theory. Increasingly towards the end of his career, 
Schmitt was drawn back towards a deeper refraining of his core conceptual language as a way 
out of his self-imposed theoretical cul-de-sac.9 His study of the phenomenon of partisan
7 J.W.Muller, A Dangerous Mind
8 Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus p.89-90 My emphasis.
9 Alongside the oblique reappraisal of the concept of the political in Theorie der Partisanen, in later 
years Schmitt also published a consciously direct reappraisal of the theme of political theology in 
Politische Theologie II: Die Legende der Erledigung jeder politischen Theologie Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot(1970).
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warfare is perhaps the most significant such attempt to think anew through Schmitt’s whole 
edifice of political categories and their status as historically conditioned concepts.
Alongside his Grossraumtheorie, the “partisan” represents Schmitt’s second attempt to 
generate a way of thinking conceptually about politics after or outside of the European state. 
But rather than attempting to build a new edifice of political order, Schmitt’s concern here is 
to strip away his political categories to discover a more basic understanding of the political, 
and how it might survive outside of the state form. It is both an historical depiction, and an 
attempt to distil a new concept to remedy the current situation. Developed from a pair of 
lectures given in Pamplona and Zaragoza early in 1962, the Theorie des Partisanen is an 
historical-theoretical meditation on politically motivated violence outside of the state, and the 
changing political meaning of such partisanship.10
Schmitt presents us with a snapshot history of the partisan from his origins in Spanish and 
Tyrolean resistance to Napoleon, right up to (anti)colonial partisan warfare in Indochina and 
Algeria. As such, we are considering a relatively narrow time frame from 1800 to the present 
in which (despite the success of the Congress of Vienna as ‘one of the most astonishing 
restorations in all world history’) the classical state-form had come under terminal pressure.11 
This historical account is used to construct a theoretical ideal-type partisan, and to suggest the 
ways in which the fate of this idealised partisan has fared in tandem with the fate of the state. 
Such partisan activity, Schmitt argues, is a precise symptom of the growing weaknesses of the 
European state, and the increasing incapacity of the jus publicum Europaeum to contain 
politics and warfare. In certain respects, therefore, the Theory o f the Partisan is offering a 
shadow narrative to the grand narrative of the state Schmitt presents in Nomos o f the Earth. It 
is a conceptual study of the underbelly of European history since Napoleon.
10 Schmitt, Theorie des Partisanen: Zwischenbemerkung zum Begrijf des Politischen (1963). Two 
preliminary English translations of this work have appeared as part of journal studies of Schmitt. See 
‘The Theory of the Partisan: A Commentary/Remark on the Concept of the Political’ trans. 
A.C.Goodson in New Centennial Review 4:3 (2004) pp. 1-78, and ‘Theory of the Partisan (1963)’ 
trans. G.Ulmen in Telos 127 (Spring 2004). Both translations have already succeeded in opening 
Schmitt’s work to a wider audience. However, since they are somewhat provisional in nature, I have 
used them only as an aid, relying on my own translation. Telos Press have subsequently produced a 
monograph translation which, as with their Nomos of the Earth, will doubtless become the standard 
English language resource. See Theory of the Partisan (trans. G.Ulmen) New York: Telos Press 
(2007).
11 Partisanen p. 16
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Both in tone and substance, it is hard to conceive of an approach more in contrast with the 
stolid, programmatic conceptual language of Grossraum. After the hubris and certainty of his 
geopolitics, Schmitt’s approach here is tentative, contemplative and non-committal. The 
partisan is not presented as the direct ‘answer’ to the current malaise, but rather as a 
conceptual device enabling us better to understand our current politics and how we have 
arrived here. We are invited to take an interest in the partisan because he represents a 
radically different way of determining and articulating enmity, and as such, gives rise to 
differing political possibilities. Moreover, as a defensive figure, the partisan might open the 
possibility of new avenues to the restriction and limitation of enmity -  that is to say, the 
partisan might be a source of order. In its own way, the Theory o f the Partisan is an attempt 
to think through the end of the jus publicum Europaeum, and to look outside of the state for a 
solution. We must assess it on those terms.
This chapter seeks to analyse the extent to which the notion of the partisan offers a political 
corrective on Schmitt’s own terms. Does it bolster the state system, or hasten its departure? 
Can it provide the ingredients for a new order, or is the partisan a twilight figure -  the last, 
insignificant representative of radical particularism? The argument shall proceed along four 
broad avenues. Firstly, the Theory of the Partisan must be considered in its own terms as a 
‘zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen’ -  that is, as a parenthetical reflection on the 
Concept of the Political. How does Schmitt use the partisan as a means of clarifying his 
political starting point, and, from the perspective of 1962, what is to be achieved by means of 
such a reappraisal?
Next we shall consider the substance of the partisan concept itself, and the method Schmitt 
deploys. Once again, we are presented with a story of conceptual fragility, and the imminent 
danger of regression along a pre-ordained path. Schmitt depicts the path via which the 
defensive, natural, particular partisan is so easily subsumed by total, unlimited, ideological 
concerns. We will consider Schmitt’s purpose in delineating an ideal-type partisan, and the 
form of historical argumentation he deploys to highlight the fragility of the partisan concept. 
Thirdly, we will consider the three precise points of vulnerability in the concept that Schmitt 
highlights. These centre on the tendency to recreate the partisan as a philosophical category, 
the impact of technological change on partisan warfare, and the exposure of the partisan to the 
increasingly globalised mechanics of world politics. All three phenomena, Schmitt argues,
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exert a pressure on the partisan, transforming him from a particular-defensive into a 
universal-spaceless figure. We shall examine the extent to which ‘authentic’ partisanship is 
able to resist these pressures, and the prospects Schmitt envisages for partisans of the future. 
That is to say, despite the historical vulnerability that Schmitt outlines, should we nevertheless 
think of the partisan as a significant locus of politics in the future?
Inevitably, perhaps, much contemporary scholarship on Schmitt’s partisan focuses on the 
possibility that this work is helpful in illuminating the contours of the post-9/11 world. In its 
examination of the relationship between the regular and the irregular, and his distinction of 
‘real’ defensive enmity from ‘absolute’ revolutionary enmity, the Theory o f the Partisan is 
Schmitt’s one work that appears to speak most directly to the circumstances of our 
contemporary politics. His language of political and anti-political violence and of imperialism 
and anti-colonialism is a source of appeal to a wide range of theorists. Naturally, such 
attempts to apply Schmitt’s categories to a radically new situation entail dangers of 
simplification and obfuscation. Yet, in many respects, these attempts to adapt and apply 
Schmitt’s categories are a useful retrospective test on whether the partisan succeeds on 
Schmitt’s own terms -  that is to say, whether or not the idea of the partisan represents a useful 
reframing of the concept of the political. Schmitt’s own conclusions on the value of thinking 
in terms of partisanship are somewhat equivocal. By presenting the contrast between 
authentic partisans and global revolutionaries, Schmitt already prefigures a core ambiguity in 
how to frame violence outside of the state. The question that remains for us is whether or not 
the partisan transcends the limits of the European state, and how it speaks to an ongoing, 
problematic interplay of politics and order.
The Four Criteria o f Partisanship
Schmitt starts his account in Spain in 1808. This marks a new point of departure, in Schmitt’s 
account, because of the intense contrast between the extraordinary regularity of Napoleon’s 
troops, and the irregularity of the Spanish partisans. The partisan as a distinct conceptual 
category relies on this status as ‘irregular.’ And since ‘the distinction between regular and 
irregular depends on the degree of regularity’, it is only with the advent of the modern,
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mobilised armies of the French Revolution that the distinct concept of the Partisan emerges.12 
A similar intensity of contrast is to be seen in Austria, where Tyrolean partisans likewise 
emerged in response to Napoleon. Schmitt presents these two settings as instances of 
spontaneous, defensive, particular, irregular and autochthonous responses to a foreign 
invasion. As we shall explore below, they become the basis of an idealised and naturalised 
ideal-type of partisan. They are the locus of a quasi-political determination in the absence of a 
credible state, and so offer the only basis for expressing enmity. ‘The salient point of the 
Spanish partisan’s situation in 1808 was that he took the risk of fighting on his home soil 
[Heimatboden], while his own king and the royal family had not yet decided who the real 
enemy was.’13
From the example of this resistance to Napoleon, Schmitt draws a typology to describe this 
form of autochthonous partisanship. Firstly, by definition, such partisans are irregular. They 
come into being in the face of an external regular force, and as a consequence of there being 
no source of regularity upon which they can rely politically. Schmitt goes to great lengths to 
distinguish between the authentic, irregular partisan, and light troops who may display certain 
characteristics of the partisan, but whose identity and orientation derives from the regular 
authority of the state. It is no accident, therefore, that the locus classicus of the partisan 
fighter is colonial and civil war -  the two arenas that most precisely denote the absence of 
political regularity on one side of the conflict. Where states succeed in dominating the 
political horizon, the partisan is an insignificant figure.14 The figure of the partisan depends 
on a highly contingent situation in which there is both a stark and firmly defined ‘regular’, 
and an external space in which the ‘irregular’ is counterpoised to it.
The second feature (or ‘touchstone’) that Schmitt identifies is the partisan’s intense political 
commitment. On the one hand, this distinguishes him from the mere criminal ‘whose motives 
aim at private enrichment.’15 This criterion works in tandem with the designation of the 
partisan as irregular. The two criteria define the partisan in two directions. He is
distinguished from regular light troops by virtue of his definitional irregularity. He is 
distinguished from the criminal or thief by virtue of his intense political commitment. As
12 Partisanen p. 10
13 Partisanen p. 14
14 Partisanen p. 17
15 Partisanen p.21
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such, he can be considered as an in-between category. ‘The Partisan personifies a radicalised 
enmity’, but this enmity is radical in the sense that it is determined outside of the structures of 
the state, rather than in the sense that it is apolitical or anti-political.16 Despite his profound 
individuality and the lack of structure that attends to his methods of fighting, the partisan is 
nevertheless a group figure. He is committed to political goals that transcend his own 
individuality.
Having situated the partisan as a political actor on a spectrum stretching from the absolute 
state to radical individualism (the criminal) Schmitt illustrates the partisan’s disposition by 
means of two further criteria. Firstly, the partisan is telluric. The partisan is ‘a specifically 
terrestrial type of active fighter’ who is tied to a locale.17 He is a creature of the land, tied to 
the valleys, mountains and homesteads of his own environment. This intimacy with the land 
is, of course, the classic source of the partisan’s tactical strength. But more than this, his 
autochthonous relationship with the land serves to define him categorically. In his original 
and ideal formulation, in Spain and the Tyrol from 1808-1813, the partisan occupies an 
‘essentially defensive situation.’18 He fights pro aris etfacis -  for the altars and the hearths.19 
That is to say, in defence of his home, his people and his culture against the perceived enemy. 
This telluric situating of the partisan is an essential component in grounding his perspective on 
enmity, and Schmitt uses it as a hallmark distinction between the classic defensive partisan 
and other irregular fighters who pursue abstract objectives detached from territorial space.20
The fourth feature distinguishing Schmitt’s partisan is his mobility. The partisan does not 
stand and fight, but rather moves seamlessly within the population. In Theorie des Partisanen 
this element of speed is somewhat simply rendered as an aspect of the partisan’s military 
status. ‘Agility, speed, and the sudden change of surprise attack and retreat’ are elements of
16 E.Horn,‘Waldganger, Traitor, Partisan: Figures of Political Irregularity in West German Postwar 




20 As Goodson puts it, the use of the telluric category is of importance in illustrating that ‘[authentic] 
politics is visceral, a matter of the local hero who fights pro aris et focis because usage, custom and 
habit are the real substance of the political.’ A.C.Goodson ‘Pro Aris et Focis' in The New Centennial 
Review 4:3 (2004) p. 157
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the tactical and functional circumstances of irregularity.21 The reader is intended to recognise 
a clear tension between the partisan’s tellurism, and the imperatives of mobility. 
Subsequently, however, Schmitt sought better to clarify his meaning of mobility as the 
interplay of the partisan’s irregularity and his intimate connection to the land. In this sense, 
Schmitt associates ‘mobility’ with ‘unpredictability.’ Drawing on Maoist language of 
partisanship, Schmitt casts mobility in terms of an absence of any Standort -  a situation that 
allows the partisan to move ‘like a fish through water. ’22
These then, are Schmitt’s conceptual foundations. Four criteria, or ‘touchstones’, that are 
intended to describe both historically real partisans, and an ideal type in theory. Irregularity, 
political commitment, tellurism and mobility -  these four interpenetrating ideas represent a 
political disposition that Schmitt clearly wishes to cast as authentic and admirable. This is not 
the state politics and strictly public enmity of The Concept o f the Political. It is a form of 
enmity that represents the limits and failings of the jus publicum Europaeum. But despite this, 
the partisans of 1808 represent politics in the raw -  a final corrective to the anti-political 
ambitions of Napoleon. In the first instance, therefore, Schmitt’s study stands in support of 
his contention that the Political is immutable. In the face of Napoleonic universalism and the 
failure of states to make the necessary declaration of enmity, some form of enmity declaration 
emerged. Mangled and inchoate, and lacking the refmed features of classic sovereignty, this 
decision against Napoleon nevertheless constituted a judgement that ‘the adversary intends to 
negate his opponent’s way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to 
preserve one’s own form of existence.’23
Schmitt’s concern in the remainder of the book is to consider how well the phenomenon of 
partisanship fares throughout the remaining twilight years of the jus publicum Europaeum.24 
Schmitt is seeking to discover whether a ‘theory of the partisan’ as resistance to universalism 
can be distilled from the concrete experience of individual partisans in certain places. The 
prospects for such a distillation are essential to Schmitt’s hopes to plotting a fresh conceptual
21 Partisanen p. 11
22 Schmitt, ‘Gesprach fiber den Partisanen’ in Stoat, Grofiraum, Nomos p.625
23 Schmitt, Concept of the Political p.21
24 Schmitt himself accepts the description of his method as ‘phenomenological’, but ‘prefers to avoid 
such general methodological questions’ as ‘they tend to go on and on without end.’ ‘Gesprach fiber 
den Partisanen’ p.621
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barrier to nihilism. Much of Schmitt’s technique here is familiar from his previous works. 
The way in which he embeds his concepts into a carefully selected historical narrative evokes 
Land und Meer and Nomos o f the Earth. His eventual conclusion that the phenomenon of 
partisanship might be prejudiced by its very conceptual origins is reminiscent of his critique of 
Hobbes and the fragility of the modern state.
The notion of the partisan differs from the other conceptual innovations we have studied in 
one important respect, however. As Eva Horn points out, the theory of the partisan is 
anthropomorphic. It involves the ‘translation of an abstract “question” or human situation into 
a human figure.’25 In a clear departure from his high political narratives of states, systems 
and grand theoreticians, Schmitt illustrates his theory by depicting the outsider individual.26 
The isolated figure of the partisan presents something of a paradox. Although quintessentially 
modern (a by-product, in a sense, of the modem state), the partisan cuts a simple, almost 
primordial figure. By hanging his insights on this figure, Schmitt appears to signal his own 
intention to present a theoretical perspective that is prior to, and outside of, the assumptions of 
state and sovereignty. He represents a radical disjuncture with order, and a figure of 
conceptual danger. Through the figure of the partisan, Schmitt suggestively raises the 
question of the Last Man, placing the isolated fighter in the context of radical and accelerating 
political dissolution. In contrast to all his earlier theory of political order, Schmitt is turning 
the tables, and writing a study that aspires to engage with the outside, rather than 
axiomatically seeking to defend the existing order. In many respects, The Theory o f the 
Partisan is one of Schmitt’s humblest works.
Theories des Partisanen and The Concept o f the Political
Schmitt presents the Theory of the Partisan as a ‘Zwischenbemerkung zum Begrijf des 
Politischen.’ A phrase that defies accurate translation into English, it might be rendered as a
25 E. Horn, ‘Waldganger’ p. 126-127
26 Horn illuminates the parallels between Schmitt’s use of the partisan to denote a position in contrast to 
the modem crisis, and the way in which Ernst Jiinger’s figure ‘of radical dissent and autonomy whom 
he calls the Waldganger'. Horn p. 127.
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‘parenthetical comment upon’, or ‘a digression on the subject o f ,  the Concept of the Political. 
Goodson leaves interpretation of the subtitle open, choosing to translate it as ‘a 
commentary/remark on the Concept of the Political.,27 As Schmitt himself puts it, the choice 
of subtitle;
‘is explained by the specific date of the publication [1963]. The publishers are 
making the text of my essay of 1932 [The Concept o f the Political] accessible 
again at this time. In recent years several corollaries to this theme have emerged.
The present treatment of the subject is not one of these, but a free-standing work 
which -  though only in a sketchy way -  issues unavoidably in the problem of the 
distinction between friend and enemy.’28
In itself, this is a sketchy and vague explanation of the linkage between the works. Schmitt is 
unwilling to frame his work on the partisan explicitly as a reference to the question of the 
Political as an autonomous category, and invites his readers to draw their own conclusions 
about this relationship.
As Slomp helpfully points out, we can learn much about Schmitt’s intentions by studying his 
preface to the 1963 edition of The Concept o f the Political published in tandem with Theorie 
des Partisanen. Schmitt reflects on three flaws in his 1932 work. Firstly, that its self­
consciously lean and punchy style is perhaps too abstract and reductive (although essential, of 
course, to its polemical effect). Secondly, and vitally, that the work reduces enmity to two 
simple types (the concrete enemy and the foe) whereas in reality a threefold distinction of 
‘conventional, real, and absolute’ enemies is more helpful. Finally, he reflects on the limits 
of systemic conceptions of politics, and the need to turn instead to new, less conceptual 
methods of theorising the political.29 Whatever the precise points of intersection between the 
two works, Slomp correctly points out that these three criticisms are key influences in Theorie 
des Partisanen.
In Chapter 2 of this work, we considered the two central contentions of Schmitt’s pre-war 
theory of the political, each pithily encapsulated in the opening lines of his two most famous 
works. First, ‘sovereign is he who decides on the exception.’30 Second, ‘the concept of the
27 ‘The Theory of the Partisan’ (trans.A.C.Goodson) in The New Centennial Review 4:3 (2004)
28 Partisanen p7
29 See G.Slomp ‘The Theory of the Partisan’ in History of Political Thought XXVI:3 (2005) p.502
30 Schmitt, Political Theology p.5
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state presupposes the concept of the political.’31 These are the explosive contentions that give 
The Concept o f the Political its extravagant conceptual force. Yet very quickly, Schmitt’s 
theory of the political as an autonomous category becomes concerned with the precise 
distinction of two quite particular kinds of enmity that only make sense if we assume the state 
form. On the one hand we have the limited, public, just hostis. This is distinguished by the 
universal, private, inimicus that cannot be framed by any reference to justice. As we noted, 
Schmitt has seamlessly imposed categories of the state onto his supposedly autonomous 
category of the political. The declaration of the enemy may be an autonomous moment, but it 
is only a political, sovereign act if it gives a certain kind of grounding to that enmity. It is a 
state-like determination. It must possess the ring of public authority, and reproduce this 
authority in the way it grounds that decision. As such, for all practical purposes, it was 
always difficult to conceive of Schmitt’s concept of the political prior to and apart from the 
concept of the state.
By targeting its enquiry on enmity outside of the state, the Theorie des Partisanen clearly 
represents an attempt to penetrate and untangle this gloss. It is an attempt to clarify the 
declaration of enmity as a real, concrete, imaginable and autonomous act. The study is 
therefore about the possibility of real politics outside of the state and, I would contend, is 
motivated by the search for new principles that can situate the political without the state. It 
therefore involves an ‘elucidation and elaboration of the claim’ that the state has lost its 
monopoly on the political.32 The same claim, that is, that Schmitt makes in Nomos o f the 
Earth and elsewhere. But more than this, it is an attempt to find a way out of the nostalgic, 
epitaphic language of Nomos, and to think productively about the problem of the political and 
order in an age apart from  the state.
Ever since the mid-1930s, Schmitt had been enormously preoccupied with the collapsing 
political competence of the state. At various stages this prompted determined defence, 
aggressive reaction, and mournful resignation. Yet the constant feature was Schmitt’s 
unstinting emotional and conceptual attachment to the European state form as the highest 
organisational achievement of politics. The Theory o f the Partisan appears, on the surface, to 
mark Schmitt’s attempt to reconcile himself to the historical process of dissolution. But it 
does so by trying to rethink the very essence of the political that Schmitt has distilled, and to
31 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political p. 19
32 Slomp, ‘Partisan’ p.503
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rescue this kernel from the wider context of the state. The obvious starting point, therefore, 
is to consider concrete evidence of the divergence between the state-form, and the decisionist 
basis of the political.
Schmitt considers in depth two instances in which the state fails to make a determination of 
enmity. One we have considered already in the Spanish instance. The failure of the Spanish 
king to recognise its true enemy created a zone of indeterminacy that was solved by the 
autochthonous expression of that enmity by the partisans. The other example derives from the 
same period, but is very different. Schmitt considers the case of General York as one of 
several members of the Prussian military elite (Clausewitz among them) who took 
commissions in the Russian army in 1812-13. Although not a partisan in the terms Schmitt 
gives, York illustrates the central importance of ‘decisionist exactness’ in situating the 
political.33 Schmitt considers York’s letter to the Prussian king, and its explanation for his 
desertion. ‘What gives York’s letter its proper, tragic, and rebellious meaning,’ Schmitt 
contends, ‘is that he -  in all his devotion to the king -  reserves judgment of who the “real 
enemy” is.’34 In both instances, the failure of the state to make the necessary political 
decision against Napoleon creates an arena of indeterminacy in which groups or individuals 
seek to impose their own decision.
Schmitt sees Europe in 1808-12 as a unique historical moment. The types of determination 
made by autochthonous partisans, and the questions that troubled Prussian Generals, were 
symptoms of the weakness of the old, conventional methods of determining enmity through 
the state apparatus.35 Before the 1790s, to be sure, the contained, idealised game structures of 
the Westphalian order had fulfilled this task well. This conventional monopoly of the political 
by states was sustainable for as long as ‘their domestic as well as their interstate concepts of 
regularity and irregularity, legality and illegality, [were] in alignment or at least structurally 
homogenous to some extent.,36 After the Congress of Vienna, such homogeneity would once
33 Partisanen p.88 Schmitt is particularly struck by the fact that, of all people, a Prussian General 
could find himself subject to the same decisionist impulses as the partisan. There can hardly be a 
greater counterpoise to the shabby irregularity of the Partisan the high political regularity of the 
Prussian state. Schmitt concedes that after 1813 ‘the notion that a Prussian general could become a 
partisan would have become grotesque and absurd even as a heuristic device.’ Partisanen p.90
34 Partisanen p.90
35 I follow Slomp in using the term ‘conventional’ to describe the traditional, pre-1789 forms of state 
determined enmity to which Schmitt refers as his default position. See Slomp, ‘Partisan’ p.508-510
36 Partisanen p.41
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again allow a structural ordering of conventional enmity. But the failure of these classical 
European states to develop a coherent sense of enmity towards Napoleon’s total, escalatory 
hostility exposed the gap that had developed between the calcified orientations of state 
governments, and the concrete political imperatives of statehood. In this context, Schmitt 
draws the distinction between the formalised structures of enmity under the jus publicum 
Europaeum, and the ‘real’ enmity expressed by partisans.
Slomp discusses this distinction at length, stressing the link between ‘the emergence of real 
enmity’ and ‘the weakening of the state.’37 My reading is slightly different, in that I do not 
agree with Slomp that ‘whereas the conventional enemy is described as a challenge to the state 
from outside, Schmitt defines the real enemy as a challenge to the state from within.,38 The 
language of inside/outside threatens to distract from the fact that the determination of ‘real’ 
enmity is an existential declaration of the group at precisely the point that the mechanics of 
conventional enmity fails to deliver. The declaration of ‘real’ enmity is always a response to 
the perceived vulnerability of the conventional mechanics of decision. It is a response to the 
dangers of obsolescence that Schmitt had noted in 1932 when he remarked;
‘For as long as a people exists in the political sphere, this people must, even if 
only in the most extreme case -  and whether this point has been reached has to be 
decided by it -  determine by itself the distinction of friend and enemy. Therein 
resides the essence of its political existence. When it no longer possesses the 
capacity or the will to make this distinction, it ceases to exist politically.’39
Civil war, in this context, involves the dispute over who best protects and promotes this 
capacity to make a decision. It is a conceptual dispute that nevertheless looks to the outside, 
and to the maintenance of the group.
The declaration of real enmity, although authentically political, is problematic precisely 
because it takes place out of context. Classical states possessed their own grammar of enmity 
according to which everyone knew where they stood. In some respects, the conventional 
arrangements of the jus publicum Europaeum are simply the outlines of this grammar. Both 
practically and conceptually, ‘conventional’ declarations of enmity benefit from the web of 
quasi-legal ‘conventions’ in which they took place. The partisan, by contrast, makes his
37 Slomp, ‘Partisan’ p.510
38 Slomp, ‘Partisan’ p.510
39 Theory of the Political p.49
205
declaration of ‘real’ enmity anew each time, throwing himself into an interaction with his 
enemy, the contours and consequences of which cannot be pre-determined. As such, the 
declaration of ‘real’ enmity entails distinct complexities that do not attach to conventional 
enmity.
The partisan falls outside of any pre-existing structure of international law. The partisan does 
not expect to benefit from the codified limitations and restrictions to warfare that exist in 
inter-state war, nor does he grant such benefits to his enemy. He is irregular, after all, and 
the very fact of his irregularity places him outside of these conventions -  he is outside the 
system. ‘A partisan would act [in resisting an occupation] neither really legally nor illegally, 
but on his own account and in a risky way.’40 If caught, the partisan will be dispatched as a 
spy. ‘He risks not only his life, like every regular combatant. He knows, and accepts, that 
the enemy places him outside law, statute, and honour.’41 In turn, he exposes the regular 
soldier to an indeterminate threat. He will seek to attack the soldier by any means, in any 
place, and at any time. The only limitation on this form of conflict is the partisan’s defensive 
disposition and the fact that his objectives are political.
Both ‘real’ enmity and more traditional forms of staatlich enmity contrast with the third 
category Schmitt presents -  ‘absolute’ enmity. This disposition is a familiar, default position 
throughout Schmitt’s oeuvre. It is the sum of his fears. Here, Schmitt sums up the 
ingredients of absolute enmity in language immediately recognisable from The Concept o f the 
Political or The Nomos o f the Earth:
‘[The danger of absolute enmity] consists in the inevitability of moral compulsion.
Men who turn [nuclear weapons] against others consider themselves compelled to 
annihilate their victims as objects in a moral sense. They have to consider the 
other side as totally criminal and inhuman -  totally worthless. The logic of value 
and its obverse, worthlessness, unfolds its annihilating consequence, compelling 
increasingly new, deeper discrimination, criminalisation and devaluation to the 
point that it annihilates all that unworthy of life.’42
In other words, in both cause and effect, ‘absolute enmity’ corresponds more or less exactly 





moral compulsion above political recognition. And it results in the kind of limitless, 
annihilation and disorder depicted in Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff (only 
now with the dangerous admixture of nuclear weapons.)43
Whatever the precise circumstances in which it is expressed, ‘absolute’ enmity is a symptom 
of the breakdown of political restraint. It is both a categorical disposition, and a symptom of 
failings within pre-existing orders of the political. Within Theorie des Partisanen, we can 
distinguish at least three historical settings in which Schmitt located this form of absolute and 
dangerous enmity. The first two concern absolute enmity that manifests itself as a perversion 
of the structures of the state. Napoleon, of course, represents the first outlet of absolute 
enmity in modem times. His enemy was not the concrete opponent of the jus publicum 
Europaeum, but an abstracted and limitless enemy. Lenin’s Russia likewise represents the 
replacement of concrete political logic with aggressive ideology. Both are instances of total 
enmity in tandem with the machinery of governance and outward staatlich features. Indeed, 
the ‘regularity of the state and of the military in Napoleonic France receive a new and exact 
determinateness.’44 Schmitt has already had much to say about the shift from conventional to 
absolute enmity within the context of the state system.45 The main point of interest here, then, 
is the parallel process by which ‘real’ enmity is replaced by ‘absolute’ enmity, and the 
‘partisan’ becomes his antipode, the ‘global revolutionary.’
The Vulnerability o f the Partisan -  Three Points o f Weakness
Just as Schmitt is concerned with the internal flaws that allowed the state to dissolve into an 
inauthentic shadow of itself, so too is he concerned to illuminate the aspects of partisanship 
that tend to undermine its very essence. Schmitt is concerned to illustrate the conceptual 
incompatibility between the autochthonous partisan who fights defensively, and the rootless 
irregular fighter whose enmity knows no limits. From the perspective of the 1960s, Schmitt’s 
readers would have been expected to make a very strong association between ‘partisan’ and
43 Schmitt, Die Wendung zum diskriminiemeden Kriegsbegriff Berlin: Duncker & Humblot (1938)
44 Partisanen p. 11
45 See Chapters 3 & 4
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Communism. From Indochina to Latin American, partisan warfare seemed intimately 
connected with the spread of global Communism. The connection is self-evident too for 
Schmitt. But rather than seeking to explain the appeal of partisanship as a revolutionary 
tactic, he instead seeks to trace ideological politics and partisanship as intertwined concepts in 
a feedback relationship. We can isolate three points of vulnerability in his ideal-type concept 
of the partisan that both stimulate the turn to ‘absolute’ enmity, and in turn expose the 
remaining authentic partisan to the dynamics of ‘absolute’ enmity. We shall consider them in 
turn.
i) Philosophical Abstraction
The ideal-type partisan is a concrete figure. Schmitt considers the Spanish partisans against 
Napoleon to have fought instinctively, from first principles. There was no pre-existing 
method, no handbook on how to be a partisan, and presumably, no particular self-awareness 
of themselves as a type of combatant. They simply acted. As with most historical examples 
Schmitt uses to exemplify his position, this contention is undoubtedly open to question in 
terms of its historical accuracy.46 Nevertheless, Schmitt is keen to discriminate between the 
partisan as a concrete figure in a particular time and place, and what we might term 
‘partisanism’ -  or put another way, ‘modem theories of the partisan.’47 Schmitt contends that 
the elaboration of ideas of the partisan as a philosophical figure have a serious effect on the 
survival of the partisan in its natural form.
Schmitt situates this philosophical seroconversion of the idea of the partisan in Hegel’s Berlin. 
He suggests that in 1808-1813, ‘a spark flew north from Spain’ and found fuel in the 
philosophical debates surrounding the question of German resistance to Napoleon.48 This 
spark,
‘did not kindle the same flame that gave the Spanish Guerrilla War its world- 
historical significance. But it started something whose continuance today in the 
second half of the twentieth century changed the face of the earth and its
46 As with the Monroe Doctrine as an idealised theoretical depiction of the Grossraum or Hobbes’s 
Leviathan as an idealised depiction of the early modem state.
47 Partisanen p. 17
48 Partisanen p. 14
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inhabitants. It produced a theory of war and of enmity that culminates in the 
theory of the partisan. ’
Rather than acting as partisans out of the sort of moral compulsion felt by the Spanish and the 
Tyroleans, these Berlin philosophers instead attempted to encapsulate the partisan as a world- 
historical figure - as a philosophical category.49
Schmitt sees the Prussian Landsturm Edict of April 1813 as the key document in this 
philosophical transformation -  as ‘a sort of Magna Carta of partisanship.’50 An attempt to 
stimulate widespread resistance to Napoleon, this edict is significant because of its attempt to 
justify partisan behaviour on the basis of state authority. The essence of this shift is so 
important that we must quote Schmitt at length on the effect he attributes to this decisive step;
‘It is a special legitimisation, namely, one that proceeds from a spirit and a 
philosophy that were current in the Prussian capital Berlin at that time. The 
Spanish Guerrilla War against Napoleon, the Tyrolean uprising of 1809, and the 
Russian Partisan War of 1812 were elemental, autochthonic movements of a pious 
Catholic or Orthodox people whose religious traditions were untouched by the
philosophical spirit of revolutionary France; they were underdeveloped  By
contrast, the Berlin of 1808-1813 was characterised by an intellectual atmosphere 
on intimate terms with the French Enlightenment: so intimate as to be equal if not 
superior to it.’51
Schmitt lists an impressive group of thinkers apparently engaged with the question of the 
partisan at this time. Fichte, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and von Kleist (‘the writer of national 
resistance to the foreign conqueror’52) are all cited. But without doubt, the pre-eminent figure 
in this depiction of the partisan as a philosophical figure is Clausewitz who, in Werner 
Hahlweg’s words, saw guerrilla warfare as ‘pre-eminently a political matter in the highest 
sense of the word.’53 In his recognition of the interpenetration of politics and warfare, in his 
sense of warfare as a reflection of political foundations, and his attachment to the tenets of
49 Schmitt apparently fails to see the irony in his criticism of this excessive attempt to categorise and 
conceptualise autonomous political phenomena.
50 Partisanen p.47
51 Partisanen p.48
52 Partisanen p. 15
53 See Partisanen p.49
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German idealism of the state, Schmitt reads Clausewitz as the original theorist of the partisan 
as a ‘hitherto unacknowledged figure of the world historical spirit.,54
As elsewhere in Schmitt’s work, Clausewitz operates here, to use Slomp’s phrase, as ‘a two- 
way link between practice and theory.’55 He is a military man who understood the mechanics 
of enmity in the raw. But he is also a man of letters who could draw linkages between high 
politics and warfare. In his recognition of the primacy of political orientation, he is always a 
sympathetic figure in Schmitt’s work. But his fateful, inadvertent step, Schmitt claims, was in 
sowing the seeds for a theory of the partisan that would break away from the moorings of its 
concrete political situation. Although Clausewitz was concerned with the specific question of 
German resistance to Napoleon56, he posited the partisan as an actor whose recognition of the 
political imperative and whose sense of enmity was potentially deeper and of greater world- 
historical significance than that of the state. He granted the partisan a world-historical role, 
and granted legitimacy to his status as a figur, in the philosophical sense.57
This elision from the concrete to the philosophical takes place, in the German instance, around 
the question of nationalism. Fichte, von Kleist and Clausewitz are all engaged with the 
national question as a political and philosophical problem. Schmitt himself always had 
surprisingly little to say directly on the question of nationalism, and once again here he sets 
the question of the relationship between nationalism and enmity in a wider context. 
Nationalism, according to this understanding, is just one of a number of factors that may 
either support or undermine sovereignty, and that may sustain or undermine existing 
international orders. As with any economic, religious or cultural distinction, the division of 
‘nations’ is only politically pregnant in terms of the intensity of association and separation that 
it denotes. In terms of The Concept o f the Political, the ‘nation’ would always be subordinate 
to decision and to the sovereign as a political category. The sovereign decision might be
54 Partisanen p.51
55 Slomp, ‘Partisan’ p.513
56 Schmitt considers Clausewitz’s concern with the specific question of irregular resistance to Napoleon 
at far greater length in his short essay ‘Clausewitz als politischer Denker’.
57 For a deeper reading of Schmitt’s understanding of Clausewitz as a philosophical thinker see 
R.Gasch6, ‘The Partisan and the Philosopher’ in The New Centennial Review 4:3 (2004)
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shaped by the pre-existing parameters of the nation, to be sure, but might equally create the 
nation by its own force.58
For Schmitt, in other words, the nation is not a foundational concept. But Schmitt recognises 
that for Fichte and Clausewitz, the nation is exactly this -  it is a world-historical ideal. The 
purer the understanding of the nation, the more that the nation itself might be an expression of 
partisan hostility -  that is to say, rather than inter-state warfare, European states increasingly 
fought, in Hegel’s phrase, as ‘the nation armed.’59 The study of the partisan is therefore part 
of Schmitt’s wider recognition that ‘the twentieth century has witnessed the strengthening of 
bonds between individuals in groups and parties.’60 Partisans are literally, in Clausewitz’s 
phrase, ‘partei-ganger’ -  adherents of a party, and advocates of a ‘partisan’ position.
Although Schmitt never makes the point particularly explicit, he is clearly suggesting that the 
collision of an idea of the partisan with a certain philosophy of the state has resulted in a 
dangerous mixture of the facade of states with the mechanics of partisan enmity. The 
Prussian state itself came close to an ‘acherontic’ moment in which enmity in its real sense 
was almost expressed blindly outside of ‘the secure framework of the state order and regular 
war.61 But since then, Schmitt suggests, states have increasingly become organised parties, 
geared around a unstable derivation of enmity from philosophies of nationalism, socialism or 
perhaps some other comprehensive ideology. One must assume that this is one way of 
explaining the violence of the First World War, which Schmitt has elsewhere described in 
terms of the collapse of a legal system of justus hostis.
In Clausewitz’s own time, the ramifications of this transformation of the partisan into a 
philosophical category remained unclear. Clausewitz ‘still thought all too much in the 
classical categories’ of the state and international law to recognise the radical potential of a 
theory of partisanship.62 The Congress of Vienna temporarily removed the vacuum in which 
real enmity develops. Nevertheless, Schmitt contends, the existence of a philosophical 
understanding of the partisan as possessing a radically alternative concept of enmity outside of
58 For a discussion of this wider point see Chapter 2
59 Partisanen p.61




the state system was ripe for expansion -  it now possessed a world-historical logic of its own 
that was to be exploited to its apogee by Lenin;
‘What Lenin learned from Clausewitz, and he learned it well, was not just the 
famous formula of war as a continuation of politics. It involved the larger 
recognition that in the age of revolution the distinction between friend and enemy 
is the primary distinction, decisive for war as for politics. Only revolutionary 
war is true war for Lenin, because it derives from absolute enmity. Everything 
else is a conventional game.’63
By exposing the gap between conventional and real enmity, and bestowing a certain 
philosophical honour on the latter, the theory of the partisan generates a persistent pressure on 
the existing order. Partisanship becomes an ideal -  the act of opposition and of uncovering a 
new intensity of enmity becomes part of a political programme that evolves rapidly into a 
logic of pure hostility and total enmity. Lenin himself, Schmitt points out, exploited a 
perceived distinction between war (Woina) and play (Igra). The unanticipated effect of 
Clausewitz’s theory of the partisan was to discredit the validity of limited and contained forms 
of enmity, and to encourage the push towards total hostility.
Increasingly, therefore, the philosophy of the partisan would overtake the possibility of the 
partisan as a concrete figure. Whereas the partisans of Spain and the Tyrol were essentially 
reactionary, and saw themselves as a last defence of the old forms of enmity, partisans of the 
future would increasingly be caught up in the logic of their own apartness. Schmitt’s 
argument here is surprisingly resonant with his logic of the ‘barely visible crack’ in the 
Hobbesian state. What emerges as an authentic solution to a problem of the political is 
increasingly calcified within its own logic. As a concept, it develops a direction of travel that 
it hard to resist, and that creates its own feedback relationship.
This criticism of the partisan as a philosophical category must surely be read as part of 
Schmitt’s wider sense of the dangers of philosophy as a way of situating and theorising the 
political, as highlighted by Meier. It is a criticism that speaks (albeit somewhat subtly) to 
Schmitt’s distinction between philosophical and theological modes of grounding politics. 
Schmitt is careful to distinguish the ideal-type partisans of 1808-1813 in terms of their
63 Partisanen p.55-56
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traditional, authoritative religious motivations derived from the Catholic or Orthodox 
traditions. Surely this is no coincidence. He is keen to highlight the vast gulf between the 
philosophical French and Germans, and their religiously conservative opponents. As ever, for 
Schmitt, the philosophers deride the simplicity of their opponents. With wry amusement, he 
quotes Napoleon deriding the Spanish as ‘a treacherous, superstitious people misled by 
300,000 monks, who could hardly be compared with the diligent, hardworking, and 
reasonable Germans.’64
If my understanding is correct, Schmitt’s purpose is certainly not to conflate partisanship with 
a slide to revolutionary total enmity. A partisan can just as well be a conservative, religious, 
particular, tellurian defender of the old order. A partisan who fulfils the four criteria of the 
ideal-type will inevitably be a partisan of this kind - a partisan of the concrete instance. In the 
terms we have explored above, the determination of his enmity has a revelatory aspect. He 
sees his enemy as a revealed truth rather than a philosophically mediated other. But the 
emergence of a theory of the partisan creates its own logic, and encourages a philosophical 
response to the failings of the conventional order of enmity. In part, I agree with Horn that 
Schmitt is seeking ‘a criterion serving to distinguish the good partisan from the bad.’65 The 
question that persists, however, is whether these ‘good partisans’ can credibly escape the 
advancing philosophical dominance of partisanship.
ii) Tellurism and Technology
The partisan’s connection to a locality is essential to the ideal-type. Schmitt chooses the term 
‘telluric’ quite deliberately to emphasise the intimacy and particularity of this connection. It is 
a term of art that emphasises the contours of the land and the colours of the soil. It positions 
the partisan in his environment in the sense of a life lived in a unique and beloved three 
dimensional space. It is a Romantic evocation of an intensely political sense of territorial
64 Partisanen p.48
65 Horn, ‘ Waldganger’ p. 142
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belonging. This is territory not in the more abstract sense of state territory, with its corollary 
of conventional enmity. Instead, it is territory in a concrete sense, as a home.66
We have already explored the importance of tellurism in Schmitt’s ideal-type. This 
connection to the land is a vital source of the partisan’s particular conception of enmity. He 
defends his home. The notion of ‘home’ gives rise to his particular sense of group identity, 
and pre-ordains the distinction of the enemy. The defence of his home is a political 
commitment par excellence -  the assertion of his own particularity against a foreign enemy. 
And the motivation of defence -  his telluric orientation -  results in a fundamentally defensive 
expression of enmity. The partisan’s cause is identical to his identity in a territorial place.
In 1808, the Spanish partisan is a simple, agrarian figure. He fought with spades and 
pitchforks against the occupying army.67 Despite this ‘pre-industrial agrarian primitiveness’, 
the partisan is more than a match for the regular French troops. With the tactical advantages 
of his irregularity, and his knowledge of the land, the partisan could strike quickly and retreat. 
Conflict was always conducted face to face. As such, French access to cannon, rifles and 
other industrial weaponry might have been an advantage in terms of the efficiency of killing, 
but it did not alter the dimensional parameters of the conflict. Partisans and regular troops 
continued to engage one another in a precise territorial context, and it remained more than 
possible for the partisan to inflict casualties.
Schmitt was acutely aware that this Romantic picture of the plucky partisan fighting with little 
more than his bare hands had become increasingly anachronistic.
‘The old-style partisan whom the Prussian Landstumedikt of 1813 wanted to force 
to take up the pitchfork would cut a comical figure today. The modern partisan 
fights with machine guns, hand grenades, plastic bombs, and soon perhaps with 
tactical atomic weapons. He is motorised and wired to a communications 
network with secret transmitters and radar.,68
66 This intimacy with the land is also the factor that has always given the partisan or guerrilla his 
distinct tactical advantage. He knows the land. He knows every foxhole, cave and riverbank - facts 
that feed in to his mobility and unpredictability.
67 Schmitt notes the particular recommendations of the Prussian Landsturm that partisans should fight 
with ‘axes, pitchforks, scythes and shotguns.’ Partisanen p.47
68 Partisanen p.79
214
With the rapid development of modern weaponry, the partisan is forced to modify his arsenal 
of weapons. He must develop or obtain more sophisticated methods of violence.
Although Schmitt is not particularly explicit here, it seems that he attributes two consequences 
to this change. Firstly, this imperative for increased sophistication contributes to a broader 
process by which the partisan’s understanding of territorial space changes. In a reflection of 
the themes from Land und Meer, Schmitt points out that ‘every technical improvement 
produces new spaces and unforeseeable modifications in traditional spatial structures. This 
holds true... for our old earthly living spaces, work spaces, ritual spaces and spaces to 
move.,69 We need hardly spell out how access to modem technology of weaponry might alter 
the autochthonous partisan’s understanding of spatial possibilities.
In many respects, his avoidance of the battlefield and the set theatres of war positions the 
partisan ahead of the curve. He has already added ‘another, darker dimension, a dimension of 
depth’ to warfare.70 But at the same time, modem weaponry and communications opens new 
horizons for the partisan that are at odds with his telluric orientation. What does it mean for 
the partisan’s tellurism that he can now escalate conflict outside of his own domain? Surely it 
is tactically expedient for him to attack the enemy at his points of vulnerability, wherever they 
may be. The advance in technology encourages the partisan to use more abstract means to 
achieve his concrete goals. And while this might not place his telluric nature into question per 
se, it undoubtedly creates greater indeterminacy in the partisan’s orientation. The point 
Schmitt appears to be making is that the technologies of modem warfare make it that much 
easier for the irregular fighter to lose sight of his original, spatial, concrete goals. As Schmitt 
puts it, ‘[the partisan’s] mobility is so enhanced by motorisation that he runs the risk of total 
dislocation.’71
The technology of warfare also raises a second area of vulnerability in the original concept of 
the partisan. The ideal-type agrarian partisan fought with pitchforks because these were the 
only means at his disposal. In so far as such means were adequate, the partisan could, in 
practical terms, remain a more or less autonomous figure. But in an age of advanced 





artillery, vehicles and telecommunications. The industrial and manufacturing complexes that 
such means require are wholly at odds with the partisan’s telluric invisibility. They are the 
products of regularity -  of organised societies and functioning states. In sourcing such 
weapons, therefore, the partisan is drawn out of his unique environment, and exposed to 
complicated arrangements and relationships with the outside world.
iii) The ‘interessierten Dritte’
This exposure to the international political context involves far more, however, than simply 
the technological aspect. It also poses deeper questions about how the partisan can situate and 
sustain his expression of enmity. It is not enough simply to decide on the enemy in an 
isolated political context and to react spontaneously to the fact of an outside power. The fact 
of a multipolar international context places demands on the partisan to give further content to 
his position. Outside powers try to situate him, and manipulate him to their own ends.
Drawing on Rolf Schroers’ phrase, Schmitt describes such external powers that engage the 
partisan as the ‘interessierten Dritte’ -  the interested third party.72 The partisan cannot resist 
the appeal of relations with this third party, for reasons that Schmitt explains at length.
‘The intessierten Dritte is not some banal figure like the proverbially laughing 
third party. It belongs rather, and essentially, to the situation of the partisan, and 
thus also to his theory. The powerful third party delivers not only weapons and 
munitions, money, material assistance and medicines of every description, he 
offers also the sort of political recognition of which the irregularly fighting 
partisan is in need, in order to avoid falling like the thief and the pirate into the 
unpolitical, which means here the criminal sphere.’73
72 Schmitt was strongly influenced by Schroers’ book Der Partisan: Ein Beitrag zur politischen 
Anthropologie Berlin: Kiepenhauer & Witsch (1961). For an explanation of this reception see Horn, 
‘ Waldganger’ pp. 138-140. Schmitt’s library testifies to the depth of his engagement with Schroers. 
See Nachlass Carl Schmitt p.659.
73 Partisanen p.78
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This is a hugely significant realisation. What it amounts to is an acceptance that the kind of 
recognition that comes through a decision on the ‘real’ enemy is, by itself, never enough. 
The partisan does not gain the necessary political self-recognition -  sufficient thymos if you 
will -  from the concrete fact of his enmity towards a specific enemy. The act of decision 
itself is not enough to anchor the political identity of the group. Schmitt underscores the point 
for emphasis;
‘In the longer view of things the irregular must legitimise itself through the 
regular, and for this only two possibilities stand open: recognition by an existing 
regular, or establishment of a new regularity by its own force. This is a tough 
alternative.’74
This is a profound admission of the limits of partisanship, and in turn, highlights the limits of 
the raw political decision depicted in The Concept o f the Political. The fact of enmity in the 
concrete situation ends up being of little significance unless it can obtain regularity. This 
regularity might be achieved by recognition from outside, or the force of its own drive 
towards a new meaning of regularity. The fundamental point is that the coherence of the 
partisan as an ongoing political category relies on its own demise. It must collapse into 
regularity.
As a definitively ‘irregular’ figure, the partisan is always dependent on his relationship to 
‘regularity’ of some kind. It is a relational category, and ‘the distinction between regular and 
irregular depends on the degree of regularity’ that pertains outside of the partisan’s real 
enmity.75 In other words, Schmitt reads the partisan as an important and illuminating 
reflection on the state of regular, conventional politics, but is sceptical of the possibility of 
any flourishing new order based on some hybrid of ‘irregular’ real enmity and conventional 
structures. Beyond its historical depiction, there is a concrete sense that Schmitt is engaged in 
an attempt to create a language with which we are able to analyse contemporary world politics 
in all its increasing messiness. Understandably, the temptation persists to ‘test’ Schmitt’s 
categorisation of the partisan against the contemporary political milieu.
Partisans and Terrorists
74 Partisanen p.78
75 Partisanen p. 10
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In its exploration of the tension between the regular and the irregular, and its attempt to recast 
our basic understanding of political interaction at a time when the state has become a 
compromised locus of politics, the Theorie des Partisanen is undoubtedly intended as a tool 
with which to examine and understand late-modern politics. Schmitt is himself trying to use 
the category of partisan to understand and classify the broad spectrum of political-like activity 
taking place, and to elicit a deeper understanding of the interplay between the political 
decision and structures of political interaction. Already in 1969, Schmitt recognised that his 
four criteria of partisanship ‘might become obsolete in a few years time.’76 But prima facie, 
Schmitt appears here to be engaged in the same process of disentangling, categorising and 
understanding violence outside of state that has reached a new height of seriousness in our age 
of mass terror. In sharp distinction to the dated language of Grossraum, it is the theory of the 
partisan that has prompted the widespread conclusion that Schmitt was ‘a prescient analyst of 
political and legal trends, possessed with an uncanny ability to identify dilemmas that would 
soon gain widespread attention.,77
It appears that Schmitt’s Theories des Partisanen might be a useful analytical tool. Firstly, in 
its finely drawn distinction between conventional, real and total enmity, it might allow us to 
generate a certain typology of state and non-state actors, and to distinguish between inherently 
conservative and inherently destabilising forms of political violence. That is to say, in Horn’s 
account, we might be able to take forward Schmitt’s own interest in distinguishing ‘good’ 
partisans from ‘bad’ partisans. Secondly, and somewhat more subtly, by raising the issue of 
the feedback relationship between regular and irregular, the ideas derived from Theorie des 
Partisanen might give us a language that allows us to consider ongoing effect of partisanship 
on the way that states themselves operate in the international sphere. Irregular violence of the 
kind that concerned Schmitt poses a radically different set of normative questions than regular 
warfare. When confronted with irregular forces, existing regular actors, existing states, are 
required to create a new normative and legal language to situate and manage the experience. 
For Schmitt, it is fundamental that states get this process right, and find a way to neutralise 
the conceptual challenge that irregular violence poses to the existing regularity. He clearly 
envisaged that there would be a feedback relationship between the regular and the irregular. 
Finally, therefore, it might be fruitful to consider how Schmitt’s categories might shed light
76 ‘Gesprach iiber den Partisanen’ p.635-636
77 Scheuerman, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib’ in Constellations 13:1 p. 108
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on the changing nature of regular politics, and how the particular manifestations of 
irregularity may have much to say about the state of regular politics.
i) Terrorists and Freedom Fighters
The defensive partisan and the ideologically charged global revolutionary clearly represent 
two wholly distinct types of actors in Schmitt’s scheme. Yet, if we cling to a primary 
distinction between regular and irregular violence, it is a distinction that might be easily and 
conveniently overlooked. The types certainly have features in common. They fall outside the 
conventions of international law and their methods are typically asymmetrical. The suspicion 
arises that the legitimacy or otherwise of violent irregular movements is primarily determined 
by whether or not such irregular violence is of value to the ‘interested third party’ -  that is to 
say, according to the external context -  rather than deriving internally from something 
distinctive about that particular group and its objectives. It is a cynicism commonly conveyed 
in the well-worn phrase ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’ Schmitt’s 
categorisation of the four features of an authentic partisan, and his distinction of such 
partisans from aggressive revolutionaries perhaps offers an analytical framework critically to 
assess the difference between authentic resistance and aggressive terrorism. Certainly, it is a 
framework that distinguishes ‘terrorist acts’ as a tactical device from terrorism as an 
existential characteristic.
Numerous other methods are available to assist in drawing this distinction, of course. There 
are extensive materials drawn from public international law that provide legal tools for 
identifying and labelling secessionist movements and resistance organisations, and for 
distinguishing legitimate and illegitimate actors. Where Schmitt’s approach differs is in 
rejecting the language of legality and legitimacy, and instead placing the distinction in a 
wholly political sphere. Both types of actors are likely to stand outside of the law. Neither 
will conduct themselves in accordance with the conventions of international law, and their 
violation of the law will always be a source both of strength and identity. The key distinction 
lies in the political potentiality of their relationship with the law. In other circumstances, the 
partisan could subscribe to a system of order in which he is, in essence, left alone. The 
global revolutionary cannot.
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The point is as simple as it is profound. Irregular sources of violence will always stand in 
some sort of relationship to the existing regular (which, for the time being, we shall assume is 
sustainable and worth maintaining). In some instances, irregular fighters will resemble the 
Spanish partisans of 1808 in so far as they are trying to impose a distinction that coheres with 
the regular status quo (or status quo ante). However incoherently, they are making a claim 
for future regularity. One can imagine such a case being made on behalf of Shia militias in 
Iraq, or on behalf of Sinn Fein.78 In other instances, the irregular fighter is irreconcilable 
with the existing order. Either his conception of political organisation is too radically distinct 
(in which case, he is attempting the tough feat of imposing a new regularity through force of 
arms)79, or else he represents Schmitt’s worst fear -  the nihilistic rejection of regularity and 
order. One could endlessly debate which of these two outcomes is represented by al Qaeda’s 
mixture of tactics and objectives.80
Grounding Schmitt’s clean distinctions in reality may be immensely challenging. He argues 
that traditional, reactionary, ‘communitarian’ partisans are necessarily less dangerous because 
their violence knows the limits of territory and particularism. The global ideologue will 
engender limitless violence. Yet as Herfried Miinkler argues in his study of Schmitt’s Theory 
o f the Partisan, such expectations may not hold true in the current climate. The reactionary 
partisan cannot reconcile himself to the norms and traditions of his enemy. He must cast the 
enemy in absolute terms. By contrast, the ideologue has a vested interest in persuading others 
of the justice of his cause, and so may very well be tempted to place limits on the extent of his 
violence. Schmitt’s assumption that the former is a preferable in terms of the level and 
duration of violence he engenders may thus be called into question.81 It is necessary to look
78 Muller suggests that Nicaraguan Contras and the Afghan Mujahadeen as possible examples from the 
1980s [although the latter might also serve as strong evidence of the slide into universal claims that 
Schmitt predicts for the partisan]. Dangerous Mind p. 154
79 See p.217 above.
80 Michael Ignatieff famously characterised al Qaeda as representing ‘apocalyptic nihilism’ in which 
there is no expectation ‘of attaining a political objective.’ M.Ignatieff, ‘It’s War -  But it Doesn’t Have 
to Be Dirty’ in The Guardian 1st October 2001. For a critique of this characterisation of al Qaeda as 
anti-political see my discussion of Andreas Behnke below.
81 See H.Miinkler Gewalt und Ordnung: Das Bild des Krieges im politischen Denken Frankfurt am 
Main: Fischer Verlag (1992) pp. 127-141. I disagree, however, with Munkler’s wider conclusion that 
this represents a failure on Schmitt’s part to distinguish adequately between the two types of fighter. 
Miinkler focuses primarily on the kinds of warfare that the two types of fighter engender. Whilst such 
distinctions were important to Schmitt, his more pressing concern was with the potential relationship
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beyond the types of violence engendered, and return to the question of their political 
orientation.82
Schmitt is concerned that the failure to distinguish adequately between these two distinct 
figures will always be to the benefit of the latter -  the more dangerous, expansive, ideological 
figure. In large part, this is because the latter is instinctively drawn towards the international 
sphere as part of his mode of being, and as such, acquires ideological allies as an adjunct to 
his partisan struggle. Additionally, his ideological ‘dangerousness’ prompts a careful and 
serious response even from those basically opposed to his universal ambitions. Schmitt 
illustrates the point by reference to Yugoslavia during the Second World War, attributing 
Tito’s triumph over Mihalovic to the energetic and ‘aggressive nature of the international 
communist world-revolution.,83 The Soviets supported Tito because they shared his 
ideological commitment. The British switched their support to Tito because they risked too 
much by frustrating him. Both would live to regret their choice. For Schmitt the conclusion 
is clear -  only the authentic, reactionary partisan will restore order and equilibrium.
In his own analysis, this led Schmitt to a certain sympathy for Maoist partisans whom he 
regarded as less destabilising in their external perspective than socialist revolutionaries infused 
with Lenin’s reading of the function of partisanship. Indeed, Schmitt published an interview 
on the idea and theory of the partisan with the prominent German Maoist Joachim Schickel in 
which he praises the prominence of the idea of ‘tao’ -  the element of land -  in Mao’s theory 
of partisan warfare.84 The point for Schmitt is a dispositional one. Is a partisan concerned 
with his own land, and the imposition of meaning, ideas and policy in it? Does he seek to 
assert or regain authentic political control regardless of the international setting? Or does he
of the fighter to regularity. This is the primary distinction, and not the tactical manifestations of their 
form of violence. Indeed, given Schmitt’s loathing of indirect violence and political hypocrisy, the 
idea that global revolutionaries might use limited and seductive methods of force would make them all 
the more fearful and contemptible.
82 To an extent, Raymond Aron prefigured Miinkler’s critique, suggesting that Schmitt ‘does not grasp 
the essential, for lack of rigorous discrimination between the levels of policy, tactics and law.’ 
(Clausewtiz: Philosopher of War (trans.C.Booker & N.Stone) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1983) p.364-365). Both are certainly correct to point out that Schmitt is far too vague on the precise 
question of tactics, circuitously reducing the methods of irregular fighters to the fact of their 
irregularity.
83 Partisanen p.59
84 Schmitt, Gesprach iiber den Partisanen’ in Stoat, Grofiraum, Nomos
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reject the natural limits of terrain and ideas of home and difference, and instead apply his 
violence to abstract ends? As a distinction that transcends questions of legality and 
methodology, it perhaps continues to have some relevance to the sorts of distinctions we make 
today.
ii) The Response of States to the Irregular
Horn is right to suggest that Schmitt’s own concern was to identify authentic resistance 
movements from revolutionary activity. But if partisanship only makes sense in a relative 
context -  in its relationship with the regular -  it is always as significant for the questions it 
raises about the state of the regular as it is in its own right. As a conceptual challenge to the 
order of the status quo, the figure of the partisan creates a space in which other political actors 
must step outside of the existing rules of the game. As long as he remains a partisan and does 
not fold back into being a light soldier controlled by a state, he does not allow his enemy the 
luxury of interacting with him within the context of existing rules and norms of warfare. Any 
attempt to distil impartial legal rules that govern the status of the irregular fighter is bound to 
fail. States must choose their response with care, since their immediate interests in the 
present confrontation may well conflict with their wider interest in maintaining the coherence 
of the existing international order. It is a dilemma that Schmitt recognised well.
In The Theory o f the Partisan Schmitt considers this feedback relationship between the 
irregular and the regular in the case of the French ‘Franktireur’, or ‘sharpshooters’, who 
fought irregularly against the invading Prussian army in 1870 (and, similarly, the Belgian 
‘sharpshooters’ who resisted occupying forces in the First World War).85 With its heightened 
sense of regularity, the Prussian army struggled to determine how it ought to respond 
politically and legally to the irregular resistance movement. Fuelled with indignation at such 
underhand tactics, and bolstered by juridical opinion that such activity was fundamentally 
illegal, the Prussians treated the sharpshooters mercilessly. Their response, Schmitt contends, 
was essentially legalistic. The sharpshooters acted illegally, beyond the line of conventional 
international and French domestic law, and so deserved to be despatched as spies (or 
terrorists). Schmitt holds this up as an example of how ‘the more regular, uniformed
85 Partisanen pp.38-41
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opponent is respected as an enemy and never mistaken, even in bloodiest warfare, for a 
criminal, the more harshly the irregular fighter is treated as a criminal.’86
In a fully functioning system of states such a conclusion might be very valid, since the 
irregular fighter clearly does pose a challenge to the prevalent regular order. But for Schmitt, 
this question can never be reduced to law. It is always a political evaluation -  the Prussians 
ought to have engaged in the question of the real enemy rather than relying on legal 
abstractions. Yes, the irregular French fighters fell outside the law. But this is of no 
relevance to their political status, and the question of the distinction between partisanship and 
terrorism. Rather, for Schmitt, it ‘is conclusive for the problem of the partisan because it 
shows normative regulation to be judicially impossible.’87 The partisan is a symptom of the 
limits of the normative order, and so, eo ipso, it is illogical to apply the existing legal 
categories to him.88 He can only be conceived of politically through the concept of enmity.
Schmitt’s historically depicted analysis of the challenges of irregular violence to all extant 
normative and juridical categories appears to prefigure the debates surrounding the legitimacy 
and legality of responses to contemporary global terrorism with astonishing resonance. The 
problem remains how to choose a language and modality with which to respond to terrorism. 
It is a legal or a political problem? Were the attacks of 9/11 illegal acts of mass-murder, or 
acts of war? And if the latter, can the parameters of that war with terrorists be conceived of 
within the existing parameters of international law, or is it an act of enmity that is inconsistent 
with that framework? Schmitt’s language seems surprisingly relevant to the high-profile 
dilemmas that dominate much contemporary debate in IR and public international law.
Scheuerman contends provocatively that ‘the Bush Administration’s legal arguments about the 
status of accused terrorists mirror crucial facets of Schmitt’s logic [of] the impossibility of a
86 Partisanen p.39
87 Partisanen p.40
88 Schmitt offers a derisory account of attempts to create a juridical status for partisans in international 
law, most notably the inclusion of intermediate categories of combatants in the 1907 Hague 
Conventions and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. He concludes that attempts to extend the laws of war 
to ‘militias, volunteer corps and spontaneous uprisings’ only work in so far as such irregular fighters 
are ‘organised’, and, as such, do not really apply to the partisan at all. Despite recognition of the 
dilemma, international law has failed, on Schmitt’s account, to find a workable legal solution to the 
problem of irregular fighters. Partisanen pp.28-33
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successful codification of the laws of war for irregular fighters.’89 The terrorist’s lack of 
status within the boundaries of any existing set of legal norms is emphasised by his 
categorisation as an ‘unlawful combatant.’ With its stark imagery of indeterminacy, 
Guantanamo Bay is the symbol par excellence of this idea of a legal black hole. Scheuerman 
suggests that, in common with Schmitt, the US government interprets the inadequacy of 
existing legal provisions governing terrorism as ‘evidence for the necessity of a fundamentally 
norm-less realm of decision making in which the executive possesses full discretionary 
authority.’90 He argues that Schmitt’s ideas dovetail with those of the Bush Administration’s 
lawyers in their shared belief that a radically irregular enemy poses a purely political 
challenge, and that existing legal norms (specifically, in both instances, the Geneva 
Conventions) are simply inapplicable to such a scenario. In so far as such legal norms might 
attempt to address the problem, they fail.
Unsurprisingly, Scheuerman cannot provide any evidence that Alberto Gonzales or the 
prominent US district judge Jay Bybee have been directly influenced by Schmitt’s ideas on the 
partisan, nor does he suggest such direct reception. To a certain extent, he is raising the 
spectre of Schmitt as a powerful (and somewhat mischievous) way to attack their legal 
conclusions. ‘[Ojnce the cancer of normlessness is allowed into the legal system’, he 
contends, ‘it is only a matter of time before it infects healthy legal organs as well.’91 
Schmitt’s theory of the partisan, according to this understanding, represents the theoretically 
complete account of legal indeterminacy, executive power and the limits of international law. 
He is holding up Schmitt as an example of where this sort of logic leads, and as a way to 
castigate the Bush Administration as fundamentally anti-liberal.
Despite his hostility to a ‘Schmittian’ conclusion, Scheuerman nevertheless agrees with 
Schmitt’s diagnosis of the dilemma. Violence beyond the existing normative structure poses a 
challenge with divergent responses. Schmitt’s categories remain prescient for the current 
debate, if only to be ultimately rejected. As an unapologetic liberal, Scheuerman cannot 
accept Schmitt’s conclusion that it is impossible to go on extending legal norms to new 
phenomena. Ultimately, Scheuerman implicitly accepts that productive conversation between 
the two sides of this debate might be impossible;
89 W.Scheuerman, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib’ in Constellations 13:1 p. 118
90 Ibid. p. 118
91 Ibid. p. 122
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‘But what if we refuse to endorse [Schmitt’s] nostalgic preference of the 
traditional state system? Then a sympathetic reading of the argument would take 
the form of suggesting that the project for regulating irregular combatants by 
ordinary law must fail for another reason: it rests on a misguided quest to 
integrate incongruent models of interstate and international law. We cannot, in 
short, maintain core features of the (state-centered) Westphalian system while 
extending ambitious new protections to non-state actors.’92
Scheuerman’s conclusion, in other words, is that the present challenge of irregular violence 
requires a refiguring of the ‘regular’ away from an outmoded Westphalian model.
iii) ‘Saving the Concepts’93
Scheuerman’s conclusions embrace Schmitt’s realisation that the partisan has the power to 
change the basis of the existing order. Both Schmitt and Scheuerman subscribe to an 
interpretation of irregular violence, partisanship and terrorism as potent harbingers of change 
in the way that law and politics functions. In contrast to Schmitt, however, this realisation is 
positive for Scheuerman in so far as it might allow for the thorough privileging of the liberal 
individual, and the permeation of the solid structures of the Westphalian system. As with 
Schmitt’s own study, therefore, the real object of concern is not simply the nature of the 
irregular fighter or the response of regular forces, but rather the historical dynamic that 
unfolds as a result of this confrontation of regular and irregular. Looking forwards, Schmitt 
can only begin to anticipate the wider ramification of this interaction, and hope for outcomes 
that reflected his own ‘[belief] that the traditional state system is normatively superior to 
recent attempts to modify it’ by elevating the standing of the individual subject.94
Schmitt’s focus on the contest for political meaning, and the maintenance of a solid regular 
political arena against external challenges, has provided a starting point for some scholars
92 Ibid. p. 117
93 This is a phrase that Raymond Aron uses repeatedly in the context of attempts by him and others to 
rescue a concrete conception of the distinction between war and peace, and as such, to save a 
Clausewitzian concept of war. See especially the conclusion to R.Aron Clausewitz.
94 Scheuerman, Abu Ghraib p. 116
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seeking to uncover a deeper understanding of the political meaning of the current threat of 
terrorism at a conceptual level. Andreas Behnke, for instance, seeks to determine whether or 
not the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 should be considered as ‘political acts’ or 
not.95 In his analysis of al-Qaeda from the perspective of Schmitt’s criteria of partisanship, 
Behnke concludes that modem global terrorism confirms many of Schmitt’s predictions of the 
vulnerable slide from particular political concerns to a universal urge to rid the world of evil. 
Al-Qaeda shows signs of tellurism in its avowed objective to defend the Arabian peninsula 
against American influence, and its conscious relationship to the political community of the 
umma constitutes a public and political commitment that distinguishes it from the radically 
private criminal.96 And yet in its extreme globalised violence, in its limitless imagination for 
the destiny of its own ideology, and in the absence of a credible basis for normalised future 
coexistence, these particular concerns are rapidly lost in a drive towards universalism.
Like Schmitt, Behnke focuses on the interaction of non-state groups with the international 
context. Schmitt explicitly attributed the increasing vulnerability of the local, defensive and 
particular partisan to a global international context that made its own liberal or socialist truth 
claims. Likewise, Behnke, following Hardt & Negri, concludes that the refraining of 
sovereign ‘regularity’ on moral, imperial and universal lines denies the space in which a 
particular partisan can exist, and instead ensures that ‘in this area., a Foe has emerged that 
mirrors the American universalist strategies in terms of its truth claims and the de-limitation 
of violence.’97 In such a pervasive international context, locally stimulated forms of violent 
resistance are rapidly and effectively forced into a frame of absolutes, and move away from 
their immediate political goals (such as the eviction of US forces from Saudi Arabia, or the 
establishment of a Palestinian state) and express universal motives.
Behnke’s approach illustrates one possible way in which Schmitt’s categories might be applied 
to the current situation. He picks up on Schmitt’s concern that the phenomenon of 
partisanship will come to dominate all political discourse, and we all literally become 
parteiganger -  adherents to ideas in a disorderly global environment. But in his determination 
to offer a critique of certain modes of American imperialism, and his focus on al-Qaeda at a
95 A.Behnke, ‘Terrorising the Political: 9/11 Within the Context of the Globalisation of Violence’ in 
Millenium: Journal of International Studies 33:2 (2004)
96 Behnke, ‘Terrorising the Political’ pp.305-310
97 Behnke, ‘Terrorising the Political’ p.300
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macro-level, Behnke misses the basic criticism that Schmitt’s categories offer of the 
categorical difference between partisans and decontextualised terrorists or revolutionaries. He 
effectively argues that al-Qaeda should be read as problematic partisans, rather than 
recognising that Schmitt has already prefigured the fundamental distinction between 
autochthonous defenders of the homeland, and radically distinct actors on a global level. He 
thus enters Schmitt’s critique at its end point -  in a situation where all particular claims have 
been abandoned, and all that remains is a formless confrontation between imperial sovereignty 
on the one hand, and globalised irregular violence on the other.
It is clear that a group such as al-Qaeda has broken out of Schmitt’s four-part ideal-typology 
of the partisan, and has become a decontextualised source of violence. The really interesting 
question that clearly concerned Schmitt was whether this feedback process was necessary, or 
whether there might be localalised partisans who resisted this slide into a formless global 
context. Perhaps in this context al Qaeda is the exception rather than the rule, and interesting 
(if less spectacular) contemporary illustrations of Schmitt’s partisan phenomenon might be 
found among, say, Shia armed groups in Iraq or Hezbollah in Lebanon. Such groups display 
the sort of ambitious irregularity that always has the achievement of regularity in mind. They 
are conscious of their political aspirations, and conscious of the need to collapse back into the 
regular sphere in order ontologically to consolidate their gains. Behnke overstates his case for 
the effect of American hegemony. Schmitt had already accepted this as a political fact in the 
1960s, yet was still concerned to search for localised, particular forms of resistance. Indeed, 
the question of the authentic partisan becomes all the more pertinent, on Schmitt’s terms, if 
we accept Behnke’s diagnosis of American universalist strategies.
The question that Behnke’s critique asks -  and the same question that troubled Schmitt in the 
1960s -  is whether this regularity of states and spaces actually constituted the regular at all. 
In the current climate, this relativist political dynamic lends itself to a post-structural solution. 
Drawing on Derrida, Alberto Moreiras poses the problem in these terms:
‘The implication is of course that contemporary partisan or counterpartisan 
violence, no longer primarily statist, no longer happens in the name of 
sovereignty. If not sovereignty, then what? Messianisms, whether of the partisan 
or of the coutnerpartisan variety?’98
98 A.Moreiras, ‘A God Without Sovereignty. Political Jouissance. The Passive Decision’ in The New 
Centennial Review 4:3 (2004) p.72
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Schmitt always recognised that political power rested on authority over the concepts of 
political life. Marking the fragility of the existing order, and offering an exit from the 
dominance of concepts such as state and order, the partisan is the natural figure of hope for 
post-structural readers of Schmitt. It is a way out of the malaise that Schmitt fully anticipated, 
and intensely feared."
Partisans, the State, and Order
The Theory o f the Partisan is Schmitt’s most emphatic attempt to think through politics away 
from the detailed mechanics of the state. Without the structures drawn from Bodin and 
Hobbes, without the comprehensive organising principles of medieval religion, this is a 
dangerous and inchoate political world. It illustrates the innate potential for raw, authentic, 
political decisions that emerge from outside the existing normative order. And it reflects the 
mounting incapacity of that normative order -  the nomos of sovereign states and its tenuous 
shadow in post-war bipolarity -  to contain and sustain politics. Schmitt cannot conclude 
whether the partisan is, in theory, a symbol of optimism for the perpetuation of politics or a 
devastating harbinger of ultimate dissolution. But more seriously than this, Schmitt cannot, in 
the final analysis, break the equation of state and the political that he always claims to have 
unravelled.100 As with his theory of Grossraum, Schmitt’s attempt to innovate a radical new 
language of political action collapses back into his overriding concern for the historical fate of 
the state, and reproduced his wider critique from a new angle.
In the instant moment, the partisan is a political actor. This much is clear. He makes a 
decision on the real enemy, he embraces a (proto)-political community, and in the extreme 
instance, he resorts to violent confrontation justified by nothing more than the fact of 
difference. The four ideal-type criteria that Schmitt provides are narrowly drawn to 
emphasise the political nature of this disposition. There is a clear transposition of the raw
99 Nothing is to be gained by here repeating our discussion of post-structural applications of Schmitt 
which were explored in length in Chapters 2 and 5. See especially p.46
100 As Schmitt put it in 1932, ‘In one way or another “political” is generally juxtaposed to “state” or at 
least is brought into relation with it. The state thus appears as something political, the political as 
something pertaining to the state -  obviously an unsatisfactory circle.’ Concept of the Political p. 20
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ideas of The Concept o f the Political into the ideal-type partisan. As an exercise in illustrating 
the independence of the categories of ‘state’ and ‘political’, the Theory o f the Partisan 
appears, at first glace, to work admirably. But as we have seen, Schmitt’s concern is to show 
that the decontextualised political decision is really of relevance only in so far as it creates a 
dynamic of regular with irregular. Its specific political potential is relational and not self- 
referential.
Without conventionality -  without an order of the international as the ultimate reference point 
-  Schmitt holds out little hope for the further containment of the political. It is not enough, 
therefore, that the partisan can make an authentically political choice outside of the context of 
a state system. Without such a context, it seems, such a decision never gains traction -  it 
never develops a meaning in a world historical sense. In other words, the political decision is 
not a free, defining and autonomous act. Instead, it is already embedded in an international 
context that will determine its ultimate fate. In an international context that drives towards the 
restoration and maintenance of a conventional inter-state system, the autochthonous decision 
of the partisan will work itself out in favour of the state. The Spanish partisans were 
ultimately a part of the reassertion of Spanish sovereignty -  a reassertion that became 
stabilised in the sovereign resurrection of the Spanish state in form. Likewise, the decisions 
of Generals York and Clausewitz against Napoleon became grounded politically in the 
assertion of Prussian state orientation. But in other world political contexts, the very lack of 
form in the partisan’s choice make it an ideal companion for absolute enmity.
Schmitt is showing his hand here, and making it clear that he is normatively committed to a 
certain order of the political. Without conventionality, the actions of the partisan have no 
replicable meaning. And without meaning -  without some form of historical permanence and 
without having a lasting impact on the consciousness of himself and his enemies -  how can 
such acts be considered properly political? The authentic partisan is caught in a performative 
contradiction that he will usually resolve by attaining regularity -  by folding himself back into 
a regular system of sovereignty. In other words, Schmitt can only envisage two eventual 
outcomes in every instance of partisan activity. The outbreak of ‘real’ enmity will fold back 
either into the recovery of conventional enmity, or the expansion of ‘absolute’ enmity.101 No 
matter how authentic and ‘Romantically’ admirable, ‘real’ enmity lacks the stability to survive
101 See discussion of Slomp above.
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as a concept in time. In the very act of its emergence, it is already dead -  exposed to the rival 
logics of order and disorder.
Far from offering a route out of the present malaise, the Theory o f the Partisan ends up 
profoundly pessimist in tone. It represents a complimentary narrative to Schmitt’s grand 
narrative of the decline of the state, and with it, the decline in the possibility of order. For as 
long as the system of European states was based on a clear sense of enmity as politically 
legitimate, the partisan too had the opportunity to express a particularist position. His raw, 
‘real’ enmity might have been regarded a perversion of the more normatively sophisticated 
mechanics of inter-state relations, but it was nevertheless a recognisable digression. Today 
though, the dual processes we examined in the first part of this work have narrowed the scope 
for a relationship between irregular partisans and the bedrock of regular states. The more 
homogeneous and static the international system becomes, the fewer in number the cracks and 
shadowlands in which the partisan can develop.
This pessimistic view of the stasis of the regular order is best summed up by Schmitt’s 
discussion of the case of General Raoul Salan in Algeria.102 Schmitt sees Salan as ‘an 
instructive, symptomatic appearance of the last stage’ of partisanship.103 Whereas the 
partisans of Spain or the Tyrol fought an authentic and straightforward battle to define the 
providential enemy of the nation, Schmitt sees the colonial war in Algeria as evidence of the 
final, impossible narrowing of space to challenge and redefine real political orientation. For 
Schmitt, Salan is a tragic hero in the tradition of Generals York and Clausewitz -  a true 
partisan who sought to act politically to remedy an absence of decision on the part of his 
president; a servant so loyal as to be driven to disloyalty. By juxtaposing Salan with York, 
Schmitt attempts to illustrate a structural change in the flexibility and political authenticity of 
the international system.104 The Prussian generals could successfully disentangle the political 
fact of enmity from the norm of legal authority, Salan could not.
102 After a distinguished military career in Indochina, Salan achieved notoriety for the part he played 
leading a failed putsch in Algeria in 1961. He subsequently founded the terrorist group OAS 
(Organisation armee secrete) to oppose the conclusion of peace between France and the FLN, and the 
consequent move towards Algerian independence. Limited resources exist on Salan in English. By 
far the best general overview of the surrounding events remains Alistair Home’s classic study A 
Savage War of Peace.
103 Partisanen p.83
104 Schmitt suggests that ‘the historian finds examples and parallels in history for all historical 
situations.’ (Ibid. p.88). One might argue, however, that the attempt to draw a parallel between
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The irony of Salan’s position is that the erosion of the state into a wholly normative and legal 
category has forced, Salan, as an agent of regularity, into the role of a partisan, and has 
therefore made a paradox of his position.105 The case of Salan shows the limits of a modern 
international setting in which all sense of existential legitimacy has been subsumed by 
normative categories. The fact that Salan ends up as a partisan between the Algerian partisan 
and the French republic shows the incompatibility of modem political forms, and any attempt 
at orientation through Schmittian enmity.
‘The enemy is our own question as Gestalt. If we have determined our own 
Gestalt unambiguously, where does this double enemy come from? The enemy is 
not something to be eliminated out of a particular reason, something to be 
annihilated as worthless. The enemy stands on my own plane....
Salan took the Algerian partisan for the absolute enemy. But all at once, a far 
worse enemy turned up on his own back: his own government, his own 
commander, his own brother.’106
Through the figure of Salan, Schmitt delivers one last blast against the triumph of positivism 
in domestic and international law, the removal of concrete decisions, and the inversion of the 
relationship between authority and command.
‘We have recalled that the partisan requires legitimation if he wants to remain in 
the sphere of the political instead of sinking into criminality. The question cannot 
be adjudicated by reference to the today habitually mentioned cheap antithesis of 
legality and legitimacy. For legality shows itself to be by far the stronger form of 
validity; indeed, it shows itself as that which it originally was for a republican, 
namely, the rational, progressive, one and only modern, in a word, highest form 
of legitimacy itself.’
General York and General Salan is one analogy too far. If nothing else, Schmitt’s intense sympathy 
for Salan exposes his political orientation in the context of decolonisation and the defence of European 
hegemony.
105 ‘The partisan can transform himself easily into a presentable uniformed officer; but to the good 
regular officer, that uniform is more than a costume.’ Ibid. p.84
106 Ibid. p.87-88
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This triumph of legal form over political decision marks a tragic end for Schmitt. His 
commitment to the system of sovereign states derived always from his admiration for the 
capacity of that system to generate restraint. And restraint was only possible when a clear 
recognition of the validity of enmity gave rise to a conventional and predictable pattern of 
enmity;
‘Every attempt at containing or fencing in war must involve the consideration that 
in relation to the concept of war enmity is the primary concept, and that the 
discrimination between various kinds of war is preceded by the discrimination 
between various kinds of enmity.’107
The partisan can only realise forms of restraint if he is subsumed into the regular. But the 
case of Salan shows that the regular itself has lost any sense of the distinctions at play. It 
reserves the right to determine everything through the law, and to apply the categories of 
criminality to spheres that it must have the courage to treat as political. Schmitt sees no 
escape from ‘the great misfortune’ that has been wrought by the abdication of the state, and its 
pernicious infection by the ‘destructive work of the professional revolutionary.’108
Today the question of the decision has been wholly subsumed by a legal category. There is 
no room for an appeal to ‘legitimacy’ and as such, no room to enforce a political decision 
against the prevailing legal order. The framework of law is now too omnipotent for a moment 
of rupture to take hold. For Schmitt, this is the ultimate expression of pessimism, since the 
triumph of positive law means the logical elimination of the political decision. Far from 
offering an alternative locus of politics, Schmitt’s account of the partisan ends up confirming 
his pessimism of the age of the state. Rather than dying its painful but inevitable death, the 
state lives on as parody. The form has finally overtaken the substance, and a political 
structure that once achieved so much in the name of restraint has become a thin veil for 
absolute enmity;
‘This is a great misfortune, for with those containments of war, European man 
had succeeded in accomplishing a rare feat: the renunciation of criminalizing 
opponents at war, in other words, relativising enmity, the negation of absolute 
enmity. It really is something rare, indeed improbably human, to bring people to 
the point of renouncing the discrimination and defamation o f their enemies.
107 Ibid. p.91
108 Ibid. p.92
109 Ibid. p.92 (my emphasis)
232
This final statement could be regarded as a precise expression of Schmitt’s resigned and 
foundationally uncertain passion for the achievements of European international law. It 
expresses the importance of a clear principles of enmity, and the contingency of a world 
intellectual-political context in which that clarity can be sustained. Through the figure of the 
partisan, as with every other attempt Schmitt makes to clarify the concepts of order and 
disorder, meaningful conclusions for the future remain painfully remote. The partisan takes 
over the state, and the statesman is forced into partisanship -  this seems to be the pessimistic 
message of Schmitt’s Theory o f the Partisan. Within the horizon of modernity, even the most 
radical expressions of enmity serve to hasten the destruction of structures and divisions that 
might serve as barriers to universalism. Figures such as Salan are tragic for their 
untimeliness -  for their noble but absurd attempts to construe patterns of enmity according to 
the old rules.
As a last word on the historical fate of the state system, Schmitt’s study of the partisan raises 
the stakes still further in the search for a new principle of order. If the centralising logic of 
modern thought has managed even to conflate the energy of the partisan and the hollow form 
of the state, how can we begin to conceive of new ordering principles that can securely 
contain a Schmittian vision of politics? There is something even Bakuninesque about the final 
pages of The Theory o f the Partisan - the corruption of the current form is absolute, and 
everything is to be treated with suspicion. The only remedy can be to embrace a total change, 
the outcome of which cannot be known. But for Schmitt the Christian, it is a conclusion that 
does not invite us to go out and bum up the world in the hope of hastening the new dawn. As 
Meier argues, he understood his own efforts to play the role of Christian Epimetheus to have 
led to his ‘bad’ and ‘unworthy’ accommodation with Nazism. Instead, Schmitt’s final word 
on political order is that of the wistful yet hopeful believer in the Katechon -  nothing.
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CONCLUSION
World order occupied Schmitt for his entire life. He posited order as an ideal, but also as an 
eternal problem in political life. Schmitt was always seized of the fact that all order is fragile, 
and his comfort in the murky zone between stasis and chaos contains an important lesson for 
all theorists of world politics. Indeed the name ‘Carl Schmitt’ has virtually become a byword 
for the hard headed acceptance of the uncomfortable ‘facts’ of human existence. But in spite 
of his many sophisticated attempts to focus his attention on order and disorder as discrete and 
autonomous subjects of study, Schmitt ultimately failed to separate his study of order from his 
study of the history of the state. Faced with what he regarded as the collapse of the existing 
order, Schmitt actually turned away from a theoretical approach to the problem of order, and 
increasingly focussed on the historical experience of the state in a painful effort to explain its 
decline.
His consideration of the problem of world order shows Schmitt in all his variety as a thinker. 
Schmitt draws extravagantly from politics and philosophy, law and theology, history and 
geopolitics. It reflects both his ‘extreme talent’ and his ‘boundless vanity.’1 And whilst such 
an approach creates great richness, it also leaves behind a confused and fractious intellectual 
legacy, in which little agreement can be reached on ‘what Schmitt was really about.’ Many 
students of IR or political theory, for instance, will read Heinrich Meier’s study of Schmitt as 
a religiously oriented thinker with great interest. The thesis that Meier advances is amply 
supported by the depth of religious metaphor, theory and conceptual development in Schmitt’s 
own work. And whilst most readers will admit to there being great validity in a religious 
reading of Schmitt, there is a tendency to suggest that this reading remains to be studied in its 
own terms. For political readers, religion in Schmitt is an embarrassing sideshow somehow 
to be ignored, explained away, or ceded to obscure German-speaking theologians to debate.
The result is the typical multiplicity of snapshots that now characterise writing about Schmitt. 
There is Schmitt the theologian, beloved of German theological writers who regard his 
fundamental achievement as the development of Christiological political concepts, and who
1 Such was the assessment of Schmitt by the director of the Berlin Handelshochschule, Moritz Julius 
Bonn, who appointed Schmitt to a faculty position in 1928. See Peter Caldwell Popular Sovereignty 
and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law p.218 fh.6
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regard him as Karl Barth’s fellow traveller in the development of a theory of secularisation 
under conditions of modernity. There is Schmitt the jurist, whose exemplary studies of 
constitutional theory and the constitutional basis of dictatorship are important contributions to 
twentieth century public jurisprudence. There is, of course, Schmitt the magician of political 
concepts, who surpassed Weber in offering precise, comprehensive and comprehensible ideas 
in reaction to the crisis of German political order in the first third of the twentieth century. 
There is even, perhaps, Schmitt the geographer, with his bold vision of the importance of 
spatial concepts in shaping the possibility of political order.
This multiple Schmitt has offered a seemingly bottomless well for those seeking ideas and 
well-crafted concepts to illuminate a particular legal, political or theological position. And it 
is equally characteristic of the various Schmittisms that exist today that, of necessity, they 
must disavow various of Schmitt’s other, less supportive interests or ideas. For instance, the 
spectre of the Antichrist and the restraining power of politics is eo ipso inconsistent with a 
serious, secular, radical Left political theory such as that espoused by Chantal Mouffe.2 From 
the opposite perspective, theological readers of Schmitt are less compelled to ignore the fact 
that Schmitt was a serious legal and political theorist, and that he showed deep concern for the 
concrete issues of his day. Yet even they are inevitably drawn towards the conclusion that 
such concerns were of merely ephemeral concern. The temptation exists to downplay 
Schmitt’s very real and destructive engagement in immediate political questions. And every 
compartmentalised reading encourages attempts to detach selected ideas from the controversy 
of Schmitt’s engagement with Nazism, rather than reading Schmitt’s theories and his political 
choices as part of a continuum (albeit, hardly a necessary or inevitable one).
Our objective here has been to offer one possible insight into the productive relationship 
between Schmitt’s concern for the meaningfulness of history, his fear of and belief in 
apocalyptic endings, and his real, detailed and dedicated search for conceptual solutions to the 
precise problems of his age. Far from being distinct concerns that may be boxed separately, 
as if they represent two detached careers emanating from the same mind, Schmitt’s conceptual 
political activism achieved its urgency and vitality from his unique sense of meaning. And as 
one might expect, this concern for meaning grew over time, both as Schmitt matured 
intellectually, and as his concerns for the stability of the political order depicted in Concept o f
2 See Mouffe, C. ‘Schmitt’s Vision of a Multipolar World Order’ in The South Atlantic Quarterly 
104:2 (2005)
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the Political reached a climax after about 1941. A career that started out rooted in relatively 
modest concerns of constitutionality and a fairly instinctive sense of the importance of a 
political pluriverse blossomed (if one might allow the term) into a fuller and more reflective 
consideration of why these challenged political facts mattered so deeply.
We have taken Concept o f the Political as the high point of Schmitt’s achievement for so long, 
especially in the English-speaking world, that we have often succumbed to the temptation to 
ignore Schmitt’s own contemplation of the context and importance of those ideas. To a very 
great extent, the remainder of Schmitt’s intellectual career offers answers to the question that 
Concept o f the Political leaves glaringly unanswered -  why should we value the seriousness of 
a specifically political life, when the alternative is a peaceful world of fun and entertainment? 
The one normative prescription in Concept o f the Political is that life should be serious. Such 
an open normative concept clearly required clarification, and this is precisely what Schmitt’s 
religiously informed ideas on history and political space provide.
Schmitt’s development of theological language expresses a multivalent reading of ‘theology’. 
On the one hand, Schmitt is concerned with disciplined theological themes. In his early study 
of the Catholic church as a quasi-political institution, and in his consideration of the elision of 
concepts of miracle and authority, Schmitt tries to apply the language of a theologian to 
political problems. But underlying such approaches is a concern for theology in its most basis 
sense -  as the study of theos. That is, the study of meaning. In the absence of any real 
contemporary political effort to grasp the nettle, and to enforce a definition of meaning, 
Schmitt turned instead to a consideration of how interpretations of meaning had been enforced 
historically. The duties of Schmitt’s state go beyond protecting the physical life of its 
citizens, and extend to providing the only credible mechanism for creating meaning in human 
life.3 For Schmitt, the alternative to a political pluriverse is a form of nihilism. It is open to 
interpretation whether this nihilism is a necessarily Christological form of apocalypse, or 
whether it is simply the absence of meaning per se.
3 Indeed, there is always something inherently problematic about the reading of ‘protego et obligo’ as 
relating simply to the physical life of citizens, since the ultimate ratio of protection is compelling men 
to die for the sake of their own protection. Unlike Hobbes, Schmitt makes existential claims about the 
duty of obedience. For Schmitt, men die for the state not only because of the abstract logic of their 
own protection, but also more directly, from the fact that they die in the protection of a credible 
definition of themselves.
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Politics is always a matter of life and death for Schmitt. The Political derives its concrete 
reality from the ‘real potential for physical killing.’4 But one might say that his ideas of 
international politics are about the comprehensibility of the patterns of life and death. Killing 
in a vacuum would not be politics as Schmitt understood them. Schmitt’s politics requires 
rules of grammar.5 The historical picture Schmitt presents in The Nomos o f the Earth and 
elsewhere, is a picture of both the functioning and fragility of various grammatical 
arrangements of the political. It is a great pity that Schmitt ended up doing so little to develop 
a fuller picture of the functioning of politics in pre-modem eras. Schmitt celebrates the 
supposed unity of order and orientation of Roman and Medieval orders, yet the actual content 
of politics in these orders remains fatally underdeveloped. In the end, it is only the system of 
states, in all its fallibility that remains. Given that his primary concern is to understand the 
decline of that system, it is all the more surprising that Schmitt spends comparatively little 
time trying to understand previous shifts from one nomic arrangement of the political to 
another. He posits the change from medieval to modem as a fundamental change in the 
concrete orientation of political life, yet offers little analysis of how this change takes place, 
and why this change should be regarded as more significant or consequential than others.
Perhaps Schmitt’s endist pessimism would have been more persuasive if he had a better point 
of comparison with which to illustrate the unique dangers of the present age. Indeed, it is the 
ambiguities of Schmitt’s critique of modernity per se that perhaps present the greatest 
problems in attempting to apply his critical categories to real or perceived political problems. 
Schmitt’s great intellectual heroes, de Maistre and Donoso Cortes, are both fundamentally 
anti-modem in so far as the advent of liberalism and the spirit of the American and French 
revolutions are taken as symptomatic of modernity. Schmitt, by contrast, takes a more 
structural and longer term perspective, in which the advent of liberalism is itself a side effect 
of the changing structure of the international system in the seventeenth century. As Schmitt’s 
study of Hobbes seeks to illustrate, an essentially positive and authentically political attempt to 
locate politics firmly and absolutely within the state is inverted (by Spinoza and others) to a
4 Schmitt, Concept of the Political p. 33
5 Schmitt outlines this basic understanding of the importance of a possibility of ‘normal’ discourse as 
early as 1922 in Political Theology. There he writes that ‘[t]here exists no norm that is applicable to 
chaos. For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who 
definitively decides whether this normal situation actually exists.’ (p. 13). Of course, the ‘normal 
situation’ of international politics is an infinitely more complicated beast than the normal domestic 
situation, but the insistence on the incommensurability of chaos and normality nevertheless pertains.
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situation in which the state is the servant of the people. In such circumstances, Schmitt fears 
that the state (and with it, all authority and all difference) can be dispensed with.
The international is even more important in Schmitt’s critique of the present than first 
appears. For him, the processes of liberal dissolution and the elimination of difference cannot 
be understood without the context of the state system, and the arcane structure of political life 
that developed out of the seventeenth century. With its simple stratification of the relationship 
between the state and the citizen (and its vulnerability to a reductive polarity of the citizen 
versus the state), the state is uniquely vulnerable as a political institution. Yet at the same 
time, Schmitt applauds the simplicity of a system of states for its potential to display the stark 
reality of politics as antagonism. Whereas the complexio oppositorum of medieval Europe 
contained inherent complexities that would frame and occasionally obscure the reality of the 
political, Schmitt sees that the Hobbesian state is the first political structure that embraces 
enmity as its ultima ratio. The problem, as Schmitt sees it, is that such a clear headed 
realisation has provoked such discomfort that ever since man has been engaged in futile 
attempts to build new complexities that will disguise and temper these cold political realities.
The canvas on which Schmitt paints the story of modernity stretches, therefore, from the 
Thirty Years War rather than the French Revolutionary Wars. And pre-eminently, this story 
is the problematic tale of the decline of the state, and with it, the decline of European 
hegemony. Caught in a moment of transition of great importance but ambiguous duration, 
Schmitt was to take faltering steps in his assessment of this process. It is clear that he could 
not lightly abandon his emotional and intellectual commitment to the European state as the 
locus of politics. Recognising the difficulties of political design and the ever present danger 
of chaos, the state of Hobbes and Westphalia remained an astonishingly successful point of 
certainty for an unprecedented period of time. And its key attribute, above any other, was 
that it could still show the occasional capacity to inspire belief, and compel obedience.
One might credibly say that Schmitt’s intense focus on the Leviathan made him a prescient 
forerunner of the recent shift in international political theory towards issues of epistemology. 
He clearly recognised the state to be a contingent entity, the success of which was wrapped up 
with its capacity to define a public truth, and to orient both the physical and emotive faith of 
its people. He understood the dangers that result from radically discordant truth claims, and 
the potential for such divergent claims to result in extreme violence. In so far as he had a
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one, Schmitt’s “project” was to allow for diverse truth claims in a context that could 
ultimately tolerate that diversity.
It was always going to be a challenge for Schmitt to look beyond the state in pursuit of this 
project, all the more so because the state was so integral to Schmitt’s concept of the political. 
Even as late as 1948, he could still force himself to believe in the continuity of the age of the 
state and the continuing historical achievement of the 17th Century. The Leviathan, he would 
write, ‘is and remains the clear Catechism for the foundational concept of state (staatlichen) 
and international (zwischenstaatlichen) law of modernity, which has not yet been subsumed by 
a new civil war.’6 Such occasional and continuing professions of his own faith in the system 
of states expose a weakness in Schmitt’s embrace of the present problems. How, one 
wonders, could Schmitt credibly have read even his own idiosyncratic reading of the 
Leviathan as a solution to the political fragmentation of 1948? The challenge Schmitt appears 
to set for himself is to provide theoretical innovations to avoid or foreshorten this ‘new civil 
war.’ It is a challenge he surely fails to meet.
On the one hand, Schmitt developed a theory of a new politics of large spaces that was 
essentially a fudge. Certainly, it embraces all of the geopolitical aspects of Schmitt’s critique 
of the modern state. It recognises that technology and modern weaponry are inconsistent with 
small territorial boundaries. It draws lessons from the model of the United States, and its 
continental projection of power across the American continent. And as such, it is very much 
a theory of its time, in its appeal to some kind of pan-European politics as the only credible 
antidote to the bipolarity of Russia and America. But when we relate the theory of Grossraum 
to Schmitt’s more fundamental concerns, it is evidently little more than a flourishing delay 
tactic. If the Grossraum is intended to contain politics, then it clearly faces an astonishing 
historical task of enforcing the bonds under which the logic of protego et obligo gains 
traction. On the other hand, if the Grossraum is seen as a simple arbitrary imposition, then 
surely it will generate new horizons of antagonism both within and between the various 
Grossrame. In short, there is no reason to believe in the Grossraum as a response to all the 
problems of dissolution and the erosion of authority that Schmitt diagnoses.
6 Schmitt, Unpublished review of Norberto Bobbio’s Elementi filosofica Sul Cittadino di Thomas 
Hobbes (Torino, 1948), HStAD RW265 19000.
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Even in the radically discontinuous figure of the partisan, Schmitt is still essentially rehearsing 
his attachment to the state, and his regret at its passing. At first it seems that the partisan will 
mark a radical new turn in Schmitt’s thought. There is a glamourous romance about Schmitt’s 
depiction of the partisan, and from the Spanish partisans of 1808 to Mao’s Long March, 
Schmitt appears to identify with the ambitions of those who take up arms and fight an 
irregular war. They, like me, Schmitt seems to say, believe in the necessity of having 
something to believe in, are willing to decide on the real enemy, and accept the fact that the 
political is a matter of life and death. Ultimately, though, Schmitt concedes that there is too 
little difference between the Romantic partisan who seeks to define new political divisions, 
and the Romanticism of the radical individual who turns every event into something aesthetic.7 
Ultimately, the partisan must step into the regular sphere for his actions and orientation to 
have any historical meaning and as such, he relies upon a pre-existing definition of the 
regular. Without the dynamic of his relationship with the regular, the partisan is nothing but a 
violent criminal. As with his other supposed attempts to chart a new course of global politics, 
Schmitt’s study of the partisan ends up as yet another mournful reflection on the state we’re 
in. Each reflection adds more layers of complexity to Schmitt’s position, but ultimately 
diminishes any confidence that there can be a Schmittian solution to Schmittian problems.
One must not attempt to distinguish between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' uses of Schmitt in 
thinking about contemporary international problems. As this study has shown, Schmitt opens 
up so many underdeveloped avenues of enquiry that might fruitfully be adapted and exploited 
in situating current problems. It is hardly surprising that he has attracted such a curious range 
of readers, and that advocacy of a Schmitt revival has come from diverse angles. What is less 
clear is whether there is any credible prospect of a productively discrete 'Schmittian' approach 
to problems in international political theory. Each invocation of Schmitt comes with caveats 
or attempts to explain away less appealing, supportive or savoury aspects of his intellectual 
output. At the most extreme, such attempts treat Schmitt's accommodation with Nazism as 
nothing more than an act of opportunism, as if his virulent anti-liberalism and Christological 
antipathy to the historical effects of Judaism in Europe didn't at least somewhat predispose 
Schmitt to Nazism vis-a-vis the other credible options at the time. Treating Schmitt as a 
character severable at our own convenience might be handy for the contemporary theorist, but 
it also ignores much that is so rich and so tragic about his career as a chronicler of the end of 
the jus publicum Europaeum.
7 The very Romanticism, that is, that Schmitt had gone to such lengths in criticising in his 1919 work 
Political Romanticism.
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Schmitt diagnosed the need for radical innovation in the concepts of the political as the only 
corrective to an age of global civil war. Yet the very seriousness of the issues at stake 
appeared to hamper his efforts in contributing to that search. The only ideal to which Schmitt 
could subscribe was that human life should be serious. And he could never formulate an 
understanding of seriousness that did not, in the extreme instance, compel killing and dying in 
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